Or Else What?

In the wake of a demand from the International Atomic Energy Agency to stop work on its recently-revealed uranium enrichment plant, Iran has threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to begin construction on ten more nuclear enrichment facilities. And while Iran may not have the capability or will to carry out either threat, the threats in and of themselves highlight the problem the international community faces in dealing with a regime like Iran: How does the international community deal with such intransigence? Iran is clearly in violation of international law as well as of international opinion and sentiment. However, all of the promised inducements, compromises, and incentives, including the recent offer to enrich Iran's uranium outside of Iran to ensure it could not be used for a weapon, have been rejected. Which leaves the international community, the UN, and the US back where it has been for the past several years: Relying on the old mantra of Comply with international law or else.

Or else what?

It's the "what" that is so important here, and that is do difficult for the international community to define. The UN has demonstrated time and time again that it can, occasionally, muster the will to impose sanctions on the most flagrant violators of international law. But, rarely does it know what to do when sanctions fail to yield results.

This is the problem today, just as it was the problem in the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq. What is the "what"? What will happen to a state that refuses to comply? Even when the Security Council members can overcome their own narrowly-defined national interests to reach a consensus, that's usually as far as they will go. So while Russia and China have been willing to rebuke Iran for its violations of Iran's obligations under the NPT, neither has been willing to discuss, let alone implement, any punishments intended to force compliance. President Obama has not shown a willingness to meld negotiations with punishment, leaving them as separate outcomes, making it possible for the avoidance of even the consideration serious punishment so long as negotiations are proceeding. So when Iran is challenged with a "comply or else" threat, the "or else" is left undefined. Iran doesn't know what will happen, nor does the US, the UN or anyone else.

If the US and the international community are serious in warning that they are "not going to just wait indefinitely and allow for the development of a nuclear weapon [and] the breach of international treaties" (please note that I do not necessarily agree with this position) then the negotiations and the threats need to be combined. The US needs to work to build a consensus with its international partners on what actions are to be demanded of Iran and what consequences will follow if Iran does not comply.

The stakes get higher in Iran day by day as Iran refuses to cooperate with the IAEA. The US needs to act quickly; once Iran develops a nuclear weapon, the whole equation changes.

Why Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?

Events seem to be coming to a head of some kind in the negotiations between Iran and the international community over Iran's nuclear program. Just today, Iran agreed to send its enriched uranium to Russia for processing, where it will be turned into fuel for a small, non-weaponized, reactor. Of course, as the New York Times points out, "If Iran has secret stockpiles of enriched uranium, the accomplishment would be hollow." Over at Shadow Government, Peter Feaver, my former dissertation advisor, has an excellent post analyzing the possible outcomes of the on-going talks:

How should we measure success in the talks with Iran that begin today? I propose the following sliding scale.

1. Breathtaking, mission accomplished victory: Iran agrees to abandon its nuclear weapons program, submit to a rigorous verification and safeguards regime, and open substantive dialogue on its support for global terrorism. If this is achieved, President Obama would be a shoo-in for the Nobel Peace Prize. Chance of this happening: I would guess near zero.

2. Demonstrable and significant progress: Iran's continued recalcitrance is identified early by all the relevant players, especially Russia and China, and the UN Security Council responds within a few weeks with a substantial ramping up of de facto sanctions on Iran -- sanctions that involve the effective participation of Iran's chief trading partners, the EU, Russia, China, and India. Chance of this happening: I would guess not zero, but maybe just a 1-in-10 chance.

3. No progress beyond what the Bush team already achieved: Iran's continued recalcitrance provokes a range of global rhetorical censure ranging from Chinese tut-tutting to American (or French or British) bluster. The United States unilaterally increases sanctions pressure, but only incrementally because U.S. unilateral leverage over Iran is minimal. Europeans agree to review their options for an incremental increase of sanctions pressure themselves, but do not commit irrevocably to a ramp up in pressure. Russians and Chinese acknowledge that Iran has not been forthcoming, but block further sanctions on the grounds that these would be counterproductive. Chance of this happening: I would guess this is the most likely outcome, so maybe a 4-in-10 chance.

4. Less progress than what the Bush team already achieved: Iran's continued recalcitrance even after the U.S. has played its "hole card" of the evidence of Iranian duplicity concerning the second enrichment site splits the international coalition and key members, likely Russia or China, blame the United States for its mishandling of the negotiations. Chance of this happening: I fear this is the next most-likely-outcome, so maybe a 3-in-10 chance.

5. False progress is achieved: Desperate to show progress, the United States accepts a fig-leaf arrangement, or merely declares the negotiations fruitful when they are not, and so there is neither true progress towards Iranian relinquishment of their nuclear program nor increased leverage imposed on them to make a deal in the next round more likely. Chance of this happening: I don't think this is as likely as some Obama critics think, but there is a non-trivial possibility of this happening, perhaps barely a 2-in-10 chance.

6. U.S. capitulation: Desperate for a deal, the United States follows the advice of some and signs a grand bargain agreement that "resolves" the issue by preemptively conceding to all of Iran's demands, including the demand that the world community stop complaining about the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Chance of this happening: not likely, probably only marginally more likely than outcome #1.

And in an op-ed in yesterday's Boston Globe, Nicholas Burns argues that the revelation of the previously secret uranium enrichment facility near Qom "gives the United States the most important opportunity in years to pressure Tehran to forgo its nuclear weapons ambitions:"

...the United States has significantly greater credibility to take advantage of Iran’s mendacity and to lead an international coalition toward comprehensive sanctions should talks fail. But, Obama must now turn to a more tough-minded policy. He should ratchet up the pressure on the Iranian government by moving from a strategy of engagement to one that combines continued negotiations, tough new inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities, and the threat of much more powerful sanctions.

Prior to any argument about what will or will not result from the current negotiations must be an understanding of why Iran wants nuclear weapons (assuming, contrary to Iran's claims, it is in fact developing its nuclear energy program with the eventual goal of weaponization). Only if we understand Iran's interests and preferences can we even hope to make progress in talks.

So, why would Iran want nuclear weapons? I can think of at least five reasons (none of which are necessarily mutually exclusive): for defense and deterrence, for aggression, to ensure its regional power, as a bargaining chip, and as a key to international status. Any chance of getting Iran to cease developing nuclear weapons depend on which these is the primary motivation. Let's consider each in turn.

Defense/deterrence: It shouldn't come as any surprise that states see nuclear weapons as the only means by which to defend themselves against the United States. Going back to the aftermath of the first Gulf War, an high-ranking Indian military officer who conducted India's after-action report noted that the first lesson of the war should be that if your national interests may run afoul of the US, be sure to get a nuclear weapon. Clearly, Iran looks at what happened to Iraq and Afghanistan and worries about what the US could do to Iran if the US so desired. Iran's national and regional interests obviously are often in conflict (although not necessarily as much as people assume) with those of the US; thus, Iran very well could be seeking nuclear weapons to prevent the US from attempting regime change. It wouldn't even necessarily take a large arsenal to deter the US. War games in which I participated when I worked in the defense industry in the mid-1990s concluded that a credible threat against even a close US ally (like Turkey or Israel) could be enough to deter the US from attacking. If this is the primary reason Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon, there is little the international community will be able to do to prevent it as nuclear capability is essentially an end unto itself. There's no other way Iran could really develop enough military capability to deter the US.

Aggression: As many in Israel seem to fear, its certainly possible that Iran is seeking WMD for aggressive reasons. Perhaps it wants to incinerate Israel, perhaps it merely wants to be able to employ a "keep out" strategy against the US in the event it embarks on a more conventional military adventure. If this is motivating Iran's nuclear ambitions, there is a better chance of getting Iran to cease, unless it simply wants to attack Israel out of some millenarian concern. In that case, Iran would be undeterrable and it's probably impossible to move Iran off of the path towards nukes. But, if Iran sees nuclear weapons as merely another weapon, or as a deterrent cover to launch a conventional war, that suggests some kind of cost-benefit analysis that can be applied to change Iran's assessment. If Iran can be made to see aggression as too costly or as unlikely to succeed, nuclear weapons become less appealing. It doesn't make for a high likelihood of success, but the door isn't shut either.

Regional power: Perhaps Iran was nuclear weapons to cement itself as the dominant power in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Like the aggression option, this implies that while Iran may have a strong interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, it's doing so as a means to a different end. And, like in the aggression option, it's then possible to change Iran's calculations. Not easy, but possible.

Bargaining chip: If Iran's nuclear program is really designed to be used as a bargaining chip, this obviously presents the best scenario for getting Iran to give up the program. The problem in this scenario is, of course, determining what Iran wants.

International status: As India long argued, the key to being accepted as a serious player on the world stage is nuclear weapon status. Perhaps Iran feels slighted and is seeking a nuclear weapon to push its way into the highest levels of international politics. In this scenario, the question becomes whether Iran can get that status and respect without developing nuclear weapons. India certainly never believed it could.

As I see things, I believe Iran's primary motivation is the first one on the list: defense and deterrence. If this is correct, it means both good and bad news. The bad news is that it will probably be impossible to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If Iran has decided that the best, if not the only, way to ensure its national security is to proliferate, it's hard to imagine that decision being altered by any combination of international sanctions or pressure (especially the kind of sanctions or pressure likely to emerge from a disparate coalition of states with unaligned interests).

The good news, however, is that Iran proliferating may not be such a problem. If Iran's main motivation is defense, proliferating may in fact stabilize the regional situation, as a state not fearful for its continued existence can be a more rational and well-behaved state. Indeed as Thomas P. M. Barnett notes:

if history is any guide, both the United States and Israel are looking at the first real chance for a durable regional security architecture to emerge (now that you should expect a nuclear Saudi Arabia and Turkey to show up at the negotiating table, too). Yes, the hotheads on all sides seem desperate to freak out over this prospect, but, again, read your history: With the exceptions of our allies in Britain and France, the U.S. has looked down upon every rising power to ever get the bomb as constituting a loose canon capable of all manner of nefarious acts and strategic stupidity. And yet we're the only one that's ever pulled the trigger.

Of course, a nuclear Iran may be a more dangerous Iran, especially if you're skeptical about the ability of the US to develop an effective deterrent relationship with a regional power like Iran (as I am). However, if Iran can't be stopped and if Iran's primary motivation is defense, the deterrence question lessens, especially as Israel will likely be able to create regional deterrence.

So, the question one must ask when assessing and predicting the talks about Iran's nuclear program is: How confident are we that we know why Iran wants nuclear weapons?

An Iranian Referendum on US Foreign Policy

Recent events surrounding Iran's nuclear program have certainly stirred up a hornets' nest of concerned observers. First, Iran admitted the existence of secret nuclear enrichment plant that led to even Iran's erstwhile allies of Russia and China to issue rebukes. Then today, to wrap up two days of war games, Iran tested upgraded versions of its most advanced medium-range missiles -- the Shahab-3 and the Sajjil, both of which have ranges sufficient to threaten Europe and Israel. Coming on the heels of the UN General Assembly meeting, these developments have seemed to create a new impetus for tightening the screws on Iran in an effort to prevent Iran from developing an extant nuclear weapons capability (while the US believes Iran is close to having the ability to assemble a nuclear bomb on short notice it does not claim that Iran presently has any functional nuclear weapons). Additionally, in the wake of the decision by the Obama administration to scrap plans to deploy a ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia had made noises indicating it may be willing to impose stricter sanctions on Iran for its uncooperative behavior and unwillingness to comport to its international obligations.

All of this makes for an important crossroads for President Obama and his preferred course of foreign policy. Obama has pursued, as he did during his electoral campaign, a strategy of "negotiate first." However to date Obama's offer of negotiations have been rewarded with very little success, largely because Iran has had little reason to respond. Iran most likely sees nuclear weapons as a critical component of its national interest, both to defend itself against the US (and Israel) but also to increase its regional power. Because the US has been offering negotiations from a position of weakness, Iran was able to ignore the calls to talk about its nuclear program.

Now, however, Obama has a real opportunity to increase the pressure on Iran and make it impossible for Iran to continue to avoid negotiating. France and Great Britain are both ramping up the rhetoric and have expressed their willingness to support tougher sanctions, as have Russia and China, although it's still far from certain what Russia will actually do when it comes time to enact (or enforce) increased sanctions. Obama must exploit this window of opportunity to impose tougher conditions on Iran prior to continuing discussions. Obama must move quickly to exploit the international furor at Iran's secret enrichment facility and the current Russian goodwill. If the moment had been exploited, sanctions can be put in place that could force Iran to negotiate seriously; sanctions could even be put in place with an automatic waiver to suspend them in the event Iran chooses to open meaningful negotiations.

If Obama sticks to his "negotiate first" policy and refuses to push the Security Council to impose more serious penalties on Iran for its intransigence, he will not only have missed a golden opportunity. He will also expose his foreign policy as toothless and ill-suited for the turbulent world of international relations. If, however, he realizes that serious negotiations fundamentally depend on serious consequences (or at the least the threat of serious consequences), he may be able to take advantage of the currently open window of opportunity and lay the groundwork for a meaningful international coalition to deal with Iran.

Obama and European Missile Defense

President Obama's decision to cease the deployment of a long-range ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic has ruffled lots of feathers. There seem to be two major objections to Obama's move. First, that scrapping the program increases the threat posed by Iran's potential nuclear capability, and second, that scrapping the program is a slap in the face to the Eastern European countries that have proven themselves to be staunch allies. Those who support Obama's decision point to the fact that Obama plans to replace the scrapped system with one designed to intercept short- and medium-range missiles rather than long-range ballistic missiles.

Obama's decision was, I believe, the correct one. But, I'd like to see him go all the way and scrap missile defense entirely. I've been on the record for years in my opposition to the cost of developing a functional missile defense program, and still believe that the money would be better off put towards other things, such buying more F-22s, hardening the US grid against EMP attacks, or developing better cyberspace defenses. I don't see that that calculus has changed. It's true that defending against short- and medium-range missiles aimed against US allies rather than against CONUS itself makes more sense; deterrence is likely to be more difficult to achieve when the stakes are asymmetric (it's one thing to threaten a nuclear response to a strike against an American; it's quite another to do so in response to an attack against an ally). But, given all the threats faced by the US and the limitations on resources, certainly exacerbated by the recession, I'm still doubtful that missile defense is worth the money.

But, while Obama's decision moved in the right direction, it was handled very poorly. First, it is not likely to go over well with the Czech Republic and Poland. Both countries have been solid US allies, expending their own political capital to support US decisions, are are justifiably worried now, especially given the US reaction to the Russian invasion of Georgia, that the US may be more interested in easing tensions with Russia than protecting their far-away allies. For Eastern Europe, missile defense wasn't so much a protection against Iran as it was a sign of US commitment to their defense. Moving away from that doesn't help to convince these states that they will be able to count on the US when the chips are down (certainly, the weaknesses of NATO being exposed in Afghanistan are compounding those fears). Certainly, more should have been done to consult with Poland and the Czech Republic as well as to signal America's strong commitment to them.

Even worse, however, is that the US has made a huge concession to Russia without getting anything in return. Russia had long voiced loud opposition to the proposed eastern European deployment. But the program, as envisioned, offered no threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent. This was a system designed to intercept a small number of missiles, not the hundreds or thousands that would be launched in a Russian response (of course, if Russia was planning on launching a small-scale strike against Warsaw, the defense shield would have been problematic). So, Russian opposition to the missile defense program stems from Russian opposition to increasing US entrenchment in what Russia considers to be its backyard. By backing down here, Obama has likely signaled to Russia that the US is unsteady in its commitment to eastern Europe. Furthermore, that concession came with no reciprocal concession from Russia. At the very least, Obama should have extracted a promise from Russia to support increased international sanctions on Iran for continuing to defy international law with its nuclear program (a position I advocated almost two years back). Instead, the US gave Russia a major policy victory, and in return Prime Minister Putin announced just last week that Russia would not support increased sanctions on Iran, a stance further supported by Foreign Minister Lavrov, and that it is convinced that Iran's nuclear program is peaceful. Russian President Medvedev did say earlier this week that while “sanctions are not very effective on the whole...sometimes you have to embark on sanctions and they can be right" which seemed to hint at a possibility Russia would, in fact, back stronger sanctions. But, that comment isn't a clear enough commitment to warrant giving up such a important bargaining chip as the European missile defense system.

It's possible that a deal has been worked out and that when the issue of Iran comes up in the Security Council Russia will indeed support the imposition of tougher sanctions. But I'm not holding my breath. By not extracting stronger public statements that would commit Russia to a course of action, the door has been left open for a Russian change of position. Obama made the right decision, but in all the wrong ways.

The Manama Dialogue: The US and the Regional Balance of Power; Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (US)

The Manama Dialogue took place in Bahrain this past weekend, and Security Dilemmas has been invited by the International Institute for Strategic Studies to cover the plenary sessions. So, here we go with the first session, "The US and the Regional Balance of Power".

US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was the speaker, and his talk covered three points: Iraq, Iran, and security cooperation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The first and third of these topics did not delve into anything new or particularly interesting. Regarding Iraq, Gates noted the impact of the surge as well as economic progress, but remarked that political progress was still needed to cement the recent gains. He also emphasized what failure in Iraq would mean for the region. With regards to security cooperation, Gates commented on a Bilateral Air Defense Initiative, which he hoped would:

become a stepping stone to a multilateral effort to develop regional air and missile defense systems that would provide more comprehensive coverage, a regional protective – defensive – umbrella. We should bear in mind the deterrent effect such a system would have. If the chances of a successful attack are greatly reduced, then so too is the value of pursuing offensive weapons systems and delivery systems.

Most of the talk concerned Iran, and, in particular, the impact of the recently released NIE. According to Gates:

The report expresses with greater confidence than ever that Iran did have a nuclear weapons program – developed secretly, kept hidden for years, and in violation of its international obligations. It reports that they do continue their nuclear enrichment program, an essential long lead time component of any nuclear weapons program. It states that they do have the mechanisms still in place to restart their program. And, the estimate is explicit that Iran is keeping its options open and could restart its nuclear weapons program at any time – I would add, if it has not done so already. Although the Estimate does not say so, there are no impediments to Iran restarting its nuclear weapons program – none, that is, but the international community.

Gates went on to describe how the US views the threat posed by Iran:

It is the policy of Iran to foment instability and chaos, no matter the strategic value or the cost in the blood of innocents – Christians, Jews, and Muslims alike. There can be little doubt that their destabilizing foreign policies are a threat to the interests of the United States, to the interests of every country in the Middle East, and to the interests of all countries within the range of the ballistic missiles Iran is developing.

Considering all this, the international community should demand that the Iranian government come clean about the extent of its past illegal nuclear weapons development. The international community should insist that Iran suspend enrichment. The international community should require that the Iranian government openly affirm that it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons in the future and, further, that it agree to inspection arrangements that will give us all confidence that it is adhering to that commitment.

This makes it clear that the US does not plan to ease up on Iran, even in face of the NIE assessment that Iran has suspended development of nuclear weapons. Interestingly, Gates did not recommend any real engagement with Iran, preferring to speak instead of pressure and sanctions:

While we must keep all our options open, the United States and the international community must continue – and intensify – our economic, financial, and diplomatic pressures on Iran to suspend enrichment and to agree to verifiable arrangements that can prevent that country from resuming its nuclear weapons program at a moment’s notice – at the whim of its most militant leaders. That should be a matter of grave concern to every government in the world. Let us continue to work together to take the necessary peaceful but effective measures necessary to bring a long-term change of policies in Tehran.

I just finished reading Hidden Iran by Ray Takeyh, in which he makes a convincing case for open negotiations with Iran, rather than threatening sanctions and punishment. He also argues for delinking the various issues of concerns so if negotiations over Iran's support for terrorism collapse, talks about Iran's nuclear program shouldn't be affected. Gates here makes no mention of such an approach, preferring instead to focus on "economic, financial, and diplomatic pressure." The NIE does credit Iran's suspension of the weapons program to such pressure, but if that pressure only produced a public change of behavior, it's not so clear that the strategy is working. US policy towards Iran since 1979 has focused on pressure and hasn't paid many dividends. Takeyh argues that the US and Iran have many common interests and that a new strategic course could pay benefits. So long as the international community remains watchful and doesn't cede too much too fast, a new approach seems worth trying.

The Q&A following Gates' speech focused primarily on Iran. In response to one question, Gates spoke about how the NIE was received:

The bottom line is that the estimate clearly has come at an awkward time. It has annoyed a number of our good friends. It has confused a lot of people around the world in terms of what we are trying to accomplish. But, the reality is that if you take the time to read the unclassified key judgments of that estimate, it points to the nature of the problem posed to all of us by the Iranians’ continuing enrichment, by the fact that they had a secret programme, which they did not suspend until put under international pressure. It is a fair question. I would tell you that the timing and the content were not determined by the President, by Secretary Rice or by me, but by the Director of National Intelligence. I think that we need to get past the give and take about how it happened and focus on the entirety of the estimate, and the key judgments that have been released and the continuing challenge that we face by Iran’s enrichment and their ability to return to a nuclear weapons programme at any time they choose. This is why I said in my remarks that it is so important to continue the economic and diplomatic pressures on Iran to make them first of all come clean, then to suspend, then to agree to arrangements for inspection that give the rest of us confidence that they are not, in fact, trying to produce a nuclear weapon.

Another question specifically asked whether the NIE was likely to undermine international efforts to curtail Iran's WMD program: "Given the reluctance of at least two members of the Security Council to exert ultimate pressure, is the dominant sound after the release of the national intelligence estimate not one of slamming doors and bolting horses, and has the likelihood of that international pressure of unanimity as far as international pressure not been totally destroyed?"

Gates' response:

I do not think it has been destroyed. One of the things that became clear to me when I was in Russia with Secretary Rice just a few weeks ago is that the Russians consider Iran to be a serious security challenge for them. In my conversations with the Chinese leaders, we had a very frank discussion about their interest in long-term energy security and particularly their reliance on oil and gas coming from this part of the world, which is not well served by an Iran that is pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, attempting to subvert its neighbours and potentially seeking nuclear weapons. Their long-term interests for obtaining security from this region are best served by working with the rest of the international community to try to get Tehran to change its policies.

I think that the statements that have come out of both Paris and Berlin, as well as London, in recent days makes clear a continued determination to not only continue to seek UN Security Council resolution but unilaterally apply sanctions that bring economic pressure to bear on the government in Tehran. My view is that even if there is not a UN Security Council resolution, a third resolution, that there are ample opportunities on the part of individual countries in this region, in Europe and elsewhere to take actions which bring further economic pressure to bear on Tehran as a means to trying to induce them to change their policies. Frankly, I do not see it change in either the perception of Iran as a disruptive influence in international affairs or the determination to try to work together using diplomatic and economic means to get them to change their policies.

A very interesting question was asked about US policy towards Iran:

I wondered if you could allow – or agree – to the Gulf States engaging Iran economically. In this manner, they will be able to involve them within the world creation in this region. If they have financial interest within the region, they will add stability to the region we live in. Would the United States consent to such policy? Perhaps this would moderate Iran, as you have done with North Korea.

Gates' answer:

This is the classic question: do you best produce results in dealing with a recalcitrant and truculent government through the application of carrots or sticks? The reality is that a number of countries, over the past 29 years, have engaged economically with Iran. There are many companies that do business in Iran; many countries that do business in Iran; that have hosted Iranian banks. There have been significant economic ties and I see no evidence that any of that has exercised any kind of a moderating influence on Iranian behaviour whatsoever.

It seems to me that if Iran were to begin to show some sign of movement, some willingness to engage the international community on the issues that concern us, then perhaps at some point there is a place where carrots and positive inducements could play a role. However, I have seen no evidence that the activities that have taken place so far have had any effect in moving them in toward that objective.

Many of the questions exhibited a serious fear of Iran, as well as concern that the US would do whatever is deemed to be in US interests without regard for the rest of the region:

Why would the Arab public opinion trust you again now that you are handling a very sensitive file, the file of Iran? There is a tremendous amount of fear that you could either end up doing a reckless thing such as a military strike that could set the whole region ablaze again, or you could actually sign a deal with Iran that would be at the expense of Arab interests, and ultimately America will end up doing what it has always done: embarrass its friends, let them down, let its allies down, and sign a deal that caters to its own interests while being detrimental to Arab interests in the region.

Gates:

I have been engaged in this region, in one way or another, for nearly 40 years. I do not have enough fingers and toes to count the times when the United States has helped its friends and allies in this region. Perhaps the most signal example of that was liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi invader. We have been the primary sponsor of virtually every peace agreement and ceasefire that has been signed in this region for the last 35 years. We have exercised a constructive influence in trying to promote positive change. I therefore do not accept the premise of the question that we have exercised negative influence.

I know that there are aspects of American policy with which people disagree. That has been true also for the last number of decades. I can only speak for myself, but I believe that, working with our friends and allies in this region is critically important. I believe it is extremely important that, in dealing with Iran, as I indicated in my speech, we keep options open. The focus now is on trying to get the Iranians to change their positions using economic and political measures.

An interviewer from Al‑Arabiya yesterday asked me what the percentage of American policy is for military and for diplomacy in dealing with Iran at the moment. I said that it was 100% diplomatic and economic. I can assure you, on the other side of the equation that you suggested, that the United States is not going to cut any kind of a deal with Iran. Iran must change its policies and its behaviour towards its neighbours, and its own nuclear programme, before the United States is willing to pursue that relationship.

It is very important for us to consult closely with our friends and allies in this region on all of the issues that we pursue. As I indicated in the answer to an earlier question, it is important that we listen. The government of which I am a part is firmly committed to that course.

What is most interesting is the level of concern from the region about Iran. Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon has very much unsettled the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Iran, as a revolutionary Shiite power, is viewed with much suspicion, which has given the US an opportunity to improve relations with many other regional actors. While Iraq and US policy towards Israel is cause for hesitation, many of these states realize that only the US can protect them from an aggressive Iran rising in power.

It is also interesting to note how little US policy has changed over time. There is little to no talk of engaging Iran, either diplomatically, politically, or economically. The US approach is to use pressure to force Iran to compromise on important issues; Takeyh argues that this policy is flawed and fails to take account of Iran's domestic political situation (Takeyh argues that Iranian politics are much more complicated and fissured than most American analysts assume). Taking Gates at his word, there seems to be few signs that US policy towards Iran will change, leaving little hope of any major breakthroughs. Perhaps the US is hoping that success in Iraq and in Palestine will further marginalize Iran, isolating it to the point that Iran must yield to international and American demands. That seems to be putting a lot of eggs in a few fragile baskets.

Iran and the NIE: Where Do We Go From Here?

In the wake of last week's bombshell that was the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program, it's time to think a bit about what the report means for US foreign policy towards Iran.

The most important impact of the NIE's findings is there is no imminent threat. If the NIE is correct (and as we learned with Iraq, intelligence is a sketchy business), Iran does not have and is not currently working to develop a nuclear weapon. Thus, there seems to be no need to contemplate preventive or preemptive uses of military force.

But that does not mean that there is no threat. A careful read of the NIE, or a perusal of this graphic from the New York Times, demonstrates that, at root, there are few real differences between the 2007 NIE and the 2005 NIE that concluded that Iran was trying to develop a nuclear weapon. Both reports assert that Iran will be capable of developing a nuclear device by the next decade: In fact, where the 2005 report claimed that "Iran is unlikely [to make a nuclear weapon] before early-to-mid next decade," the 2007 NIE has repeated that assessment, stating "Iran would probably be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon sometime between the 2010-2015 time frame."

Furthermore, the NIE states that while Iran halted its nuclear weapon program in 2003, it qualifies that statement with a footnote saying that "by 'nuclear weapons program' we mean Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium related work; we do not mean Iran's declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment." This is a highly problematic qualification. The US, the EU, and the UN have long considered Iran's civil nuclear program to be worrisome. Given Iran's long history of NPT violations concerning its civilian nuclear program, the international community has viewed Iran's civil nuclear program as a source of concern nearly as great as its potential weapons program. And, as this New York Times article points out, "The open secret of the nuclear age is that the line between civilian and military programs is extraordinarily thin:"

One threshold is enriched uranium. Enriched to low levels, uranium can fuel a reactor that produces electrical power — which is what Tehran says it wants to do. But if uranium is purified in spinning centrifuges long enough, and becomes highly enriched, it can fuel an atom bomb.

Another boundary between civilian and military programs is weapons design. Designing a nuclear weapon involves sophisticated mathematical and engineering work to figure out how to squeeze the bomb fuel in a way that creates the nuclear blast.

Indeed, the most difficult part of building a bomb is not doing the secret military design work but rather the part of the process that is also crucial to civilian nuclear power — producing the fuel.

History illustrates the point. During World War II, scientists working secretly at Los Alamos in the mountains of New Mexico were so sure of the reliability of their simple design that they gave it no explosive test before the bomb was made and dropped on Hiroshima. It worked to devastating effect.

But making the bomb’s highly enriched fuel required a vast industrial effort clouded by great uncertainty. In a race, three huge factories were built in the Tennessee wilds, each pursuing a different way of enriching uranium. One had literally millions of miles of pipes.

In the end, no technique worked well enough to be relied upon exclusively. So engineers blended the outputs. “All three methods contributed to Hiroshima,” said Robert S. Norris, author of “Racing for the Bomb” (Steerforth, 2002), a biography of the project’s military chief.

That history cast light on the question of whether Iran’s enrichment work today could represent a future military threat.

Here, again, the NIE is less than reassuring. It states that it assesses Iran is most likely to obtain HEU through centrifuge enrichment and that "Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006" and that "Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz." The 2010-2015 time frame mentioned above is based on estimations of Iran's ability to produce through centrifuge enrichment enough HEU for a nuclear device. Additionally, "Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so."

It appears that Iran is going to be walking a thin line, staying on the "good" side of a civilian program, but retaining the ability to cross the line to military applications if deemed necessary.

The real change from the 2005 to the 2007 NIE is in the assessment of Iran's intentions (which is interesting given the caveat in the NIE that the 10 year time frame of the NIE's estimate is "more appropriate for estimating capabilities than intentions....). In 2005, the intelligence community "assess[ed] with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not assess that Iran is immovable." [emphasis added] The 2007 judgment essential revises the estimate of Iran's determination, assessing that Iran can be influenced by "increasing international scrutiny and pressure."

If Iran's intentions have changed, but its capability to produce a nuclear device have not changed, then it is just as important as before to maintain "international scrutiny and pressure." Already, rosy readings of the NIE are having their effect as Russia has expressed skepticism at the need to use the threat of expanded sanctions to coax Iran into greater cooperation with the IAEA. While the European states, and France and Germany in particular, have stated their willingness to maintain attention and pressure on Iran, the Russian hesitance highlights the need for a new diplomatic strategy. As I blogged about before, trading the European-based ballistic missile defense program for Russian assistance in forcing Iran to come clean and cooperate is just such a strategy. And the NIE hasn't made a case for a different one.

Missile Defense or Non-Proliferation?

Russia has announced that it is ready for dialogue on the proposed missile defense shield the US wishes to construct, partly in Eastern Europe. While Russia opposed to the shield, which the US has declared to be a critical component of its national security policy, both sides seem to be open to compromises intended to reassure the Russians without undermining their deterrent capabilities.

I've blogged before about my skepticism of the utility of developing such a shield, mostly on cost-benefit grounds. That skepticism, however, reveals the potential for some interesting possibilities. For example, if Russia wants the US to move, scale down, or back away from developing a defense shield, Russia should be willing to give the US something in return. And that something would be most valuable if it helped accomplish the goals that the shield is designed to address -- the threat of the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles. So what could Russia offer the US that would be of use in that area...hmmm....I don't know...how about...oh...

Increased pressure on Iran to comply with UN demands about the Iranian nuclear program? If the US intends to compromise at all on the missile shield, the price should be nothing less than Russia's complete cooperation in pressuring Iran to comply with its obligations under the NPT. That would be a worthy return on an unwise investment.

More On the Syrian Nuclear (?) Site

The above pictures, taken by commercial satellite reconnaissance companies, show the site in Syria that was reportedly attacked by Israeli air assets on 6 September. The picture on the left, taken 10 August 2007 clearly shows a large structure measuring approximately 150 meters per side. The structure is not at all visible in the picture on the right, taken 24 October. Not at all visible. Not even the rubble or traces that would be expected to be visible following an air raid.

According to the New York Times, from which the above photos come:

the images, federal and private analysts said Thursday, suggest that the Syrian authorities rushed to dismantle the facility after the strike, saying its removal could be interpreted as a tacit admission of guilt.

“It’s a magic act — here today, gone tomorrow,” said a senior intelligence official. “It doesn’t lower suspicions; it raises them. This was not the long-term decommissioning of a building, which can take a year. It was speedy. It’s incredible that they could have gone to that effort to make something go away.”

David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington that this week released a report on the Syrian site, said Thursday that the building’s removal was inherently suspicious.

...

“It’s clearly very suspicious,” said Joseph Cirincione, an expert on nuclear proliferation at the Center for American Progress in Washington. “The Syrians were up to something that they clearly didn’t want the world to know about.”

Mr. Cirincione said the photographic evidence “tilts toward a nuclear program,” but did not prove that Damascus was building a reactor. Besides, he said, even if Syria was developing a nuclear program, it was still years away from being operational and thus not an imminent threat.

The desolate Syrian site is situated on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River some 90 miles north of the Iraqi border and seven miles north of the desert village of At Tibnah. An airfield lies nearby.

The new images, in addition to revealing the removal of the tall building, show still standing a secondary structure and what could be a pumping station on the Euphrates. Analysts suspect the pumping station was for cooling the reactor.

The building was said by analysts to have been modeled on a design used by the North Koreans, whose building is a few feet larger that the Syrian building that vanished.

Mr. Albright called the Syrian site “consistent with being a North Korean reactor design.”

...

The Institute for Science and International Security, Mr. Albright’s group, released a report analyzing the new DigitalGlobe image. The building, it said, had been “completely removed and the ground scraped.”

The comparison of August and October images, it said, “effectively confirms that this site was indeed the target of the Israeli raid” in September.

The report said tractors or bulldozers could be seen where the suspected reactor building once stood, as well as scrape marks on the ground. It added that the dismantling and removal of the building “at such a rapid pace dramatically complicates any inspection of the facilities.”

The report said Syria had an obligation to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency of its decision to construct any new nuclear facility. It added that weapons experts were now debating whether Syria would have violated its safeguards agreement with the agency if it started clandestine work on a nuclear reactor.

Syria signed an agreement with the agency in 1992 and is obligated, the report said, under that accord to report on its nuclear plans and developments to the Vienna agency, which is an arm of the United Nations.

“An important question,” the report said, “is whether Syria may be in violation of its agreements.”

If the atomic energy agency found Syria in violation of its responsibilities, it could refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions, as has recently occurred in the case of Iran and its suspected nuclear weapons program.

The evidence is mounting that Syria was indeed building some kind of nuclear reactor. Such a move would be incredibly destabilizing, as Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, and even Egypt would all be threatened by a nuclear-armed Syria. Israel's preventive strike may have averted a regional arms race that would be to the benefit of no one.

The North Korea Deal And The Triumph (?) Of Realism

The US and North Korea have reached, for now at least, a deal concerning North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea has agreed to shut down its main nuclear reactor, disarm any existing nuclear weapons, and submit its remaining nuclear facilities to international inspections. In exchange, the US and the international community will provide around $400 million in food, fuel, and development aid, and the US will begin normalizing relations with North Korea, including discussions to remove North Korea from the list of states involved with sponsoring terrorism and lifting trade and financial sanctions. There are, of course, concerns over the verifiability of the deal, as the Times notes, "North Korea has sidestepped previous agreements, and is thought to have many mountainside tunnels where it can hide projects."

The deal, as it stands, is a pretty good one. There were few other palatable options, and using military force was nearly inconceivable. The deal, if it holds, gets the US and the international community pretty much everything desired. The US is bolstered by the presence of the Chinese, South Koreans, Japanese, and Russians, all of whom were involved in the negotiations. Specifically:

The deal places new requirements on both North Korea and the United States within the 60-day period. Besides closing and sealing Yongbyon , North Korea will "discuss" with the other nations a list of all its nuclear programs, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods. International inspectors are to verify the process.

The accord sets a 60-day deadline for North Korea to accomplish the first steps toward disarmament, and leaves until an undefined moment — and to another negotiation — the actual removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the fuel manufactured to produce them.

Under the agreement, the first part of the aid -- 50,000 tons of fuel oil, or an equivalent value of economic or humanitarian aid -- would be provided by South Korea, Russia, China and the United States; in the case of the United States , that would require congressional approval, which is likely to be difficult to get....

For disabling the reactor and declaring all nuclear programs, the North will eventually receive another 950,000 tons in aid. Further negotiations are to begin on March 19 in Beijing.

The ultimate goal is the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and the next round of talks is expected to begin to wade into the thicket of disputes over how to carry this out.

The steps outlined require the North to provide a complete list of its nuclear programs, including an inventory of its plutonium stockpile. It must also disable all nuclear facilities, including "graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing facilities."

Politically, however, there are two main problems with this deal. First, as former UN Ambassador John Bolton noted, the deal "sends exactly the wrong signal to would-be proliferators around the world: 'If we hold out long enough, wear down the State Department negotiators, eventually you get rewarded,' in this case with massive shipments of heavy fuel oil for doing only partially what needs to be done." As I've noted in a previous post, this is a perennial problem in international politics: states with interests in a particular outcome can be "blackmailed." The US and others want North Korea not to proliferate, so if North Korea can proliferate it can then bargain away its nuclear capability for rewards. Of course, this can work both ways -- perhaps Iran will look to this deal and see an opportunity to wheel and deal and get aid and assistance that it needs. On the other hand, maybe other problematic states will see proliferation as a useful and even necessary step towards international acceptance and payouts. Care must be taken so that the US and its allies not be painted as easy marks for nuclear blackmail. In this case, the length and history of the negotiations and the very nature of the bilateral relationship makes it easier for the US to claim that this is a unique deal and not a model for emulation (although if Iran eventually gets a similar deal, the claim becomes more difficult to sustain).

The other potential problem is more theoretical. The deal represents a clear triumph of a realist foreign policy that preferences raw national interest, defined narrowly, against more liberal considerations like human rights or values. Providing North Korea with food and fuel aid extends a lifeline to perhaps the worst regime the world has even known. There are no guarantees that the aid will improve the lives of North Korea's long-suffering people. As the Times report of the deal notes, the debate within the Bush Administration, and even before 2000, has been whether to deal with North Korea or to "squeeze" the country in hopes that it will collapse. That debate has been resolved now.

Should the US be making deals to prop up such a reprehensible regime? Many of those critical of the invasion of Iraq desired for a more realist foreign policy, noting that much of the case for invading Iraq came from neo-conservatives who saw the opportunity to topple a dictator, improve human rights, and introduce democracy into a part of the world that has known only authoritarian rule. Here's the result of that backlash: A deal that helps North Korea maintain its iron grip on its people and continue to starve them into submission and subservience.

Foreign policy must always be judged in the context of the situation: risk, alternatives, and potential outcomes must all be considered. Consistency is nearly impossible, as every situation, no matter how similar, is different from another, posing its own set of parameters and challenges. The US lacked any good options for dealing with North Korea. An invasion would likely wreak horrific damage on South Korea, and perhaps even Japan and China. Sanctions might have toppled the regime in the long run (although evidence of the efficacy of sanctions is very rare) but in the short run were merely further impoverishing the people of North Korea. Furthermore a nuclear North Korea threatened to undermine regional stability in a serious way, by encouraging both Japan and South Korea to consider proliferation themselves. In short, North Korea presents a sufficiently serious and imminent challenge to American and international security that it could only be dealt with under a "realist" framework.

I do not like the idea of the deal, but on balance it is probably the best outcome at the moment. However, in keeping with my earlier arguments about the need for multilateralism to be backed by force, if North Korea fails to keep to its obligations, the full weight and wrath of the international community must fall on North Korea. The US must make it clear to all involved parties, and especially Russia and China, that total isolation and complete economic sanctions must follow if North Korea obstructs the deal in any meaningful way and to be willing to threaten military action if necessary. The US was willing to go the multilateral route of a negotiated settlement, but the multilateral community must be willing to back the US if the settlement fails.

No Wonder The US Goes Unilateral

An article in today's New York Times details a growing spat between the US and the EU over the pace of imposing sanctions on Iran as punishment for Iran's continued violations of UN Security Council resolutions to abandon its nuclear program. Specifically, despite being in the forefront of the diplomatic push against Iran's nuclear program and strongly supporting the UNSC resolution calling for sanctions, the EU is now dragging its feet in actually imposing those sanctions. According to the Times:

At issue now is how the resolution is to be carried out, with Europeans resisting American appeals for quick action, citing technical and political problems related to the heavy European economic ties to Iran and its oil industry.

...

Administration officials say a new American drive to reduce exports to Iran and cut off its financial transactions is intended to further isolate Iran commercially amid the first signs that global pressure has hurt Iran’s oil production and its economy. There are also reports of rising political dissent in Iran.

...

“We are telling the Europeans that they need to go way beyond what they’ve done to maximize pressure on Iran,” said a senior administration official. “The European response on the economic side has been pretty weak.” The American demands and European responses were provided by 10 different officials, including both supporters and critics of the American approach.

One irony of the latest pressure, European and American officials say, is that on their own, many European banks have begun to cut back their transactions with Iran, partly because of a Treasury Department ban on using dollars in deals involving two leading Iranian banks.

American pressure on European governments, as opposed to banks, has been less successful, administration and European officials say.

The main targets are Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain, all with extensive business dealings with Iran, particularly in energy. Administration officials say, however, that Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, the current head of the European Union, has been responsive.

Europe has more commercial and economic ties with Iran than does the United States, which severed relations with Iran after the revolution and seizure of hostages in 1979.

The administration says that European governments provided $18 billion in government loan guarantees for Iran in 2005. The numbers have gone down in the last year, but not by much, American and European officials say.

American officials say that European governments may have facilitated illicit business and that European governments must do more to stop such transactions. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. has said the United States has shared with Europeans the names of at least 30 front companies involved in terrorism or weapons programs.

“They’ve told us they don’t have the tools,” said a senior American official. “Our answer is: get them.”

“We want to squeeze the Iranians,” said a European official. “But there are varying degrees of political will in Europe about turning the thumbscrews. It’s not straightforward for the European Union to do what the United States wants.”

[Interesting, isn't it, that this is a very similar problem to the one going on during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq; the Europeans, specifically the French and the Germans, were pushing for easing the sanctions on Iraq so they could ramp up their business dealings with Iraq, while the US was demanding stronger actions.]

The US under the Bush Administration has come under extremely heavy criticism for its failure to act multilaterally and for its disrespect of international institutions. Much of that criticism has been well deserved, as the US has squandered much of its post-9/11 goodwill, harmed its reputation as a cooperative actor, and damaged the institutions that it uses to govern the international system. However, multilateralism can be, if done poorly, just as dangerous as can be unilateralism.

Unilateral action can be more efficient, but it is also prone to less rational decision making processes. Multilateral action may get more opinions involved in the decision making process, and it may increase the sense of legitimacy surrounding an international action, but it can also be more prone to collective actions problems, such as free riding. Furthermore, when multilateral action in dealing with a crisis is not backed up with a sanction of force, it can easily devolve into appeasement.

It is plausible [please note I'm not arguing that this would have happened, only that it is plausible] that if France, Germany, and those in the UN opposed to the invasion of Iraq had been willing to enact a resolution threatening Iraq with war unless increased cooperation with previous resolution was immediately forthcoming, the US might have been willing to wait to see if inspections and sanctions would have worked, possibly avoiding the invasion all together. Instead, the UN steadfastly refused to give its own resolutions teeth, France and Germany continued lobbying for the erosion of the sanctions regime, and the US had good reason to doubt that the UN would do what was necessary to enforce its resolutions. One need look no farther than the moronic comments of Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency for another example of multilateralism that cannot be taken seriously.

If multilateralism is to be taken seriously in the security arena -- that is, if states and particularly the leader of the international system, i.e. the US, are to place responsibility for their own security in the hands of other states or even international institutions -- multilateralism must prove itself capable of fulfilling its mandate. And that will, occasionally, require the serious threat of force, and in even rarer circumstances, the use of that threatened force. The US will only see fit to restrain its unilateral freedom of action if the international community steps up to the plate when called upon. In this case, if the EU wishes to remain a meaningful partner in the non-proliferation efforts against Iran and wants to be taken seriously as a power broker on the world stage, it must be capable of enforcing the rules that it creates. It must develop the tools, in the case, to punish Iran for its proliferation according to the rules that the EU helped put into place. Then, and only then, can one even begin to discuss getting the US to behave in a more multilateral fashion. And if the EU or the UN will not do that, then the US will continue to ride roughshod over international opinion in an effort to provide for its own security.

Analyzing The WMD Intelligence Failure In Iraq

On Friday, I attended a talk by Professor Robert Jervis of Columbia University, sponsored by the International Studies Colloquium of the Political Science Department at the University of Washington. Jervis, recently ranked as one of the top 1o most influential international relations scholars by Foreign Policy, gave a talk entitled "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures on WMD: The Case of Iraq" in which he analyzed and assessed what caused the failure of the US, and international, intelligence communities to miss the absence of WMD in Iraq, and what can be done to improve intelligence efforts in the future. Professor Jervis has worked with the CIA on intelligence reform, and performed an external review of the Iraq-WMD failure, much of which is classified, so much of the talk was based on that review.

The general problems experienced by the CIA in Iraq, while perhaps more serious due to their nature, are not really different, according to Jervis, from the problems experienced by many other large organizations. Organizations have pathologies all their own that makes it difficult for them to learn from their mistakes and to adapt. The specific problems in Iraq were compounded by the difficulties in penetrating the country and in understanding the erratic and confusing behaviors of Saddam Hussein. Unfortunately, all these problems are present in other scenarios, such as North Korea or Iran.

The intelligence failure itself can be explained as one of three outcomes: Wrong assessments, not having the information that good intelligence should have had (also called collection failure), and developing unreasonable inferences from the available information (analysis failure). Having looked at all of the information and spoken with the analysts, Jervis concluded that a combination of collection and analysis failure were at work, causing analysts to make errors, but not ones caused by political pressure or willful ignorance/wishful thinking. This, however, leads to an interesting paradox of good news/bad news: The good news is that the analysts did a pretty good job of processing the available information, the bad news is that it is exceedingly difficult to avoid similar problems in the future.

The main problem of collection failure is a basic one: How much intelligence is needed to prove the absence of WMD? As former SecDef Donald Rumsfeld once noted, "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." And of course this can be true: intelligence grossly understated the state of Iraq's WMD programs before the first Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) as well as the nuclear program of Iran before confirming evidence could be gathered. There is no easy fix for this problem, and it is likely to be even worse in the future: the US had tons of intelligence on Iraq and will likely have much less in, say, confrontations with Iran or North Korea. One thing that can be improved, according to Jervis, is to create closer links between the collectors and the analysts. More reliance on alternative explanations could help as well.

The problem of analytic failure is just as serious and just as hard to fix. Alternative explanations of Saddam's behavior seemed to be missing from the analysis -- no one bothered to ask why Hussein would commit suicide. Furthermore, while analysts were making reasonable assessments based on the available information -- remember, every country, even those opposed to the invasion agreed that Iraq had large stocks of CBW and was moving towards a nuclear program -- they did tend to overstate their confidence in their assessments.

Unfortunately, Jervis notes that the overall failure would have been very difficult to prevent. Jervis' assessment was, as noted, that given the available information and intelligence, the inference of the presence of WMD was the best and more reasonable inference, even with the benefit of hindsight, although perhaps the confidence levels were overstated. Saddam's behavior was extremely puzzling for any alternative explanations, as he was clearly behaving, even while UN inspectors were crawling all over the country, as if he was trying to hide a WMD program. Why would Hussein behave this way and risk invasion and the destruction of his regime if he did in fact have nothing to hide? Furthermore, the plausibility of this inference was supported by previous examples: the inability of the intelligence community to correctly assess Iraq's WMD program before Desert Storm, the fact that Hussein had in fact used WMD in both the Iran-Iraq War and against the Kurds. UN inspectors were only able to examine 35% of the identified potential WMD sites, and Hussein's behavior of delays and misdirection seemed to support an argument that WMD information was being moved around to deceive the inspectors.

Jervis was able to identify several fundamental problems that can be addressed, although with great difficulty. First, the analysts in general did not do a good job of questioning their base assumptions. Also, the analysts displayed a lack of understanding of how to deal with negative evidence. For example, there was no systematic tallying or analysis of reports asserting the absence of WMDs. As any good scientist knows, a theory must be able to account for negative evidence. Unfortunately, these are some of the hardest problems to deal with and Jervis was unable to provide any concrete methods for solving them.

He did present a solid argument that political pressure was not responsible for the intelligence failure, claiming that no reasonable inference to the contrary could have been drawn from the available intelligence, and that while the confidence levels could have been lower, that likely would not have been sufficient to avoid conflict. Furthermore, if the Bush Administration was systematically pressuring the CIA to produce skewed analysis, that wouldn't explain why even the countries opposed to the war, such as France or Germany, could not produce any solid evidence or arguments to the contrary. Finally, Jervis noted that the CIA did challenge the Bush Administration on both the difficulties of occupation/reconstruction as well as the possibility of an Iraq-al Qaeda link. If political pressure was to blame for the intelligence failure, you would not likely have seen disagreement on those areas either.

So, what can be done? Unfortunately, the problems that produced the Iraqi WMD intelligence failure are some of the hardest to solve. There were no glaring, obvious, easy-to-solve causes or problems, meaning that there will be no easy solutions. Jervis presented three main reform proposals: Increased use of Red Teaming (Red Teaming means using a group of people to think solely about alternative explanations and to challenge the logic of the "main" group); more product evaluation (which is very hard to do for a variety of reasons), and greater connection of the intelligence community to outside experts for new, fresh opinions.

Ultimately, Jervis' talk was exceedingly important, if not frustrating. Frustrating because the problems in intelligence analysis are not likely to be solved. The international community is facing two major WMD problems in Iran and North Korea, and good intel is critically important in dealing with each. However, the US is likely to have even less reliable intel in either country than it did in Iraq. So, how to proceed? First, recognizing that there is a problem is the first step in solving the problem. Merely being cognizant of the reasons for failure in Iraq can help prevent a repeat failure. Analysts and policy makers alike must be more aware of how to deal with negative evidence, and must be more realistic when producing confidence levels. Iraq also reveals the limitations of relying on previous experience and outcomes; lessons drawn from history can guide present policy, but cannot be used as hard and fast rules. With Iran, for example, many similar problems exist. Iran had engaged in a long practice of deceit and denial about its nuclear program, causing international observers to grossly underestimate the extent of the program until recently. Analysts must be careful not to fall back too much on historical examples to determine plausibility of present scenarios. Each must be considered independently, and all assumptions must be challenged. This of course raises the serious possibility of historical ignorance and the creation of blinders.

The business of intelligence collection and analysis is necessarily a messy one, but one that is nonetheless vital to the security of this country and the larger international community. We will inevitable have to make decisions based on incomplete and unsatsifactory information. The lessons of the WMD failure in Iraq cannot be that the analysis was wrong and suspect. Jervis presents some useful ways to think about how to improve on the analytic assessments but we must be prepared for more failures along the lines of Iraq. Policy makers must make decisions for a collective good based on the best information they have, and they will often be wrong. It's important to remember that the intelligence failure is a separate issue from debacles that have been present in the occupation and reconstruction. Becoming too cautious as a result could have just as bad consequences, if not worse.

Can They Revoke A Peace Prize?

Mohamed ElBaradei, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the winner of the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, announced today that sanctions placed last month on Iran for its continued violations of UN and IAEA rules are a bad idea. The sanctions, imposed by the UN Security Council banned transfers of sensitive nuclear materials and know-how to Iran and established a 60-day deadline for Iran to halt nuclear fuel work or else face the possibility of increased punishment. However, according to ElBaradei "I don't think sanctions will resolve the issue. I think sanctions, in my view, could lead to escalation on both sides."

This is an absolute disgrace and amounts to little more than appeasement. Iran's violations of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations are numerous and well-documented. All five members of the UN Security Council supported the sanctions, which is as rare as a political event can be. The five UNSC members along with Germany have long been offering a generous incentive package to Iran on the condition that it suspends its uranium enrichment program. And yet ElBaradei sees fit to undermine the UN by drawing some kind of moral equivalency in the two positions: "My worry right now is that each side is sticking to their gun if you like. The international community is sticking to their gun, saying 'sanctions or bust'. Iran is saying 'nuclear enrichment capability or bust'." Meanwhile, ElBaradei has openly agreed with John Negroponte, the former head of US National Intelligence and currently awaiting confirmation as Deputy Secretary of State, that Iran will likely be capable of producing a nuclear weapon in 4-7 years.

Peace is not about giving in. As Europe learned in the 1930s, it's not about appeasing rogue states (and no, I'm not comparing Iran to Nazi Germany). Sometimes the cause of peace requires making judgments about good and bad, right and wrong. Sometimes it even requires going to war. ElBaradei's comments and subversion of the UN do not contribute to peace. Rather, they create incentives for Iran to continue to ignore the unanimous will of the international community. I don't believe that the UN will necessarily be able to solve this crisis. In fact, it may not be possible to prevent Iran from proliferating. But when the UN can unite behind something it should be given a chance to work. If the UN is to have any meaning in maintaining international peace and security, it must become tougher and more willing and capable of implementing sanctions on those that violate the will of the international community. ElBaradei is simply ensuring the UN continues to be a weak institution doomed to be ignored by those it seeks to restrain. One can only wish that his Nobel Peace Prize could be revoked.

How NOT To Do Multilateralism

If serious multilateralism is to be a viable option to unilateral action in international security, then the organizations, institutions, and individuals involved in multilateralism must present themselves as credible and honest alternatives by which states can secure their security at lower costs than they could on their own. Yesterday, Mohammed ElBaradei, the executive director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, displayed why so many people are so skeptical of the ability of the UN and its related institutions to provide real international security. In the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear tests and in the midst of Iran ramping up its own enrichment programs, did ElBaradei warn these countries about their flagrant violations of international law, institutional commitments, and international norms? Of course not. To the contrary, ElBarabdei warned that sanctions could empower hardliners in both countries, stated that he does not believe Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, and argued that North Korea's nuclear test was a "cry for help."

This is so absurd as to almost be unbelievable. The UN Security Council which oversees the IAEA has condemned the actions of both states, passed sanctions against North Korea, warned Iran not to continue its path, and has clearly expressed the will of the international community that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be not be acceptable and will not be tolerated. If states are going to put their trust to any degree in international institutions to preserve international security, those institutions must step up to the plate in the face of threats. The more the UN refuses to enforce its own laws and punish states like Iran and North Korea that break their own legal commitments, the less any state will look to the UN as a guarantor of international peace.

Regardless of one's opinion of the invasion of Iraq, a large part of President Bush's reluctance to wait (not that waiting would have altered the outcome) on the UN inspections was a lack of faith that the UN would do anything meaningful to punish Iraq. Time and time again, from silence, if not almost cooperation, in the face of genocide, to a failure to even be able to condemn states that illegally develop WMD, the unwillingness of the UN and other international institutions to chastise and punish undermines the efficacy of those institutions. ElBaradei's comments are both dangerous and foolhardy, and undermine the very mission he purports to be advancing.

So It Was Nuclear

The US is now acknowledging that North Korea did indeed test a nuclear device last week. But given that the blast had a yield of under 1 kt, either the test was a failure or North Korea's nuclear program is far less advanced than has been assumed. It's most likely the former: developing a successful nuclear program is much more difficult than movies, TVs, and many analysts make it seem. This doesn't mean that North Korea isn't a threat...rather, it means that the time line is not as advanced as a successful test would have meant. If North Korea can't successfully detonate a device in ideal testing conditions, it certainly can't yet be considered a threat to deploy nuclear weapons. Furthermore, North Korea still doesn't have a demonstrable delivery capability.

All of this means that there is still time to try to encourage North Korea to back away from the precipice. Unfortunately but not surprisingly, it doesn' t look like the UN is going to be able to have much effect. The US must use all of its political and economic incentives (and sanctions) to force China and South Korea to isolate North Korea. Only if those states see that their aiding and abetting of the North Korean gulag state risks their domestic economic health as well as their relations with the larger international community will they take any serious actions against North Korea. The US, and only the US, can make this happen.

Update on the North Korean "Nuclear" Test

I posted a few days ago that I didn't believe that North Korea had successfully, or even unsuccessfully, tested a nuclear device. And while the jury is not quite yet in, it's getting closer to a verdict. Air samples taken from the area around the test site displayed no traces of radiation. Chinese officials confirmed this, stating that their own testing had discerned no radioactivity.

How NOT To Respond To North Korea

In the wake of North Korea's suspected test of a nuclear device, the US Congress has reacted predictably by throwing money at a solution. Duncan Hunter (R-CA 52nd) said "lawmakers negotiating the Pentagon's fiscal 2007 budget had added $100 million for Aegis ballistic missile defense SM-3 interceptors and Aegis system development."

Congress, and government more generally, is a fundamentally reactive body. That it, when something happens, Congress reacts to it which often causes an misestimation of the threat and an unnecessarly excessive response. Rather than thinking in an analytic manner about the nature of the threat posed, the costs and benefits of a particular solution, or anything else, Congress likes to throw money at a problem, both hoping that the chosen solution will work as well as trying to look like it's on top of the problem and taking actions to protect the country.

Thus, without considering why nuclear deterrence would fail to dissuade North Korea from launching a nuclear-armed ballistic missile at the US, without thinking about how much of a threat such an attack poses to the US, without thinking about how else $100 million might be spent on more useful, more immediate problems, Congress simply adds $100 million to the budget to deal with a technology fraught with technical problems and of dubious strategic necessity.

I wouldn't go so far to say Congress is a bigger threat to this country than Kim Jong-Il, but I wouldn't trust either of them with my ATM card.

I Don't Believe Kim Jong-Il

Let me go on record: I do not believe that North Korea tested a nuclear weapon or device on Sunday. I wish I had posted yesterday, but I'm buried writing a promotion evaluation of one of my colleagues and finishing a paper that's due this weekend. But ask my students: I said this before the White House has come out questioning what actually happened in North Korea.

There is very little evidence that the explosion detected in North Korea was the result of a nuclear reaction. The yield was under 1 kiloton, pathetically weak for a nuclear explosion. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of 12-15kt and 20-22 kt respectively. The first devices tested by India and Pakistan in the 1990s were 12 kt and 9 kt. So, if what detonated below North Korea was, in fact, nuclear, then it either didn't work or is so primitive and rudimentary as to be almost laughable.

But why should we believe North Korea in the first place? Since the announcement that the Hermit Kingdom there has been no confirmation of the existence of nuclear weapons. US intelligence agencies agree that North Korea should have enough fissile material to make several weapons, but having the material is a long way from being able to use them. North Korea has little to gain from a policy of "strategic ambiguity" a la Israel. North Korea wants to leverage its "arsenal" against the United States to extract economic concessions and no-attack guarantees, and it can't do that with a "bomb in the basement." However, if in fact the regime is too economically crippled to build a bomb (and given that it can't even provide electricity to its capital city for 24 hours, that's not hard to believe), then and only then would it make sense to intimate that a bomb exists. Given the lessons of both Gulf Wars (don't piss of the US unless you have a nuke), North Korea likely believes that only by making the US believe that Seoul is at risk of inceneration can the US be deterred.

Of course, I may be wrong. I don't think I am, but even if I am, I don't believe that North Korea is anywhere near weaponizing a nuclear device and is, as the most recent ballistic missile tests demonstrated, even farther away from being able to deliver such a weapon. However (and this is a big caveat), the threat posed by a "nuclear" North Korea is not so much about its capability to threaten the US, but more about the political pressure it puts on the regional security dynamic. So far, China seems to be on board with the West, Japan is reassuring everyone that it will not proliferate in response, and South Korea seems to be rethinking its idiotic "sunshine" policy. So far, so good. The US needs to work to create a regional coalition and, hopefully through the UN, work to impose serious punitive consequences on North Korea. Even if there is no weapon there, such moves are necessary to reaffirm the US dominance that is necessary for tamping down regional security dilemmas.

UPDATE: Apparently, we should know in a few days with some degree of confidence whether the explosion was in fact nuclear. Read this article to see why and how.

(What's So Funny 'Bout) Nuclear Testing?

As North Korea ramps up its preparation for an announced test of a nuclear weapon, the international community is up in arms. The US has urged North Korea to back away from its promise to test, stating that the US will not live with a nuclear-armed North Korea. As the US plans how to impose sanctions on an already-isolated Hermit Kingdom, the New York Times is urging President Bush to return to the negotiating table in a serious effort to determine North Korea's price for abandoning its nuclear program. On the other hand, the Washington Post encourages China and South Korea to take firm stand by punishing North Korea for its behavior to force it back into talks.

The stakes are, of course, high. First, North Korea is certainly one of the most erratic and abomindable regimes ever to exist. Possessing an overt arsenal of nuclear weapons with the capability of devastating major cities of its neighbors, North Korea could certainly become emboldened towards a more aggressive foreign policy. Second, proliferation by North Korea will create strong pressures on other countries in the region -- namely Japan and South Korea -- to develop a nuclear arsenal of their own. Such actions would create wide-ranging instability in Asia and must be avoided at (almost) any cost. Third, North Korea has demonstrated its affinity for criminal dealings to prop up its pathetic economy: The major sources of income for North Korea are believed to come from counterfeiting US currency and the drug trade. It is certainly not inconceivable that North Korea would sell enriched plutonium, if not an actual weapon, to a terrorist group.

So, what to do? The answer really lies in the assessment of North Korea's preferences vis-a-vis the status quo. States can be understood to view their interests in relation to the status quo. Most states perceive that their security and interests can best be protected and promoted by adhering to the existing rules and norms of the system. Some states believe that the status quo fundamentally threatens their security and interests, and thus they seek, at best, to promote their interests by means outside of the accepted norms and, at worst, to overthrow the status quo. The former types are known as "status quo" states, while the latter are "revisionist." Note that status quo and revisionist are not synonymous with "good" and "bad" or "friends" or "enemies." For example, two states may not "like" each other and may very well be locked in serious confrontation; however, if they pursue that competition within the existing rules of the system, they are status quo. The strategy selected to deal with a state greatly depends on its fundamental type.

If two states are in a crisis scenario, and the "complaining" state is status quo, its aims will be limited. That is, the nature of the system is seen as part of its security and interest; such a state can be dealt with through negotiations. However, if the complaining state is revisionist, negotiations will likely only increase the state's demands as it perceives weakness. This is the classic "Munich" analogy: appeasing aggressive, expansionist states now only makes them stronger in the long run. If North Korea is a revisionist state, negotiations, economic incentives, and other "carrots" will only postpone the inevitable confrontation by both emboldening and strengthening North Korea. If, however, North Korea is status quo, then negotiations may actually address its legitimate security concerns, while a muscular confrontation may, in fact, threaten the state and back it into a corner.

So, which type is North Korea? This is, perhaps, the most difficult question of them all. On the one hand, North Korea, while no angel, isn't the sort of international menace that, say, Iran is or pre-invasion Iraq was. There is no evidence of North Korean connections to international terrorist and there have been no cross-border invasions since 1950. On the other hand, North Korea demonstates no willingness to participate in the international institutions that go a long way to encouraging states to see their national interests as synonymous with the international order.

My sense is that North Korea is fundamentally a revisionist state, and that the only thing that has kept it hemmed in has been US power. A North Korea possessing nuclear weapons would be a difficult beast to keep caged, in addition to the wider implications and problems that would be caused for the other countries in the region. When North Korea's beyond-abysmal human rights record is thrown in to the mix, it's hard to understand how North Korea could perceive its national interest to be in line with that of the international community. The time has come for the UN, China, South Korea, Japan, and the US to take a firm, unyielding stand towards North Korea: Give up your nuclear arsenal or face serious consequences, including the shut-off of all monies and energy from China and South Korea, along with possible military action from the US. It is simply unacceptable for North Korea to be allowed to develop a nuclear arsenal.

The High Cost of Low Defense

In the run-up to a suspected North Korean missile test-launch, the United States has announced that its missile defense system only possesses "limited operational capability," meaning that it is most likely incapable of intercepting the North Korean missile.

Missile defense has been one of the most controversial defense issues for many years now, and, to my mind, it's a giant waste. Not because it doesn't work: this is exceedingly difficult technology, but there's no reason to think the technological hurdles won't be overcome. The question is at what price? It's hard to pin down a figure of how much the US has spent on missile defense, because there are multiple agencies and defense programs involved. The best information I can find comes from this Center for Defense Information report from January 2006 which claims that $92.5 billion has been spent on missile defense since 1983. Also, according to this CBS report from 2003, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that missile defense will cost, by 2015, $49 billion. No matter the figure, we're talking huge chunks of change.

Again, I don't object to missile defense on its to-date ineffectiveness. Nor do I object based on the price tag alone. But, how much of a threat is posed to the US by a missile strike? The answer, I believe, is not much, especially when compared to the other things that threaten this country. Launching and accurately targeting a ballistic missile is an exceedingly difficult prospect that, for the forseeable future, will only be possible by states. This is made clear when looking at the nature of the missile defense program: it is clearly aimed at states like North Korea. But why should it be assumed that traditional deterrence will fail to work? It may be difficult to deter regional powers from taking actions in their own backyards, but that's not what's at issue here. Rather, we're talking about a direct attack against the United States homeland. I see no reason to assume that the overwhelming might of the US and the American ability to retaliate would not be seen as a credible deterrent threat.

So, if deterrence can work to restrain rogue states from lobbing missiles at the US, then what's the point of spending umpteen billions of dollars on a missile defense system? Not much. That money would be better spent on other defense programs, like expanding the "boots on the ground" force or training troops for urban control operations.

UPDATE: The two top defense officials in the Clinton Administration, William Perry and Ashton Carter, have an article in today's Washington Post arguing that the US should "immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before it can be launched." The authors acknowledge that this would be an exceedingly unpopular step, especially with South Korea, but recommend the course of action nonetheless.

Such an action is a critical step in maintaining the deterrent relationship against North Korea. The US needs to make clear, in no uncertain terms, that a rogue state like North Korea will, in no way, form, or manner, be permitted to undermine regional or global stability, or threaten its neighbors.