An Impending Disaster in Darfur

Things are about to get worse in Darfur. A whole lot worse.

In the wake of his indictment by the International Criminal Court, Sudanese President Omar Hassan al Bashir has set about demonstrating to the international community that he will not be cowed by its action. First, Sudan ordered the 13 largest aid and relief organizations -- including Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders, Save the Children, CARE, and the International Rescue Committee -- working in Sudan out of the country. Bashir has also expressed his desire to have all international aid groups out of Darfur within a year. Then, Bashir openly flaunted the ICC warrant by traveling to Eritrea and Egypt. The visits are intended to make it clear that the ICC has no power to arrest Bashir unless states choose to do so themselves; the Arab League has rejected the ICC's call to arrest Bashir, opening the way for Bashir to attend the summit of the League in Qatar.

The ejection of the aid workers is, in the short term, of the gravest concern, as these groups provided 35% of Darfur's food distribution capability. In a piece in today's Washington Post, Michael Gerson recounts an interview with Mohammed Ahmed Abdallah, a physician and human rights advocate in Darfur, in which Abdallah warns that "People are likely to die very soon." In the absence of the aid groups, only 9% of the population of Darfur will have access to clean water, and a cholera or (perhaps and) a meningitis outbreak seems likely. With disease increasing and food supplies decreasing, the desperate Darfuris are likely to begin migrating to eastern Chad. Doing so, however, requires them to leave the relative safety of their refugee camps in order to cross more than 300 miles of desert, exposing themselves to attacks by janjaweed militia groups, dehydration, and starvation.

So, what is to be done? There are several options, none of which is particularly palatable. First, the international community could, for all intents and purposes, back down by blocking or suspending the ICC arrest warrant in hopes that Sudan would allow the aid groups back in. Second, pressure could be put on the member states of the Arab League to enforce the warrant, effectively blocking Bashir's ability to travel. Third, massive pressure could be put on Sudan (and by proxy, China) to allow the aid groups back in. Fourth, the international community could intervene, sending soldiers into the Darfur region to provide security, food, and aid. Finally, as is always an option, the international community can do nothing.

It's pretty clear that the international community has little stomach or will for an intervention. So that leaves a choice between where, how, and whether to apply pressure to reverse Bashir's decision and get the aid groups back in. Backing down in an entirely unacceptible option at this point. While many people, including myself, warned about issuing an arrest warrant, now that it has been issued, backing down would completely destroy any credibility that either the ICC or the international community has; it would also make it clear that international law can easily be hijacked by threatening one own people.

Doing nothing is the most likely option. Protestations and hand-wringing aside, the international community, and the US and the EU in particular, has never shown much interest in incurring any costs to help Darfur, or other African peoples being subjected to genocide. It will certainly be easy for President Obama to maintain the moral rhetoric of "never again" as all his predecssors have done while doing nothing. But that would be shameful, and ultimately counterproductive for American interests. The US does have an interest in stopping genocide, and that interest is the ideals that have made this country what it is: liberalism, human rights, natural law. That a state can be free to slaughter and uproot its own people in an age of American hegemony is an affront to all of these ideals and challenges American interests in a fundamental way. While the fate of the Fur may not threaten the US in as direct manner as a North Korean weapons program or international terrorism, the willingness of the US to abdicate its moral leadership on genocide and human rights undermines US power in a very real way.

So, then, where should the pressue be placed? Sudan has proven nearly impervious to international pressure, largely due to its protector on the Security Council, China, which has been willing to shield Sudan in exchange for access to Sudanese energy exports. It may be more fruitful to pressure China, which has in the past shown its willingess to help the US. But, given the situation in North Korea right now, the US may prefer to save its political capital with China for that.

That leaves pressuring the states of the Arab League. And here the US has a lot of possibilities. Many of these states, such as Egypt, are, essentially, US clients. Many others, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are highly dependent on the US for protection and economic support. The US should use whatever carrots it has to get the Arab League to apply pressure to Sudan.

But for what end? The pressure could be for one of two ends: To get the Arab League to promise to enforce the ICC warrant and arrest Bashir, or to get the League to lean on Sudan to readmit the aid groups. The first would ensure Sudan's isolation, but would also make it all but impossible for the aid groups to return. While the isolation might, eventually, force Sudan to comply with international demands on Darfur, that is a long-term option. The second option might solve the impending humanitarian crisis, but wouldn't increase the likelihood of a long-term solution.

While it might be desirable to pursue the first option, I'm skeptical about any future sustained international effort to help Darfur. Rather, the immediate priority should be to avert the coming disaster. The US, EU, and UN shoud begin exerting whatever pressure they can on the Arab League to, in turn, pressure Sudan to readmit the aid NGOs. Unless that happens, the world will once again sit back and watch the destruction of a people.

Peace and Justice in Darfur

In the wake of the announcement back in July by the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court that he intended to seek indictments against the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, I have blogged my general inclination that such a move would be counter-productive. I am on record in several different places that, when there is a tension between the two, I tend to favor efforts to achieve peace than those aimed at creating justice. Today, the chair of the African Union, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, seems to agree with me, "Justice has to be done. Justice must be seen to be done. What the AU is simply saying is that what is critical, what is the priority, is peace. That is priority number one now...We should do the first thing first. On this basis, the AU supports deferral of the indictment." While I agree with Mr. Kikwete's final assessment, I am not encouraged by his support.

Sadly, the African Union hasn't demonstrated either the willingness or the ability to stand up for what is right. If I honestly believed that the AU was going to be involved in creating peace in Darfur, it would be appropriate for the AU to discuss easing off the pressure on Sudan. But given the AU's record (or lack of record) in standing up to Mugabe in Zimbabwe, not to mention its dismal performace in Darfur, one cannot have any faith in the AU to advance anything but its own weakness and blind support of any African dictator. It's one thing to contemplate giving up on justice in order to achieve peace; it's another thing entirely to give up on justice because one is too weak or scared to challenge the miscreant. Sudan's efforts to destroy the Fur people must be stopped, and if the price of that is letting al-Bashir walk free of international charges, so be it. But if peace is not to be achieved, then let justice be done.

Can Mercenaries Save Darfur?

An interesting possibility has emerged in the conundrum over what to do about Darfur, and other humanitarian crises that seem to demand international peacemaking. Sadly, politics being what it is, states are unwilling to commit their own soldiers into situations that might costs lives for issues that are not directly seen as being part of the national interest. Thus, states tend to look the other way and pass the buck to international organizations, as happened in Rwanda and is happening in Darfur. When states go ahead and get involved anyway, they tend to do so in a half-assed manner, as the US did in Somalia. Even when IOs, like the UN or the African Union, deploy peacekeepers, they are often ineffective, underfunded, undermanned, and underequipped, hampered by restrictive Rules of Engagement necessary to reach political consensus and soothe states fearful of having their soldiers killed, and are beholden to the whims of sovereign states (for example, despite approving a 26,000 strong peacekeeping force, Sudan's insistence that the force be made up predominantly of African troops has prevented the UN from deploying a sufficiently strong enough presence in Darfur). In short, while the UN may be good at peacekeeping, the (perhaps) more important task of peacemaking is beyond its abilities, and outside of the political will and interest of states that do have the necessary capabilities.

Which brings us to a meeting of bizarre bedfellows last month: the actress and Darfur activist Mia Farrow and Erik Prince, founder and CEO of the government contractor, Blackwater Worldwide. According to an ABC News report:

Farrow told ABC News that Blackwater, despite its controversial history and allegations of murdering civilians in Iraq, might be able to help the "hopelessly under-equipped" African Union forces deployed in Darfur with logistics and training.

"Blackwater has a much better idea of what an effective peace-keeping mission would look like than western governments," Farrow told ABC News from a refugee camp in near the Darfur border. Farrow said those governments have been unsuccessful in standing up to the Sudanese government and bringing peace to the region.

...

Prince, meanwhile, has reportedly said that with about 250 professionals, Blackwater could transform roughly one thousand of the African Union soldiers into an elite and highly mobile force.

"I'm so sick of hearing that nothing can be done," Prince told the Wall Street Journal last month, calling the Janjaweed, a militia force backed by the Sudanese government, an "unfettered bully."

"No one has stood up to them," he told the Journal. "If they were met by a mobile quick reaction force of African Union soldiers, the Janjaweed would quickly learn their habits were not sustainable."

Prince also told the Associated Press in July that the military "can't be all things to all people" all the time. "There are always going to be some pieces that the private sector can help in."

The possibility of involving a private contractor like Blackwater in a crisis like Darfur has, unsurprisingly, ruffled many feathers. J. Steven Morrison, a Sudan expert for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued that "It's preposterous to think there is some magic silver bullet that takes the form of Blackwater or any other private military contractor to solve the problems in Darfur." Furthermore, Blackwater's troubled record in Iraq has led other to question the wisdom of involving this specific company:

Blackwater employees have been involved in two deadly incidents in Iraq that proved to be public relations disasters for the company.

The first was the slaying and mutilation of four Blackwater contractors in 2004 in Fallujah that led to congressional hearings about the protection Blackwater provided its employees.

The second, a September 2007 shooting at a crowded Baghdad intersection that killed 17 Iraqis, triggered congressional hearings and investigations from more than a dozen federal agencies.

Federal prosecutors have sent target letters to six of the security guards involved in the September shooting, indicating a high likelihood the Justice Department will seek to indict at least some of the men, according to reports by the Washington Post on Sunday.

An Iraqi government investigation concluded that the security contractors fired without provocation. Blackwater has said its personnel acted in self-defense.

The question Blackwater in particular is not really one which I am equipped to engage. But the general antipathy to the use of private military trainers and personnel -- mercenaries, if you will -- is, I believe, misplaced. Morrison's worry is one of standard political paralysis: There's no guarantee that a new idea will work, so better to stick with the old idea, even if it's not working. And clearly, international peacemaking efforts aren't working. While the UN dithers and tries to raise enough soldiers and equipment, the janjaweed continue their reign of terror against the people of Darfur. And it's not like the UN has a much better track record than Blackwater: numerous allegations of rape, prostitution, child pornography, and other sexual abuses have dogged UN peacekeepers for years. And, even when UN peacekeepers have been on the ground, events like Srebrenica and Rwanda indicate the limits of their willingness to fight to protect their charges. And waiting for states to get involved hasn't been much better.

So, why not turn to private firms? Note that what Blackwater is discussing here isn't putting its own people into the situation, but rather training the African Union peacekeepers to be competent at their jobs. A private company will not be hampered by a lack of political will or fears of alienating public constituencies. While the world may not yet be ready to use mercenaries for the job itself, using a firm like Blackwater to train those who are willing to go into situations like Darfur should certainly be seriously considered.

Dark Days for Darfur

Things are getting much, more worse for Darfur lately. Last week, a convoy of UN peacekeepers was ambushed by 200 gunmen on horseback and in SUVs. Seven peacekeepers were killed, and 22 wounded in the attack, which reinforces the argument that peacekeeping forces are inappropriate and ill-suited for a conflict which has not been resolved. Peacekeeping forces normally are introduced into conflict situations that have ended by agreement of all warring parties but who do not trust one another to keep the peace. Thus, a neutral third party interposes itself between the sides, guaranteeing that each side will adhere to its commitments. But Darfur is not a settled conflict. The central government in Khartoum is still conducting its raids, the janjaweed continue to raid refugee camps, and the Darfuri rebels are still fighting back, even having attacked peacekeepers in the past.

As if the situation isn't bad enough, it's like to get much worse in the near future. Today, the International Criminal Court announced that its prosecutor has requested an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir on three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity and two of murder. While it will be months before the ICC to rule on the application, but if the warrant is issued, President al-Bashir will "effectively turn al-Bashir into a prisoner in his own country. In the past, Interpol has issued so-called Red Notices for fugitives wanted by the court, meaning they should be arrested any time they attempt to cross an international border."

But even if the warrant isn't issued, the damage is already done. The UN, which backs the ICC, also maintains the current peacekeeping force in Darfur, and it seems unlikely that Sudan will allow the peacekeepers to remain if their political leaders face indictment and arrest. The removal of the peacekeeping force, as ineffectual as it has been, would likely herald the resumption of a massive cleansing campaign by the Sudanese government in an effort to "solve" the Darfur problem before international intervention occurs again (if it ever does). Furthermore, the BBC reported on Sunday that China was breaking the UN-imposed arms embargo on Sudan, "roviding military equipment and training pilots to fly Chinese jets." While this development is all that surprising, given the diversion of international pressure on China from Darfur to Tibet, it is a troubling one, as it signals, perhaps, the end of Chinese cooperation on Sudan.

Given the precarious nature of the international community's involvement in Darfur, the indictment of al-Bashir by the ICC was definitely ill-timed and most likely ill-advised. I've blogged several times before about the problems inherent in international justice and law, and this is no different. Given that al-Bashir is unlikely to ever stand trial, maintaining the peacekeeping presence was more important than making a point through law.

The international community needs to prepare itself for more attacks on the peacekeepers, if not their expulsion from Sudan. And if (and when) that happens, given China's backsliding, it is all but impossible for the UN to put together a stronger intervention. So, the burden and responsibility will likely fall on the United States and its NATO allies. Sudan must not be allowed to continue its murderous campaign against Darfur, and China must not be allowed to shield Sudan. President Bush and the heads of states and government of the western countries should immediately threaten to boycott the Olympics, not over Tibet (which is a lost cause) but over Chinese violations of the arms embargo and protection of Sudan. China must be leveraged away from Sudan.

However, while China may be willing to support increased sanctions on Sudan, it will not, nor will Russia, support an intervention without the permission of the Sudanese government. Thus, NATO needs to be ready, if it cares at all about saving the Darfuri people, to deploy a force to Sudan immediately. Anything less will likely condemn the people of Darfur to their doom.

Trading Darfur For Tibet

With the uproar over the Chinese crackdown on Tibetan pro-independence/autonomy protests, the hubbub over the Olympic torch relay, and the to-do over the Dalai Lama's visit to the US, it's no wonder that the 2008 Beijing Olympics are being referred to as the "Tibet Olympics." As world leaders debate whether to boycott, or just skip, the Opening Ceremonies or the Games themselves, more and more attention gets turned to the cause of Tibet.

To the detriment of Darfur.

Before the protests in Tibet broke out, the Beijing Olympics were supposed to be the "Darfur Olympics." Much attention was paid to China's role as Sudan's patron and protector in the UN Security Council; Mia Farrow and Steven Spielberg criticized the Chinese government; I even spoke at a rally sponsored by SaveDarfur here in Tacoma about China's role in Sudan and what might be done. And the campaign seemed to be paying off. As I blogged last April:

after two years of shielding Sudan from international sanctions over the situation in Darfur, China has recently begun applying more pressure to Sudan.

Just when it seemed safe to buy a plane ticket to Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games, nongovernmental organizations and other groups appear to have scored a surprising success in an effort to link the Olympics, which the Chinese government holds very dear, to the killings in Darfur, which, until recently, Beijing had not seemed too concerned about.

Groups focusing on many issues, including Tibet and human rights, have called for boycotts of the Games next year. But none of those issues have packed the punch of Darfur, where at least 200,000 people — some say as many as 400,000 — mostly non-Arab men, women and children, have died and 2.5 million have been displaced, as government-backed Arab militias called the janjaweed have attacked the local population.

But now, all that attention has shifted to Tibet. The situation in Darfur continues to worsen, but the pressure is now off China to do anything to reverse things there. Political capital and the energy needed to motivate protests is, of course, limited. It may be that the media, non-governmental organizations, protesters, and the general public only have the resources to focus on one issue. If so, it seems as if Tibet has won out over Darfur for linkage with the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

But that would be a mistake. If only one cause can be aggressively championed (or even if championing both detracts from each), that cause should be Darfur. Not because the Darfuris are more worthy of protection that are the Tibetans, not because the situation is worse in Darfur (although a strong case could probably be made for that argument), not for any reason other than practicality. China is much more likely to yield to pressure over Darfur than it is over Tibet. Sudan represents important political and economic interests for China; Tibet represents sovereignty. China will, most likely, never cede Tibet. Greater autonomy is possible, but not in the short term. Using the Olympics to pressure and shame China into leaning on Sudan to moderate its behavior in Darfur seemed to be paying off. Using the Olympics to pressure and shame China into backing off Tibet is only likely to alienate and anger Beijing.

It would truly be a shame if an opportunity to help the people of Darfur went unrealized so that people can vent their anger over Tibet. The Tibetan people may very well deserve independence and our support. But not in ineffective protests that distract from and obstruct progress over Darfur.

The New York Times Hates the Darfuris

OK, so that's probably not true. But yesterday's editorial in the New York Times certainly isn't going to do anything to help end the suffering, deaths, and dislocation in Darfur either. In the editorial, the Times accurately points out that "The new United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur is not off to an encouraging start." The problem is that, unsurprisingly, the Sudanese government in Khartoum has done nearly everything possible to undermine the mission and prevent it from being able to do its job.

The 20,000 man joint UN-AU force was supposed to supplement from the badly under-equipped, under-sized (7,000) and poorly trained AU force that had been "patrolling" Darfur. So far, however, only one-tenth of the additional forces have been deployed (meaning that 9,000 of the 26,000 troops are in Darfur), largely because Khartoum has refused to allow non-African peace keepers. Much of the equipment necessary for the mission has not been provided, including helicopters which are essential for patrolling an land area the size of France. To date, none of the 24 helicopters so far requested has been deployed. One of the leaders of the genocidal janjaweed was named to be a special adviser to Sudanese President Omar El Bashir. And just 2 weeks ago, a UN convoy came under fire from Sudanese government forces, in an attack that Sudan denies was intentional, but UN officials claim should have been avoided as Sudanese forces were informed of the presence and route of the convoy.

It should be of no surprise that the UN mission in Darfur is failing. The UN is notoriously bad at these kinds of missions, which in reality should be called "peace making" rather than "peace keeping." In peace keeping, two sides which have been warring decide that they wish to end the conflict, but do not trust each other enough to warrant laying down their arms. A neutral third party is needed to interpose itself between the two sides and guarantee the peace will be observed. The UN, as a neutral and trusted third part is very good at these kinds of missions.

But that doesn't really describe the situation in Darfur, which looks more like peace making, in which an outside party uses military force (or the threat of military force) to impose a peace on a situation, particular when one weaker group is being threatened by a larger group. The NATO intervention in Kosovo is a classic example of peace making. Darfur looks much more like this kind of operation that it resembles peace keeping.

However, as good as the UN is at peace keeping, it is notoriously bad at peace making, largely because it lacks the political will to take sides and impose its will on the aggressor (which is exactly why it was NATO and not the UN that intervened in Kosovo, and why the UN was so disastrous in Bosnia [see Srebrenica]). The UN has neither the appetite nor the ability to bully Sudan, to deploy sufficient numbers of well-equipped troops, or to do what is really necessary to protect the people of Darfur.

So, why does the New York Times hate, or so I jest, the Darfuri? Because in the editorial in which the Times notes many of the problems I list above, the Times concludes that "There is no hope at all until a credible and credibly armed peacekeeping force is deployed" and that "What is needed is troops, equipment and a lot more diplomatic pressure on Sudan. The word of the United Nations is on the line, and so are the lives of Darfur’s people."

Has the Times learned nothing? Wasn't the word of the UN on the line when the Serb forces demanded access to slaughter the Muslims of Srebrenica? Wasn't the word of the UN on the line when UN forces on the ground in Rwanda stood back and watched 800,000 people hacked to death? Wasn't the word on the UN on the line when Albanians in Kosovo were driven from the homes and subjected to ethnic cleansing?

The UN will not be able to help the people of Darfur. It is simply not a mission for which the UN is well suited. And continuing to hope that the UN will come through is to condemn more Darfuris to explusion from their homes or death. If the Times really wanted to see the suffering in Darfur end, it would set aside calls for the UN, and instead ask President Bush and the leaders of NATO to take matters into their own hands as they did in Kosovo. That is the only chance that Darfur has.

Who's The Problem In Darfur?

Yesterday, hundreds of Darfur rebels poured out of the desert and assaulted a camp of peacekeeping troops from the African Union. When the attack was over, 10 peacekeepers were dead, dozens more were missing, possibly kidnapped, and lots of supplies, including heavy weapons, had been stolen. According to the New York Times:

Relief officials said that as those groups splintered, their new factions needed matériel, and that the attack on the peacekeepers might have been intended to seize quality weapons. “It’s indicative of the complete insecurity,” said Alun McDonald, a spokesman for the Oxfam aid organization in Sudan. “These groups are attacking anybody and everybody with total impunity.”

He added that armed groups were “increasingly targeting aid workers to steal their vehicles, radios and logistical stuff.” He said the attack on the peacekeepers “sounds quite similar to that, just on a much larger scale.”

Mr. McDonald's explanation is, however, unsatisfactory. Attacking the peacekeepers is very likely to result in the withdrawal of the AU force, and perhaps even a delay or cancellation of the UN-AU hybrid force that has been authorized to replace the existing AU force. Already Senegal, one of the largest contributors to the AU force, has announced that it is considering withdrawing its troops from the force. So, unless the rebels wanted the peacekeepers out of Darfur, attacking them doesn't make sense.

But it's altogether likely that the rebels do, in fact, want the peacekeepers out. The rebels are those Darfuri who have decided to take up arms against the Sudanese government in hopes of achieving greater political autonomy and protection, if not independence, for Darfur. The presence of peacekeepers, while perhaps sufficing to minimize or prevent the attacks against civilians that has killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions more, will not serve to advance the larger political goal. If anything, the peacekeepers will serve to entrench the status quo by freezing the battlelines and political demands in place. They certainly will make it more difficult for the rebels to attain their larger political goals.

Of course, if the UN was capable of disregarding concerns for sovereign equality and actually taking sides in ethnic conflicts like this, the rebels might have a little more faith that their concerns would be addressed by the international community. But history has likely given them little confidence that the presence of UN peacekeepers will do anything but perpetuate the existing situation, and might, in a worst case, prevent the Darfuri from defending themselves against Sudanese predation.

This attack will likely go a long way to convincing states that sending soldiers to Darfur is not realyl in their national interest. And while that might benefit the rebels, it will do little to ease the suffering of the average Darfuri. Whatever forces end up on the ground in Darfur must be capable of defending themselves against government or rebel forces, and must not be unwilling to use force to enforce the peace.

Dallaire On Darfur

Romeo Dallaire, now a senator in the Canadian parliament, was the commander of the UN peacekeeping force on the ground at the onset of the Rwandan genocide. He has been haunted by his inability to do anything about the slaughter, and has written extensively about his failure, the failure of the UN, and of the international community.

Yesterday, Dallaire published an open letter to General Martin Agwai, the commander-designate of the UN force that will, someday, be deployed into Darfur. The letter is worth reading in its entirety:

An open letter from the former force commander of the ill-fated Unamir mission to Rwanda, to General Martin Agwai, the newly appointed force commander designate for the UN mission in Darfur.

Dear General Agwai

Congratulations on your recent appointment as Joint United Nations/African Union force commander for the hybrid UN/AU Mission in Darfur, formalised by resolution 1769 as Unamid. After over four years of massive killing and displacement in Darfur, a conflict that has not only destabilised Sudan but the entire Eastern Sahel region, Unamid under the leadership of Mr Adada, joint special representative for Darfur, and the force under your command will have the historic opportunity to end slaughter, bring peace, [and] allow humanitarian aid. In the longer term, Unamid has the potential to facilitate the return of Darfur's people to their homes, enhance Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity and stabilise the region.

This is a daunting mandate, and you enter into this mission facing long odds. The intentions of the regime in Khartoum toward an effective, impartial implementation of the Unamid mandate are deeply uncertain. The Sudanese government has blocked and whittled international efforts, through the AU and UN, to end the killing and facilitate a durable peace through fair and transparent internal negotiations. Even since the enactment of Resolution 1769, we have seen ample indications that the Sudanese government will at every turn seek to impose a minimalist reading of the Unamid mandate. The government has already signalled that it will try to restrict the non-African role in the mission as much as it can and prolong the internal divisions and growing chaos which undermine efforts to end the fighting and provide humanitarian aid to all in need.

The challenges you will face in dealing with the rebel movements will also be substantial. In the absence of a viable political settlement process, and exacerbated by the Abuja settlement which many saw as imposed and unbalanced, the groups have fragmented and many elements have degenerated into criminal activity and focus on fighting each other. The same holds true of many "Arab" elements, some of which previously fought alongside government troops. The recent efforts of special envoys Salim and Eliasson have given some hope that this deterioration can be reversed with support from rebel movement leaders and field commanders themselves. But as you know, not all leaders are cooperating and conflict has certainly not diminished on the ground since the recent Arusha meeting. The threat to sustaining humanitarian operations as well as to nurturing the AU/UN-sponsored political talks is obvious and severe.

Finally, assembling, sustaining and directing such a large force in this most remote and inhospitable area will tax you, as it will test the will and capacity of both sponsoring organisations. The Unamid hybrid is conceptually novel, with many practical and legal issues that will impact your work yet to be discovered, let alone resolved. Funding, command and control, reporting and provisioning are all areas where both the location and force size will be taxing, and where the novel character of Unamid will add a difficult layer of challenge for you and the SRSG.

In wishing you well, as a fellow force commander, in your important mission, I would like to take the opportunity to offer a few broad thoughts that I hope may assist you in your preparation and implementation of the mission in the field.

First: I urge you to insist both to New York and to Addis Ababa that they clarify, in the most practical terms and as fast as possible, the chain of command and reporting for the mission. Resolution 1769 is vague on command and control. It did not precisely resolve the well-known disagreement between Khartoum, which insists on essentially AU command, and many other member states, that demand UN command and control as the only guarantor of effectiveness.

For my part, I would press hard for New York to be the headquarters you look to for ongoing guidance and authority to implement the mandate. In practical terms, DPKO has the mechanisms to give you guidance and respond to your urgent requirements at any time, whereas the AU headquarters does not, and DPKO also has long and hard-won experience in supporting missions in the field. At the same time, you will want to ensure that Unamid and DPKO itself integrate the AU secretariat into that process, so that its views and interests are dynamically engaged in your support. Above all, you and SRSG Adada will need to demand from both the UN and AU that they reject undue Sudanese government interference in the implementation of Resolution 1769 regarding command and control, and indeed in your operations.

Second: To succeed in the task given you, it is evident that you must exercise, and insist on, the broadest reading of the mandate given in resolution 1769 (especially operative paragraph 15) concerning your chapter VII authority. We are already seeing efforts by the Sudanese government and its friends to argue that the chapter VII authority extends only to force protection situations and support for the execution of the Darfur peace agreement. But the plain text of the resolution and the intent of the security council clearly are that Unamid should play an active role not only in maintaining peace, but also in protecting the vulnerable civilian population.

The security council's intent flows from those aspects of the Darfur conflict which have set it apart as an international concern of special priority - notably, the massive, purposeful death and displacement at the hands of government forces and their janjaweed militia creation. Those attacks burdened the African Union Mission (Amis) and cast in stark relief its lack of mandate and practical inability to intervene against even the most egregious and predictable attacks on civilians. The Sudanese government has indicated that it does not want Unamid to exercise its chapter VII authority to protect civilians. That cannot be accepted. It would render Unamid a nullity regarding the most fundamental reason for its creation.

Third: All are agreed that Unamid will benefit from having "a predominantly African character," but you must insist that member states with sophisticated capacities provide quickly, and with no political obstruction from Khartoum, what you need to make your force mobile and capable of extending its reach throughout Darfur. So far, a number of African countries have made significant and encouraging commitments. It is beyond dispute, however, that African states themselves simply cannot provide nearly 20,000 qualified troops (nor enough police). Unamid needs attack helicopters, engineers, big cargo lorries, communications and other capabilities that African states also cannot provide.

So far, the UN member states that can provide such capabilities have been slow to do so. I therefore encourage you to reject assertions that the AU has already committed, or could provide, all the needed military forces. Equally, you should bring great pressure, working with the senior UN and AU leadership, to pressure more resource-rich member states to provide the specialised capacities you need. And if Khartoum seeks to discourage meaningful non-African contributions, I urge you to take active exception in the interest of succeeding in your difficult task.

Fourth: Press for progressive deployment of the force, as elements are recruited and prepared. Resolution 1769 sets ambitious target dates for establishing Unamid's operations headquarters, for taking command of the support packages and support for Amis, and for assumption of command authority from Amis. Ranged against those targets are the real challenges of rapid mobilisation and deployment of national troop contributions to Unamid.

The thrust of the resolution is correct in practical as well as policy terms, but the period from now until full Unamid deployment will be a testing one and in many ways the determining period for the mission's success or failure. Previous Amis commanders have made clear their assessment that getting more troops on the ground will shift the balance of authority toward the peacekeepers and away from the spoilers. With a progressive deployment, Unamid can foster a gradual shift in the balance of power in Darfur, which will enhance the longer-term prospects for its effectiveness. In this regard, you will want to maintain pressure on both the UN and AU headquarters to build your needed camp and other logistical facilities as fast as possible, and to monitor Sudanese government interaction with Unamid and the camp construction contractors to ensure that any delaying manoeuvres are quickly identified, reported to New York and Addis Ababa and made a priority for diplomatic intervention.

Fifth: Be vigorous and frank, both in your official reporting to New York and Addis Ababa, and in your public commentary, concerning your achievements and the challenges and obstacles you encounter. It is important that your official reporting, in describing progress on mandate implementation, should highlight obstacles you face that require action by the two headquarters, or by member states. You can anticipate being let down by everyone on whom you depend for support, be that troops, funding, logistics or political engagement. Only by shining a spotlight on those failures in every possible way can you mobilise the attention necessary to get the action you need. Bear in mind that whoever fails you will, in the end, be the most active in blaming you for whatever goes wrong.

Permit me to conclude, general, by wishing you every success in this most challenging and important assignment.

Sincerely,

Senator/Lt General Roméo Dallaire

An excellent letter. Unfortunately, if I was a betting man, I would wager that Dallaire's advice will not be followed, and that the situation in Darfur is far from improving.

Don't Count Your Peacekeepers Before They're Deployed

Sudan has finally agreed to allow a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force of nearly 20,000 soldiers into Darfur to monitor the situation and prevent any further genocide. Sort of.

While the announcement by Sudan is being hailed as a "breakthrough moment" by the African Union, it's not so clear that it's time to breath a sigh of relief for Darfur. Apparently, Sudan is insisting that the force be made up almost entirely of Africans, a demand that makes the deployment all but impossible. According to John Prendergast, a Sudan expert who helps lead Enough Project, “the gulf between the rhetoric of acceptance and the reality of deployment is huge,” and the continued haggling over force makeup “is putting a condition on the deployment which ensures its failure.” Similarly, US Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad stated that "if [the acceptance] is conditional, as we hear, that there will be only African troops involved and no non-Africans, that is putting a condition on the acceptance, and that would be unacceptable.”

The UN will examine the plan today. Hopefully, if Sudan is still trying to stall and block the deployment by such insistences, the UN will finally decide to act and punish the genocidal regime. While this is welcome news, I'm certainly not holding my breath.

US Troops In Darfur?

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) has called for the deployment of US troops into Sudan to stop the on-going genocide in Darfur. Biden, who was attending a multinational meeting at the UN on the Darfur crisis, stated that he would impose a no-fly zone and send American soldiers into the region immediately, and also said that President Bush is considering implementing a large sanctions regime against Sudan if the Sudanese government continues to refuse to admit a larger peacekeeping force.

It's nice to see Biden go out a limb like this; the rest of the congressional delegation (Sen. Bob Corker [R-TN] and Sen. Benjamin Cardin [D-MD]) weren't willing to go as far as Biden and call for an intervention. However, despite the designation of the crisis as a genocide by President Bush, an armed intervention is unlikely to happen. The UN is far too gutless and hamstrung by its bureaucratic procedures to pass a Security Council resolution, the US military is strained by the deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and there is very likely little will -- political or public -- in the US right now for such an intervention.

But, even if Bush decided to send troops, how would such a move be greeted by those who have opposed the use of force in Iraq? An intervention in Darfur is almost guaranteed to be "illegal" in that it will not have the sanction of the UN Security Council, just as the invasion of Iraq did not. Does that mean the US shouldn't intervene? The US public has shown a willingness to tolerate the casualties sustained in Iraq...but will that continue in Darfur? Or will it be a repeat of Somalia where, unconvinced of the national interest at stake, a few US casualties undermined the whole operation?

If such an intervention is to occur, President Bush, along with Senator Biden and the rest of Congress, need to prepare the US public. Specifically, they need to make the case of why the US should expend its treasure, and more importantly, why US soldiers should risk their lives and even die to protect the Darfuris. As I have said before, this is not a hard case to make. But it needs to be made, or else an intervention in Darfur, or anywhere else the US intervenes for humanitarian purposes, will follow the same road as Somalia.

Fiddling While Darfur Burns

It is hard to imagine that anyone puts any faith in the UN to solve international crises any more. And yet, the optimism that followed the earlier announcement that Sudan would allow UN peace keepers into Darfur seemed to indicate trust that the blue helmets would soon be riding to rescue of the long-suffering Darfuris. However, all indications are that any hope that the genocide would be ending soon seems premature.

First, Sudan only agreed to allow 3,000 UN troops into the region, and only in a supporting or advisory role. That would bring the total UN-African Union hybrid force to 10,000; far short of the 17,000 - 20,000 peace keepers that both the AU and the UN have claimed would be needed to properly monitor the situation and protect the civilians. There is no indication that Sudan is considering allowing the larger force into Darfur. And given that the UN is having trouble raising the 3,000 troops already given permission, it's not even clear that a larger force could be mustered. Furthermore, the New York Times reports today that Sudan has been flying heavy weapons into the area in planes disguised as UN or AU transports. There are also indications that these planes are being used to bombard villages. These certainly do not seem like the actions of a state willing to cooperate with the UN in order to end the genocide in Darfur.

While the UN fiddles in the vain and desperate hopes that the murderous Sudanese regime will consent to end a policy that has so far served its purposes well, the US continues to push for a heavier hand in dealing with Sudan. Today, President Bush threatened to strengthen US sanctions against Sudan unless immediate actions are taken to stop the killing. Specifically, Bush demanded that "the Sudanese government must allow U.N. support forces, facilitate deployment of a full U.N.-African Union peacekeeping force, stop supporting violent militias and let humanitarian aid reach the people of Darfur." If such actions are not forthcoming, Bush stated that "the United States would tighten economic sanctions on Sudan, barring certain companies from taking part in the U.S. financial system; target sanctions on individuals responsible for violence; and apply new sanctions against the government of Sudan."

However, such sanctions while well-intentioned and certainly an improvement over the pathetic dithering and wishful thinking of the UN, aren't likely to have a sufficiently rapid effect to make a significant difference. If Darfur is to be saved, the US, NATO, the EU, and any other state that gives a damn needs to deploy military force to the area, without Sudanese consent if need be. In congressional hearings last week, Senator Joseph Biden called for just such an intervention, arguing that even 2,500 U.S. troops could "radically change the situation on the ground now." And while Biden acknowledged that intervention would not end "solve the situation", "it will mean that there will be ten, a hundred, five hundred, a thousand, two thousand, five thousan, fifteen thousand women who will not be raped, children who will not die, and people who will not just be murdered indiscriminately." Biden went on to call for establishing a firm deadline by which Sudan would have to accept a larger and better-equipped UN peace keeping force or else face military intervention, even without the support of the UN. The UN has, of course, resisted any and all calls to set any hard or meaningful deadlines or demands.

Unfortunately, the current policy situation makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the US to act. One of the most tragic results of the Iraq War, and the Vietnam War before that, is the increased reluctance of the US policy makers and the American public to support military intervention. Since the invasion of Iraq, American support for interventions like that in Kosovo has drastically declined. A 2005 Pew Center poll found that 42 percent of Americans agreed with the statement that “the U.S. should mind its own business internationally, and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.” It was the highest figure in over 40 years of polling on that question.

The American experience in Iraq must not be allowed to prevent the US from intervening to stop genocide and prevent murderous regimes from destroying large swathes of their populations. As I have written about before, there are plenty of reasons why such an intervention should be seen as part of American strategic national interest. But we also should not forget the moral imperative. Never again.

A Victory For Engagement

I blogged a few days ago about the role of the US strategy of engagement in moderating the behavior of China and how the recent filing of suit against China by the US in the WTO was likely to produce a nice test of the strategy as well as China's preferences. Today we have more evidence that the strategy of engagement is working. The New York Times is reporting that, after two years of shielding Sudan from international sanctions over the situation in Darfur, China has recently begun applying more pressure to Sudan. According to the article:

A senior Chinese official, Zhai Jun, traveled to Sudan to push the Sudanese government to accept a United Nations peacekeeping force. Mr. Zhai even went all the way to Darfur and toured three refugee camps, a rare event for a high-ranking official from China, which has extensive business and oil ties to Sudan and generally avoids telling other countries how to conduct their internal affairs.

Why the change? The Times credits a PR campaign waged against the upcoming 2008 Olympics to be held in Beijing:

Credit goes to Hollywood — Mia Farrow and Steven Spielberg in particular. Just when it seemed safe to buy a plane ticket to Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games, nongovernmental organizations and other groups appear to have scored a surprising success in an effort to link the Olympics, which the Chinese government holds very dear, to the killings in Darfur, which, until recently, Beijing had not seemed too concerned about.

Ms. Farrow, a good-will ambassador for the United Nations Children’s Fund, has played a crucial role, starting a campaign last month to label the Games in Beijing the “Genocide Olympics” and calling on corporate sponsors and even Mr. Spielberg, who is an artistic adviser to China for the Games, to publicly exhort China to do something about Darfur. In a March 28 op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, she warned Mr. Spielberg that he could “go down in history as the Leni Riefenstahl of the Beijing Games,” a reference to a German filmmaker who made Nazi propaganda films.

Four days later, Mr. Spielberg sent a letter to President Hu Jintao of China, condemning the killings in Darfur and asking the Chinese government to use its influence in the region “to bring an end to the human suffering there,” according to Mr. Spielberg’s spokesman, Marvin Levy.

China soon dispatched Mr. Zhai to Darfur, a turnaround that served as a classic study of how a pressure campaign, aimed to strike Beijing in a vulnerable spot at a vulnerable time, could accomplish what years of diplomacy could not.

Groups focusing on many issues, including Tibet and human rights, have called for boycotts of the Games next year. But none of those issues have packed the punch of Darfur, where at least 200,000 people — some say as many as 400,000 — mostly non-Arab men, women and children, have died and 2.5 million have been displaced, as government-backed Arab militias called the janjaweed have attacked the local population.

It is extremely important to China that the Games go off smoothly. Hosting the Olympics represents China's aspirations to join and get respect from the international community. Landing the Games in the first place was seen as validation for China's economic and political moderation, and it scares China that something like Darfur could taint that. According to J. Stephen Morrison of CSIS, China's goal "is to be seen as an ethical, rising global power. Their goal is not to get in bed with every sleazy government that comes up with a little oil."

Again we see the logic of engagement at work. Only by getting China to value its connections with the larger international community more than those with genocidal states would China be willing to challenge a strategic ally -- especially one that provides oil that is much-needed to maintain China's economic boom. While China has not yet agreed to allow the UN to impose serious sanctions on Sudan, there is evidence that Chinese pressure has been instrumental in the little ground Sudan has ceded lately. And while it may still be a long way to the deployment of an international peace keeping force, getting China to rethink where its interests lie is a critical step, and one that could only occur in the context of engagement.

The Larger Case For Intervention

The genocide in Darfur has been going on for some time now; hundreds of thousands of people have been murdered and millions have been chased from their homes. In response, the international community has done, essentially, nothing. This lack of interest is not difficult to understand. States are extremely reluctant to risk their own soldiers and resources on humanitarian interventions. The US experience in Somalia in 1993-4 is the model for this reluctance, but the failure to stop the bloodshed in Rwanda demonstrates that the lesson was learned. NATO's intervention in Kosovo is the exception that proves the rule, as Kosovo was much more about strategic and national interests than enforcing moral or ethical values.

Darfur, goes the argument, may be a tragedy, but it is worse when states become involved in conflicts in which their interest is low. When interest is low, states do not devote sufficient resources and lack political will (as happened in Somalia), making it unlikely that the intervention will succeed and often making the situation worse. There is no national interest in ending the genocide in Darfur. So nothing will happen. The UN fails to condemn it, the international community fails to act, and "never again" becomes a meaningless catchphrase.

But, does the genocide in Darfur really not threaten US, Western, or international interests? Not at all. As I blogged a few weeks back, humanitarian intervention can be understood as part of American national interest, and this is especially true in Darfur. First, the US is and always has been (current debates over Guantanamo aside) a leader in the promulgation of liberal values, human rights, and international law. That role depends on the US putting its money where its mouth is; only by acting to prevent the grossest violations of human rights and international law and norms can the US maintain its position that it held during the Cold War of the defender of freedom. Without US leadership and military force, the world would be a much more violent and much less free place.

But there are other ways that humanitarian crises like Darfur represent more serious threats to US national interest. For example, tensions are rising between Sudan and Chad over a border incursion by Chadian forces into Sudan this past weekend. Sudanese-backed rebels often cross into Chad to attack Darfurian militias, as well as refugee camps, and Chad has begun crossing into Sudan in pursuit of the rebels. This has the potential to spiral into a larger war, and this is exactly why ethnic conflicts should be understood as part of national interest. Ethnic conflict creates larger regional conflicts and creates failed states; these things destabilize regions other states, creating even larger wars as well as the conditions for terrorism. Al Qaeda and the Taliban had their Afghani roots in the fact that once the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, the US failed to devote any resources to building a state, allowing the Taliban to seize power and collaborate with al Qaeda. The failed US operation in Somalia led to the control of that country by an Islamic fundamentalist group with connections to al Qaeda. What happens in African states that seem to have little strategic import can in fact matter greatly to the US.

Fighting against those states that would allow the massacre of their populations is not just a moral issue. In fact, the moral argument is not likely to be one that produces the desired result. Opposing genocide is, however, also in the strategic interest of the US and its liberal allies. Building an international community based on respect for basic human rights is of strategic interest to all. And that is why humanitarian intervention should remain an active component of US foreign policy. Especially and immediately in Darfur.

A Choice In Darfur

Last week was hailed by some as a moderate breakthrough in Darfur, as Sudan once again agreed to consider allowing UN support to the beleaguered African Union peacekeeping mission in the troubled region. However, as even the New York Times acknowledged in an editorial this weekend, Sudan is unlikely to comply with this new deal, let alone implement it in a manner that will actually make a difference to the hundreds of thousands of murdered or the millions of displaced Darfuris. Unsurprisingly, things are once again getting worse; five African Union peacekeepers were killed as they guarded a water resource, underscoring how vulnerable and ineffective the AU force truly is.

Those who care about stopping genocide and ending the crisis in Sudan are faced with a choice: Support the multilateral process of the UN and international law or call for unilateral intervention by, among other possibilities, the United States. All too often, those involved in the Darfur debate, such as the Times and its stalwart columnist Nicholas Kristof, opt for the first solution, calling on the UN to get serious in enforcing its rules and norms. Witness the Times editorial referenced above:

The diplomatic timidity of the handful of governments that have denounced the horrors in Darfur has been almost as frustrating as the callousness of the many that will not. The European Union, for example, has no meaningful sanctions of its own against the responsible Sudanese leaders. The United States, which has been enforcing financial sanctions against a list of companies and individuals linked to the Darfur genocide, needs to expand the list, toughen the sanctions and persuade its allies, in Europe and elsewhere, to apply similar restrictions.

The United Nations has repeatedly disgraced itself by its halfhearted and inadequate response to the gravest human rights challenge it has faced since it failed the same genocide test in Rwanda more than a decade ago. The Security Council, which has authorized an international force, must now see to it that it is actually dispatched. The Human Rights Council, which should focus moral pressure on the Sudanese government, holds back from doing so. And Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and his representatives have too often been taken in by Mr. Bashir’s hollow assurances.

China and a shrinking bloc of nonaligned nations have repeatedly put the sovereign right of Sudan’s rulers to annihilate minorities ahead of the international community’s legal responsibility to prevent genocide and protect human rights.

Other international leaders need to demonstrate that they can act as well as talk, or else fine words and empty deeds will be the epitaph for the dwindling survivors of Darfur.

OK...all nice words. But what does the Times ultimately recommend that will end the genocide? Nothing. The UN cannot and will not act. The Security Council is crippled by its institutional structure that allows any permanent member -- Russia and China in this case -- to block the will of the international community and the enforcement of international law. The UN Human Rights Council prefers to focus its attention on Israel and dismiss any challenges to its moral authority than examine what's going on in Darfur. As of today, there has been no condemnation from the highest international human rights body. Nicholas Kristof, who perhaps more than anyone else has kept public attention on Sudan and Darfur, is no better. He truly cares about Darfur, but refuses to acknowledge the only avenue by which the genocide must be ended.

If Darfur is to be saved before only a Pyhrric victory will be left, it must be the US that chooses to save it. If the UN is to be involved, then China and Russia must be told that their defense of Sudan will come at the high price of international economic relations with the West. If China wants to benefit from globalization and trade with the US and Europe, it must behave responsibly in international politics and stop protecting the worst of the worst. However, such actions will take a long time. If Darfur is to be saved, the US must deploy peacekeeping forces immediately, or, more likely, offer logistical support to an EU force that can bolster the AU force already on the ground. Only such direct and immediate intervention will stem the tide of genocide before its too late.

Of course such an action is a violation of international law. So was the intervention in Kosovo, as well as the invasion of Iraq. The letter of international law is all too often a hindrance to the enforcement of its spirit. and if you're serious about saving Darfur, it's time to abandon hope in the UN or law itself, and acknowledge that only military force can bring justice.

Recasting The Darfur Debate

The US State Department has named the on-going genocide in Darfur the world's worst human rights abuse of 2006. The just-released 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices noted that "the Sudanese government and government-backed janjaweed militia bear responsibility for the genocide in Darfur" and that "all parties to the conflagration committed serious abuses, including widespread killing of civilians, rape as a tool of war, systematic torture, robbery and recruitment of child soldiers." The reappearance of the word "genocide" is particularly notable; it was first used in reference to Darfur in 2004 by then-SecState Powell, but has largely disappeared from official reports and speeches on the situation.

The US Special Envoy for Darfur, Andrew Natsios, is scheduled to meet with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir two days from now in an effort to convince al-Bashir to allow UN/AU peace keepers to increase their presence in the region. However, there are no signs of a imminent reversal by Sudan, which has to date steadfastly refused to allow a larger and better-equipped force into Darfur to protect the people there.

So, what the US do? While China has been willing to press Sudan a bit, it is unlikely that China (or Russia for that matter) would ever permit the Security Council to authorize an intervention without the acquiescence of the Sudanese government. Therefore any international action to protect the people of Darfur is likely to be, a la Kosovo and Iraq, conducted outside the bounds of the UN and international law. Given the experience of the US in interventions over the last 15 or so years -- Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan -- there is likely to be little stomach for an armed intervention. Even the success of Kosovo is more an exception that proves the rule, as Kosovo was a more traditional "war" involving state-against-state violence, while an intervention in Sudan is more likely to resemble Somalia or Rwanda.

Some people point to the recent breakthrough with North Korea as evidence that sanctions can work, particularly in the globalized world. But North Korea is more of unique case that I'm not sure can be applied to Sudan. North Korea has little to export the world, while Sudan has resources and oil. North Korea is politically and economically isolated, making it easier to close the flows, while Sudan is not.

If a military intervention is the only likely way to end the genocide and protect the long-suffering people of Darfur, how can the US overcome its reluctance to engage in these kinds of humanitarian operations? In a presentation I gave this past weekend to the local Darfur Action Group, I talked about how the discussion needs to be recast. Talking about the horrors and atrocities may help raise public awareness and sentiment, but it's not going to convince policy makers that action should be taken. The debate needs to be less about why Darfur is worthy of intervention, and more about why intervening in Darfur should be understood as part of US national interest.

Why should the US risk its soldiers and treasure to protect the people of Darfur? In Somalia, there was no clear answer to this question, and so when 18 US Rangers were killed, the country and the president lost their nerve and withdrew. If the US is to take action in Darfur, it must be made clear to the American public and decision makers that the action is the American interest and that US soldiers should die to protect the people of Darfur. I believe that case can be made. There are lots of ways that protecting innocent people being slaughtered by their government is in the US interest. There are lots of ways that stabilizing a volatile region is as well. President Bush in particular has shown himself to be open to this kind of argument; unfortunately, much of its force has been discredited by the debacle in Iraq.

But Darfur should not be forgotten. This country has a strong and vital interest in ensuring "Never Again."

A(nother) Cease-Fire in Darfur? Don't Get Too Excited...

For the second time, a cease-fire has been reached between the Sudanese government and the major rebel militia groups in Darfur. The cease-fire involves a 60-day cessation of hostilities, leading up to a peace summit with the African Union, the UN, the Sudan, and rebel groups. However, no one should be holding his breath in anticipation that this cease-fire will work.

First of all, negotiations like this always create a collective action problem wherein any group not party to the deal has a strong incentive to defect from the deal. [Sometimes this even applies to a group party to a deal but with multiple decentralized factions, such as the ETA, which announced that despite conducting a bombing in Spain over the New Year weekend, its cease-fire deal with the Spanish government is still in effect. In essence, because Spain has more to lose by scuttling the cease-fire, the ETA has a "get out of jail free" card.] This is what brought down the first cease-fire deal, and unless each and every Darfuri rebel group is included and has an incentive to adhere to the deal, it will, very shortly, be violated.

Second, the Sudanese government has, shortly after annoucing the cease-fire, reconfirmed that it will not allow UN troops to join or replace the too-small and too-weak AU peacekeeping force already on the ground in Darfur.

Nex Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, currently in Darfur and involved in the cease-fire negotiations, stated that "we've achieved something significant. It needs to be followed up. But unless there is proper implementation and follow through, this agreement is still up in the air. But I believe we've made an important breakthrough."

Unfortunately, Governor Richardson's comments are very likely premature. Neither the US nor the UN has demonstrated sufficient spine to enforce any deals or agreements, and has hardly mustered the energy to put any real pressure on Sudan or its protector, China. Until that happens, the situation is unlikely to improve.

An Open Letter on Darfur

Courtesy of the Henry Jackson Society:

Alarmed by the continuing murder of the black people of Darfur by the Janjaweed militias - supported by the Sudanese regime in Khartoum - The Henry Jackson Society decided that more appropriate and concerted action by the world’s great democracies should be requested from leading governments. Accordingly, The Henry Jackson Society issued an open letter on the crisis in Darfur, signed by fifty-five politicians, opinion formers, academics and journalists, to both raise awareness of this pressing moral and strategic issue, and call on the international community to end ethnic cleansing in Darfur.

The open letter has been sent to the High Representative for European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, Dr. Javier Solana; Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Rt. Hon. Tony Blair MP; Chancellor of Germany, Dr. Angela Merkel; President of France, M. Jacques Chirac; President of the United States, Mr. George W. Bush; Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh; and President of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki. It was sent also to the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Rt. Hon. Margaret Beckett MP and the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt. Hon. Des Browne MP.

An open letter on the crisis in Darfur to the leaders of the European Union, the United States, India, South Africa, and other great democracies.

After the Holocaust, the world said ‘never again’ to genocide. Yet our will to prevent the murder and destruction of particular peoples was not sufficient to stop further genocides, even in the closing years of the last century. The genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia are a scar on the conscience of the world, and they led to insecurity and suffering on a scale which is beyond comprehension.

Today, in the early years of a new century the world stares in the hideous face of genocide once again. In Darfur, the black population faces annihilation at the hands of Arab Janjaweed and other militias, supported by the Sudanese regime in Khartoum. This is not a civil war or a religious conflict, but a calculated strategy of intimidation and ethnic cleansing. It is designed to kill, remove or enslave black people in Darfur. 200,000 have already been murdered, with a further two million driven from their homes.

We therefore urge our leaders – of the European Union and its member-states, the United States of America, India, South Africa, and other democratic nations the world over – to ensure that genocide does not destroy the people of Darfur. And although a genocide in Darfur is a serious moral issue, it is also a concern paramount to European security. Should the situation deteriorate further, it will spill over and damage an already unstable region, creating a breeding ground for extremism and terror. Moreover, we have a clear strategic interest to prevent attempts by the People’s Republic of China to support repressive regimes in Africa in return for energy concessions.

In light of such circumstances, we call on our governments to empower and fund the African Union, so that it has one last chance to deal with the crisis. Meanwhile, our leaders must apply as much pressure as may be required on the Sudanese regime in order to make it cooperate with the international community. Khartoum must allow international forces with a robust mandate into Darfur to reverse ethnic cleansing and re-establish the rule of law, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706. Should this cooperation not be forthcoming, we call on our governments to take all the necessary action – insofar as is possible in coordination with the United Nations – to ensure that the people of Darfur are protected, and that those driven from their livelihoods be allowed to return to their homes. This may require the speedy deployment of peace enforcers and the establishment of no-fly zones, in order to prevent the Sudanese regime from assisting the Janjaweed in their murder.

For many months, Darfur has stood on a precipice; today, it is very close to falling off into a dark age of chaos, carnage and genocidal murder. We must not let this happen.

Supported by (institutional affiliation listed only for means of identification),

Karim Abdian - Director, Ahwaz Human Rights Organisation

Mansour Silawi Ahwazi - Foreign Relations, Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz

Michael Allen - Editor, Democracy Digest

Nasser Bani Assad - President, British Ahwazi Friendship Society

Paul Beaver - Commentator and Parliamentary Advisor, United Kingdom

Prof. Vernon Bogdanor - Professor of Government, University of Oxford

Nicholas Boles - Director, Policy Exchange

Roberta Bonazzi - Director, European Foundation for Democracy

Max Boot - Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Daniel Brett - Director, British Ahwazi Friendship Society

Chris Bryant MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

David Clelland MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

Humphry Crum Ewing - Chairman, The Standish Group

Yahia Elbashir - Human Rights Secretary, Darfur Union

David Gauke MP - Member of Parliament (Conservative), United Kingdom

Michael Gove MP - Member of Parliament (Conservative), United Kingdom

Robert Halfon - Political Director, Conservative Friends of Israel

Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann - Founder and President, World Security Network

Gary Kent - Director, Labour Friends of Iraq (Personal Capacity)

Daniel Keohane - Centre for European Reform

Dr. William Kristol - Editor, The Weekly Standard

Bruce Jackson - President, Project on Transitional Democracies

Prof. Alan Johnson - Editor, Democratiya

Henry Knobil

Jackie Lawrence - Member of Parliament (Labour), 1997-2005, United Kingdom

The Hon. John Lehman - Secretary of the United States Navy, 1981-1987

Prof. Andrew Lever - University of Cambridge

Dr. Andrew Lilico - Managing Director, Europe Economics

Gideon Mailer - Africa Director, The Henry Jackson Society

Dr. Alan Mendoza - Executive Director, The Henry Jackson Society

Jan Mortier - Director, Civitatis International

Michael Mosbacher - Director, The Social Affairs Unit

Douglas Murray - Senior Fellow, The Social Affairs Unit

Fionnuala Jay O’Boyle MBE - Jay Associates Public and Government Affairs

Robert Philpot - Director, Progress

Dr. Efraim Podosik - Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Stephen Pollard - Columnist, The Times

Greg Pope MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

Ben Ramm - Editor, The Liberal

Ben Rogers - Deputy Chairman, Conservatives’ Human Rights Commission

James M. Rogers - Executive Secretary, The Henry Jackson Society

Prof. William Rubinstein - University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Prof. Roger Scruton - University of Arlington

Dr. Gary Schmitt - Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Dr. Brendan Simms - Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

Alex Singleton - Director-General, The Globalisation Institute

Dr. Ulrich Speck - Commentator and Journalist

Eva Strickmann - German Council on Foreign Relations

Gisela Stuart MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

Peter Tatchell - Human Rights Campaigner

Rebecca Tinsley - Waging Peace

Lord Trimble - Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, 1998

Tomáš Weiss - Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM

Stuart Wheeler - Founder of IG Index

Prof. Alan Lee Williams - Director, Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom

A Looming Genocide in Sudan

Despite the signing of a peace deal in May 2006, the situation in Darfur seems to be heading towards disaster and genocide. Last week, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir refused to meet with the envoy dispatched from the United States, and then rejected a UN resolution to fold the existing, but ineffective, African Union peacekeeping force into a larger, more capable United Nations force. Today, the AU force threatened to pull out of Darfur when its mandate expires at the end of the month if the mission is not handed over to the UN. Meanwhile, Sudan has begun a major offensive -- a testament in and of itself to the ineffectiveness of the AU peacekeepers -- presumably in an effort to crush the Darfuri rebels before being forced to accept a UN force (or, more cynically, in advance of "graciously" allowing the UN in to Darfur to see how nicely the situation has been resolved). Civilian casualties, looting, and rapes are all on the rise. To date, deaths in Darfur are approximately 250,000, with 2.5 million peope displaced and at the mercy of the Sudanese government and the murderous janjaweed raiders if the peacekeepers are withdrawn.

The situation is coming to a head, and the world cannot wait for the UN to take action. Waiting to convince Sudan to accept the international peacekeepers will simply present Sudan with a window of opportunity to complete its operations. The UN needs to set aside its strong predilictions for state sovereignty, and formally request that other international actors, such as NATO, take actions into their own hands. However, as opposed to Kosovo, when UN authorization was not particular explicit and didn't come until after the NATO operation, this time the UN needs to act before thousands more Darfuris are slaughtered by their barbaric government. True, China and Russia would likely veto a Chapter VIII authorization of a regional actor intevening in Sudan's affairs, or even a less formal request to do so. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan must act in accordance with the spirit, rather the laws, of his institution, and issue a direct call from his office.

Would, if given the opportunity and green light from the UN, the west act? It's hard to say. On the one hand, the NATO powers, and the US in particular, has been much more vocal and active about Darfur than previous genocidal situations in Africa, like Rwanda. However, the lessons of Somalia still ring loudly in the ears of politicians and military leaders alike: in the absence of strong public support, humanitarian deployments are doomed to failure. Now is the time for President Bush to begin mustering support for a deployment to Sudan. Given that many European powers are providing troops for Lebanon, the US may have to send several thousand of its own. But, given the need to rebuild the US image (although intervening against the Muslim state of Sudan may not help the US with the Arab "street"), the clearly looming disaster, President Bush's interest in the problem, as well as the growing recognition that US inaction in Rwanda was a great black spot on US foreign policy, it doesn't seem impossible to imagine.

Kristof on the United Nations

First, let me begin today by offering a brief apology for the sparse blogging lately. I'm buried under piles and piles of papers and exams to grade, and am slowly digging myself out.

Next, I want to call attention to Nicholas Kristof's piece in today's New York Times entitled "Dithering Through Death." It is a withering attack on the UN and its role (or lack thereof) in preventing genocide and other egregious crimes against humanity. Some of the best quotes:

The sad fact is that the U.N. is a wimp. It publishes fine reports and is terrific at handing out food and organizing vaccination campaigns, but the General Assembly and the Security Council routinely doze through crimes against humanity.

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My guess is that the recent peace deal in Darfur will fall apart. It is fragile on the rebel side, and Sudan is probably lying once again when it promises to disarm the janjaweed militia. All that said, this peace agreement is the best hope we have to end the genocide, and the U.N. needs to back it up by dispatching an international force to Darfur. If the U.N. fails that test in the coming weeks, it will have disgraced itself again.

Frankly, the U.N. has regularly failed abysmally in situations like the one in Darfur, when military intervention is needed but a major power (in this case China) uses the threat of a veto to block action.

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But by and large, victims of war and genocide are served about as well by the U.N. as earlier generations were by the Kellogg-Briand pact to outlaw war. Granted, when the U.N. fails, that simply means that its member states fail — but the upshot is still that when genocide alarm bells tinkle, the places to call are Washington, London and Paris, not New York.

Does this mean I buy into the right wing's denunciations of the U.N.?

No, partly because the U.N. agencies do a fine job in humanitarian operations. The World Food Program and Unicef are first-rate; they jointly run the U.N. operation I most admire, the school-feeding program. For 19 cents a day per child, they provide meals in impoverished schools, and those meals hugely increase school attendance (see www.wfp.org).

And without the World Food Program organizing food shipments to Sudan and Chad, hundreds of thousands more people would have died. Those U.N. field workers are heroic — just this month, a 37-year-old Spanish woman working for Unicef was shot and critically injured in Chad. People like her redeem the honor of the U.N.

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John Bolton, now the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., once suggested it wouldn't matter if the U.N.'s top 10 floors were lopped off. But let's not do that — the U.N. is far better than the alternative of having no such institution. But take it from this disillusioned fan of the U.N. system: let's also be realistic and drop any fantasy that the U.N. is going to save the day as a genocide unfolds. In that mission, the U.N. is failing about as badly as the League of Nations did.

Kristof is a bit more optimistic about the UN in general than I, but his point is well taken. The UN, as with many international institutions, works best when it coordinates the activities of states with commensurate interests. When it tries to work against the interest of states -- actions that typically require force or at least the threat of force -- it is practically useless, and sometimes even deterimental, as it distracts from the task at hand. It would be a great thing if the UN could focus more on what it does well -- peacekeeping, organizing and monitoring elections, providing humanitarian aid, organizing vaccination campaigns, etc. -- and less on what it does not do well, like preventing genocide.

On a related note, the UN Security Council just approved a resolution calling for strict observance of the recent peace deal between the Sudanese government and the main rebel group. However, as the article notes, the deal is already being "widely violated," and it's clear that the African Union peacekeeping force on the ground is incapable of enforcing it or protecting Darfur. Unless Sudan agrees to allow a more robust force of UN peacekeepers into the area (given the recent record of UN troops raping women, however, maybe that's not such a great idea either), as Ethiopa has urged Sudan to do, the deal has no chance. When and if that moment comes, the burden will be on the UN to prove that it puts the protection of innocents above sovereign immunity of murderous regimes. When the UN fails, let's hope the US steps up.

Hope For Darfur

The Sudanese government and the largest Darfur rebel group have signed a peace deal. Brokered by the United States, the deal calls for "a cease-fire; disarmament of militias linked to the government and accused of some of the war's worst atrocities; the integration of thousands of rebel fighters into Sudan's armed forces; and a protection force for civilians." Furthermore, "political provisions included guarantees that rebel factions will have the majority in Darfur's three state legislatures, but the rebels did not get the national vice presidency they had sought."

This last clause is problematic, as two important, but smaller and less powerful than the one that signed the deal, rebel groups refused to sign, insisting that Sudanese vice presidency be given to someone from Darfur. This could cause problems similar to those in the Palestinian territories, where the inability to disarm and control all armed factions leads to a slow undermining of the conditions for peace. Also, there isn't a great track record here, as neither the Sudanese government nor the rebel factions made much of an effort to abide by a 2004 cease-fire agreement.

However, this deal is still a critical step. It seems likely that a stronger UN peacekeeping force will be deployed to replace the ineffective African Union troops already on the ground in Darfur. If Sudan allows that to happen, and if the deal can be respected by both sides, it represents an opportunity to address the political concerns of Darfur, as well as provide protection for the region from Khartoum. And if it doesn't work, it will be that much more difficult for Russia and China to block UN action. And, if all else fails, the US will now be able to claim it has tried all other options and is left with no choice but to intervene. Let's hope for the people of Darfur it doesn't come to that.