The 10 Worst Ideas From Obama and McCain

Foreign Policy.com has published two fascinating articles detailing what are, in its opinion, the 10 worst policy proposals advanced by Obama and McCain.

First, Obama's worst:

Renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement

What he said: “I will make sure that we renegotiate. … I think we should use the hammer of a potential opt-out as leverage to ensure that we actually get labor and environmental standards that are enforced.” —Democratic primary debate in Cleveland, Feb. 26, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: Trade agreements take years to negotiate, and Mexico and Canada would almost certainly seek new concessions of their own in a new round. Obama is right to argue that more economic development in Mexico will lower illegal immigration; he’s wrong to think that bashing NAFTA is the right way to address the Rust Belt’s economic woes. Happily, since the Ohio primary, Obama has backed off his harshest criticisms of the agreement.

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Opposing the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement

What he said: “And I’ll also oppose the Colombia Free Trade Agreement if President Bush insists on sending it to Congress because the violence against unions in Colombia would make a mockery of the very labor protections that we have insisted be included in these kinds of agreements.” —Speech to Philadelphia AFL-CIO, April 2, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: Although Obama cited antilabor violence, the murder rate for union members in Colombia last year was 4 per 100,000, well below the rate for the general population. The deal carries little to no cost for the United States; economists actually predict modest increases in U.S. exports. The upshot for an important ally in the war on drugs, however, is high, and consolidating Colombia’s commitment to open trade with the United States is a worthy goal.

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Talking Openly About Bombing Pakistan

What he said: “If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won’t act, we will.” —Speech at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, Washington, D.C., Aug. 1, 2007

Why it’s a bad idea: Engaging in military strikes in Pakistan happens to be established policy. But, as none other than Joe Biden pointed out last August, “It’s not something you talk about. … The last thing you want to do is telegraph to the folks in Pakistan that we are about to violate their sovereignty.”

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Sitting Down with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

What he said: Asked if he’d be “willing to meet separately, without precondition, during the first year of your administration, in Washington or anywhere else, with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea,” Obama replied: “I would.” —Democratic primary debate, Charleston, S.C., July 23, 2007

Why it’s a bad idea: Engaging rogue states can be a savvy move, and even the Bush administration has negotiated with Pyongyang and sent envoys to meetings with Iran. But sitting down with heads of state without precondition? That’s another thing entirely, especially when it comes to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. As Carnegie Endowment expert Karim Sadjadpour told the Wall Street Journal, “Only two things can rehabilitate Ahmadinejad politically: bombing Iran or major efforts to engage.” No wonder Obama’s foreign-policy team has walked back its candidate’s off-the-cuff remarks.

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Pushing the Patriot Employer Act

What he said: “When I am president … I’ll pass the Patriot Employer Act that I’ve been fighting for ever since I ran for the Senate—we will end the tax breaks for companies who ship our jobs overseas, and we will give those breaks to companies who create good jobs with decent wages right here in America.” —Speech in Janesville, Wis., Feb. 13, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: British economists Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert slam the bill as, “reactionary, populist, xenophobic and just plain silly.” That’s a bit much. A little populist pandering is hardly a threat to the global economic order—the bill offers employers a small tax credit if they meet six conditions, including the probably unworkable provision that they keep their headquarters in the United States. It’s never smart economic policy to reward companies for placing limitations on their own profitable activities, but as The Economist put it, “Obama deserves a slap on the wrist” for this one, not a full-throated indictment.

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Promoting Coal-to-Liquid Fuels

What he said: “The people I meet in town hall meetings back home would rather fill their cars with fuel made from coal reserves in Southern Illinois than with fuel made from crude reserves in Saudi Arabia. We already have the technology to do this in a way that’s both clean and efficient. What we’ve been lacking is the political will.” —Statement introducing the Coal-to-Liquid Fuel Promotion Act of 2006, June 7, 2006

Why it’s a bad idea: Obama’s energy policy has much to commend it. But borrowing an idea from World War II Germany and apartheid South Africa? Bad move. Coal-to-liquid fuels produce nearly twice the greenhouse gases of ordinary petroleum, experts say, and it’s foolish to subsidize an industry that easily could go under if oil prices fall. Under withering fire from environmentalists, the Obama camp clarified his position in June 2007 as, “[U]nless and until this technology is perfected, Senator Obama will not support the development of any coal-to-liquid fuels unless they emit at least 20% less life-cycle carbon than conventional fuels.” It’s since been dropped from campaign materials.

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Eliminating Income Taxes for Seniors Making Under $50,000

What he said: “I’ll make retirement more secure for America’s seniors by eliminating income taxes for any retiree making less than $50,000 per year.” —Speech on Nov. 7, 2007, in Bettendorf, Iowa

Why it’s a bad idea: Most seniors already pay no income taxes. That’s because they already get preferential treatment in the tax code. Plus, why are seniors more deserving of tax relief than struggling young families? The Tax Policy Center—run by the Brookings Institution and the Urban Institute—criticized the idea in a recent report, saying that because government spending on seniors is already set to balloon due to retiring baby boomers, “it seems inappropriate to target special income tax breaks to this group.”

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Boosting Ethanol Subsidies

What he said: “[Ethanol] ultimately helps our national security, because right now we’re sending billions of dollars to some of the most hostile nations on earth.” —Statement at the opening of a VeraSun Energy ethanol processing plant in Charles City, Iowa, August 2007

Why it’s a bad idea: As economist Paul Krugman has written, corn-based ethanol is “bad for the economy, bad for consumers, bad for the planet—what’s not to love?” World Bank economist Daniel Mitchell blames biofuels, including ethanol, for a 75 percent increase in global food prices since 2002 that has led to economic distress and rioting in such countries as Haiti, Egypt, and Somalia. There’s also little evidence that they do much to prevent global warming. A recent study published in Science demonstrated that the farmland needed to grow corn for ethanol results in deforestation on a massive scale, negating any benefit the reduction in carbon emissions might have. So why does the senator support such a wasteful and damaging subsidy, even voting for the recent farm bill’s billions in pork for ethanol producers? “[B]ecause Illinois … is a major corn producer,” he said in April. At least he’s honest.

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Taxing Oil Companies Extra

What he said: “I’ll make oil companies like Exxon pay a tax on their windfall profits, and we’ll use the money to help families pay for their skyrocketing energy costs and other bills.” —Speech in Raleigh, N.C., June 9, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: He’s attacking the symptom, not the disease. It’s certainly hard to defend oil companies making record profits while consumers are struggling to fill their tanks, but Big Oil has very little control over day-to-day gas prices, which are set by global supply and demand and, of course, OPEC. By discouraging oil companies from making big profits, such a tax could potentially discourage them from making investments in new refineries and finding new oil sources, resulting in fewer jobs and even higher prices at the pump. Jimmy Carter tried this in 1980, and it only increased U.S. dependence on foreign oil. Singling out one particular industry for punishment because it is politically unpopular doesn’t make much economic sense, either.

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Opening the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

What he said: “We should sell 70 million barrels of oil from our Strategic Petroleum Reserve for less-expensive crude, which in the past has lowered gas prices within two weeks.” —Speech in Lansing, Mich., Aug. 4, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: Obama was right in July when he said that the strategic oil reserve “has to be reserved for a genuine emergency.” Selling oil from the 700 million barrel reserve would increase domestic supply and could drive down prices in the short term, but encouraging consumers to use more oil isn’t going to fix anything. And depleting the reserve would leave the United States vulnerable to a supply disruption caused by a natural disaster or further unrest in the Middle East. Obama swapped common sense for this dangerous boondoggle in August after McCain started to hammer him on offshore drilling. So much for tough truths.

And here are McCain's worst:

Creating a League of Democracies

What he said:“We have to strengthen our global alliances as the core of a new global compact—a League of Democracies—that can harness the vast influence of the more than one hundred democratic nations around the world to advance our values and defend our shared interests.” —Speech at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, March 26, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: As Thomas Carothers argues in the July/August issue of FP, “[T]he idea that democracies naturally align is only half right and risks being a dangerous oversimplification.” Carothers and other critics have noted that such a league might further weaken the United Nations. For the most part, world leaders have been cool to the idea, and rightfully so. A previous iteration, the little-known Community of Democracies, founded in 2000, has stumbled into irrelevance.

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Calling for a Gas-Tax Holiday

What he said: “I propose that the federal government suspend all taxes on gasoline now paid by the American people—from Memorial Day to Labor Day of this year. The effect will be an immediate economic stimulus—taking a few dollars off the price of a tank of gas every time a family, a farmer, or trucker stops to fill up.” —Speech at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa., April 15, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: Pick your poison. Many (including Dick Cheney) predict that such a “holiday” would have little effect, as oil companies would just pocket the difference. Ditching the 18.4-cents-a-gallon gas tax and 24.4-cents-a-gallon diesel tax would deprive the already-strapped Highway Trust Fund, which relies on gas-tax revenues to fund transportation projects, of cash. Economists and environmentalists also widely deride the proposal, which would boost demand and therefore quickly drive prices back up. When you’re in a hole, it’s best to stop digging.

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Requiring a Three-Fifths Majority to Raise Taxes

What he said: “John McCain believes it should require a 3/5 majority vote in Congress to raise taxes.” —Press release, Dec. 18, 2007

Why it’s a bad idea: States that have enacted supermajority requirements for tax increases haven’t exactly entered the pantheon of budgetary glory. Take California, which requires approval from two thirds of the state legislature to raise taxes. The Golden State has recently struggled to raise revenues—and has witnessed an increase in taxes disguised as “fees” as a result. Raising taxes should be like the use of force in foreign policy—the last resort, yes, but you never want to take any option off the table.

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Flip-flopping on Immigration

What he said: “I understand why you would call it a, quote, shift. I say it is a lesson learned about what the American people’s priorities are. And their priority is to secure the borders.” —Remarks to reporters in Simpsonville, S.C., Nov. 3, 2007

Why it’s a bad idea: Immigration was once an issue where McCain could justifiably claim to be a “maverick,” unafraid to buck party orthodoxy and popular opinion. The Arizona senator even partnered with Democratic Massachusetts Sen. Ted Kennedy in 2005 to craft a bipartisan bill that would both give illegal immigrants a chance at citizenship and boost security at the U.S.-Mexico border. But with his poll numbers plummeting during the Republican primary, McCain began trumpeting the party line of “securing the borders first.” The problem is, without providing more opportunities for legal immigration or taking steps to build up the Mexican economy, taller fences and more guards will only address the symptoms, not the ultimate causes of illegal immigration.

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Drilling Our Way Out of the Oil Crisis

What he said: “Gas prices are through the roof. Energy costs have seeped into our grocery bills, making it more expensive to feed our families. ... It is time for America to get serious about energy independence, and that means we need to start drilling offshore at advanced oil rigs like this.” —Press conference on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico, Aug. 19, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: Even ignoring potential environmental impacts, lifting the moratorium on offshore drilling would make little difference for consumers. According to the government’s own Energy Information Administration, production of the new supplies would not even begin until 2017 and would have little effect on what Americans pay at the pump anyway—just a few cents a gallon by 2030 under the best-case scenario. More to the point, it’s a strategy of yesteryear. As columnist Thomas Friedman put it in a recent interview with FP, “When I hear McCain pounding the table for ‘drill, drill, drill,’ it reminds me of someone pounding the table for IBM Selectric typewriters on the eve of the IT revolution.”

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Balancing the Budget through Victory in the War on Terror

What he said: “The McCain administration would reserve all savings from victory in the Iraq and Afghanistan operations in the fight against Islamic extremists for reducing the deficit. Since all their costs were financed with deficit spending, all their savings must go to deficit reduction.” —Jobs for America: The McCain Economic Plan, released July 7, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: The yearly bill for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is certainly enormous. Yet it still covers less than half of the United States’ projected $490 billion deficit for 2009. Given the massive tax cuts that McCain also supports, it’s unclear how his debt-reduction math adds up. McCain opposes a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq, yet he feels confident enough to budget for victory by the end of his first term. Afghanistan is getting worse, not better. And as for “the fight against Islamic extremists,” how does one even define victory? Don’t try asking McCain: He doesn’t have an answer.

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Making the Bush Tax Cuts Permanent

What he said: “We’ve got to make these tax cuts permanent. We have to, otherwise I think it’ll have a negative impact on our economy.” —NBC’s Meet the Press, Jan. 27, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: You might say McCain was against the $1.35 trillion Bush tax cuts before he was for them. In 2004, he said he opposed them “because of the disproportional amount that went to the wealthiest Americans.” Now, he says he supports them because the economy is weakening. Yet “the tax cuts are more likely to reduce long-term growth than to increase it,” according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. McCain insists he will restrain spending and eliminate the budget deficit. But McCain’s budget numbers simply don’t add up, and the senator’s constant hammering on congressional earmarks misses the big picture: Defense and entitlement programs are where most of the fat lies, not in relatively small pork projects such as Alaska’s infamous “Bridge to Nowhere.”

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Supporting Abstinence-Only Education and the Global Gag Rule

What he said: Asked on the campaign trail if he thought grants for sex education should include instruction on contraception, McCain turned to an aide for help, saying, “Brian, would you find out what my position is on contraception—I’m sure I’m opposed to government spending on it, I’m sure I support the president’s policies on it.” The reporter asked, “Do you think contraceptives help stop the spread of HIV?” After a long pause, McCain replied, “You’ve stumped me.” —Town hall meeting, Iowa, Mar. 16, 2007

Why it’s a bad idea: A landmark, 10-year study sponsored by Congress found in 2007 that students in sexual-abstinence programs “were just as likely to have sex as those who did not, reported having similar numbers of sexual partners, and first had sex at about the same age,” the Chicago Tribune reported. Abstinence-only education is one of the core principles guiding the so-called global gag rule, an executive order passed by President George W. Bush in 2001 that prohibits giving foreign aid to NGOs that offer any kind of counseling on abortion as family planning. McCain voted against repealing the measure in 2005. Critics of the gag rule point to reports showing a shortage of contraceptives, clinic closings, loss of funds for HIV/AIDS education, and a rise in unsafe abortions since it was instituted.

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Calling for 45 Nuclear Power Plants

What he said: “If I am elected president, I will set this nation on a course to building 45 new reactors by the year 2030, with the ultimate goal of 100 new plants to power the homes and factories and cities of America.” —Speech in Springfield, Mo., June 18, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: There are many good reasons to be skeptical of the widespread new enthusiasm for nuclear power, including its high-and-rising costs, but perhaps the best one is that, as experts Charles Ferguson and Sharon Squassoni explained in 2007, “a nuclear renaissance will take too long to have a significant effect” on climate change. Moreover, how do we know that 45 is the right number? A drop in the price of alternative fuels could “make nuclear plants look like white elephants,” the Wall Street Journal noted in May. For someone who likes to extol the virtues of the free market, McCain’s target sure smacks of socialist planning.

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Backing Cap-and-Trade Without a 100 Percent Auction

What he said: “We will cap emissions according to specific goals, measuring progress by reference to past carbon emissions. … Over time, an increasing fraction of permits for emissions could be supplied by auction, yielding federal revenues that can be put to good use.” —Speech in Portland, Ore., May 12, 2008

Why it’s a bad idea: McCain’s gotten credit for supporting a cap-and-trade system, but his specific proposal is pretty weak. Cap-and-trade systems work by putting a ceiling on carbon emissions, and then allocating permits that give companies the right to pollute a given amount. From an environmental standpoint, it doesn’t much matter how you initially distribute the permits, as long as the cap is stringent enough. But most economists think that, unless you first auction these off in a transparent process, you’re basically enabling a massive corporate giveaway, raising the likelihood that well-connected corporations or industries will get sweetheart deals, and failing to capture revenue that can pay for other priorities.

Now, I'm on record as supporting the attempt to create a league of democracies. And I find the rationale against it presented here monumentally unconvincing. No one assumes that all democracies think alike or will automatically cooperate on all issues. But there certainly are more commonalities between democracies than between non-, and those commonalities might be exploited. I really don't see this critique as being a reason not to try...maybe a reason it won't work, but not not to try.

The scariest of these bad ideas are, in my opinion, Obama's opposition to free trade. It may be that that opposition was a political ploy, and that Obama will, in the end, support the expansion of free trade. But if he meant what he said, Obama's policies threaten to undermine the global trade regime and squander American goodwill and leadership in a way George Bush couldn't even have dreamed of doing. Re-opening ratified trade treaties, or refusing to push for new ones, will have disastrous consequences for this country, and for the larger international community. Let's hope that, if he wins, Obama quickly disassociates himself from the anti-trade wing of the Democratic Party.

As for McCain's ideas, most of them are simply stupid, as opposed to dangerous. However, restricting immigration is the worst and most potentially dangerous of them all. Restricting immigration would put massive demographic and economic strains on countries like Mexico, by stopping unemployed and disaffected peoples from finding gainful employment. It would also depress the domestic economy by raising the cost of labor. This is one of the worst and most shameful of McCain's reversals. Again, as with Obama's trade statements, let's hope that if McCain wins he can move away from the neo-isolationists and anti-immigrants in the Republican Party and adopt the more sensible policies he espoused in the past.

Peace and Justice in Darfur

In the wake of the announcement back in July by the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court that he intended to seek indictments against the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, I have blogged my general inclination that such a move would be counter-productive. I am on record in several different places that, when there is a tension between the two, I tend to favor efforts to achieve peace than those aimed at creating justice. Today, the chair of the African Union, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, seems to agree with me, "Justice has to be done. Justice must be seen to be done. What the AU is simply saying is that what is critical, what is the priority, is peace. That is priority number one now...We should do the first thing first. On this basis, the AU supports deferral of the indictment." While I agree with Mr. Kikwete's final assessment, I am not encouraged by his support.

Sadly, the African Union hasn't demonstrated either the willingness or the ability to stand up for what is right. If I honestly believed that the AU was going to be involved in creating peace in Darfur, it would be appropriate for the AU to discuss easing off the pressure on Sudan. But given the AU's record (or lack of record) in standing up to Mugabe in Zimbabwe, not to mention its dismal performace in Darfur, one cannot have any faith in the AU to advance anything but its own weakness and blind support of any African dictator. It's one thing to contemplate giving up on justice in order to achieve peace; it's another thing entirely to give up on justice because one is too weak or scared to challenge the miscreant. Sudan's efforts to destroy the Fur people must be stopped, and if the price of that is letting al-Bashir walk free of international charges, so be it. But if peace is not to be achieved, then let justice be done.

Russia Stands Alone

So much for Russia's hopes of igniting a united front against western power and leadership. Russian President Dimitri Medvedev went to the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization seeking the organization's backing for the Russian invasion of Georgia and subsequent recognition of the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Instead, the SCO refused to lend its support for the Russian endeavor, choosing instead a neutral stance, urging all parties to resolve their differences without war. The SCO furthermore endorsed the basic concept of territorial integrity.

It's difficult to see how Russia made such a strategic mistake, and why it expected to get the SCO's support. The members of the SCO are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and China. It's China's presence that makes Russia's move confusing. It seems likely that Russia thought that the opportunity to stand up to the US and NATO would be so appealing that China would jump at the chance. But given China's own domestic problems with separatist regions in Taiwan, Tibet and the Uighurs in the west, it seems foolish to ask China to support a principle that would encourage those regions to break away from China and that would allow outside parties to intervene to support their independence. Furthermore, China does not support any the independence of any separatist regions outside of China, as NATO did with Kosovo and as Russia did in Georgia. And finally, China has become increasingly interdependent on the US and western institutions, like the WTO. It should have been obvious to Russia that China would not back this move.

The move by the SCO reveals the limitations of Russian power and appeal. Russia simply does not have the strategic or ideological attraction that the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Few states are looking towards Russia as a viable alternative to the US and western leadership and institutions. While Russia's invasion of Georgia may pay off in the short-term, in the long run, Russia will be increasingly alienated from the global community which will, hopefully, be a price Russia would prefer not to pay.

The US should quickly move to exploit the decision by the SCO. The US should be telling China that Kosovo was a one-off, unique situation that will not be repeated, especially not in China. The US and NATO will not certainly not be willing to go to war with China to "free" Tibet or even Taiwan, and the cost of doing so diplomatically is also far too high a price for the west to pay. If China can come to see Russia as a dangerous, free-wheeling state that is a threat to international norms, Russia will be even more isolated. And that may help force Russia back in line.

Can Mercenaries Save Darfur?

An interesting possibility has emerged in the conundrum over what to do about Darfur, and other humanitarian crises that seem to demand international peacemaking. Sadly, politics being what it is, states are unwilling to commit their own soldiers into situations that might costs lives for issues that are not directly seen as being part of the national interest. Thus, states tend to look the other way and pass the buck to international organizations, as happened in Rwanda and is happening in Darfur. When states go ahead and get involved anyway, they tend to do so in a half-assed manner, as the US did in Somalia. Even when IOs, like the UN or the African Union, deploy peacekeepers, they are often ineffective, underfunded, undermanned, and underequipped, hampered by restrictive Rules of Engagement necessary to reach political consensus and soothe states fearful of having their soldiers killed, and are beholden to the whims of sovereign states (for example, despite approving a 26,000 strong peacekeeping force, Sudan's insistence that the force be made up predominantly of African troops has prevented the UN from deploying a sufficiently strong enough presence in Darfur). In short, while the UN may be good at peacekeeping, the (perhaps) more important task of peacemaking is beyond its abilities, and outside of the political will and interest of states that do have the necessary capabilities.

Which brings us to a meeting of bizarre bedfellows last month: the actress and Darfur activist Mia Farrow and Erik Prince, founder and CEO of the government contractor, Blackwater Worldwide. According to an ABC News report:

Farrow told ABC News that Blackwater, despite its controversial history and allegations of murdering civilians in Iraq, might be able to help the "hopelessly under-equipped" African Union forces deployed in Darfur with logistics and training.

"Blackwater has a much better idea of what an effective peace-keeping mission would look like than western governments," Farrow told ABC News from a refugee camp in near the Darfur border. Farrow said those governments have been unsuccessful in standing up to the Sudanese government and bringing peace to the region.

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Prince, meanwhile, has reportedly said that with about 250 professionals, Blackwater could transform roughly one thousand of the African Union soldiers into an elite and highly mobile force.

"I'm so sick of hearing that nothing can be done," Prince told the Wall Street Journal last month, calling the Janjaweed, a militia force backed by the Sudanese government, an "unfettered bully."

"No one has stood up to them," he told the Journal. "If they were met by a mobile quick reaction force of African Union soldiers, the Janjaweed would quickly learn their habits were not sustainable."

Prince also told the Associated Press in July that the military "can't be all things to all people" all the time. "There are always going to be some pieces that the private sector can help in."

The possibility of involving a private contractor like Blackwater in a crisis like Darfur has, unsurprisingly, ruffled many feathers. J. Steven Morrison, a Sudan expert for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued that "It's preposterous to think there is some magic silver bullet that takes the form of Blackwater or any other private military contractor to solve the problems in Darfur." Furthermore, Blackwater's troubled record in Iraq has led other to question the wisdom of involving this specific company:

Blackwater employees have been involved in two deadly incidents in Iraq that proved to be public relations disasters for the company.

The first was the slaying and mutilation of four Blackwater contractors in 2004 in Fallujah that led to congressional hearings about the protection Blackwater provided its employees.

The second, a September 2007 shooting at a crowded Baghdad intersection that killed 17 Iraqis, triggered congressional hearings and investigations from more than a dozen federal agencies.

Federal prosecutors have sent target letters to six of the security guards involved in the September shooting, indicating a high likelihood the Justice Department will seek to indict at least some of the men, according to reports by the Washington Post on Sunday.

An Iraqi government investigation concluded that the security contractors fired without provocation. Blackwater has said its personnel acted in self-defense.

The question Blackwater in particular is not really one which I am equipped to engage. But the general antipathy to the use of private military trainers and personnel -- mercenaries, if you will -- is, I believe, misplaced. Morrison's worry is one of standard political paralysis: There's no guarantee that a new idea will work, so better to stick with the old idea, even if it's not working. And clearly, international peacemaking efforts aren't working. While the UN dithers and tries to raise enough soldiers and equipment, the janjaweed continue their reign of terror against the people of Darfur. And it's not like the UN has a much better track record than Blackwater: numerous allegations of rape, prostitution, child pornography, and other sexual abuses have dogged UN peacekeepers for years. And, even when UN peacekeepers have been on the ground, events like Srebrenica and Rwanda indicate the limits of their willingness to fight to protect their charges. And waiting for states to get involved hasn't been much better.

So, why not turn to private firms? Note that what Blackwater is discussing here isn't putting its own people into the situation, but rather training the African Union peacekeepers to be competent at their jobs. A private company will not be hampered by a lack of political will or fears of alienating public constituencies. While the world may not yet be ready to use mercenaries for the job itself, using a firm like Blackwater to train those who are willing to go into situations like Darfur should certainly be seriously considered.

A New Cold War?

The aftermath of the Russian invasion of Georgia in defense of the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia certainly has not smoothed any of the ruffled feathers. Yesterday, Russia recognized the independence of the break-away territories, making it clear that the invasion was pay-back for the west's protection of and support for Kosovo, which declared its independence from Russian-allied Serbia. The US and most of its allies denounced the move, with the US declaring that it would veto any attempt by Russia to get the UN to recognize the territories' independence. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said “Abkhazia and South Ossetia are a part of the internationally recognized borders of Georgia, and it’s going to remain so.”

Today, the tensions continued to rise, as a US warship arrived in the Georgian port of Batumi, ostensibly to deliver humanitarian aid. However, the interjection of US sailors and vessels into the region will undoubtedly be read by Russia as a signal of the American willingness to support Georgia in any further crises, and perhaps even as a commitment to defend Georgian territorial integrity. In response, Russia sent three warships to a port in Abkhazia, clearly signaling Russian intentions to break the region, along with South Ossetia, away from Georgia. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion prompted Poland to move quickly to accept deployment of an American ballistic missile defense system, a move to which Russia has responded with threats of military action. Russian President Dimitri Medvedev has responded to the west's support of Georgia, as well as the deployment agreement of the ABM system, by stating that “[Russia is] not afraid of anything, including the prospect of a Cold War.”

Is that where all of this is leading? Does Russia, desperate to regain the glory, power, and respect held by the Soviet Union, want to enter into a new global struggle with the United States, NATO, and the western powers? Is the US ready to accept such a development?

While it's possible that Russia prefers a new Cold War to the status quo of weaknesses, dependence, and perceived humiliation, it's not likely to happen. The Russia of the 21st century is a far cry from the Soviet Union. Russia lacks, plain and simple, the military capability, and the power projection in particular, to challenge the US for global leadership. While Russia's economy has strengthened, it has done so largely on the basis of energy exports, which makes Russia as dependent on foreign economies as foreign states are on Russia. Meanwhile, the rest of the economy is underdeveloped and highly dependent on foreign investment, which gives the outside world a fair amount of leverage over Russia. The Russian stock market has taken a beating since the invasion of Georgia, and lost billions of dollars in value with the recognition of independence. Foreign investors, wary about the chance of war, sanctions, or other punishments, are pulling their money out of Russia, and the stock market lost 4.1% of its value, and the ruble has slid 4% as well. Also yesterday, Russian officials acknowledged that Russia is not likely to be admitted into the World Trade Organization any time soon. And while there were real economic concerns over Russia's accession, the invasion more or less sealed Russia's fate.

All of this demonstrates the potential power of engagement. If Russia seeks a new Cold War, it will have to do so at the expense of its domestic economy, which, given that many of the leading Russian government officials are connected to Russian state-owned enterprises (Medvedev was chairman of Gazprom until ascending to the presidency in May), will directly affect their personal finances.

This is not to say that Russia will not continue to challenge the West. But the price of starting a new Cold War is likely far more than Russia would be willing to pay. The US, NATO, and the western powers need to make it painfully clear to Russia that the price for this behavior will be, first and foremost, economic, and secondly, Russian participation in international organizations. Far from being empty, such threats can actually be carried out, and can impose serious costs on Russia.

Russia Learns A Lesson, But Was It The Right Lesson?

In the last few days, the diplomatic wires have been burning up as US officials warn Russia about possible consequences of the invasion of Georgia. SecState Rice is in Tbilisi working on the details of the ceasefire and trying to get Russian troops out of Georgia. President Bush referred to Russia's actions as "bullying and intimidation," warned of as-of-yet unspecified consequences, and wondered, perhaps tellingly, what the G-7 would do about the invasion. SecDef Gates warned that “Russia’s behavior over the past week has called into question the entire premise of that dialogue and has profound implications for our security relationship going forward, both bilaterally and with NATO. If Russia does not step back from its aggressive posture and actions in Georgia, the U.S.-Russian relationship could be adversely affected for years to come.”

So, what did Russia learn from all of these warnings and blustering. Apparently, not much. Despite the signing of a cease-fire, Russian armored vehicles were, as of Friday night in Georgia, moving towards the capital city of Tbilisi, seizing a village about 15 miles out of town. Russian troops also moved west through Georgia, to the town of Abasha, although they seem to have withdrawn. Most concerning, however, was Russia's reaction to the signing of a deal to place a ballistic missile defense system in Poland. A senior Russian defense official lashed out at the move, saying that "cannot go unpunished." This, of course, is of direct and immediate concern to the US. Not only is Poland a member of NATO, but the deal ties the US closer to Poland than ever before:

In exchange for providing the base, Poland would get what the two sides called “enhanced security cooperation,” notably a top-of-the-line Patriot air defense system that can shoot down shorter-range missiles or attacking fighters or bombers.

A senior Pentagon official described an unusual part of this quid pro quo: an American Patriot battery would be moved from Germany to Poland, where it would be operated by a crew of about 100 American military personnel members. The expenses would be shared by both nations. American troops would join the Polish military, at least temporarily, at the front lines — facing east toward Russia.

...

the United States would be obliged to defend Poland in case of an attack with greater speed than required under NATO, of which Poland is a member.

Polish officials said the agreement would strengthen the mutual commitment of the United States to defend Poland, and vice versa. “Poland and the Poles do not want to be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later — it is no good when assistance comes to dead people,” the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, said on Polish television. “Poland wants to be in alliances where assistance comes in the very first hours of — knock on wood — any possible conflict.”

Would Russia really attack Poland if such an attack risks bringing NATO into the fight? If Russia does attack Poland, would the US go to war to defend its new ally, if that war was against a military power (fading though it is) like Russia?

Certainly, the failure of the West to come to Georgia's aid has emboldened Russia, as has the to-date unwillingness to set out any punishment. But Poland and Eastern Europe are a different story from Georgia. America's credibility, alliance structure, and policies of engagement and enlargement depend on the expansion of NATO and the US's ability to protect its allies. The US cannot fail to protect Poland, even if that means going to war with Russia. Such a war would, hopefully, remain limited (this isn't the Cold War, after all, and Russia doesn't see its interest or sphere of influence as global). But if Russia seeks such a war, it would be far too damaging to American long-term interests not to fight. Which means that the US must be willing to engage in high-stakes brinksmanship to ensure that such a war does not happen and that Russia knows that the US will go to war to defend its NATO ally.

All of these events have the realists waving their "told you so" signs about the dangers of NATO expansion. For realists, the end of the Cold War signaled the end of NATO's relevance; it makes no sense, they argue, to antagonize Russia over Georgia, Ukraine, or Poland. Russia has a legitimate security concern in Eastern Europe, the US does not. Thus, NATO should not push towards Russia's western border.

As I have argued many many times on these pages, the US should not, and does not, understand its interests along the narrow lines outlined by realists. It's not all about power. The problems in Georgia do not represent a victory for realism; they do expose the difficulties in advancing an agenda of engagement and enlargement. If Georgia had been admitted into NATO, Russia's decision to invade would have been made in a very different strategic environment.

US hegemony and leadership has moved much of the world further away from war than it has ever been. But that program requires constant maintenance, and comes at a high cost. The US must not shirk its duty here. President Bush should immediately make it clear that Poland is a member of NATO, and that the US and all NATO members will, if need be, fulfill their obligations to Poland. Then, as soon as possible, a nominal number of US troops should be rushed to Poland, to make a credible demonstration of US will and intent. Russia clearly feels emboldened and empowered by the west's debacle in Georgia. But Russian interests must be put back in their place.

Russia Gets Nervous (But Not Nervous Enough)

In Monday's post on the Russian invasion of Georgia, I wrote that Russian membership in the G-8 should be immediately and indefinitely suspended, if not revoked all together. Of course, I wasn't the only person to suggest such a move. Charles Krauthammer takes the argument one step further, arguing that the US should "suspend the NATO-Russia Council established in 2002 to help bring Russia closer to the West," dissolve the G-8 (later reforming it as the G-7 sans Russia), bar Russia from joining the WTO, and boycott the 2014 Winter Olympics to be held in Russia, just 15 miles from the Georgian border. While neither President Bush nor the presidential candidates have made such concrete proposals, it won't be surprising to such such punishments come down the line in the near future. WTO membership will be hard enough for Russia now, as every member, including Georgia, has to agree to a bilateral agreement with Russia for Russia to join. If President Mikheil Saakashvili can hold on to power (the thrust of the violation of the ceasefire by Russia seems to be replacing Saakashvili with a Russian puppet leader as well as preventing Georgia from retaining the separatist provinces), getting that agreement will be next-to-impossible.

Nonetheless, Russia seems to be a bit worried about these possibilities. Today, a senior Russian official expressed concern, saying that "there are no formal reasons to stop these (accession) talks," and that "The statements that our accession should be delayed because of events in Georgia sound strange. It contradicts basic logic, common sense and promises that were given by the governments of Western countries to Russia." This statement seems to indicate that Russia is concerned about the possibility of being shut out of the global economic system. Of course, Russia doesn't seem too concerned, probably because no such threat is immediately forthcoming.

President Bush should immediately make it clear to Russia what the consequences of this action will be, not only for US-Russian relations, but for Russia's whole approach to the west. Sending humanitarian aid is not enough; the credibility of the American role as protector of the global order is at stake here. Bush needs to move quickly to prevent the Georgian government from collapsing and the Finlandization of Georgia, with Ukraine sure to follow.

Georgia On My Mind

In the wake of this weekend's invasion of Georgia by Russian armed forces, things seem to be proceeding from bad to worse. After Georgian forces took action against ethnic Russian separatists in the region of South Ossetia, Russian forces entered the country in a self-proclaimed effort to force Georgia to "bring peace" to the region. However, Russia quickly expanded the conflict, conducting air strikes against Georgian cities and crossing the border and occupying a military base in the region of Abkhazia. Reports today from Georgia claim that Russian forces have seized a vital highway, effectively splitting Georgia in two, while a Georgian official in the embassy in Russia has said that Russian forces are moving towards the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and that Russia's goals are the "complete liquidation" of the Georgian government.

Most of the blame deservedly falls on Russia for using force to reassert its fading power in areas Russia deems critical to its own national security. And Russia is also clearly sending a message to the West in the wake of the declaration of independence by Kosovo. If NATO is free to use force to intervene in an ethnic conflict over sovereignty, so is Russia. And finally, Russia is likely punishing Georgia for its recent move towards the West, particularly the US, that culminated in Georgia's failed bid to join NATO.

But some blame for this situation must fall on the West as well. NATO allowed Georgia to put itself in a very dangerous position with its bid for membership, and then failed to follow through and admit Georgia. At the time, I wrote that NATO made a bad choice by bowing to Russian concerns over Georgia (and Ukraine); now we see the consequences of that bad choice. Georgia put itself out on a limb by seeking NATO membership (not to mention by contributing troops to Iraq), and the West is now standing by while Russia saws that limb off. Needless to say, this is likely to have a very negative impact on the value of ties to the US, NATO, and the West, if seeking such ties produces an outcome such as Georgia is now experiencing.

What is to be done at this point? Given Russia's membership on the UN Security Council, the UN is not likely to be capable of playing any kind of role, be it meaningful or token, in resolving this crisis. Nor is the NATO-end-around viable here, as war with Russia is certainly not on anyone's radar screen at this point.

However, the West, and particularly the US, must not roll over here. It is vital to send a message to countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine, that warming up to the West will not end in abandonment and a Russian invasion. If globalization, engagement, and other aspects of Western global strategy are to succeed, nations in hot spots must be willing to take risks and confidently believe that those risks will pay off and that the West will help them.

For starters, Russia should have its membership in the G-8 suspended immediately and indefinitely, if not revoked all together. I have long argued that Russia's participation is a joke and more of a sop to a fading former power. But now that membership is a true farce. If Russia chooses to act in this way, it cannot be a participant in the global order. The whole logic of engagement is predicated on the benefits of the global system acting as an inducement for states to liberalize their behavior. Now, not only is Russia's domestic situation problematic, but it's international behavior is as well. Russia cannot be allowed to continue as a member of the G-8 so long as it remains involved in Georgian affairs to this degree.

After that, I'm not sure what steps should follow. But the G-8 has served as a useful carrot in the past, now it is well suited to be a stick.

Peter Rodman, RIP

My first foreign policy mentor, Peter Rodman, died this past Saturday. I first worked with Rodman as an intern when he was the director of Middle East Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I moved with him to the Nixon Center, where he was Director of National Security Studies. Peter has had an impressive, albeit largely behind the scenes, career at the center of US foreign policy and national security, having been one of Henry Kissinger's top aides during events such as the opening of China, the peace talks ending the Vietnam War, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Peter helped me understand the difficult decisions inherent in policy making, but also worked with me to see how analysis and clear thinking helped uncover the best decision. I hadn't spoken with him in several years, but I will never forget the guidance, support, and wisdom he imparted to a 23 year old intern, eager to learn about foreign policy.

He will be greatly missed.

From the New York Times:

Peter Rodman, Foreign Affairs Expert, Dies at 64

By DOUGLAS MARTIN

Peter W. Rodman, a foreign policy expert who served every Republican president from Richard M. Nixon to George W. Bush, including as an assistant secretary of defense for nearly six years in the current administration, died on Saturday in Baltimore. He was 64.

The cause was complications of leukemia, said Danielle Pletka, vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

Mr. Rodman was lured into government by his senior thesis adviser at Harvard, Henry A. Kissinger, then the national security adviser, and he became Dr. Kissinger’s aide in negotiations that included the opening of China, peace talks on Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, he traveled with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to gather allies for the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. He led a mission to London to help establish the multinational peacekeeping force for Kabul after the overthrow of the Taliban.

His jobs included being director of the State Department’s policy planning staff; a senior editor at National Review; and director of national security programs at the Nixon Center, a foreign policy research organization. He had been a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution since March 2007.

Peter Warren Rodman was born on Nov. 24, 1943, in Boston. He became interested in foreign policy at 4 and later taught himself Russian to listen to Soviet broadcasts, his family said. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard in three years and earned a master’s degree from Oxford and a law degree from Harvard.

In 1994, he published “More Precious Than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World,” a study of Soviet-American competition in the developing nations that Foreign Affairs called a “tour de force.” Next year, Knopf is to publish his “Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush,” which melds his own experiences with extensive research.

Mr. Rodman also worked extensively with Mr. Kissinger on Mr. Kissinger’s memoirs and published many monographs and articles, some in the popular press.

Mr. Rodman is survived by his wife, the former Veronique Boulad, a daughter, Theodora, and a son, Nicholas, all of Washington; his father, Sumner, and mother, Helen, of Chestnut Hill, Mass; and a brother, John, of Newton Centre, Mass.

Should Congress Declare War on al Qaeda?

Testifying before Congress today, Attorney General Michael Mukasey urged Congress to formally declare war on al Qaeda. Appearing to provide testimony about pending legislation concerning the decision in the Boumediene case that detainees in Guantanamo Bay do have habeas rights, Mukasey argued that the legislation should:

prohibit courts from ordering a detainee to be released within the United States, protect secrets in court hearings, ensure that soldiers are not taken from the battlefield to testify and prevent challenges from delaying detainee trials,

In addition, he said, "Any legislation should acknowledge again and explicitly that this nation remains engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated organizations, who have already proclaimed themselves at war with us."

"Congress should reaffirm that for the duration of the conflict the United States may detain as enemy combatants those who have engaged in hostilities or purposefully supported al Qaeda," and related groups, he said.

As readers of this blog, I have long argued that the congressional power to declare war is about the legal status of individuals under the jurisdiction of US law, rather than the power to deploy troops and initial hostilities, and Mukasey's request fits along that opinion.

However, it would be disastrous if Congress declared war. Fortunately, it's hard to imagine Congress doing so, especially as the Bush presidency comes to an end. But, if Congress agrees with Mukasey and does declare war, Bush would be placed at the absolute zenith of presidential power. Declarations of war are tools by which Congress recognizes the grave danger faced by the nation and expands presidential power to meet that threat. The expanded power enjoyed by the president under a formal declaration of war is, in essence, the power to legislate normally possessed by Congress. Thus, under a declaration of war, presidents are able to intern US citizens, seize domestic industry, censor the press, and take similar actions of a legislative nature. Clearly, these are the kinds of powers Mukasey has in mind, as he seeks stronger powers to detain, investigate, and try those suspected of involvement in international terrorism.

And that is why Congress should not declare war. Reasonable people can and do debate over the nature of the threat posed to the US by al Qaeda. But al Qaeda does not threaten to destroy the United States, and has not even be able to mount a successful attack against the US since 2001. While the threat may very well be serious, and may even be the most serious threat faced by the US today, it does not justify giving such broad powers to the president. True, the administration has faced several setbacks in its efforts to combat al Qaeda at the hands of the Supreme Court, which very well may hurt those efforts. But cutting the Court out of the process by getting a declaration of war is not the answer. Rather, the Bush Administration should consult more with Congress to get legislative backing for its policies.

Is the War in Iraq Over?

If you're not familiar with the work of Michael Yon, you should be. He is an independent reporter who has spent more time in Iraq than any other journalist, and most of that time he has been embedded with various military units. According to Yon:

barring any major and unexpected developments (like an Israeli air strike on Iran and the retaliations that would follow), a fair-minded person could say with reasonable certainty that the war has ended. A new and better nation is growing legs. What's left is messy politics that likely will be punctuated by low-level violence and the occasional spectacular attack. Yet, the will of the Iraqi people has changed, and the Iraqi military has dramatically improved, so those spectacular attacks are diminishing along with the regular violence. Now it's time to rebuild the country, and create a pluralistic, stable and peaceful Iraq. That will be long, hard work. But by my estimation, the Iraq War is over. We won. Which means the Iraqi people won.

Yon also provides statistics to back up his claim (they can be found here in a PowerPoint file). The statistics are amazing to look at, as are the trends. Michael Totten summarizes them over at Commentary:

Security incidents, or attacks, are at their lowest level in four years. Civilian deaths are down by almost 90 percent since General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency “surge” strategy went into effect. High profile attacks, or explosions, are down by 80 percent in the same time period. American and Iraqi soldiers suffer far fewer casualties than they have for years. Ethno-sectarian deaths from Iraq’s civil war plunged all the way down to zero in May and June 2008.

Reports from all over Iraq indicate that al Qaeda is all but defeated, and the US Embassy in Iraq recently reported that Iraq has met 15 of the 18 benchmarks established by Congress. According to the report:

the only remaining shortfalls were the Baghdad government's failure to enact and implement laws governing the oil industry and the disarmament of militia and insurgent groups, and continuing problems with the professionalism of the Iraqi police. All other goals -- including preparations for upcoming elections, reform of de-Baathification and disarmament laws, progress on enacting and spending Iraq's budget, and the capabilities of the Iraqi army -- were rated "satisfactory."

The GAO has disagreed with this report, stating that there has been "little improvement in the political and economic spheres and noted continuing military problems despite a significant decline in overall violence." Still, the significant decline in violence is astounding. The embassy report stated that:

the Iraqi parliament has passed significant legislation on de-Baathification reform, the division of powers between the central and provincial governments, and amnesty for former insurgents. It grades progress in all of those areas as newly "satisfactory" even as it acknowledges that the laws in most cases have been implemented slowly, if at all. Congress mandated that Iraq both "enact and implement" the benchmark laws.

The embassy cited progress toward increasing the number of Iraqi security force units capable of independent operations. Although it says that the overall number of units that can operate independently has increased "marginally," it concludes that "70% of all formed units can now conduct [counter-insurgency] operations with or without Coalition support."

This is not to say that there won't be more deaths, either of US soldiers or Iraqis. But if al Qaeda has in fact been defeated, and the Iraqi government is stabilizing, there may in fact be a light at the end of the tunnel.

Dark Days for Darfur

Things are getting much, more worse for Darfur lately. Last week, a convoy of UN peacekeepers was ambushed by 200 gunmen on horseback and in SUVs. Seven peacekeepers were killed, and 22 wounded in the attack, which reinforces the argument that peacekeeping forces are inappropriate and ill-suited for a conflict which has not been resolved. Peacekeeping forces normally are introduced into conflict situations that have ended by agreement of all warring parties but who do not trust one another to keep the peace. Thus, a neutral third party interposes itself between the sides, guaranteeing that each side will adhere to its commitments. But Darfur is not a settled conflict. The central government in Khartoum is still conducting its raids, the janjaweed continue to raid refugee camps, and the Darfuri rebels are still fighting back, even having attacked peacekeepers in the past.

As if the situation isn't bad enough, it's like to get much worse in the near future. Today, the International Criminal Court announced that its prosecutor has requested an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir on three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity and two of murder. While it will be months before the ICC to rule on the application, but if the warrant is issued, President al-Bashir will "effectively turn al-Bashir into a prisoner in his own country. In the past, Interpol has issued so-called Red Notices for fugitives wanted by the court, meaning they should be arrested any time they attempt to cross an international border."

But even if the warrant isn't issued, the damage is already done. The UN, which backs the ICC, also maintains the current peacekeeping force in Darfur, and it seems unlikely that Sudan will allow the peacekeepers to remain if their political leaders face indictment and arrest. The removal of the peacekeeping force, as ineffectual as it has been, would likely herald the resumption of a massive cleansing campaign by the Sudanese government in an effort to "solve" the Darfur problem before international intervention occurs again (if it ever does). Furthermore, the BBC reported on Sunday that China was breaking the UN-imposed arms embargo on Sudan, "roviding military equipment and training pilots to fly Chinese jets." While this development is all that surprising, given the diversion of international pressure on China from Darfur to Tibet, it is a troubling one, as it signals, perhaps, the end of Chinese cooperation on Sudan.

Given the precarious nature of the international community's involvement in Darfur, the indictment of al-Bashir by the ICC was definitely ill-timed and most likely ill-advised. I've blogged several times before about the problems inherent in international justice and law, and this is no different. Given that al-Bashir is unlikely to ever stand trial, maintaining the peacekeeping presence was more important than making a point through law.

The international community needs to prepare itself for more attacks on the peacekeepers, if not their expulsion from Sudan. And if (and when) that happens, given China's backsliding, it is all but impossible for the UN to put together a stronger intervention. So, the burden and responsibility will likely fall on the United States and its NATO allies. Sudan must not be allowed to continue its murderous campaign against Darfur, and China must not be allowed to shield Sudan. President Bush and the heads of states and government of the western countries should immediately threaten to boycott the Olympics, not over Tibet (which is a lost cause) but over Chinese violations of the arms embargo and protection of Sudan. China must be leveraged away from Sudan.

However, while China may be willing to support increased sanctions on Sudan, it will not, nor will Russia, support an intervention without the permission of the Sudanese government. Thus, NATO needs to be ready, if it cares at all about saving the Darfuri people, to deploy a force to Sudan immediately. Anything less will likely condemn the people of Darfur to their doom.

Know How to Photoshop? Iran Needs Your Help!

The international community was on edge this week as tensions rose in the Middle East between Israel and Iran. News of an Israeli wargame leaked out, and Iran responded by testing four missiles that potentially have the range to hit Israel.

However, as the photo above reveals, the evidence of the missile test was faked by Iran. According to the New York Times:

Agence France-Presse, which distributed the image of the four missiles to the West, said it was obtained on Wednesday from the Web site of Sepah News, the media arm of the Revolutionary Guards.

On Thursday, The Associated Press released what appeared to be a nearly identical photo, but Little Green Footballs a conservative blog, identified the altered image on its site on Wednesday night . Last year the blog pointed out a manipulated image that had been distributed by Iran’s semiofficial Fars News Agency. As in the case of Wednesday’s photograph and many others that the site has uncovered, the one from 2007 appeared to contain several cloned elements.

Iranian leaders have overstated military developments in the past. “They’ve made some exaggerated claims from time to time,” said Gary Sick, an expert on Iran at Columbia University. “They clearly want the world to be impressed with their missile capability.”

Agence France-Presse retracted its original image on Thursday morning, saying the fourth missile “has apparently been added in digital retouch to cover a grounded missile that may have failed during the test.”

Furthermore, many analysts questioned Iran's claim that the test revealed improvements in Iran's strategic capabilities. In the Los Angeles Times, Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, states that “There is no evidence of a significant advance in previously known missile capabilities of Iran’s medium- and long-range missiles.”

If it weren't so scary, it would be pretty funny.

The Absurdity of International Climate Change Policy

Yesterday, the leaders of the G8 countries announced a break-through (of sorts) on international climate change policy. In exchange for getting the United States to agree to the relatively modest goal of reducing carbon emissions by 50% by 2050, the other members signed on to a statement that developing countries -- including China (now the leading producer of carbon emissions), India, Brazil, and Mexico -- need to cut their emissions as well.

But therein lies the rub. The developing countries do not feel that they should be required to cut their emissions, as they did not contribute to the current problem. In a statement, the five major developing countries announced that "It is essential that developed countries take the lead in achieving ambitious and absolute greenhouse gas emissions reductions," and that they rejected the notion that all should share in the 50-percent target, since it is wealthier countries that have created most of the environmental damage up to now.

This might be true in a moral sense. Certainly, the developed economies of the Western countries have produced more carbon that have those of the developing nations. But morality doesn't count for much in politics. If the developing countries refuse to cut their emissions, political theory tells us that the developed states will be hesitant to do so, for fear of losing their edge and seeing their relative power diminish. Ultimately, the environment is a massive tragedy of the commons, in which the absence of over-arching regulatory authority means that a public good gets overused, as no actor will restrain his use of the commons while other actors remain free to exploit it. Why should the US damage its own economy if China remains free to pollute? China will enjoy the gains of a better environment, without paying the costs, while the US will pay the costs without reaping the full benefits, due to China's continued polluting.

The international arena is not the best venue for producing global environmental change. The collective actions problems, as well as other barriers to action, are simply too large. As states like California have recently developed, the best strategy is to focus on local change, and to allow other mechanisms to spread the successful innovations and developments to other parts of the country and the world. The international system is far too anarchic and power-based to expect any real progress.

Fixing the War Powers Resolution

As readers of Security Dilemmas may know, I am currently working on questions of presidential-congressional war powers, and have a contract with Praeger Press for my book Restoring the Balance: War Powers in an Age of Terror. So, it is of course of interest to me that the National War Powers Commission has published its report (the pdf file of the final report is here) on how to fix war powers. The Commission also published an op-ed in today's New York Times summarizing their findings.

The Commission notes that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 has been monumentally ineffective at resolving fundamental questions -- both constitutional and political -- of war powers. The WPR is also, most likely, unconstitutional, as the stipulation that Congress need only pass a concurrent resolution to force the president to withdraw deployed troops seems to violate the prohibition on legislative vetoes established in INS v. Chadha. But, more importantly, the WPR wasn't really in tune with political reality:

it too narrowly defines the president’s war powers to exclude the power to respond to sudden attacks on Americans abroad; it empowers Congress to terminate an armed conflict by simply doing nothing; and it fails to identify which of the 535 members of Congress the president should consult before going to war.

Their recommendations:

Our proposed statute would provide that the president must consult with Congress before ordering a “significant armed conflict” — defined as combat operations that last or are expected to last more than a week. To provide more clarity than the 1973 War Powers Resolution, our statute also defines what types of hostilities would not be considered significant armed conflicts — for example, training exercises, covert operations or missions to protect and rescue Americans abroad. If secrecy or other circumstances precluded prior consultation, then consultation — not just notification — would need to be undertaken within three days.

To guarantee that the president consults with a cross section of Congress, the act would create a joint Congressional committee made up of the leaders of the House and the Senate as well as the chairmen and ranking members of key committees. These are the members of Congress with whom the president would need to personally consult. Almost as important, the act would establish a permanent, bipartisan staff with access to all relevant intelligence and national-security information.

Congress would have obligations, too. Unless it declared war or otherwise expressly authorized a conflict, it would have to vote within 30 days on a resolution of approval. If the resolution of approval was defeated in either House, any member of Congress could propose a resolution of disapproval. Such a resolution would have the force of law, however, only if it were passed by both houses and signed by the president or the president’s veto were overridden. If the resolution of disapproval did not survive the president’s veto, Congress could express its opposition by, for example, using its internal rules to block future spending on the conflict.

This is an admirable effort, and is infinitely better than the War Powers Resolution (not to mention that it solves the legislative veto problem). However, it is not likely to satisfactorily resolve the concerns over war powers.

On one hand, the proposed statute gives broad powers to the president, but still couches the commander-in-chief power under the domain of the legislative branch. As I have argued multiple times on this site, as well as in two law review articles and my forthcoming book, it is not at all clear that the Constitution intends Congress to have any say whatsoever over the deployment of the armed forces of the United States. If, as I argue, the "declare war" clause is about the power to transform the legal status of the political arenas rather than the power to deploy troops or initiate hostilities, then giving Congress any power to force the president to bring deployed troops home is a violation of the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution.

On the other hand, the method by which the proposed statute functions is unlikely to satisfy proponents of a more robust role for Congress on the issue of war powers. Forcing the president to bring the troops home would require: 1) A vote to authorize the deployment to fail; 2) Both Houses to pass a "resolution of disapproval," and; 3) Both Houses to override the inevitable presidential veto by a 2/3 vote. It is all but inconceivable that this would happen. Even in a fantastically unpopular war, like the current one in Iraq was during its darkest days, it is unlikely that enough of the president's fellow party members would defect. Furthermore, as Iraq has clearly demonstrated, even those congressmen vehemently opposed to the war are loath to go on record opposing the president, and even more hesitant to take actions to end the war when such actions would place blame and responsibility on their heads, rather than on the president's.

The report is a welcome improvement on the War Powers Resolution. But I do not expect that it will have any meaningful impact on the balance of war powers between the president and Congress. It does mandate regular reporting on active troop deployments, and creates a clear mechanism for doing so, and that is a good thing. But, even while rejecting the War Powers Resolution, presidents have tended to regularly report to Congress, so not much will change there either. Still, the War Powers Resolution is a terrible piece of legislation, and deserves to be put to rest. Whether this proposed legislation can and will pass is a question to which I do not know the answer. It definitely seems to reduce the power of Congress (although only hypothetically, as Congress has never even really tried to enforce the WPR), so it should be an interesting debate.

UPDATE: I'm currently teaching US Foreign Policy in summer school, and as we talked about war powers yesterday, we considered the Commission's report today. It occurred to me that there's another reason this proposal might be not-so-good from the perspective of desiring a strong congressional role. Forcing a vote on approving the deployment of force at the 30 day mark may make it more likely that Congress will fail to stand up to the president. It's exceedingly hard for Congress to go on record as opposing the use of force by the president. After all, no one wants to be seen as soft on ____ (Insert communism, terrorism, or whatever bogeyman is popular); furthermore, congressmen don't want to be blamed for whatever happens, especially if they force the troops to come home. So, at the 30 day mark, when the conflict is still relatively fresh, there may be bureaucratic inertia that favors the president and renders any dissent impotent.

The Torture of Christopher Hitchens

This blog has spent a fair amount of time in the past considering the question of torture (a few of the posts can be found here, here, here, here, and here). I've gone back and forth on the issue, but, in brief, my position is this: Measures amounting to torture, if they are to be used at all, must only be used in rare and specific cases and always in accordance with existing laws. But, for all my theoretical exploration of the issue I have, thankfully, no practical experience on which to base my argument.

But Christopher Hitchens does. Recently, Hitch allowed himself to be waterboarded by the people who train US Special Forces soldiers to resist torture at the hands of the enemy. The experience is, by all acounts, horrifying. Over at Vanity Fair, Hitchens has written an article about the experience, and there is a video as well. Both are well worth your time. In Hitchens' opinion, "if waterboarding does not constitute torture, then there is no such thing as torture."

I don't know quite what to make of the torture of Hitchens. Watching the video is truly shocking. He lasts all of 10 seconds (more or less) before ending the demonstration in sheer terror, and confesses to now having panic attacks and nightmares. However, while I may not have experienced waterboarding, I was under no naive conceptions about its nature. Nor does that change the theoretic logic with which I understand the dilemma. Of course, interrogation measures like waterboarding are extreme, terrifying, and torturous. They are, and should be, beyond the pale of all but the most extreme interrogations. If the country as a whole believes that there are absolutely no circumstances under which such techniques would be justified, then the techniques should be clearly and explicitly prohibited. Congress' refusal to explicitly ban waterboarding has left the door open for its use. While I do believe that the use of torture may, in very rare, unique, and controlled cases be justified, I also believe that the law must be followed.

The question of the use of torture is a difficult one to think clearly and rationally about. Hitchens manages to do so, even having undergone torture himself. As he notes (quoting a discussion he had with Malcolm Nance:

1. Waterboarding is a deliberate torture technique and has been prosecuted as such by our judicial arm when perpetrated by others.

2. If we allow it and justify it, we cannot complain if it is employed in the future by other regimes on captive U.S. citizens. It is a method of putting American prisoners in harm’s way.

3. It may be a means of extracting information, but it is also a means of extracting junk information. (Mr. Nance told me that he had heard of someone’s being compelled to confess that he was a hermaphrodite. I later had an awful twinge while wondering if I myself could have been “dunked” this far.) To put it briefly, even the C.I.A. sources for the Washington Post story on waterboarding conceded that the information they got out of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was “not all of it reliable.” Just put a pencil line under that last phrase, or commit it to memory.

4. It opens a door that cannot be closed. Once you have posed the notorious “ticking bomb” question, and once you assume that you are in the right, what will you not do? Waterboarding not getting results fast enough? The terrorist’s clock still ticking? Well, then, bring on the thumbscrews and the pincers and the electrodes and the rack.

As I've noted in my posts linked above, some of these arguments I do not buy; others I have great sympathy with. This is not an easy discussion to have; even having it is likely to get one branded as a "torture sympathizer." But we must have it.