Another Opportunity for Obama to Miss an Opportunity

When North Korea launched a "satellite" back in April, I wrote about how Obama missed a golden opportunity to shore up the UN's role in security issues as well as to put together a serious international effort to rein in North Korea.

Things have gotten worse.

Over the weekend, North Korea conducted what seems to be a successful test of a nuclear device that erases the failure of its previous attempt. Yesterday and today, North Korea has been launching several missiles -- both surface-to-air and surface-to-ship -- and is threatening to launch several more tomorrow. President Obama has vowed a swift and strong response to the test and launches, but it's not clear what good options exist at this point. Dan Blumenthal and Robert Kagan, in an op-ed in today's Washington Post outline the paucity of choices for the US:

the United States probably has little choice but to wait out Kim until the emergence of a leader who can make the strategic decision to abandon the nuclear weapons program. In the meantime, Washington should embark on a three-pronged approach. First, it should enhance its deterrent to protect itself, South Korea and Japan. That means, above all, bolstering American and allied missile defenses and deterrent capabilities. Unfortunately, it is precisely American missile defense capabilities that the Obama administration is now cutting -- despite the growing missile threat from North Korea and Iran. Second, it should strengthen multilateral efforts to stem North Korean proliferation, including more active efforts at interdiction and freezing bank accounts used to fund proliferation. Third, it should give up on the six-party talks. If it ever proves useful to talk to Pyongyang -- a big "if" -- let's do so directly.

Blumenthal and Kagan argue that neither China nor Russia has any serious interest in reining in North Korea, and thus efforts focused on mustering international will through the UN are useless.

While it's true that China does have an interest in a unpredictable and unfettered North Korea, that interest has its limits. China most certainly does not have an interest in a strengthened and proliferated Japan, which is a very serious possibility in the wake of the latest test. As Reuters reported over the weekend, Japan's ruling party is preparing to alter the constitution to allow for preemptive strikes under Japan's pacifistic doctrine. The LDP is also considering developing an indigenous early-warning satellite capability as Japan is currently dependent on US intelligence for warning of missile launches.

This would be a most unwelcome development for both China and Russia, which have long benefited from having a weakened and restrained Japan on their borders. And this is Obama's opening.

It's true that there aren't really any good options here. While it may have been feasible for the US to strike against the rocket launched two months ago, it is not possible for the US to use limited strikes against the nuclear program or the short-range missiles being launched now. The only option that exists while waiting out the passing of Kim Jong-Il is to get the UN to impose a complete and total sanctions regime on North Korea along the lines of that which was imposed on South Africa during the apartheid era. Doing so would require not just the acquiesence but the participation of both China and Russia, neither of which would participate for free.

But Obama has two things to offer: One is the prospect of the US operating through the multilateral channels of the UN, which Obama has clearly expressed a preference for doing when possible. Obama should make it clear to both Russia and China that North Korea is a test of their willingness to support the UN on issues of security, and that if they fail, the US will simply consider the UN to be obsolete on such issues in the future. If they want the UN to be a major player and to restrain the unilateralism of the US, then the UN has to be able to deal with such relatively easy cases as North Korea. Second, Obama should offer to use his good offices to prevent Japan from expanding its military doctrine and, down the road, from proliferating.

Both of these are issues about which Russia and China both care deeply; more deeply I believe than they care about keeping North Korea on the loose. If Obama plays his cards right, North Korea can be made to pay a meaningful and painful price for its wanton disregard of its obligations under international law.

But I doubt Obama will play his cards right. While Obama has shown a willingness to talk to any and all and to "reset" US relations, so far his talking has borne little if any fruit. Iran is just as intransigent, if not more so, than before, North Korea is, obviously, even more defiant, and Russia and China have responded to Obama's overtures with caution rather than warmth. So far, I've seen little evidence that Obama, his cabinet, or his policy aides have a strong coherent sense of policy to match their enthusiasm for talking.

What is China (and Russia) Doing?

I wrote a few days ago about how the UN's response to the North Korean launch of a missile/satellite would be vital in determining how the US deals with the UN and multilateralism more generally in the future. Specifically, I wrote that:

If China, Russia, and the other members of the UN truly wish to see the US restrain itself, follow international law, and respect the UN, the Security Council, and other international institutions, those institutions must demonstrate the ability to deal with security issues such as North Korea, a relatively easy case given the coincidence of interests between the major players (no one, especially not China, wants to see a nuclear DPRK).

Well, China and Russia don't seem to be listening to me. The UN Security Council met yesterday, but came to no agreement about what to do regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. China and Russia both expressed skepticism about the need for increasing sanctions on North Korea and opposed a US-Japanese resolution to punish the DPRK. UN insiders are reporting that Russian and Chinese opposition is so strong that "the United States and Japan might have to accept a non-binding warning statement from the council instead of a legally binding resolution." Meanwhile, China has advanced weak resolution that prompted one US official to comment that "The Chinese have come up with a completely watered down text which is unacceptable to us. It's not even worth discussing."

While I am not in any way surprised at the UN's complete inability to deal with issues of international security, I must admit I do not understand the strategic thinking of Russia and China here. President Obama has expressed his interest in more multilateral solutions as compared to President Bush, and sought to use the UN to deal with North Korea. Furthermore, neither Russia nor China has an interest in seeing North Korea proliferate. China in particular needs to worry about this, especially as North Korean proliferation may in turn drive Japan to develop a nuclear capability, or at the very least increase its ability for power projection.

Given that neither Russia nor China cares all that much about North Korea, given that they could have taken this opportunity as a chance to demonstrate that their preferred multilateral forum -- the UN Security Council -- is the proper place to deal with such issues and does have the capability to do so, given that the potential responses to North Korean proliferation are not in their interest, why would China and Russia be so unwilling to impose increased sanctions on North Korea for its flagrant violation of international law? I must admit I do not understand the strategic thinking here. The outcome of this intransigence is likely to demonstrate to Obama what President Bush knew: the multilateralism is not an end unto itself and that the UN cannot be relied upon to deal with issues that threaten American national security. Combine that with the regional destabilizing that will accompany North Korean proliferation and the potential for Japanese proliferation in turn, and it seems that China and Russia have made a colossal blunder here.

Russia Stands Alone

So much for Russia's hopes of igniting a united front against western power and leadership. Russian President Dimitri Medvedev went to the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization seeking the organization's backing for the Russian invasion of Georgia and subsequent recognition of the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Instead, the SCO refused to lend its support for the Russian endeavor, choosing instead a neutral stance, urging all parties to resolve their differences without war. The SCO furthermore endorsed the basic concept of territorial integrity.

It's difficult to see how Russia made such a strategic mistake, and why it expected to get the SCO's support. The members of the SCO are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and China. It's China's presence that makes Russia's move confusing. It seems likely that Russia thought that the opportunity to stand up to the US and NATO would be so appealing that China would jump at the chance. But given China's own domestic problems with separatist regions in Taiwan, Tibet and the Uighurs in the west, it seems foolish to ask China to support a principle that would encourage those regions to break away from China and that would allow outside parties to intervene to support their independence. Furthermore, China does not support any the independence of any separatist regions outside of China, as NATO did with Kosovo and as Russia did in Georgia. And finally, China has become increasingly interdependent on the US and western institutions, like the WTO. It should have been obvious to Russia that China would not back this move.

The move by the SCO reveals the limitations of Russian power and appeal. Russia simply does not have the strategic or ideological attraction that the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Few states are looking towards Russia as a viable alternative to the US and western leadership and institutions. While Russia's invasion of Georgia may pay off in the short-term, in the long run, Russia will be increasingly alienated from the global community which will, hopefully, be a price Russia would prefer not to pay.

The US should quickly move to exploit the decision by the SCO. The US should be telling China that Kosovo was a one-off, unique situation that will not be repeated, especially not in China. The US and NATO will not certainly not be willing to go to war with China to "free" Tibet or even Taiwan, and the cost of doing so diplomatically is also far too high a price for the west to pay. If China can come to see Russia as a dangerous, free-wheeling state that is a threat to international norms, Russia will be even more isolated. And that may help force Russia back in line.

Dark Days for Darfur

Things are getting much, more worse for Darfur lately. Last week, a convoy of UN peacekeepers was ambushed by 200 gunmen on horseback and in SUVs. Seven peacekeepers were killed, and 22 wounded in the attack, which reinforces the argument that peacekeeping forces are inappropriate and ill-suited for a conflict which has not been resolved. Peacekeeping forces normally are introduced into conflict situations that have ended by agreement of all warring parties but who do not trust one another to keep the peace. Thus, a neutral third party interposes itself between the sides, guaranteeing that each side will adhere to its commitments. But Darfur is not a settled conflict. The central government in Khartoum is still conducting its raids, the janjaweed continue to raid refugee camps, and the Darfuri rebels are still fighting back, even having attacked peacekeepers in the past.

As if the situation isn't bad enough, it's like to get much worse in the near future. Today, the International Criminal Court announced that its prosecutor has requested an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir on three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity and two of murder. While it will be months before the ICC to rule on the application, but if the warrant is issued, President al-Bashir will "effectively turn al-Bashir into a prisoner in his own country. In the past, Interpol has issued so-called Red Notices for fugitives wanted by the court, meaning they should be arrested any time they attempt to cross an international border."

But even if the warrant isn't issued, the damage is already done. The UN, which backs the ICC, also maintains the current peacekeeping force in Darfur, and it seems unlikely that Sudan will allow the peacekeepers to remain if their political leaders face indictment and arrest. The removal of the peacekeeping force, as ineffectual as it has been, would likely herald the resumption of a massive cleansing campaign by the Sudanese government in an effort to "solve" the Darfur problem before international intervention occurs again (if it ever does). Furthermore, the BBC reported on Sunday that China was breaking the UN-imposed arms embargo on Sudan, "roviding military equipment and training pilots to fly Chinese jets." While this development is all that surprising, given the diversion of international pressure on China from Darfur to Tibet, it is a troubling one, as it signals, perhaps, the end of Chinese cooperation on Sudan.

Given the precarious nature of the international community's involvement in Darfur, the indictment of al-Bashir by the ICC was definitely ill-timed and most likely ill-advised. I've blogged several times before about the problems inherent in international justice and law, and this is no different. Given that al-Bashir is unlikely to ever stand trial, maintaining the peacekeeping presence was more important than making a point through law.

The international community needs to prepare itself for more attacks on the peacekeepers, if not their expulsion from Sudan. And if (and when) that happens, given China's backsliding, it is all but impossible for the UN to put together a stronger intervention. So, the burden and responsibility will likely fall on the United States and its NATO allies. Sudan must not be allowed to continue its murderous campaign against Darfur, and China must not be allowed to shield Sudan. President Bush and the heads of states and government of the western countries should immediately threaten to boycott the Olympics, not over Tibet (which is a lost cause) but over Chinese violations of the arms embargo and protection of Sudan. China must be leveraged away from Sudan.

However, while China may be willing to support increased sanctions on Sudan, it will not, nor will Russia, support an intervention without the permission of the Sudanese government. Thus, NATO needs to be ready, if it cares at all about saving the Darfuri people, to deploy a force to Sudan immediately. Anything less will likely condemn the people of Darfur to their doom.

Trading Darfur For Tibet

With the uproar over the Chinese crackdown on Tibetan pro-independence/autonomy protests, the hubbub over the Olympic torch relay, and the to-do over the Dalai Lama's visit to the US, it's no wonder that the 2008 Beijing Olympics are being referred to as the "Tibet Olympics." As world leaders debate whether to boycott, or just skip, the Opening Ceremonies or the Games themselves, more and more attention gets turned to the cause of Tibet.

To the detriment of Darfur.

Before the protests in Tibet broke out, the Beijing Olympics were supposed to be the "Darfur Olympics." Much attention was paid to China's role as Sudan's patron and protector in the UN Security Council; Mia Farrow and Steven Spielberg criticized the Chinese government; I even spoke at a rally sponsored by SaveDarfur here in Tacoma about China's role in Sudan and what might be done. And the campaign seemed to be paying off. As I blogged last April:

after two years of shielding Sudan from international sanctions over the situation in Darfur, China has recently begun applying more pressure to Sudan.

Just when it seemed safe to buy a plane ticket to Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games, nongovernmental organizations and other groups appear to have scored a surprising success in an effort to link the Olympics, which the Chinese government holds very dear, to the killings in Darfur, which, until recently, Beijing had not seemed too concerned about.

Groups focusing on many issues, including Tibet and human rights, have called for boycotts of the Games next year. But none of those issues have packed the punch of Darfur, where at least 200,000 people — some say as many as 400,000 — mostly non-Arab men, women and children, have died and 2.5 million have been displaced, as government-backed Arab militias called the janjaweed have attacked the local population.

But now, all that attention has shifted to Tibet. The situation in Darfur continues to worsen, but the pressure is now off China to do anything to reverse things there. Political capital and the energy needed to motivate protests is, of course, limited. It may be that the media, non-governmental organizations, protesters, and the general public only have the resources to focus on one issue. If so, it seems as if Tibet has won out over Darfur for linkage with the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

But that would be a mistake. If only one cause can be aggressively championed (or even if championing both detracts from each), that cause should be Darfur. Not because the Darfuris are more worthy of protection that are the Tibetans, not because the situation is worse in Darfur (although a strong case could probably be made for that argument), not for any reason other than practicality. China is much more likely to yield to pressure over Darfur than it is over Tibet. Sudan represents important political and economic interests for China; Tibet represents sovereignty. China will, most likely, never cede Tibet. Greater autonomy is possible, but not in the short term. Using the Olympics to pressure and shame China into leaning on Sudan to moderate its behavior in Darfur seemed to be paying off. Using the Olympics to pressure and shame China into backing off Tibet is only likely to alienate and anger Beijing.

It would truly be a shame if an opportunity to help the people of Darfur went unrealized so that people can vent their anger over Tibet. The Tibetan people may very well deserve independence and our support. But not in ineffective protests that distract from and obstruct progress over Darfur.

The Fallout from the US Satellite Interception

The United States has apparently successfully intercepted a failing satellite using a missile fired from an Aegis-class cruiser. However, it's not clear that the benefits of the strike will be worth the likely fallout. Coming on the heels of a Chinese test of a dedicated anti-satellite weapon, pressure seems to be mounting towards a space-based arms race as countries race to develop ASAT and AASAT capabilities at the same time as they seek to protect their own satellites. According to Clay Moltz, a professor of nuclear and space policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in California, "[the destruction of the satellite] solved a short-term problem, but it may cause us long-term headaches in terms of emerging test programs in other countries.”

This is a bad situation for the United States. The US is far more advanced in its satellite technology and capabilities than any other country. And while satellites are fairly expensive and sophisticated, it doesn't take nearly as much effort or sophistication to shoot them down. If American dominance in space is threatened, American dominance in many other fields is threatened as well. From my previous post on the January 2007 Chinese ASAT test:

First, from a national security perspective, a good deal of the American dominance in combat comes from its huge advantages in information -- reconnaissance, communications, imaging, GPS targeting and navigation, and so on -- which relies on satellites. An early strike on those space-based assets could blind the US military and level the playing field. True, the US has better weapons platforms and better trained soldiers, but without satellites, those advantages get mitigated.

Second, from a more global perspective, there is so much dual-use technology sharing between the military and the wider public that satellites, even military ones, are rarely purely military targets. GPS navigation, cell phones, weather imaging...all of these technologies rely on satellites that would be targeted in any preemptive military strike. Extending war into space could have dire consequences not just for the US military, but for the economies and civilian populations the world over.

The US needs to move quickly to derail the emerging space arms race. The US stands to lose far more than does any other actor, including China. There may have been pressing reasons to use a missile to destroy this particular falling satellite (although the only one that is credible is that the US feared that enough of the satellite would survive re-entry and impact as to pose a security threat if another country was able to retrieve it), this incident must not be allowed to set a precedent or spur spiral pressures for an arms race. The US has long opposed a global treaty banning ASAT weapons developments, largely for concerns over verification. Just last week, China and Russia proposed an international treaty banning ASATs. The US needs to work to figure out a mechanism by which it can confidently create a regime ensuring that space will remain peaceful and available for use by Americans and the world alike.

A Test For China

For the first time, the World Trade Organization has issued a major ruling against China. According to the AP report:

The WTO found that China was breaking trade rules by taxing imports of auto parts at the same rate as foreign-made finished cars, according to a copy of the ruling's conclusions obtained by The Associated Press.

In the sweeping decision, the three-member WTO panel found against China on nearly every point of contention with the U.S., the 27-nation EU and Canada.

The three trade powers argued that the tariff was discouraging automakers from using imported car parts for the vehicles they assemble in China. As a result, car parts companies had an incentive to shift production to China, costing Americans, Canadians and Europeans their jobs, they said.

...

China, which will still be able to appeal, claims the tariffs are intended to stop whole cars being imported in large chunks, allowing companies to avoid the higher tariff rates for finished cars. It argues that all measures are fully consistent with WTO rules and do not discriminate against foreign auto parts.

But the U.S. and the EU say that China promised not to treat parts as whole cars when it joined the WTO in 2001.

China's accession to the WTO was a vital component of the US strategy of engagement, in which economic relations with China are pursued as part of a two-pronged strategy. The first goal of economic development is to transform China's domestic economy into a middle-class, capitalist-style market which, it is argued, will in turn create domestic pressure for political reform. The second strategy of engagement is to make China increasingly dependent on the international community so that adherence to the status quo is more valuable than challenging it.

The WTO is an excellent forum for the latter strategy, as it requires countries to alter their domestic laws and economic rules to comply with international free trade requirements. As protection of domestic status is, more or less, the raison d'etre of national governments, agreeing to alter those arrangements for the sake of international free trade is a powerful signal of adherence to the status quo. How China reacts to the first negative ruling will be a meaningful statement of how China understands its own preferences vis-a-vis the status quo and the international system. If it agrees to comply with the ruling, which will certainly harm a sector of China's domestic economy that it desires to protect, it will be a strong sign that engagement is working.

The Return Of The Club For Growth

The passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 is now widely seen as one of the most disastrous laws ever passed by Congress. The high tarrifs lengthened and intensified, if not caused, the Great Depression and contributed to the coming of World War II by exacerbating poor economic conditions in Europe and undermining any sense of international trust. At the time, it was opposed by 1,028 of this county's leading economists, who called themselves the Club For Growth. Unfortunately, Congress thought it knew better than the economists and ignored their advice.

History seems to be repeating itself today as a newly protectionism-minded Congress prepares to pass legislation that will impose punitive tariffs on China if China does not raise the value of its currency, the yuan. While the yuan has risen by about 9% in value relative to the dollar, it may still be undervalued by 40%.

Fortunately, the Club For Growth has returned, as 1,028 of our leading economists have once again signed a petition urging Congress to abandon punitive tariffs as a policy tool. Unfortunately, it's likely that the current incarnation of the Club will be ignored just as was the first.

There are so many reasons why these tariffs would be a bad idea. First, they are little more than protectionism disguised as congressmen seek to protect their inefficient and struggling manufacturing industries from foreign competition. Succeeding will cost this country, and the global economy, billions of dollars, and will punish the poorest Americans who can least afford to waste their money on tariffs.

Second, this policy threatens to undermine the long-standing US policy of engagement towards China. While China is not a model global citizen, there can be no question that the China of today is infinitely better -- economically, socially, politically -- than the China of 20 years ago, and little doubt that the China of tomorrow will be better than the China of today. And there is little question that economic interdependence, globalization, and engagement are large reasons why.

Undermining such a critical long-term policy for short-term political benefit is so short-sighted as to be moronic. But why would we expect anything less from our elected officials?

A Victory For Engagement

I blogged a few days ago about the role of the US strategy of engagement in moderating the behavior of China and how the recent filing of suit against China by the US in the WTO was likely to produce a nice test of the strategy as well as China's preferences. Today we have more evidence that the strategy of engagement is working. The New York Times is reporting that, after two years of shielding Sudan from international sanctions over the situation in Darfur, China has recently begun applying more pressure to Sudan. According to the article:

A senior Chinese official, Zhai Jun, traveled to Sudan to push the Sudanese government to accept a United Nations peacekeeping force. Mr. Zhai even went all the way to Darfur and toured three refugee camps, a rare event for a high-ranking official from China, which has extensive business and oil ties to Sudan and generally avoids telling other countries how to conduct their internal affairs.

Why the change? The Times credits a PR campaign waged against the upcoming 2008 Olympics to be held in Beijing:

Credit goes to Hollywood — Mia Farrow and Steven Spielberg in particular. Just when it seemed safe to buy a plane ticket to Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games, nongovernmental organizations and other groups appear to have scored a surprising success in an effort to link the Olympics, which the Chinese government holds very dear, to the killings in Darfur, which, until recently, Beijing had not seemed too concerned about.

Ms. Farrow, a good-will ambassador for the United Nations Children’s Fund, has played a crucial role, starting a campaign last month to label the Games in Beijing the “Genocide Olympics” and calling on corporate sponsors and even Mr. Spielberg, who is an artistic adviser to China for the Games, to publicly exhort China to do something about Darfur. In a March 28 op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, she warned Mr. Spielberg that he could “go down in history as the Leni Riefenstahl of the Beijing Games,” a reference to a German filmmaker who made Nazi propaganda films.

Four days later, Mr. Spielberg sent a letter to President Hu Jintao of China, condemning the killings in Darfur and asking the Chinese government to use its influence in the region “to bring an end to the human suffering there,” according to Mr. Spielberg’s spokesman, Marvin Levy.

China soon dispatched Mr. Zhai to Darfur, a turnaround that served as a classic study of how a pressure campaign, aimed to strike Beijing in a vulnerable spot at a vulnerable time, could accomplish what years of diplomacy could not.

Groups focusing on many issues, including Tibet and human rights, have called for boycotts of the Games next year. But none of those issues have packed the punch of Darfur, where at least 200,000 people — some say as many as 400,000 — mostly non-Arab men, women and children, have died and 2.5 million have been displaced, as government-backed Arab militias called the janjaweed have attacked the local population.

It is extremely important to China that the Games go off smoothly. Hosting the Olympics represents China's aspirations to join and get respect from the international community. Landing the Games in the first place was seen as validation for China's economic and political moderation, and it scares China that something like Darfur could taint that. According to J. Stephen Morrison of CSIS, China's goal "is to be seen as an ethical, rising global power. Their goal is not to get in bed with every sleazy government that comes up with a little oil."

Again we see the logic of engagement at work. Only by getting China to value its connections with the larger international community more than those with genocidal states would China be willing to challenge a strategic ally -- especially one that provides oil that is much-needed to maintain China's economic boom. While China has not yet agreed to allow the UN to impose serious sanctions on Sudan, there is evidence that Chinese pressure has been instrumental in the little ground Sudan has ceded lately. And while it may still be a long way to the deployment of an international peace keeping force, getting China to rethink where its interests lie is a critical step, and one that could only occur in the context of engagement.

China's Poker Face

The US recently announced that it would soon file suit against China in the World Trade Organization (WTO) over Chinese trade barriers as well as violations of intellectual property through piracy of DVDs, video games, CDs, books, and other good. The decision is a change in the long-standing approach of the US, defined as "engagement," in which the US has overlooked Chinese violations of various laws and norms -- such as in human rights as well as economic -- in order to not derail the process of tying China more tightly to the international political and economic community. For example, after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the economic sanctions imposed by the US only lasted about 6 months (although a joint arms embargo imposed by the US and the EU is still in place today). When newly-elected President Clinton tried to condition renewal of Chinese Most-Favored Nation status on improvements in Chinese human rights policies as a response to the perceived soft American reaction to Tiananmen Square, Clinton was forced to abandon his threat and back away from confrontation.

The policy of engagement is based on two assumptions. One is that the process of domestic economic growth will create a climate more conducive to the development of a middle class, which in turn will demand political reforms, such as property rights and increased access to information, to protect their new-found wealth and status and to ensure future competitiveness. Such political reform will inevitably move the country closer to democracy, and following the logic of the democratic peace theory, democracies are less bellicose. Thus, China's peaceful rise can be assured by turning the country into a nation of rich, middle-class consumers.

The second thread of engagement is an argument that as China's economy grows, China will become increasingly tied to international economic and political institutions, such as the WTO. As that interdependence grows, China will come to identify its national interest with cooperation, not confrontation, as confrontation would risk upsetting the apple cart, threatening to undermine all of China's economic ties.

This larger policy of engagement, however, does create a moral hazard problem, in which China is encouraged to "cheat" in the short-term, knowing that the US is taking a long-term approach, and won't punish defection too seriously for fear for ruining the larger relationship. This explains, among other things, the "China-Google" controversy from last year.

So why is the US willing to challenge China now? For one, the process of Chinese integration into the global economy and political superstructure has proceeded nicely. Chinese entry into the WTO marked a critical junction; if China was willing to join the WTO and alter its laws to meet membership requirements, it is possible that the appropriate level of economic and political integration has occurred, and that China now identifies its interest with the status quo.

In my dissertation, as well as an article I published in the journal Security Studies entitled "Institutional Signaling and the Origins of the Cold War," I argued that institutions are vitally important to international politics not only for their intended benefits, but because they force states to reveal private information about their type and preferences. Complying with an institutional obligation forces a state to revel that it values adherence more than defection. That enables other states to then judge the first state's intentions and preferences.

China will be faced with a separating equilibrium -- a costly decision that will force actors of one type to choose one action, while actors of another type will not be willing to pay the cost and thus will choose a different action; this then reveals the preferences of the actors -- in the WTO: Risk losing in the WTO process and be forced to change its laws and behaviors (something China obviously would prefer not to do, otherwise the laws and behaviors in question wouldn't exist), or refuse to comply. Refusal will, however, force the EU and the US to question Chinese commitment to the multilateral economic and political institutions that make up the international system. Why would China be allowed to benefit from those institutions if it won't meet its obligations and responsibilities? Failure to comply would put at risk the economic growth that has buoyed the Chinese state. But, if China would prefer to pursue its own path, if it sees the extant rules as incommensurate with its national interest, it will not be willing to pay the price of WTO compliance.

The suit filed by the US against China signals that the US is ready to test Chinese intentions. All eyes will be on China to see if it complies with the institutional processes and any adverse ruling. If it does, the policy of engagement will be justified. If not, however, expect to see increased confrontation and suspicion of Chinese intentions. My guess is that China will comply. There's simply too much at stake for China to prefer being a revisionist state that seeks to undermine the status quo.

War In Space?

The wars of the future will not be fought on a battlefield or at sea. They will be fought on space, or possibly on the top of a very tall mountain. In any case, most of the fighting will be done by small robots. And as you go forth today, remember always your duty is clear: To build and maintain those robots. Thank you.

-- Commandant, Rommelwood Military School ("The Secret War of Lisa Simpson," The Simpsons).

The war envisioned in the above quote is perhaps not quite so far off any more. On January 11, China successfully tested a ground-based weapon system designed to intercept and destroy space-based platforms, such as satellites. Using a kinetic-kill vehicle (a weapon that uses kinetic energy rather than explosives to destroy its target), China successfully knocked out an aging weather satellite using a ballistic missile. The test has been greeted with condemnation from the US, Great Britain, Japan, Australia, and Canada as an unnecessary creation of a space-based arms race, to which China has responded by professing its desire to "oppose the weaponization of space."

Why is a successful test of an ASAT (anti-satellite) weapon so troubling to so many countries? War is a pretty awful and comprehensive business anyway? Why would extending war into space be so vexing? Several reasons: First, from a national security perspective, a good deal of the American dominance in combat comes from its huge advantages in information -- reconnaissance, communications, imaging, GPS targeting and navigation, and so on -- which relies on satellites. An early strike on those space-based assets could blind the US military and level the playing field. True, the US has better weapons platforms and better trained soldiers, but without satellites, those advantages get mitigated.

Second, from a more global perspective, there is so much dual-use technology sharing between the military and the wider public that satellites, even military ones, are rarely purely military targets. GPS navigation, cell phones, weather imaging...all of these technologies rely on satellites that would be targeted in any preemptive military strike. Extending war into space could have dire consequences not just for the US military, but for the economies and civilian populations the world over.

The Bush Administration has, to date, not been willing to expend any resources for a ban on anti-satellite weapons, stating that "there is no arms race in space." Now there is. And it's serious. Despite Chinese professions to the contrary, "in the short-term, the Chinese will simply not be credible partners in efforts to keep space peaceful. Moreover, other countries could follow suit with their own anti-satellite programs, including the United States." Furthermore, the test sends another strong signal that China is moving to balance the might of the US.

The US needs to move quickly to deal with this development. While a war with China may be a long, long, LONG off, the US strategy of engagement cannot become complacent. If China is to be slowly brought in to the Western fold, it needs to be presented with stark choices: Its support for the genocidal Sudanese regime, for example, should be punished by the restriction of economic ties, as should any further development of ASAT weapons. Such actions may hurt in the short run, but if China really prefers economic engagement with the West to military confrontation, the pain won't last too long. However, if China desires to challenge US hegemony, better to know now than later.

The Manama Dialogue: Asia's Role in the Persian Gulf

Sorry for the delays in blogging the Manama Dialogue...there seems to be some problems in getting governments to approve the release of the transcripts of their officials. But, I now have a few more addresses....

Speaking on Asia's role in the Persian Gulf was H.E. Mr. M.K. Narayanan, National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of India and H.E. Mr. Sun Bigan, China's Special Envoy to the Middle East. The full texts of their speeches can be found here and here respectively. Unfortunately, the speeches seem to be plagued by what I have previously identified as the Immutable Law of Speeches by Public Officials: the fact that the more important and higher up in government the speaker, the less meaningful the speech. Both of these speeches are long in vague generalizations, but short in concrete suggestions for solving the serious security problems. My guess is that the most interesting work at the Manama Dialogue is happening off-the-record at dinners, over drinks, and between plenary sessions. Note that there are also break-out groups, which are not being made part of the public record.

Mr. Narayanan makes a few interesting points, perhaps the most interesting of which is:

There are other issues as well which demand close attention. Any calibration of effort to create stable conditions cannot, for instance, ignore the role of Iran. India has long-standing ties with Iran. It is an important trade partner, apart from providing for India’s access to Central Asia. Like any other nation, Iran has its security concerns and perceptions; these need to be suitably addressed. Regional security quite clearly requires that there is a dialogue between the concerned parties in this regard. Non-engagement cannot be the basis of a long-term strategy.

India and Iran have long shared dissatisfaction at the exclusion from the parents' table, each feeling itself to be ignored and underappreciated by the most powerful players on the international stage. This has contributed to a synchronization of many mutual interests, including nuclear proliferation. The US and the West has long tried to get India to participate in ramping up pressure on Iran, which India has refused to do. The comments by Narayanan indicate that India will continue to press for direct negotiation, as well as an acknowledgement of Iran's legitimate security concerns. India's own proliferation makes it unlikely that India would support sanctions or punishments on Iran. Here, India's interests diverge from those of most of the relevant actors in the Gulf.

Narayanan does express very strong support for the stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, which is not surprising a stable and secure Afghanistan provides a check on India's major concern, Pakistan. Narayanan stated that:

Taliban’s incursions into Southern Afghanistan have been made possible by the existence of support structures across the border from Afghanistan. Any destabilization of the moderate and democratic Afghan Government would have incalculable long-term consequences, not only for Afghanistan but for almost all countries in the region, including India, and also Central Asia. It could, in turn, also have a domino effect with extremist and fundamentalist elements gaining the upper hand, endangering peace and stability along a very wide arc. This could have incalculable global consequences. Thus, the international community has a vital stake in ensuring that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for extremist and fundamentalist forces.

Note the not-so-subtle accusation of Pakistani support for the Taliban. This is an issue of vital importance for India, and an area where pressure can be placed on India to, perhaps, join international efforts to deal with Iran. It does point out why Afghanistan is so critical for global security, and why NATO's effort there must not fail.

Mr. Bigan's speech was even less substantive than was Mr. Narayanan's. However, given China's recent forays into Africa, the Persian Gulf represents an excellent opportunity for China to continue to extend its influence and balance the US and the West. Thus, perhaps the most important part of Bigan's address was:

In order to build a harmonious Gulf, we must be committed to promoting economic and social development of the region. Development is a precondition to eradicate the destabilizing factors of regional security, and an important basis and the guarantee of peace and stability. Sustained peace is impossible without sustained development. We support the Gulf countries to strengthen regional economic cooperation, and to endeavor to set up an open, fair and regulated multilateral trading system, so as to realize mutual benefit and win-win results with other economies. We also support the Gulf countries to choose a model of development that adapts their own historical traditions, cultural characters and development levels. We believe that sustained and sound economic and social development will provide a solid basis for the regional security.

Again, we see a strong argument for globalization. China has learned, perhaps more than any other country, of the power of economic reform and openness. This may herald a drive for China to increase its presence in and connections to the Persian Gulf. But more importantly, it entrenches the need for economic liberalization, which cannot help but produce, albeit slowly, political liberalization.

Caution: Balancing Ahead!

Over the weekend, there were numerous news reports about China's diplomatic efforts in Africa, including debt forgiveness, pledges of large aid packages, and other agreements designed to pull Africa and China closer together. Specifically, China offered $5 billion in loans and credits and promised to double its aid to the continent by 2009, as well as promised to forgive the interest-free loans of the most indebted and underdeveloped states. Among other deals, China agreed to:

-- train 15,000 African professionals, send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa, and set up 10 agricultural technology centers in Africa over the next three years.

-- build 30 hospitals and provide 300 million yuan (37.5 million U.S. dollars) in grants to help fight malaria.

-- dispatch 300 volunteers, build 100 rural schools, and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from 2,000 per year now to 4,000 per year by 2009.

-- increase to more than 440 from 190 the number of items which will not be taxed when imported to China from Africa. He did not provide details.

There's nothing in and of itself troubling about any of these deals. But taken in context of the larger strategic picture, they could spell trouble for American foreign policy, as well as for the broader agenda of liberal international security. We can see quite clearly how Chinese ties to Sudan have negatively impacted the ability of the UN and the West to effectively deal with the problem of Darfur. As Chinese influence in Africa grows, China will continue to gain more of a say in the political affairs of Africa, and as Darfur clearly demonstrates, China and the West still don't see eye to eye on all issues.

What can the West, and specifically the US, do to counter China's growing African presence? A few things. First, the US and the West should take steps to increase their influence there. I'm not a huge fan of debt forgiveness as in isolation it can create a moral hazard and contribute to bad governance. But, it's far past time for the US and other Western countries to stop protecting their agricultural and manufacturing sectors and open up those areas to the comparative advantages of African producers. As this year's Nobel Peace Prize made clear, the surest path to peace is economic development, and the surest path to economic development is innovation and free trade. Programs like the Millenium Challenge Account need to be expanded and strengthened, as they help provide economic improvements along with strengthening governance and democracy.

The US also needs to work more at connecting China to the larger globalized economy, making it clear that China's ability to profit from its relations with the West depend on China's overall strategic behavior. If China wants to continue to protect the Sudanese government, for example, it must realize that such behavior will be costly to its larger economy and efforts to enter into the globalized world. This strategy would pay dividends with North Korea as well, but Africa will, very likely, become increasingly important in a strategic sense in the future, not only as a latent source of economic growth, but also a nexus for security challenges, such as ethnic conflict and infectious disease.

Moving to counter China's African initative not only makes sense for the strategic interests of the US and its liberal democratic allies. It also makes sense of the long-suffering peoples of Africa.

UPDATE: To see how the Millenium Challenge Account grades the performance of the developing world, and what programs have already been put in place, go here.

An Open Letter on Darfur

Courtesy of the Henry Jackson Society:

Alarmed by the continuing murder of the black people of Darfur by the Janjaweed militias - supported by the Sudanese regime in Khartoum - The Henry Jackson Society decided that more appropriate and concerted action by the world’s great democracies should be requested from leading governments. Accordingly, The Henry Jackson Society issued an open letter on the crisis in Darfur, signed by fifty-five politicians, opinion formers, academics and journalists, to both raise awareness of this pressing moral and strategic issue, and call on the international community to end ethnic cleansing in Darfur.

The open letter has been sent to the High Representative for European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, Dr. Javier Solana; Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Rt. Hon. Tony Blair MP; Chancellor of Germany, Dr. Angela Merkel; President of France, M. Jacques Chirac; President of the United States, Mr. George W. Bush; Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh; and President of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki. It was sent also to the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Rt. Hon. Margaret Beckett MP and the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt. Hon. Des Browne MP.

An open letter on the crisis in Darfur to the leaders of the European Union, the United States, India, South Africa, and other great democracies.

After the Holocaust, the world said ‘never again’ to genocide. Yet our will to prevent the murder and destruction of particular peoples was not sufficient to stop further genocides, even in the closing years of the last century. The genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia are a scar on the conscience of the world, and they led to insecurity and suffering on a scale which is beyond comprehension.

Today, in the early years of a new century the world stares in the hideous face of genocide once again. In Darfur, the black population faces annihilation at the hands of Arab Janjaweed and other militias, supported by the Sudanese regime in Khartoum. This is not a civil war or a religious conflict, but a calculated strategy of intimidation and ethnic cleansing. It is designed to kill, remove or enslave black people in Darfur. 200,000 have already been murdered, with a further two million driven from their homes.

We therefore urge our leaders – of the European Union and its member-states, the United States of America, India, South Africa, and other democratic nations the world over – to ensure that genocide does not destroy the people of Darfur. And although a genocide in Darfur is a serious moral issue, it is also a concern paramount to European security. Should the situation deteriorate further, it will spill over and damage an already unstable region, creating a breeding ground for extremism and terror. Moreover, we have a clear strategic interest to prevent attempts by the People’s Republic of China to support repressive regimes in Africa in return for energy concessions.

In light of such circumstances, we call on our governments to empower and fund the African Union, so that it has one last chance to deal with the crisis. Meanwhile, our leaders must apply as much pressure as may be required on the Sudanese regime in order to make it cooperate with the international community. Khartoum must allow international forces with a robust mandate into Darfur to reverse ethnic cleansing and re-establish the rule of law, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706. Should this cooperation not be forthcoming, we call on our governments to take all the necessary action – insofar as is possible in coordination with the United Nations – to ensure that the people of Darfur are protected, and that those driven from their livelihoods be allowed to return to their homes. This may require the speedy deployment of peace enforcers and the establishment of no-fly zones, in order to prevent the Sudanese regime from assisting the Janjaweed in their murder.

For many months, Darfur has stood on a precipice; today, it is very close to falling off into a dark age of chaos, carnage and genocidal murder. We must not let this happen.

Supported by (institutional affiliation listed only for means of identification),

Karim Abdian - Director, Ahwaz Human Rights Organisation

Mansour Silawi Ahwazi - Foreign Relations, Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz

Michael Allen - Editor, Democracy Digest

Nasser Bani Assad - President, British Ahwazi Friendship Society

Paul Beaver - Commentator and Parliamentary Advisor, United Kingdom

Prof. Vernon Bogdanor - Professor of Government, University of Oxford

Nicholas Boles - Director, Policy Exchange

Roberta Bonazzi - Director, European Foundation for Democracy

Max Boot - Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Daniel Brett - Director, British Ahwazi Friendship Society

Chris Bryant MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

David Clelland MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

Humphry Crum Ewing - Chairman, The Standish Group

Yahia Elbashir - Human Rights Secretary, Darfur Union

David Gauke MP - Member of Parliament (Conservative), United Kingdom

Michael Gove MP - Member of Parliament (Conservative), United Kingdom

Robert Halfon - Political Director, Conservative Friends of Israel

Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann - Founder and President, World Security Network

Gary Kent - Director, Labour Friends of Iraq (Personal Capacity)

Daniel Keohane - Centre for European Reform

Dr. William Kristol - Editor, The Weekly Standard

Bruce Jackson - President, Project on Transitional Democracies

Prof. Alan Johnson - Editor, Democratiya

Henry Knobil

Jackie Lawrence - Member of Parliament (Labour), 1997-2005, United Kingdom

The Hon. John Lehman - Secretary of the United States Navy, 1981-1987

Prof. Andrew Lever - University of Cambridge

Dr. Andrew Lilico - Managing Director, Europe Economics

Gideon Mailer - Africa Director, The Henry Jackson Society

Dr. Alan Mendoza - Executive Director, The Henry Jackson Society

Jan Mortier - Director, Civitatis International

Michael Mosbacher - Director, The Social Affairs Unit

Douglas Murray - Senior Fellow, The Social Affairs Unit

Fionnuala Jay O’Boyle MBE - Jay Associates Public and Government Affairs

Robert Philpot - Director, Progress

Dr. Efraim Podosik - Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Stephen Pollard - Columnist, The Times

Greg Pope MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

Ben Ramm - Editor, The Liberal

Ben Rogers - Deputy Chairman, Conservatives’ Human Rights Commission

James M. Rogers - Executive Secretary, The Henry Jackson Society

Prof. William Rubinstein - University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Prof. Roger Scruton - University of Arlington

Dr. Gary Schmitt - Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Dr. Brendan Simms - Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

Alex Singleton - Director-General, The Globalisation Institute

Dr. Ulrich Speck - Commentator and Journalist

Eva Strickmann - German Council on Foreign Relations

Gisela Stuart MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

Peter Tatchell - Human Rights Campaigner

Rebecca Tinsley - Waging Peace

Lord Trimble - Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, 1998

Tomáš Weiss - Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM

Stuart Wheeler - Founder of IG Index

Prof. Alan Lee Williams - Director, Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom

More on Taiwan

Michael Turton's comment to my post about China and Taiwan deserves a direct response. First, Mr. Turton grossly mischaracterizes the Anti-Secession Law passed by China in early 2005. Yes, the law does raise the possibility of using force to retake Taiwan, but only if Taiwan continues to move towards independence. Here is the relevant section from the Anti-Secession Law:

Article 8 In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The State Council and the Central Military Commission shall decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in the preceding paragraph and shall promptly report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

This is simply a codification of the existing status quo, which Taiwan has been doing more to undermine than has China.

The "deal" Mr. Turton claims does not exist is the quid pro quo known as "strategic ambiguity" by which the US has controlled and smoothed problems between China and Taiwan: Taiwan will not seek or move towards de jure independence and China will not seek to forcefully reunite with Taiwan. This deal is an absolutely critical part of US-China relations, and without it, the US would not be willing to support Taiwan. China is simply too important to the US, both economically and strategically, to allow the Taiwan question to scuttle US-Sino relations. It will never be allowed to happen. If the US is forced to choose between protecting Taiwan and good relations with China, Taipei has no chance. Only this non-existent deal has kept Taiwan safe and indepdent in a de facto sense.

Mr. Turton castigates the Chinese for crying to the US to restrain Taiwan in this instance, writing that "It's a might hypocritical for China to yammer for three decades that the US is interfering, and then suddenly ask the US to interfere." This is not hypocritical at all. China has accepted the concept of "strategic ambiguity" and has allowed the US to shore up Taiwan, so long as there are no moves towards independence. Abolishing the Council, even if only symbolic, represents such a move.

Make no mistake. China will use force to prevent Taiwan from obtaining formal sovereign indepdence. It may be true that China does not have a sufficient amphibious force projection capability to invade, but China does have a large long-range strike force, in missiles and airplanes.

Mr. Turton further complains that "There isn't any balance anymore. China now has military ascendancy over Taiwan, and the US has been tilting toward China for the last twenty years. The "ambiguity" that you refer to in your second paragraph has been replaced by a veiled agreement that China can annex Taiwan, an island no ethnic Chinese emperor ever owned. The US simply says it cannot do so by force. At the moment, the US position, weirdly, is that it is willing to go war to prevent violent annexation." All of this is true, except for the implication that this is anything new. China has always enjoyed military dominance over Taiwan, and the US has long supported the policy of "strategic ambiguity" to manage Sino-Taiwanese relations.

Taiwanese independence is a fact that China cannot undo by diplomacy, unless Taiwan consents. The longer Taiwan exists, the harder that fact becomes. And as the Chinese leaderhip ages and moderates itself, the more chance there is that, somewhere in the future, China will allow, to some degree, Taiwanese legal sovereignty. By rocking the boat now, Taiwan is compromising any chances it may have in the future.

Turton concludes by claiming that "It is both curious and sad that you regard Taiwan, the victim in this case, and the last legacy of the Great Game of the 19th century, as the cause of the problem. Independence and democracy are not threats to anyone. Rather, people who make threats and point missiles are the problem." True. Politics is a nasty business. I would wager that all US presidents would prefer to support a democratic Taiwan instead of a communist China. But political reality dicates the opposite behavior.

Finally, if Taiwan so desperately wants independence and formal de jure sovereignty, there is nothing that US or China can do to stop Taiwan from declaring a split with China. So why doesn't Taiwan make such a move? Because it can't survive without US support. If Taiwan can't maintain its independence without the US, then Taiwan needs to do what the US asks of it. America will not, and should not, come to Taiwan's aid if it provokes a Chinese attack.

Trouble in Taiwan

China has issued a not-so-subtle warning to the US that the US needs to more to rein in Taiwan's hopes for independence from the mainland. On Feb. 27th, Taiwan abolished the National Unification Counci, a body tasked with creating guidelines for the eventual unification of Taiwan and China. While the Council had been largely defunct since Taiwanese President Chen assumed office in 2000, Chen did issue a campaign promise not to take steps to inflame the independence movement, specifically promising not to abolish the Council. China is upset that the US has not been more involved in restraining Taiwan in such moves.

The US policy towards Taiwan has long been based on "strategic ambiguity"; that is, it's not clear what the US would do in case of a Chinese invasion. Most analysts assume that the US reaction would depend on the nature of the provocation: If Taiwan moves towards independence prompting a Chinese invasion, the US would likely not aid Taiwan, while if China launches an unprovoked invasion, the US most likely would come to help Taiwan.

Moves like abolishing the National Unification Council are unnecessary fingers in the eyes of China. China has long tolerated the de facto independence of Taiwan but is unwilling to see that become de jure. Steps like this increase the chances that Taiwan will seek formal independence. The US must, for the sake of Asian stability, restrain Taiwan and encourage Taiwan to stick to the deal as it exists. Anything else risks upsetting a fragile balance.

More on China and Google

Sunday's Washington Post had an excellent article about China and the censoring of the Internet. In short, the article argues that "widespread Internet use in [China's] largest cities and among the educated is changing the way Chinese learn about the world and weakening the Communist Party's monopoloy on the media." How is this possible? Doesn't the Chinese government censor the Internet? Doesn't Google help the Communist Party do this, in a nefarious attempt to make money at all costs?

The article writes that "the success of those [censorship] measures has been mixed. ...the Internet presents a formidable challenge to China's authoritarian political system." Just having access to the Internet, even if it's under governmental control, makes it more difficult to keep information out. And the more information flows into China, the better. So, as I've said before, chastising, punishing, or preventing Google from bringing the Internet into China, even if they have to collaborate with the Communist Party to do so, is extremely short-sighted.

China, Google, and Censorship

Over at Instapundit is a collection of posts relating to Google's decision to cooperate with Chinese government officials in censoring web access as a condition for launching Google's search-engine into the Sino-sphere. Naturally this decision is being met with derision and scorn from human rights activists and others dismayed by Google's decision to censor the Net.

It seems to me that these critiques may be a bit short-sighted and possibly even counter-productive. Of course, I would prefer that China was not an authoritarian country, did not censor what its citizens are allowed to read and would not have put Google in this position. But lets consider, for a moment, the nature of US foreign policy towards China which can be described in one word: engagement. The logic stems from IR theories of democratic peace and economic interdependence. In short, the argument goes that as China becomes richer and more integrated into the international community, it will necessarly become more open and free domestically (as middle-class businessmen clamor for more transparency, greater enforcement of rule of law and property rights, a more open and fair economic environment, improved access to information, etc.) and more responsible on the world stage (preferring to gain the benefits of cooperation with the US and the West [such as membership in the WTO and hosting the Olympic Games] as opposed to wages of rogue status).

This is the logic that has guided US policy towards China for decades. It is the logic that prompted the first President Bush to quickly move beyond the Tiananmen Square massacres and re-establish friendly relations with China. It is the same logic that forced President Clinton to renege on his threat to tie China's MFN status to improvements in China's human rights record. It is a long-term strategy that ignores (or at least minimizes) short-term problems and concerns in favor of a slow, evolutionary approach. Better to continue, goes the argument, the slow transition towards a liberal economy and freer society than harp on one particular and immediate human rights violation and undermine the whole process.

Now, I do not believe (although I admit I know little about business so perhaps I'm wrong) that Google is aware of its role in this strategy and that Google's executives do not see their business decisions regarding China as fitting into the bigger picture of US foreign policy. But, I also believe that criticizing Google in hopes that it will be shamed into abandoning its ventures in China is a bad, short-sighted idea. China is already a more open and freer society than it was 10 or 15 years ago, and while the trajectory may not be smooth or even, it is trending towards even more freedom. If Google can assist that long-term development, it may be worth a little short-term censorship. This, in a nutshell, is what is known as realpolitik.