Know How to Photoshop? Iran Needs Your Help!

The international community was on edge this week as tensions rose in the Middle East between Israel and Iran. News of an Israeli wargame leaked out, and Iran responded by testing four missiles that potentially have the range to hit Israel.

However, as the photo above reveals, the evidence of the missile test was faked by Iran. According to the New York Times:

Agence France-Presse, which distributed the image of the four missiles to the West, said it was obtained on Wednesday from the Web site of Sepah News, the media arm of the Revolutionary Guards.

On Thursday, The Associated Press released what appeared to be a nearly identical photo, but Little Green Footballs a conservative blog, identified the altered image on its site on Wednesday night . Last year the blog pointed out a manipulated image that had been distributed by Iran’s semiofficial Fars News Agency. As in the case of Wednesday’s photograph and many others that the site has uncovered, the one from 2007 appeared to contain several cloned elements.

Iranian leaders have overstated military developments in the past. “They’ve made some exaggerated claims from time to time,” said Gary Sick, an expert on Iran at Columbia University. “They clearly want the world to be impressed with their missile capability.”

Agence France-Presse retracted its original image on Thursday morning, saying the fourth missile “has apparently been added in digital retouch to cover a grounded missile that may have failed during the test.”

Furthermore, many analysts questioned Iran's claim that the test revealed improvements in Iran's strategic capabilities. In the Los Angeles Times, Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, states that “There is no evidence of a significant advance in previously known missile capabilities of Iran’s medium- and long-range missiles.”

If it weren't so scary, it would be pretty funny.

More On the Syrian Nuclear (?) Site

The above pictures, taken by commercial satellite reconnaissance companies, show the site in Syria that was reportedly attacked by Israeli air assets on 6 September. The picture on the left, taken 10 August 2007 clearly shows a large structure measuring approximately 150 meters per side. The structure is not at all visible in the picture on the right, taken 24 October. Not at all visible. Not even the rubble or traces that would be expected to be visible following an air raid.

According to the New York Times, from which the above photos come:

the images, federal and private analysts said Thursday, suggest that the Syrian authorities rushed to dismantle the facility after the strike, saying its removal could be interpreted as a tacit admission of guilt.

“It’s a magic act — here today, gone tomorrow,” said a senior intelligence official. “It doesn’t lower suspicions; it raises them. This was not the long-term decommissioning of a building, which can take a year. It was speedy. It’s incredible that they could have gone to that effort to make something go away.”

David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington that this week released a report on the Syrian site, said Thursday that the building’s removal was inherently suspicious.

...

“It’s clearly very suspicious,” said Joseph Cirincione, an expert on nuclear proliferation at the Center for American Progress in Washington. “The Syrians were up to something that they clearly didn’t want the world to know about.”

Mr. Cirincione said the photographic evidence “tilts toward a nuclear program,” but did not prove that Damascus was building a reactor. Besides, he said, even if Syria was developing a nuclear program, it was still years away from being operational and thus not an imminent threat.

The desolate Syrian site is situated on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River some 90 miles north of the Iraqi border and seven miles north of the desert village of At Tibnah. An airfield lies nearby.

The new images, in addition to revealing the removal of the tall building, show still standing a secondary structure and what could be a pumping station on the Euphrates. Analysts suspect the pumping station was for cooling the reactor.

The building was said by analysts to have been modeled on a design used by the North Koreans, whose building is a few feet larger that the Syrian building that vanished.

Mr. Albright called the Syrian site “consistent with being a North Korean reactor design.”

...

The Institute for Science and International Security, Mr. Albright’s group, released a report analyzing the new DigitalGlobe image. The building, it said, had been “completely removed and the ground scraped.”

The comparison of August and October images, it said, “effectively confirms that this site was indeed the target of the Israeli raid” in September.

The report said tractors or bulldozers could be seen where the suspected reactor building once stood, as well as scrape marks on the ground. It added that the dismantling and removal of the building “at such a rapid pace dramatically complicates any inspection of the facilities.”

The report said Syria had an obligation to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency of its decision to construct any new nuclear facility. It added that weapons experts were now debating whether Syria would have violated its safeguards agreement with the agency if it started clandestine work on a nuclear reactor.

Syria signed an agreement with the agency in 1992 and is obligated, the report said, under that accord to report on its nuclear plans and developments to the Vienna agency, which is an arm of the United Nations.

“An important question,” the report said, “is whether Syria may be in violation of its agreements.”

If the atomic energy agency found Syria in violation of its responsibilities, it could refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions, as has recently occurred in the case of Iran and its suspected nuclear weapons program.

The evidence is mounting that Syria was indeed building some kind of nuclear reactor. Such a move would be incredibly destabilizing, as Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, and even Egypt would all be threatened by a nuclear-armed Syria. Israel's preventive strike may have averted a regional arms race that would be to the benefit of no one.

What Happened in Syria on 6 September?

On 6 September, Israeli aircraft penetrated Syrian airspace. Apart from that, not much is known for sure about what happened. Syria claims its air defense systems fired on the planes, forcing them to jettison their external fuel tanks; Syria also claims that only a building "related to the military" but one that "was not used" was destroyed. Israel has been unusually tight-lipped about the operation.

Slowly, however, information is beginning to leak out. The New York Times reported yesterday, in apparent confirmation of numerous rumors that had been swirling around, that the target of the airstrike was a nascent nuclear reactor, most likely provided to Syria by North Korea. The Times is reporting that there had been debate within the Bush administration about how to respond to the reactor, but that "there wasn’t a lot of debate about the evidence."

Why would there by any debate? Because if it comes out, in the middle of talks surrounding North Korea's own nuclear program, that North Korea has providing a nuclear reactor to Syria, the case for negotiating with North Korea would be eviscerated. The talks would inevitably collapse, it would be nearly impossible to continue any diplomatic processes, and military strikes, an option which is about as bad as doing nothing, would be the only options left on the table.

Apparently, this is the source of the division with the Bush Administration. The hard-liners, led by VP Cheney and supported by those like former Ambassador to the UN John Bolton, supported the strike and argue that the evidence pointing to the reactor:

should lead the United States to reconsider delicate negotiations with North Korea over ending its nuclear program, as well as America’s diplomatic strategy toward Syria, which has been invited to join Middle East peace talks in Annapolis, Md., next month.

Mr. Cheney in particular, officials say, has also cited the indications that North Korea aided Syria to question the Bush administration’s agreement to supply the North with large amounts of fuel oil. During Mr. Bush’s first term, Mr. Cheney was among the advocates of a strategy to squeeze the North Korean government in hopes that it would collapse, and the administration cut off oil shipments set up under an agreement between North Korea and the Clinton administration, saying the North had cheated on that accord.

Meanwhile SecState Rice and SecDef Gates both opposed the strike, perhaps out of fear that it would cascade into a collapse of the agreement with North Korea.

It strikes me that both sides are wrong. Cheney and Bolton oppose the North Korea deal in and of itself and very well might like to use the strike as a pretense for scuttling the deal. So, Rice and Gates are right to worry about preserving the deal with North Korea: it's clearly the only option for dealing with North Korea's nuclear program at the moment. But ignoring the reactor entirely may have been even worse.

The balance of power in the Middle East is a precarious one. Israel has, by far, the dominant military power, and has a nuclear arsenal of its own. But Israel has also long adhered to a policy of strategic ambiguity by refusing to discuss or confirm its nuclear capability, largely so that its Arab neighbors would not feel compelled to proliferate themselves, an act that Egypt, Jordan, and until now, Syria, have demonstrated little interest in doing. But a Syrian nuclear program would pose a grave threat to regional stability. And even though the reactor may have been in the very early stages -- "it would have been years before the Syrians could have used the reactor to produce the spent nuclear fuel that could, through a series of additional steps, be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium" according to the Times -- allowing it to progress would have increased pressure on other Arab nations to proliferate, as well as undercut Israel's deterrent capability.

Perhaps the best gauge for the need for Israel's strike is the reaction from the other Middle East, Arab, and Islamic states. Or rather the lack of reaction. For there was none. The deafening silence that emanated from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Iran was extremely telling. Normally, an Israeli airstrike, and especially an unprovoked one, would be met by a chorus of condemnations and anti-Israel UN resolutions. But no one other than Syria and North Korea has said a word in protest of Israel's actions. No one wants to see a nuclear-armed Syria.

So, once again, Israel has performed a valuable role in ensuring non-proliferation in the Middle East. Now it's up to the diplomats to ensure that this doesn't undermine the progress in North Korea.

Israel v. the US

Imagine that you're on the highway, driving in to a major city, like New York. All of sudden, traffic comes to a complete standstill. Nothing moving at all. You tune your radio to the news to find out what's causing the jam and hear the police chief of NYC announcing that there is solid evidence that a terrorist is heading into NYC and that all roads have been blocked off and the city closed to impede the terrorist's access to the city. The police officer announces that helicopters will bring in water and be capable of extracting anyone in need of medical care, but that because the terrorist may already be on the road, no one is allowed to pull off of the highway so that each car may be examined and searched.

It's hard to know what would happen first: A mass panic or a lawsuit from the ACLU. This is but one of the critical differences between the US and the Israeli approaches to the problem each faces from terrorism.

Without question, Israel is subjected to a more regular threat. While things are relatively quiet now, largely due to the construction of the security fence around the West Bank, the withdrawal from Gaza, and the infighting between Hamas and Fatah, there were 135 (according to my count) suicide bombings in Israel between the outbreak of the second intifida in November 2000 and the Gaza pullout. It boggles the mind to think what would happen in the US if there were even four or five suicide bombings a year, let alone 44 like Israel suffered in 2002.

That difference has produced a big difference in reactions. First, Israel doesn't have time or the resources to waste on efforts that assuage public fears but accomplish little in actual security. So, security on El Al, the Israeli national airline, doesn't bother making you pack teeny bottles of liquids in plastic bags. Rather, as you stand in line to check in, someone walks up and down swabbing bags and people for explosives. Profiling is used as well. Not the blunt kind, but a more common sense kind. When I was on the way back to the US in Ben Gurion Airport, one of my colleagues on the trip caused a minor kerfuffle when he revealed that he had not received his commemorative book bag in the US with the rest of us, but rather in Israel (he had gone to Israel a few days before the group...the rest of us got our bags in the Newark Airport). After a security manager looked at his bag and asked a few questions, he became convinced everything was fine, no doubt because he wasn't worried about a group of academics from the States.

Armed guards stand at the entrance to nearly every restaurant or public place, like shopping malls, and stop everyone entering and inspect their bags. Restaurants are, in fact, allowed by law to charge a security surcharge, which is optional and can be refused (but no one does).

These are merely the tactical differences. One key strategic difference is that Israel does not have a national strategy or policy for combating terror; rather it makes and changes policies as needed. Not having a formal strategy enables Israel to be more flexible; it encourages free thinking among the various agencies and operatives responsible for protecting the country. The US, on the other hand, has, among other ponderous and platitudinous documents, a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. But reading it doesn't provide any guidance on how to actually deal with the problem of terror, and it certainly doesn't ask the question of what is the nature of the threat to the US posed by global terrorism. And it doesn't explain how Old MacDonald's Petting Zoo or the Amish Country Popcorn Factory get on a federal list of potential terror targets, or how Indiana is ranked as nearly having more potential terror targets (8,591) than New York (5,687) and California (3,212) combined.

Israel even has a saner legal strategy for dealing with terror. Israel has one of most activist court systems in the western world, and terror subjects, or those defending them, often have direct access to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, while Israel uses the "unlawful combatant" designation, as does the US (this is done to prevent suspected terrorist from having access to the traditional civilian justice system, which Israel has deemed inadequate for dealing with questions of terror). However, anyone designated as an unlawful combatant is given counsel and brought before a judge for the opportunity to challenge that designation, and the suspect has the right to appeal the judge's decision. As I mentioned in an earlier post, any use of coercive force during an interrogation must be authorized by the Army's legal department and the Attorney General's office.

Now, it's true that Israel has been dealing with the problem of terror longer than has the US, and has had more time to develop a rational and effective policy, as well as more opportunities to use trial and error to implement good policies. But the fact remains that Israel approaches the problem much more rationally and effectively than does the US. Too much of American counter-terror efforts, at least those seen by the public, are reactive and primarily for show. How else to explain full-page ads in the New York Times explaining how people can prepare a room in their house in case of a chemical or biological attack? [I can't find a link to these ads...but I saw 'em!!] Benjamin Friedman has a devastating critique [RR] of the Department of Homeland Security, arguing that the US counter-terror response is more about responding to, and creating, fear than it is about providing real and meaningful security.

The threats faced by Israel are different than those faced by the US. As are the political systems and the public's willingness to tolerate restrictions of freedoms. In some ways, Israel is more aggressive in its fight against terror, as with the constant presence of security guards. That reflects a rational response to the type of threat faced. In other ways, Israel is more relaxed than is the US, for example, in its willingness to give every "unlawful combatant" a chance to challenge that designation, something that the Bush Administration is unwilling to do. That reflects the recognition that terror, and even high levels of terrorism, can be borne without the collapse of society.

Notes From An Israeli Prison

One of the most interesting parts of my recent fellowship in Israel was the visit to an Israeli maximum security prison (for security reasons, I can say which one). I had never been inside a prison before, and wasn't sure what to expect, with my only experience with one coming from television. Well, the prison was nothing like what I was expecting. The warden, an Israeli Arab, does not believe in rehabilitation and makes no effort to convert the prisoners, the vast majority of whom are convicted terrorists ("regular" criminals are housed in separate facilities from the "security" prisoners), to non-violence or pacifism. Instead, the prisoners are free to associate with whomever, read and watch on TV whatever they want. Materials that incite violence are forbidden, but that's about the only limitation.

The prisoners live in cells of 8, which open into a yard where they can exercise and socialize with others. Each cell block holds, if I remember correctly (we weren't allowed to make any notes) 120 prisoners, and 60 are allowed into the yard at one time (except on Friday, when everyone is allowed to attend a communal prayer session). The prisoners are allowed regular visits from their families, have little electric stoves and teak kettles in their cells, are allowed fresh fruits and vegetables, and have televisions with access to Arab TV channels, including al Jazeera and Saudi, Jordanian, and Egyptian channels. When the prisoners step out of line, they lose their privileges forever...to date, however, the warden stated that there hadn't been more than a handful of serious problems.

From what I know of prisons in America (and again, what I know pretty much comes from TV and reading), if I'm going to be sent to a maximum security prison, I'll take one in Israel, thank you very much.

And this points out what struck me the most from my visit: the differences in the way that Israel and the US treat those arrested in the struggle against global terrorism. Where the US detains its suspects in military prisons, often in solitary confinement, Israel puts those convicted of killing in Israelis in open prisons, where they have contact with the outside world and their families.

Israel is on the front-line in the war on terror in a way that the US is not. Yes, the US suffered the worst terror attack of all-time on 9/11, and there have been reports of a few attacks that have been broken up, like the recent plot against JFK airport or the plot to blow up numerous flights between the UK and the US. But Israel has been under near-constant attack since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in Oslo in 1993. Here's a list of just the suicide attacks in that time period. And yet, Israel has responded much more soberly and carefully than has the US.

I have long gone back and forth on where I stand vis-a-vis the US response to 9/11. On one hand, I realize the threat that terrorism poses to a democratic polity. A state that cannot protect its people cannot function, and terrorism preys on that fact, seeking both to undermine the nature of its opponent as well as exploit its openness. The public must believe that the government is on top of the situation and doing what it can to preserve the peace; this is what explains so many of the visible, yet likely ineffective, security measures, like the restriction on liquids on planes (something that security-crazed El Al doesn't bother with, mind you).

On the other hand, the civil libertarian in me believes that the threat has been overstated. I see the danger in undermining our freedoms with wiretappings or the suspension of habeas corpus for suspected terrorists.

If my trip to Israel did anything, it reinforced the latter of these beliefs. Terrorism is a threat to democratic states. But that threat can be managed. And it can be managed in a way that doesn't undermine the very nature of our democracy. There is a price to paid for living in a democracy. Yes, our freedoms make it easier for terrorists to attack us so we must be vigilant. But the US has much to learn from Israel on how to balance the fight against terror with the need to preserve a normal, democratic life. In my next post, tomorrow or Friday, I'll go into more detail on the Israeli response to terror. Israel isn't perfect, but much of its response make a lot more sense than that of the US.

The Logic Of Torture

There are two main reasons that people are opposed to the use of torture in the interrogation of suspected terrorists. First, the moral argument: Torture is a violation of liberal moral and ethical norms. The use of violence and cruelty by the state betrays our most deeply held values and ideals. Second, the pragmatic argument: Torture doesn't work, so it's not worth the damage to a country's public image. In this argument, a suspect being subjected to torture will say anything and everything to end the ordeal, and therefore evidence procured through torture is useless.

Interestingly, while the first argument may be the most powerful, many anti-torture advocates have moved to the second argument, primarily because the first leaves room for a utilitarian calculus. Yes, torture may be abhorrent to our liberal norms, but if, in extreme circumstances, such as the "ticking time bomb" scenario, the use of torture can prevent a large number of deaths or protect the larger fabric of society, its use may be justified. So, to avoid such leaving open such a possibility, many arguments against torture make the pragmatic argument: Torture doesn't work, and its use is damaging to the soft power of a liberal democratic state (as happened in the Abu Ghraib incident).

I have blogged many times (here, here, and here, for example) about torture and how I do not buy the logic of the pragmatic argument. Simply put: If torture doesn't work, then why is its use even a question? If it's so obvious to everyone that torture produces false confessions and made-up evidence, then why would those tasked with preventing terrorism and protecting their countries even want to use torture? Why would they waste their time pursuing false leads? It simply makes no logical sense. I have much more sympathy for the moral argument, although I also find logic in the argument for allowing the use of coercive interrogation tactics (and no, this is not just a euphemism...I'll explain more about this below) in certain circumstances.

So, I was quite excited for a lecture by Yohai Kitron, the former Chief of Interrogation of the Shabak (the Israeli FBI, more or less, also known as the Shin Bet) entitled The Failed Logic of Torture. At last, I thought, I'd get the real answer as to why torture is ineffective.

Mr. Kitron, however, did not make that argument. First, he differentiated between torture, which is the sadistic use of cruelty, and coercive interrogation, which is the controlled use of violence (or the threat of violence) to further an interrogation by undermining the mental safety and security of the suspect. Mr. Kitron claimed that while coercive interrogation is no more effective than non-coercive methods, it is most certainly faster. Thus, Israel now only uses coercive methods in "ticking bomb" scenarios, for example if a suspected terrorist in custody is believed to have information about a suicide bomber on his way to a target.

In such scenarios, the interrogator does not, under any circumstances, have the authority to use coercive methods on his own account. Rather, the interrogator must seek permission from the Legal Department of the Israeli Army, which is in turn subordinated to the Attorney General's office. Each interrogator bears personal responsibility for any force used; even if the circumstances dictate an ex post justification, such as the claim that there wasn't time to seek authorization, the interrogator will be reprimanded and punished, severely when the use of force cannot be justified (Kitron spoke of two Shin Bet officers sentenced to 8 years in prison for the unauthorized use of coercive interrogation).

Kitron emphasized the difference between an investigation and an interrogation. An investigation has a much longer time line, and is intended to produce information to further counter-terrorism and prevention efforts. An interrogation is when time-sensitive information is sought, such as to prevent an imminent terror attack. Coercive interrogation techniques can and should only be used in interrogations and only when the interrogation is necessary to prevent death. Coercive methods are not likely to be helpful in investigations, as suspects can provide much less specific information that may not be able to be verified and thus are more likely to say anything to end their ordeal.

Kitron was clear that coercive methods are immoral and damaging both to the society and the individual that uses them. Using them too often threatens to undermine democratic norms, damage the public image of the country, and do serious damage to the fabric of a democracy. However, just as the failure to protect individual rights undermines democracy, so does the failure to provide security. In a country that has suffered a sustained campaign of suicide bombings, rocket attacks, kidnappings, and other attacks against its citizens and soldiers, it's not hard to see why a method that might help prevent such attacks would be used, even if it is morally questionable.

However, the US is not Israel. There are few scenarios in which coercive methods would be needed by US security forces. There is no sustained campaign of suicide attacks within this country, no steady rain of rockets on our towns. Most of the time when terror suspects are in custody it is an investigation, not an interrogation. In these cases, as Kitron made clear, a good investigator can get the same, if not better, information using non-coercive, non-violent methods, and thus it's not worth the damage to American democratic norms, liberal ideals, and public image to use violence, coercive methods, or torture.

However, the option needs to be left open in case the scenario presents itself where a terrorist in custody does have knowledge of an imminent attack. This seems to be the result of the anti-torture amendment passed by Congress and signed by the president in December 2006. Torture is not allowed, although coercive interrogation techniques are still on the table. The president needs to realize the damage that even coercive interrogation can do to the US public image, and reserve its use for only the most drastic and critical of situations.

Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

Matthew from Caffeine Bunker asks whether the Israeli officials and academics with whom I met "regard Iran as seeking a nuclear weapons capability for power balancing and security self-assurance purposes or if they regarded them as more of an impending existential threat and regional expansionist/revolutionary power. What are they anticipating the regional behavior of a nuclear-capable Iran to be like?"

An excellent question, with a not-so-easy answer.

Almost all of the military types, most of whom are now retired and working for think tanks such as the Institute for Counter Terrorism, seemed to be exceedingly worried about Iran and the potential nuclear proliferation. They pointed to last year's war with Hezbollah as a sign that Iran is growing bolder, and argued that the inability of Israel to crush Hezbollah weakened Israeli deterrence vis-a-vis Hezbollah as well as Iran. The recent Qassam attacks by Hamas from Gaza, in this view, are seen as the fruits of that eroding deterrence. Many of them see an Iranian nuclear weapon as a direct and existential threat to Israel, not in the sense of an immediate attack, but in Iran being so emboldened behind its own nuclear deterrent that it would increase the pressure on Israel from Lebanon and Gaza (and soon in the West Bank, where Fatah's dominance is being steadily eroded by Islamists). And with the US bogged down in Iraq likely incapable of mustering political will for a strike as well as the current high price of oil, Iran's foreign policy will, according to these military types, become more aggressive. The Iranian reform movement lacks any real power, and the hard-liners are moving to expand their reach and spread Iranian influence to contain and respond to the growing Sunni/al Qaeda threat. Those who argued Iran represents a fundamental and potentially existential threat see Iran as the engine of global terror, even more than bin Laden or al Qaeda, and fear that the current political climate in the region strongly favors the regime in Tehran.

However, the more academic, non-military (well, all Israelis are military, but not all of them were career officers) types were much more reserved in their assessments of the threat from Iran. Many of them made the case that while Israel certainly didn't win in the second Lebanese War, Hezbollah, and by proxy Iran, came out with the shortest end of the stick as the looming threat of "unleashing Hezbollah" was exposed to be not too great. Remember, Hezbollah launched over 4,000 rockets into Israel and only killed 43 civilians (although much of northern Israel was evacuated). As one of our speakers said [I'm paraphrasing here], "Iran has green-lighted Hezbollah and has green-lighted Hamas, and the threat just isn't that serious."

According to this position, Iran's nuclear program is cause for concern, but not for panic. Israel does have its own nuclear deterrent, and combined with the failure of Hezbollah in the second Lebanese war and the presence of US troops on Iran's doorstep, Iran will find its options more constrained than it would like. Of course it would be better if Iran was weaker than it is, and if it is not able to develop a nuclear weapon, but in this line of thinking, the threat is a manageable one.

Personally, I agree with the second, more pragmatic line of reasoning. I have been arguing for some time that Hezbollah was the biggest loser in the last Lebanese war, as Iran has long held out the threat of "unleashing" Hezbollah as a potential deterrent, and now we know how impotent that threat is. The same with Hamas in Gaza: It's unthinkable, for the time being, that Hamas could launch a serious invasion of Israel, and short of that seems to be limited to Qassam attacks and minor infiltrations. These of course are problematic, but they are tolerable and pose only a limited threat to Israel. Iran is unlikely, even with a nuclear weapon, to launch a convention invasion.

One real different was whether one believes the apocalyptic rhetoric of Iranian President Ahmadinejad and some of the other more radical mullahs. Many of the military types seems to believe that Iran is irrational and undeterrable, and that a nuclear weapon in those hands would create a very serious possibility of use. I find this a difficult argument to sustain, as public rhetoric is one thing, but risking regime survival is another.

The only person who spoke at length about Iran was David Menashri of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. In his view, much of Iran's current strength stems from the weakness of its potential balancers, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. He sees the nuclear program as a potential threat, but not an immediate one, and recommended a containment-style strategy, designed to slow down the acquisition of NW as well as encourage internal dissent and the possibility of a domestic revolution against the religious regime. He was one of the more moderate voices, as most of the former career military officers suggested, often overtly, that US military action against Iran was absolutely necessary to maintain regional security.

It often felt like the military types were feeding us a line for us to come back and influence public policy here (if only we academics had that much power!!!!). It is telling that the split seemed to lie between the academics and ex-military. Iran most certainly poses a more serious threat to Israel than it does to the US. However, I for one do not see that threat as being an existential one, and I do not see US military force as desirable, necessary, or imminent.