The Return Of The Club For Growth

The passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 is now widely seen as one of the most disastrous laws ever passed by Congress. The high tarrifs lengthened and intensified, if not caused, the Great Depression and contributed to the coming of World War II by exacerbating poor economic conditions in Europe and undermining any sense of international trust. At the time, it was opposed by 1,028 of this county's leading economists, who called themselves the Club For Growth. Unfortunately, Congress thought it knew better than the economists and ignored their advice.

History seems to be repeating itself today as a newly protectionism-minded Congress prepares to pass legislation that will impose punitive tariffs on China if China does not raise the value of its currency, the yuan. While the yuan has risen by about 9% in value relative to the dollar, it may still be undervalued by 40%.

Fortunately, the Club For Growth has returned, as 1,028 of our leading economists have once again signed a petition urging Congress to abandon punitive tariffs as a policy tool. Unfortunately, it's likely that the current incarnation of the Club will be ignored just as was the first.

There are so many reasons why these tariffs would be a bad idea. First, they are little more than protectionism disguised as congressmen seek to protect their inefficient and struggling manufacturing industries from foreign competition. Succeeding will cost this country, and the global economy, billions of dollars, and will punish the poorest Americans who can least afford to waste their money on tariffs.

Second, this policy threatens to undermine the long-standing US policy of engagement towards China. While China is not a model global citizen, there can be no question that the China of today is infinitely better -- economically, socially, politically -- than the China of 20 years ago, and little doubt that the China of tomorrow will be better than the China of today. And there is little question that economic interdependence, globalization, and engagement are large reasons why.

Undermining such a critical long-term policy for short-term political benefit is so short-sighted as to be moronic. But why would we expect anything less from our elected officials?

If The Surge Is Working, Why Are We Still Losing Iraq?

By many accounts, the surge of US troops in Iraq is beginning to pay dividends. Admiral Michael Mullen, the pick to be the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified at his confirmation hearing that the security situation is "better, not great, but better." Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack, two vocal critics of the handling of the Iraq occupation (although Pollack was a strong supporter of the invasion itself) wrote a piece in the New York Times arguing that the situation is improving: "We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with." In a long interview with Hugh Hewitt, New York Times reporter John Burns argued much the same point:

I think there’s no doubt that those extra 30,000 American troops are making a difference. They’re definitely making a difference in Baghdad. Some of the crucial indicators of the war, metrics as the American command calls them, have moved in a positive direction from the American, and dare I say the Iraqi point of view, fewer car bombs, fewer bombs in general, lower levels of civilian casualties, quite remarkably lower levels of civilian casualties. And add in what they call the Baghdad belts, that’s to say the approaches to Baghdad, particularly in Diyala Province to the northeast, to in the area south of Baghdad in Babil Province, and to the west of Baghdad in Anbar Province, there’s no doubt that al Qaeda has taken something of a beating.

[Shia on Sunni violence since the surge] is reduced, and it’s reduced primarily, as far as we can see, because of the increment, and I’m talking here of a virtual doubling of American troop strength in Baghdad, to speak only the neighborhood in which the New York Times operates here, the Rusafa neighborhood on the east side of the Tigris River, we here now have American troops quartered about a half a mile away from us for the first time in three years. So when you put American boots on the ground, you definitely have an inhibiting effect on this, and we’ve seen that in falling levels of sectarian violence. Where you don’t have American boots on the ground inside Baghdad, you see higher levels of sectarian violence. So I would that on the whole, the situation is somewhat better than it was, which is exactly what you would have expected by introducing a significant increase of American combat troops.

Peter Beaumont of The Guardian, no fan of the invasion or Bush's policies, remains critical, but also notes progress:

And while in Iraq it has usually been the best policy to deal with officials with a strong dose of scepticism following the years of pronouncements of victory around the corner, for now at least there appears to be corroborating evidence that in the north, the war may be drawing, ever so slowly, towards some kind of close.

In Mosul, which once hosted 21,000 US soldiers in the city, now only a single battalion, in the mid-hundreds, remains inside the city, matched by an equivalent drop in attacks. And it is not only in Mosul that security is improving. The sense that things are getting better is reflected in Nineveh Province. In two years US troop levels around Tal Afar, once the heartland of al-Qaeda, have been reduced from 6,000 to 1,200.

The general trend for acts of violence - despite some spikes - also has been steadily decreasing. Indeed, until Jamil Salem Jamil detonated his human bomb there had not been a suicide vest attack in Tal Afar since 14 January.

And there are other striking indicators. The last time that I flew across this area, two years ago, what agriculture there was was sporadic. Now it has turned golden with a vast expanse of freshly cut wheat fields that have turned the flat plains that touch the Kurdish foothills into a vast prairie, using almost every patch of viable land.

At this point, we are still only few months into the surge, with most analysts agreeing that we won't know much for sure until September, at the earliest. But if early signs are trending positive, why is there still so much cynicism and pessimism?

The problem is that the military component is but one aspect of the overall solution, and is not even the most important solution. The only way to succeed in Iraq is for the political process to develop in such a way that the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds all believe that their interests will best be protected by the government and through participation in that process. The surge is intended not to pacify the country, but rather to provide sufficient security to create breathing room in which the government can pass needed laws and stabilize the political situation.

But while the surge may be working, the political process is not. All of the people cited above for their optimism on the military aspect of the surge also voiced their pessimism about the political side. Admiral Mullen stated that "there does not appear to be much political progress" in resolving the critical issues that might ease sectarian violence. O'Hanlon and Pollack note that Iraq "still faces huge hurdles on the political front. Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation — or at least accommodation — are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines" and that "Iraqi high-level politics remains completely log-jammed, we saw zero evidence of progress there." According to Burns, the political situation is:

probably the most depressing or discouraging aspect of the entire situation. I think it’s probably fair to say that the Iraqi political leaders, Sunni, Shiia, Kurd in the main, are somewhat further apart now than they were six months ago. In other words, the Bush administration’s hope that the military surge would be accompanied by what they called a political surge, a movement towards some sort of national reconciliation, uniting around a kind of national compact, that has simply not occurred. Indeed, the gulf between the Shiite and Sunni leaders in the government is probably wider than it has ever been. There’s a great deal of recrimination. There’s hardly a day when the Sunnis do not, as they did again today, threaten to withdraw from the government altogether. There’s virtually no progress on the key benchmarks, as the Bush administration calls them, matters like a comprehensive oil law that will settle the issue of how oil revenues, which account for 90% of government revenues here, will in future be divided and spent between the various communities, and many other issues, eighteen of them, benchmarks identified by the Congress, there’s very little progress on those benchmarks. Where there is some progress is at the grass roots level, some progress, though we’re beginning to see tribal leaders, in particular, in some of the most heavily congested war areas, beginning to stand up and say they’ve had enough of it, and to volunteer to put forth their young men, either to join the Iraqi police or army, or to join in tribal auxiliaries, or levees if you will. That’s probably the most encouraging political sign. But at the Baghdad level, unfortunately, the United States still does not have an effective political partner.

Meanwhile, amidst these reports of political failures, the Iraqi parliament prepares to adjourn for the entire month of August, since it had not been presented any laws on which to vote.

The political stalemate is unquestionably undermining the military progress. But what can be done? The problem is that, as I blogged about more than a year ago, the US has been too quick to hand the reins of power over to the Iraqi government, which is not up to the task (nor should be expected to be). It is simply not realistic to expect a brand-new democracy to be capable of dealing with such difficult and contentious issues while setting aside years of ethnic hatred and desires for vengeance. It is time to recognize that the Iraqi government is failing in what must be done.

To that end, I strongly agree with Senator Barack Obama's proposal (found in his recent Foreign Affairs article outlining his presidential foreign policy) to institute a soft deadline for a US troop withdrawal. A soft deadline would contain a solid date (Obama proposes March 31, 2008; I would defer to military analyses of how long the surge needs to be truly effective) by which US troops would be pulled from Iraq; however, that deadline could be waived if the Iraqi government meets certain benchmarks on its political progress. The deadline would put serious pressure on the government to make progress; not even the Sunnis in the government want the process to collapse. But the waivers take away the possibility of the insurgents lying low until US troops leave. If progress occurs, the US military will remain as long as needed to ensure security and train Iraqi forces to handle matter on their own. If no progress occurs, then what's the point (other than preventing a massive civil war and genocide, which at that point would likely become unavoidable as US troops certainly won't remain in Iraq indefinitely in the absence of political progress) in keeping the troops there?

Something must be done. Strong steps must be taken to prevent the weaknesses of the Iraqi government from squandering the sacrifices of our soldiers.

A Trade Trade?

The Washington Post reports that congressional Democrats are seeking to expand the role, scope and power of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program. The TAA was implemented to help workers adjust to the impact of globalization, by providing funds for re-training, relocation, and job searching to those "whose hours of work or wages are reduced as a result of increased imports." Currently, TAA assistance is limited to those in the manufacturing sectors, whom had been the hardest hit by globalization; the Democrats are trying to expand TAA to jobs in the service industries, such as computer programmers and call-center staffers. According to the Post:

Last year, the Labor Department approved 1,400 petitions covering about 400,000 workers, according to a recent study by the Government Accountability Office, though fewer than 100,000 workers sought and received benefits. The agency denied 800 petitions, mainly because the workers did not produce "an article" and hence fulfill the basic definition of a manufacturing worker. Most of the denials involved two industries, the GAO said: business services such as computer programming and airport-related services such as aircraft maintenance.

The TAA is a grand political compromise that helps make globalization possible. While globalization produces massive net benefits, those benefits tend to be spread across the entire population, while the costs of globalization are typically localized in inefficient industries that suffer as jobs move abroad. Those that lose their jobs have a larger incentive to lobby their congressmen than the vast majority that benefit from lower prices and increased quality; thus, globalization contains the seeds of its own defeat. The TAA helps reduce the cost of economic dislocation, making it easier for the public and politicians alike to "do the right thing" by advancing the cause of globalization. The TAA has typically enjoyed broad bipartisan support, and the current bill is co-sponsored by Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT).

Why is this effort from the Democrats problematic then? In the past, TAA has been part of a grand trade deal: Republicans would support TAA and in return Democrats would support free trade deals. But the current Congress doesn't seem as willing to give that quid pro quo. The extension of Trade Promotion Authority (formerly known as Fast Track, TPA means that Congress can only vote up-or-down on trade bills, rather than amending, adding, and subtracting to the deal. Without TPA, it is exceedingly difficult to conclude trade agreements, as other states are loathe to make concessions knowing that Congress may very well undo whatever US concessions are given in return.) is in danger, and Congress has delayed consideration, let alone approval, of the previously signed trade deals with Peru, Panama, Colombia, and South Korea, despite a deal in May to bring the agreements to a vote. Protectionism was a major theme of many of the Democrats who won office in last year's election, and passing TAA in the absence of a commensurate expansion of global trade will only further retard the global and domestic economy.

Hopefully, Senate Republicans will insist that the Democrats acquiesce on trade in exchange for expanding protection for those who suffer from globalization. If they don't, and the growing anti-trend continues, economic promise will grow dim.

Shame on the Senate

Last night, the US Senate held an all-night debate on a proposal to force a withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 120 days. The fact that a bunch of middle-aged (and older) millionaires would be staying up all night was irresistible to the New York Times, which ran a front-page picture of the cots that the tired legislators would be using (doesn't that defeat the purpose of an all-night debate? Just shows just how useless big government is...it can't even get an all-nighter right). The Times thought the even so important to run a page 7 article that described the idiotic theater that went on: Pizza boxes (one would hope that the Senate has good enough taste to order from Pizzeria Paradiso, but I doubt it), the photo shoots of the cots (in which the Times obviously participated) and the gift bags sent to the Republicans by the majority leader Harry Reid which were tied with yellow ribbons and bore a note reading “A few supplies for your sleepless night — help us bring an end to this war.” (And Reid insists this all-night debate wasn't about political theater.)

I don't quite understand the oohing and aahing about the Senate doing what many of my students do on a routine basis. So a bunch of rich people who only work half the year (true, I only work half the year, but I don't make $165,000 a year) stayed up all night once? So what? Are we supposed to be awed by how seriously the Senate is taking the question of withdrawing troops? Only a group as self-congratulatory and narcissistic as the Senate could believe that such a transparent and empty gesture as an all-nighter could substitute for intelligent and informed discourse.

But the shame of the Senate goes even farther. What was the point of the debate? To pass a law requiring the withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 120 days; a law which would undoubtedly be vetoed or simply ignored as unconstitutional (as I have argued several time, unless the power of the purse is used, Congress may not tell the president how to use the armed forces). The time to oppose the surge, or even the entire mission, is not now; it was months ago when Congress voted on the appropriations bill to fund the war in Iraq. The Senate didn't have the guts then to do what it would take to end the war, so the surge went forward and the war continued. It's now only a few months into the surge, so why give up now? Not that the Republicans are any better. Several prominent GOP Senators, like Richard Lugar (R-IN) or Pete Domenici (R-NM) have backed away from the Iraq mission publicly but failed to back the Democrat's bill. So why have they distanced themselves from the larger mission?

For the Senate to behave this way is shameful. Iraq demands and deserves serious political discussion. It demands politicians who have the spine to do what they believe is right, even if it may be politically damaging to them. But to put on political theater to convince us that they're serious is utterly disgraceful.

Losing Afghanistan

As if the situation in Iraq wasn't bad enough, things in Afghanistan are looking dire. Unfortunately, due to the obsession with Iraq of our political leaders (both Republican and Democrat) and the myopia of our national media, Afghanistan doesn't get much press here.

Not so in Great Britain, where the UK's most senior generals have told the prime minister that NATO is facing a catastrophic failure in Afghanistan, one that even threatens the stability of Pakistan. The Guardian reports that "Lord Inge, the former chief of the defence staff, highlighted [the generals'] fears in public last week when he warned of a 'strategic failure' in Afghanistan." According to the report:

'The situation in Afghanistan is much worse than many people recognise,' Inge told peers. 'We need to face up to that issue, the consequence of strategic failure in Afghanistan and what that would mean for Nato... We need to recognise that the situation - in my view, and I have recently been in Afghanistan - is much, much more serious than people want to recognise.'

Inge's remarks reflect the fears of serving generals that the government is so overwhelmed by Iraq that it is in danger of losing sight of the threat of failure in Afghanistan. One source, who is familiar with the fears of the senior officers, told The Observer: 'If you talk privately to the generals they are very very worried. You heard it in Inge's speech. Inge said we are failing and remember Inge speaks for the generals.'

Inge made a point in the Lords of endorsing a speech by Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader, who painted a bleak picture during the debate. Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq.

'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.'

...

Ashdown said two mistakes were being made: a lack of a co-ordinated military command because of the multinational 'hearts and minds' Nato campaign and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom offensive campaign against the Taliban. There was also insufficient civic support on, for example, providing clean water.

'There is a very short shelf life for an occupation force. Once that begins to shift against you it is very very difficult to turn it round.'

The warnings from Ashdown and the generals on Afghanistan will be echoed in a report this week by the all-party Commons defence select committee. MPs will say that the combination of civilian casualties, war damage and US-led efforts to eradicate lucrative poppy crops risk turning ordinary people towards the Taliban.

The immediate impulse here is to blame President Bush and the war in Iraq from diverting focus and resources away from Afghanistan, and such criticism would most definitely be valid. But it would also not be complete. NATO as an institution has had problems before with its military command: Read General Wesley Clark's or Robert Kagan's account of the intervention in Kosovo for excellent descriptions of this. Divided command and competing national interests have hamstrung NATO, making it difficult to conduct military operations in a coherent, unified manner. Furthermore, many NATO members have not been willing to provide sufficient troops or materiel for the Afghan campaign.

These are some of the critical problems with multilateral military action, and it is not surprising that they are present in Afghanistan. If the situation is to be saved, two things, neither of which is likely to occur must happen. First, the US must increase the number of ground forces in Afghanistan. The all-too-frequent air strikes with high civilian casualties are undermining the "hearts-and-minds" campaign, undoing all the good work being done in other areas. More troops are needed to secure villages and hunt down the Taliban units. Second, NATO needs to develop a more unitary command structure, in which member states provide troops to be used at the discretion of the NATO commander. If NATO is to remain a serious and competent military force, it cannot continue to be incapable of sustaining military operations.

Losing the War on Terror

Picking up from my previous post, today's news is filled with intelligence reports that al Qaeda has rebuilt its operational capacity. A National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Al-Qaeda Better Positioned to Strike the West" to be released soon asserts that al Qaeda is "considerably operationally stronger than a year ago," has "regrouped to an extent not seen since 2001," and "[is] showing greater and greater ability to plan attacks in Europe and the United States." Furthermore, al Qaeda has succeeded in creating"the most robust training program since 2001, with an interest in using European operatives" while the US is suffering from"significant gaps in intelligence" so U.S. authorities may be ignorant of potential or planned attacks.

One of the main successes so far in the War on Terror was the destruction of al Qaeda's formal institutionalized command structure that existed in Afghanistan pre-9/11. It was the organized nature of the group that enabled it to carry out such sophisticated attacks like 9/11, the bombing of the USS Cole, and the double bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. However, since the loss of the organizational structure, al Qaeda has been largely incapable of mounting attacks of high sophistication, and has largely relied on suicide bombs on soft targets, like buses, trains, and discos. While deadly, such attacks are not what al Qaeda wants to be doing, as they don't raise its operational profile or seriously threaten the target states.

If al Qaeda is in fact reorganizing itself as it was before 9/11, that is very bad news. The new al Qaeda may be decentralized and dispersed, making it harder to find the leaders, but it is also less dangerous. While it should be easier to locate al Qaeda if it has rebuilt its organizational capacity and training camps, the US hasn't exactly demonstrated the will to go after those new organizational structures.

The failure by the US to deal with a regrouping al Qaeda calls into question all of the gains and sacrifices this country and its soldiers have made to date. It is disgraceful. It is one thing to be sensitive to Pakistan's precarious position and not press too hard for democratization for fear of undermining Musharraf or emboldening the radical Islamists. It's another thing entirely to allow al Qaeda to recreate itself as a serious threat to this country.

Questioning the Nature of the Threat

Since 9/11, I have been in an intellectual debate with myself about the nature of the threat posed by global terrorists to the United States. On the one hand, I look at the low numbers of people killed by terrorists, even in hot spots like Israel, and question how this problem could truly threaten the stability of the free world. The arguments of people like John Mueller make an convincing argument that the threat is overblown, largely because the government reacts to the irrational fears of a skittish public, and that scarce resources would be better spent protecting the nation from more serious threats.

On the other hand, I understand the ultimately fragile foundation on which liberal democracies rest: belief in the ability of government to provide security and order. If citizens do not believe that the government is in charge and can protect society, the social order unravels as people do what they can to protect themselves. No free society can exist if people lose faith in their government. Now, the case of Israel demonstrates that that faith can be sustained even in the face of a sustained campaign of suicide bombings; it's not the amount of risk that matters, but whether citizens believe the government is doing what it can to deal with the threat.

I go back and forth on this issue and find myself perhaps more conflicted on this than on any other question in international politics.

Which is why I found a story in yesterday's New York Times so disturbing. The Times reported that, in 2005, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld aborted a raid on a meeting of al Qaeda chiefs in Pakistan, a meeting at which Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number 2 in the terrorist organization, was believed to be attending. According to the article, "Mr. Rumsfeld decided that the operation, which had ballooned from a small number of military personnel and C.I.A. operatives to several hundred, was cumbersome and put too many American lives at risk, the current and former officials said. He was also concerned that it could cause a rift with Pakistan, an often reluctant ally that has barred the American military from operating in its tribal areas, the officials said."

Furthermore:

the mission was called off after Donald H. Rumsfeld, then the defense secretary, rejected an 11th-hour appeal by Porter J. Goss, then the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, officials said. Members of a Navy Seals unit in parachute gear had already boarded C-130 cargo planes in Afghanistan when the mission was canceled, said a former senior intelligence official involved in the planning.
...
Officials said one reason Mr. Rumsfeld called off the 2005 operation was that the number of troops involved in the mission had grown to several hundred, including Army Rangers, members of the Navy Seals and C.I.A. operatives, and he determined that the United States could no longer carry out the mission without General Musharraf’s permission. It is unlikely that the Pakistani president would have approved an operation of that size, officials said.

Some outside experts said American counterterrorism operations had been hamstrung because of concerns about General Musharraf’s shaky government.

“The reluctance to take risk or jeopardize our political relationship with Musharraf may well account for the fact that five and half years after 9/11 we are still trying to run bin Laden and Zawahri to ground,” said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University.

In and of itself, there is nothing particularly surprising or troubling about the decision to cancel the raid. Politics is a messy business, and goals always need to be considered in the larger picture. Given the uncertainty about Zawahiri's presence, given the risk to US personnel, given the risk to the stability of the Pakistani government, a plausible case for canceling the raid isn't hard to grasp.

However, the decision can't even be examined solely in those lights. It was made in the context of a "War on Terror" in which this country is being asked to place extraordinary trust in our government. We are being asked to permit our government to listen in to our phone calls without warrants, to use coercive interrogation techniques, to suspend habeas corpus for those suspected of terrorism, to spend billions of dollars on protecting this country (not to mention impose idiotic regulations like the restrictions of liquids on planes), to sacrifice thousands of our soldiers, and many other leaps of faith.

I do not support all of the policies that the Bush Administration has implemented, but I have tried to view all of them in the context of the nature of the threat. I believed that the Administration believed terror to be a primary threat to this country and that the policies represented honest attempts to do what would best protect the US.

But how can the Bush Administration justify these requests when it won't take risks to apprehend or kill one of the two most important global terrorists? If the threat from terrorism has been overblown and isn't really that serious, then the decision to abort the raid makes sense: Why take all those risks to deal with something that isn't all that threatening? But in the context of the policies that the Bush Administration has implemented, the decision cannot be justified. If terror is the primary threat, or at least one of the primary threats, if combating terror requires the encroaching on civil liberties, then shouldn't the potential risks of the mission been outweighed of neutralizing Zawahiri?

This one instance does not resolve the argument in my head, but it certainly tips the scales.

Happy July 4th!!!!

Dissent Is Patriotic (Isn't It?)

I find it interesting that so many people who take pride in dissent, especially when President Bush or the war in Iraq is concerned, are among those who try to stifle discussion of global warming by asserting that the science is settled. When I blogged a while back about this, I was greeted by the predictable dismay that I wasn't toeing the party line, with incredulity that I could possibly consider that global warming might not be the problem that Al Gore tells me it is, and with disbelief that I have accepted that the science is settled.

The whole tenor of the global warming activists is evident in the very title of Gore's slide-show cum documentary An Inconvienent Truth, with emphasis on the word "truth." Things are rarely, if ever, true, especially when science and politics are concerned, and even more so when they meet. Clearly the title is an effort to squash any dissent, for how can one argue against the truth (not the idiotic anti-smoking campaign that runs those awful TV commercials where people pretend to die in front of tobacco companies' offices is also called the "truth")? Gore clearly believes that the science surrounding global warming is settled; all that's left to argue about is how dire the consequences will be and how much the world should spend to forestall those consequences.

And yet, Gore's movie is riddled with inaccuracies -- large ones -- that belie the title. Many of the examples he uses to illustrate the devastating impact of global warming are simply false. An op-ed in the Chicago Sun Times lays out some of these inaccuracies:

Gore claims that Himalayan glaciers are shrinking and global warming is to blame. Yet the September 2006 issue of the American Meteorological Society's Journal of Climate reported, "Glaciers are growing in the Himalayan Mountains, confounding global warming alarmists who recently claimed the glaciers were shrinking and that global warming was to blame."

Gore claims the snowcap atop Africa's Mt. Kilimanjaro is shrinking and that global warming is to blame. Yet according to the November 23, 2003, issue of Nature magazine, "Although it's tempting to blame the ice loss on global warming, researchers think that deforestation of the mountain's foothills is the more likely culprit. Without the forests' humidity, previously moisture-laden winds blew dry. No longer replenished with water, the ice is evaporating in the strong equatorial sunshine."

Gore claims global warming is causing more tornadoes. Yet the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change stated in February that there has been no scientific link established between global warming and tornadoes.

Gore claims global warming is causing more frequent and severe hurricanes. However, hurricane expert Chris Landsea published a study on May 1 documenting that hurricane activity is no higher now than in decades past. Hurricane expert William Gray reported just a few days earlier, on April 27, that the number of major hurricanes making landfall on the U.S. Atlantic coast has declined in the past 40 years. Hurricane scientists reported in the April 18 Geophysical Research Letters that global warming enhances wind shear, which will prevent a significant increase in future hurricane activity.

Gore claims global warming is causing an expansion of African deserts. However, the Sept. 16, 2002, issue of New Scientist reports, "Africa's deserts are in 'spectacular' retreat . . . making farming viable again in what were some of the most arid parts of Africa."

Gore argues Greenland is in rapid meltdown, and that this threatens to raise sea levels by 20 feet. But according to a 2005 study in the Journal of Glaciology, "the Greenland ice sheet is thinning at the margins and growing inland, with a small overall mass gain." In late 2006, researchers at the Danish Meteorological Institute reported that the past two decades were the coldest for Greenland since the 1910s.

Gore claims the Antarctic ice sheet is melting because of global warming. Yet the Jan. 14, 2002, issue of Nature magazine reported Antarctica as a whole has been dramatically cooling for decades. More recently, scientists reported in the September 2006 issue of the British journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society Series A: Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences, that satellite measurements of the Antarctic ice sheet showed significant growth between 1992 and 2003. And the U.N. Climate Change panel reported in February 2007 that Antarctica is unlikely to lose any ice mass during the remainder of the century.

None of these inaccuracies mean that global warming isn't happening. But they do call in to question to what degree Gore is providing us with the "truth." They highlight the difficulties inherent in ever knowing the "truth."

Again, I do not know whether global warming is occurring, whether humans are to blame, and what the results of that warming may be. But I certainly don't trust Al Gore to tell me the "truth" about it and to provide solutions as to what should be done.

Understanding the Surge, Pt. 2

Much has been written about "the surge" in US troops that began these past few months. Pundits on both sides weigh in arguing that the surge is or isn't working. Investor's Business Daily provides a nice example of the former position, arguing that most domestic media are not reporting the successes in Iraq:

This year, for instance, the U.S. has killed roughly 650 terrorists a month, according to published reports and Defense Department estimates. That compares with about 37 U.S. combat deaths per month, through May.

The ratio, thus, is about 18 terrorists killed in combat for every allied soldier killed. And that doesn't include the current offensive in Diayala Province, Operation Arrowhead Ripper, which dispatched 159 enemy combatants in just the first five days.

Since the war began, we've lost about 70 troops a month. This compares with 526 a month in Vietnam, more than 900 a month in Korea and 6,639 a month during World War II.

In other words, by any meaningful metric employed, the U.S. is winning this war. But it will never be reported that way.

On the other position, for example, is my co-columnist at The Internationalist, Una Hardester who argues that:

The “surge” is not working. Violence is going up, not down. Every day brings news of another bomb in a marketplace, another dozen bodies found. Attacks on places of worship continue, and sectarian death squads roam the streets of Iraq’s cities, killing their victims with medieval brutality and instilling terror in the civilian population.

Neither argument, nor the larger arguments for which each is a proxy, is sustainable and largely for the same reasons: Both lack any theoretical framework in which to assess the surge and rely only on casualties as their critical metric.

It is clearly wrong to look at enemy body counts, as does IBD, and conclude that the US is winning. Just as that was not the way to judge progress and success in Vietnam, it is not sufficient in Iraq today. This is not a traditional war; what matters is not how many of the enemy our forces kill, but who controls the political situation on the ground, and that can't be measured with body counts.

Nor can one point to the recurring violence against either Iraqi civilians or US troops as evidence of the surge's failure. It is simply to easy too kill large numbers of civilians. True, the violence might be a symptom of a larger problem that indicates that surge isn't working (more on this later), but the numbers don't provide that in and of themselves.

So, how to judge the surge? Two of our most esteemed military analysts discussed this issue this week before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Affairs (and a former professor of mine at Georgetown) and Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute testified on how to judge the surge.

In his testimony, Cordesman focused on the connection between the tactical and strategic goals of the surge, arguing that "it is all too clear that the US, its Coalition allies, and the Iraqi government cannot win any form of security and stability if insurgent movements can keep large areas of Iraq unstable and constantly provoke Iraq’s civil conflicts." While the current surge may be working tactically, Cordesman warns that "there are serious serious issues regarding its strategic value," largely because, as he sees it, there's not as much progress on the strategic front: "none of this matters unless the Iraqis can move towards political conciliation – or at least a relatively stable form of coexistence."

What needs to happen? According to Cordesman, "giving tactical victories lasting meaning requires the following additional elements:"

1. Iraqi Army forces must begin to take over meaning operations without US embeds and US partner units, and dependence on US reinforcement and support. There does seem to be increasing Iraqi Army capability here, but Coalition reporting does not provide a meaningful picture of progress – merely grossly inflated figures on areas of responsibility and total numbers of battalions in the lead.

2. Iraqi police and local security forces must establishing a lasting security presence in the areas where tactical victories are won, and do so credibly in ways that give ordinary Iraqis security. There can be no “win” without “hold.” So far, the US has made claim after claim to have secured cities after winning tactical battles to control them, and has never actually established lasting security in even one of them. The most critical problem has been the lack of active, combat-capable police, without corruption and sectarian and ethnic ties. Falluja and Samara are only the most obvious cases of such failures.

Coalition reporting so far talks about the number of police posts established or with US embeds. It has not said a word about the ability provide lasting security using Iraqi police in parts of Baghdad or anywhere else. It also has not talked about the ability to support police efforts with an effective local criminal justice and court system or to screen detainees in ways that do not breed local hostility.

The Coalition also needs to start talking about who actually does provide local security, and stop treating militias, local security forces, and police hired locally without Coalition training, as if it was always hostile or did not exist. In the real world, these forces and not the “trained and equipped” police are the real local security force in most of Iraq. There has to be a credible plan to use, absorb, or contain them.

3. The Iraqi government must follow-up security with a meaningful presence and by providing steady improvements in services. “Winning hearts and minds” doesn’t come from public information campaigns and propaganda. It comes from providing real security for ordinary Iraqis, and showing the government cares, is present, and can steadily improve services. Once again, promise after promise has been made in past campaigns, and the central government has not yet shown it can follow up in even a single case. If this is happening even in the “secured” areas of Baghdad, no one has yet said so. How it can happen in Diyala or other high threat areas is even unclear.

4. There must also be effective local government. The liberation of various areas often has seen the emergence of local leaders willing to work with the Coalition – although often with little faith in, or ties to, the central government. In most cases, however, they have become targets, and the effort has broken down in local faction disputes or because of a lack of effective government support and problems in Coalition civil affairs efforts. Once again, if there is progress in creating stable, survivable, effective local government; none of the details are clear.

5. There has to be economic aid and progress. Iraqis have to give priority to physical security and key services, but unemployment , underemployment, and shut or failed businesses affect some 60% or more of Iraqis nationally and the figures are even higher in high threat and combat areas. The strategy President Bush advanced in January 2007 advanced proposals for accomplishing such an effort in Baghdad. Once again, there has been no meaningful Coalition reporting on broad progress in such efforts in the secured areas of Baghdad, and past promises such aid would be provided in “liberated” cities like Samara and Falluja were not kept.

6. There must be an end to sectarian and ethnic cleansing and displacement. There is no near and perhaps midterm answer to suicide bombings and atrocities, to attacks on sacred shrines and critical facilities. No mix of security forces can stop even small cadres of extremists from occasional successes. No tactical victory has meaning, however, unless Iraqis can be secure in neighborhoods and areas where they are in the minority, and can reach across ethnic and sectarian lines and barriers in ordinary life.

One of the greatest single failures of the current approach to fighting in Iraq is that it does not track sectarian and ethnic separation and displacement and make ending this on a local and national level at least as important as halting major attacks and killings. It may take years to make Iraqis secure from Islamist extremists and the worst elements of Shi’ite gangs and militias. There can be no meaningful tactical success, however, unless Iraqis can be safe from their own neighbors and begin to lead ordinary lives in their own neighborhoods.

Regardless, Cordesman warns that it is far too early to judge the surge: "both the media and outside analysts need to focus far more on the full range of actions it takes to win, and do so with patience and objectivity. No strategy or campaign could possibly achieve significant success in all of these elements by this fall, or even ensure a successful start." Furthermore, "The odds are bad enough given the problems in Iraq; they are hopeless if the political environment in the US offers no hope of the necessary time and bipartisanship."

Kagan makes a similar argument, claiming that while "the early signs are positive in a number of respects, difficulties and challenges clearly remain. But it is too soon to evaluate the outcome of an operation that is just moving into the first of several phases intended to produce significant positive change in the situation overall." Kagan focuses on the surge itself, describing its aims and goals:

This new approach focuses on establishing security in Baghdad and its immediate environs as the prerequisite for political progress. It recognizes that American forces must be in the lead in many (but not all) areas, and that they will have to remain in areas that have been cleared for some time in order to ensure that security becomes permanent. The aim of the security strategy is to buy space and time for the political process in Iraq to work, and for the Iraqi Security Forces to mature and grow to the point where they can maintain the dramatically improved security situation our forces will have helped them to establish.

...

The purpose [of the first phase] was instead to establish positions within those key areas and to develop both intelligence about the enemy and trust relationships with the local communities that would make possible decisive clear-and-hold operations subsequently. During this phase of the operation, additional Iraqi Security Forces deployed to Baghdad in accord with a plan developed jointly by the U.S. and Iraqi military commands.

...

The purpose of [the second phase] operation—Phantom Thunder—is to disrupt terrorist and militia networks and bases outside of Baghdad that have been feeding the violence within the city. Most of the car bomb and suicide bomb networks that have been supporting the al Qaeda surge since January are based in these belt areas, and American commanders have rightly recognized that they cannot establish stable security in the capital without disrupting these networks and their bases.

But even this operation—the largest coordinated combat operation the U.S. has undertaken since the invasion in 2003—is not the decisive phase of the current strategy. It is an operation designed to set the preconditions for a successful clear-and-hold operation that will probably begin in late July or early August within Baghdad itself. That is the operation that is designed to bring security to Iraq’s capital in a lasting way that will create the space for political progress that we all desire.

The U.S. has not undertaken a multi-phased operation on such a large scale since 2003, and it is not surprising therefore that many commentators have become confused about how to evaluate what is going on and how to report it. Sectarian deaths in Baghdad dropped significantly as soon as the new strategy was announced in January, and remain at less than half their former levels. Spectacular attacks rose as al Qaeda conducted a counter-surge of its own, but have recently begun falling again. Violence is down tremendously in Anbar province, where the Sunni tribes have turned against al Qaeda and are actively cooperating with U.S. forces for the first time. This process has spread from Anbar into Babil, Salah-ad-Din, and even Diyala provinces, and echoes of it have even spread into one of the worst neighborhoods in Baghdad—Ameriyah, formerly an al Qaeda stronghold. Violence has risen naturally in areas that the enemy had long controlled but in which U.S. forces are now actively fighting for the first time in many years, and the downward spiral in Diyala that began in mid-2006 continued (which is not surprising, since the Baghdad Security Plan does not aim to establish security in Diyala).

...

To say that the current plan has failed is simply incorrect. It might fail, of course, as any military/political plan might fail. Indications on the military side strongly suggest that success—in the form of dramatically reduced violence by the end of this year—is quite likely. Indications on the political side are more mixed, but are also less meaningful at this early stage before security has been established.

Both analysts see that the surge is producing tactical results. The real question is whether the tactical successes can be connected to the larger strategic victory. It's clearly far to early to determine whether the strategic picture is coming together, but the bits and pieces we do see are mixed. What is clear is that more time is needed to let the surge continue to improve security around the country.

The US is an impatient country. We like our results quick and clearly decisive, like the invasion of Iraq. But the rebuilding of the country will not be like that at all. But rash and uninformed judgments from either side of the argument do not help matters. We shouldn't put blind faith in the Bush Administration to get it right. Hardly. But nor should we simply assume things are doomed to fail. We need to sit back and think carefully about what constitutes success, and then determine whether US military and political operations are creating those conditions. And, above all, we need to be patient.

Understanding the Surge

Over at Small Wars Journal, David Kilcullen has a very interesting post on "Understanding Current Operations in Iraq." Why should we listen to Kilcullen? Because he is the Senior Counter-Insurgency Adviser to the Multi-National Forces in Iraq.

According to Kilcullen:

This post is not about whether current ops are “working” — for us, here on the ground, time will tell, though some observers elsewhere seem to have already made up their minds (on the basis of what evidence, I’m not really sure). But for professional counterinsurgency operators such as our SWJ community, the thing to understand at this point is the intention and concept behind current ops in Iraq: if you grasp this, you can tell for yourself how the operations are going, without relying on armchair pundits. So in the interests of self-education (and cutting out the commentariat middlemen—sorry, guys) here is a field perspective on current operations.

...

These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another, and to create an operational synergy between what we're doing in Baghdad and what's happening outside. Unlike on previous occasions, we don't plan to leave these areas once they’re secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that have "gone quiet" as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action.

...

Personally, I think we are doing reasonably well and casualties have been lower so far than I feared. Every single loss is a tragedy. But so far, thank God, the loss rate has not been too terrible: casualties are up in absolute terms, but down as a proportion of troops deployed (in the fourth quarter of 2006 we had about 100,000 troops in country and casualties averaged 90 deaths a month; now we have almost 160,000 troops in country but deaths are under 120 per month, much less than a proportionate increase, which would have been around 150 a month). And last year we patrolled rarely, mainly in vehicles, and got hit almost every time we went out. Now we patrol all the time, on foot, by day and night with Iraqi units normally present as partners, and the chances of getting hit are much lower on each patrol. We are finally coming out of the "defensive crouch" with which we used to approach the environment, and it is starting to pay off.

I'll follow up today or tomorrow with some thoughts of my own on the surge.

Israel v. the US

Imagine that you're on the highway, driving in to a major city, like New York. All of sudden, traffic comes to a complete standstill. Nothing moving at all. You tune your radio to the news to find out what's causing the jam and hear the police chief of NYC announcing that there is solid evidence that a terrorist is heading into NYC and that all roads have been blocked off and the city closed to impede the terrorist's access to the city. The police officer announces that helicopters will bring in water and be capable of extracting anyone in need of medical care, but that because the terrorist may already be on the road, no one is allowed to pull off of the highway so that each car may be examined and searched.

It's hard to know what would happen first: A mass panic or a lawsuit from the ACLU. This is but one of the critical differences between the US and the Israeli approaches to the problem each faces from terrorism.

Without question, Israel is subjected to a more regular threat. While things are relatively quiet now, largely due to the construction of the security fence around the West Bank, the withdrawal from Gaza, and the infighting between Hamas and Fatah, there were 135 (according to my count) suicide bombings in Israel between the outbreak of the second intifida in November 2000 and the Gaza pullout. It boggles the mind to think what would happen in the US if there were even four or five suicide bombings a year, let alone 44 like Israel suffered in 2002.

That difference has produced a big difference in reactions. First, Israel doesn't have time or the resources to waste on efforts that assuage public fears but accomplish little in actual security. So, security on El Al, the Israeli national airline, doesn't bother making you pack teeny bottles of liquids in plastic bags. Rather, as you stand in line to check in, someone walks up and down swabbing bags and people for explosives. Profiling is used as well. Not the blunt kind, but a more common sense kind. When I was on the way back to the US in Ben Gurion Airport, one of my colleagues on the trip caused a minor kerfuffle when he revealed that he had not received his commemorative book bag in the US with the rest of us, but rather in Israel (he had gone to Israel a few days before the group...the rest of us got our bags in the Newark Airport). After a security manager looked at his bag and asked a few questions, he became convinced everything was fine, no doubt because he wasn't worried about a group of academics from the States.

Armed guards stand at the entrance to nearly every restaurant or public place, like shopping malls, and stop everyone entering and inspect their bags. Restaurants are, in fact, allowed by law to charge a security surcharge, which is optional and can be refused (but no one does).

These are merely the tactical differences. One key strategic difference is that Israel does not have a national strategy or policy for combating terror; rather it makes and changes policies as needed. Not having a formal strategy enables Israel to be more flexible; it encourages free thinking among the various agencies and operatives responsible for protecting the country. The US, on the other hand, has, among other ponderous and platitudinous documents, a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. But reading it doesn't provide any guidance on how to actually deal with the problem of terror, and it certainly doesn't ask the question of what is the nature of the threat to the US posed by global terrorism. And it doesn't explain how Old MacDonald's Petting Zoo or the Amish Country Popcorn Factory get on a federal list of potential terror targets, or how Indiana is ranked as nearly having more potential terror targets (8,591) than New York (5,687) and California (3,212) combined.

Israel even has a saner legal strategy for dealing with terror. Israel has one of most activist court systems in the western world, and terror subjects, or those defending them, often have direct access to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, while Israel uses the "unlawful combatant" designation, as does the US (this is done to prevent suspected terrorist from having access to the traditional civilian justice system, which Israel has deemed inadequate for dealing with questions of terror). However, anyone designated as an unlawful combatant is given counsel and brought before a judge for the opportunity to challenge that designation, and the suspect has the right to appeal the judge's decision. As I mentioned in an earlier post, any use of coercive force during an interrogation must be authorized by the Army's legal department and the Attorney General's office.

Now, it's true that Israel has been dealing with the problem of terror longer than has the US, and has had more time to develop a rational and effective policy, as well as more opportunities to use trial and error to implement good policies. But the fact remains that Israel approaches the problem much more rationally and effectively than does the US. Too much of American counter-terror efforts, at least those seen by the public, are reactive and primarily for show. How else to explain full-page ads in the New York Times explaining how people can prepare a room in their house in case of a chemical or biological attack? [I can't find a link to these ads...but I saw 'em!!] Benjamin Friedman has a devastating critique [RR] of the Department of Homeland Security, arguing that the US counter-terror response is more about responding to, and creating, fear than it is about providing real and meaningful security.

The threats faced by Israel are different than those faced by the US. As are the political systems and the public's willingness to tolerate restrictions of freedoms. In some ways, Israel is more aggressive in its fight against terror, as with the constant presence of security guards. That reflects a rational response to the type of threat faced. In other ways, Israel is more relaxed than is the US, for example, in its willingness to give every "unlawful combatant" a chance to challenge that designation, something that the Bush Administration is unwilling to do. That reflects the recognition that terror, and even high levels of terrorism, can be borne without the collapse of society.

Notes From An Israeli Prison

One of the most interesting parts of my recent fellowship in Israel was the visit to an Israeli maximum security prison (for security reasons, I can say which one). I had never been inside a prison before, and wasn't sure what to expect, with my only experience with one coming from television. Well, the prison was nothing like what I was expecting. The warden, an Israeli Arab, does not believe in rehabilitation and makes no effort to convert the prisoners, the vast majority of whom are convicted terrorists ("regular" criminals are housed in separate facilities from the "security" prisoners), to non-violence or pacifism. Instead, the prisoners are free to associate with whomever, read and watch on TV whatever they want. Materials that incite violence are forbidden, but that's about the only limitation.

The prisoners live in cells of 8, which open into a yard where they can exercise and socialize with others. Each cell block holds, if I remember correctly (we weren't allowed to make any notes) 120 prisoners, and 60 are allowed into the yard at one time (except on Friday, when everyone is allowed to attend a communal prayer session). The prisoners are allowed regular visits from their families, have little electric stoves and teak kettles in their cells, are allowed fresh fruits and vegetables, and have televisions with access to Arab TV channels, including al Jazeera and Saudi, Jordanian, and Egyptian channels. When the prisoners step out of line, they lose their privileges forever...to date, however, the warden stated that there hadn't been more than a handful of serious problems.

From what I know of prisons in America (and again, what I know pretty much comes from TV and reading), if I'm going to be sent to a maximum security prison, I'll take one in Israel, thank you very much.

And this points out what struck me the most from my visit: the differences in the way that Israel and the US treat those arrested in the struggle against global terrorism. Where the US detains its suspects in military prisons, often in solitary confinement, Israel puts those convicted of killing in Israelis in open prisons, where they have contact with the outside world and their families.

Israel is on the front-line in the war on terror in a way that the US is not. Yes, the US suffered the worst terror attack of all-time on 9/11, and there have been reports of a few attacks that have been broken up, like the recent plot against JFK airport or the plot to blow up numerous flights between the UK and the US. But Israel has been under near-constant attack since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in Oslo in 1993. Here's a list of just the suicide attacks in that time period. And yet, Israel has responded much more soberly and carefully than has the US.

I have long gone back and forth on where I stand vis-a-vis the US response to 9/11. On one hand, I realize the threat that terrorism poses to a democratic polity. A state that cannot protect its people cannot function, and terrorism preys on that fact, seeking both to undermine the nature of its opponent as well as exploit its openness. The public must believe that the government is on top of the situation and doing what it can to preserve the peace; this is what explains so many of the visible, yet likely ineffective, security measures, like the restriction on liquids on planes (something that security-crazed El Al doesn't bother with, mind you).

On the other hand, the civil libertarian in me believes that the threat has been overstated. I see the danger in undermining our freedoms with wiretappings or the suspension of habeas corpus for suspected terrorists.

If my trip to Israel did anything, it reinforced the latter of these beliefs. Terrorism is a threat to democratic states. But that threat can be managed. And it can be managed in a way that doesn't undermine the very nature of our democracy. There is a price to paid for living in a democracy. Yes, our freedoms make it easier for terrorists to attack us so we must be vigilant. But the US has much to learn from Israel on how to balance the fight against terror with the need to preserve a normal, democratic life. In my next post, tomorrow or Friday, I'll go into more detail on the Israeli response to terror. Israel isn't perfect, but much of its response make a lot more sense than that of the US.

Civil War In Gaza

It seems as if Hamas has all but destroyed Fatah in the Gaza Strip. Yesterday, Hamas gunmen ransacked the house of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, a member of Fatah and chased the remnants of Arafat's former movement into the West Bank. In response, Abbas has dissolved the Palestinian government and replaced the prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas, and replaced him with Fatah-based former Minister of Finance Salam Fayyad. Meanwhile, the US, the EU, and Israel are moving to release frozen tax revenues to Abbas in an effort to bolster Fatah against Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert praised the move by Abbas to reform the Palestinian government, while Hamas lacks the power in the West Bank to challenge Abbas there.

The plan of the US and its allies assumes that "that strengthening Abbas, and reviving the peace process through him in the West Bank, would serve to marginalize Hamas and increase Fatah's chances of winning any future elections." The New York Times editorializes today that the Hamas victory in Gaza is a defeat for Palestinians, Israel, and the US, and that Abbas should be offered concessions such as "a total freeze on settlement building and expansion, a prompt easing of the onerous, humiliating and economically strangulating blockades on Palestinian movements within the West Bank, and the swift release to Mr. Abbas’s office of all tax revenues rightfully belonging to the Palestinians but still in Israeli hands," while "Hamas’s future diplomatic treatment should depend strictly on its own behavior. If it is ever willing to stop engaging in terrorism and live up to the standards expected of law-abiding governments, there will be something for Israeli and American officials to discuss with it."

The logic of these suggestions and strategies is that since Fatah accepts Israel's right to exist and the previous negotiations while Hamas does not, Fatah represents the horse to bet on, and Abbas should be supported, while Hamas should be ignored until it comes around. All good ideas...in the short run. However, in the long run, the bolstering of Fatah against Hamas will at best undermine future chances of a negotiated settlement, and at worst lead to an even bloodier civil war.

The problem is the monopoly of violence in the Palestinian territories, or lack thereof. I've written about this several times, but the fact remains: So long as significant military force rests with the various militias (Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, etc.) rather than with the government, whomever that may be at any given time, there will be no peace process. While one side negotiates, other sides are free to use their military capabilities to improve their own position, enhance their credentials as hard-liners by continuing to fight, and undermine the political positioning of their rivals. All sides are guilty of this. Just as Hamas used suicide bombings and Qassam rocket attacks to undermine on-going negotiations between Fatah and Israel, so did Fatah use its own militia to weaken Hamas' power in Gaza.

If there is ever to be a solution to the Israel-Palestinian problem, if the Palestinians are to ever be given the stable and credible government that they deserve, then force must be controlled by the government. The current strategy of supporting Fatah may assuage those worried about the radical ideology and violence of Hamas, but it won't solve the problem.

One of the speakers on my trip to Israel, Meir Litvak of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, agrees with my position. In his view, both Israel and the Palestinians need a stable, unified Palestinian government, even if that government is led by Hamas. He argues, as I have in the past, that when given the choice, Hamas prefers to govern than to fight. If forced with the need for real governance, Hamas will likely become more pragmatic, and do what it needs to do, i.e. negotiate with Israel. And while Hamas would be unlikely to drop its radical ideology, or cease all attacks against Israel, the situation very well might be better than it is now, as Hamas would be forced to behave itself in order to receive international funding, tax revenue, and diplomatic recognition.

But, you argue, Hamas had the opportunity to moderate itself when it won the elections in early 2006 and took over the Palestinian Authorty, and failed to do so. Why would it be any different in the future? Hamas never had a chance to really govern, as Fatah and PIJ did what they could to undermine Hamas' rule. In order for any party to really govern, the Palestinian Authority must have a monopoly of force; it must be able to rein in the militias, fighters, and terrorists of all of the various groups. For this reason, the strategy of supporting Abbas is a very short-sighted one. It does nothing to resolve the real problem in the territories and sets the stage for endless war between the Palestinian political actors.

Don't Count Your Peacekeepers Before They're Deployed

Sudan has finally agreed to allow a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force of nearly 20,000 soldiers into Darfur to monitor the situation and prevent any further genocide. Sort of.

While the announcement by Sudan is being hailed as a "breakthrough moment" by the African Union, it's not so clear that it's time to breath a sigh of relief for Darfur. Apparently, Sudan is insisting that the force be made up almost entirely of Africans, a demand that makes the deployment all but impossible. According to John Prendergast, a Sudan expert who helps lead Enough Project, “the gulf between the rhetoric of acceptance and the reality of deployment is huge,” and the continued haggling over force makeup “is putting a condition on the deployment which ensures its failure.” Similarly, US Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad stated that "if [the acceptance] is conditional, as we hear, that there will be only African troops involved and no non-Africans, that is putting a condition on the acceptance, and that would be unacceptable.”

The UN will examine the plan today. Hopefully, if Sudan is still trying to stall and block the deployment by such insistences, the UN will finally decide to act and punish the genocidal regime. While this is welcome news, I'm certainly not holding my breath.

The Logic Of Torture

There are two main reasons that people are opposed to the use of torture in the interrogation of suspected terrorists. First, the moral argument: Torture is a violation of liberal moral and ethical norms. The use of violence and cruelty by the state betrays our most deeply held values and ideals. Second, the pragmatic argument: Torture doesn't work, so it's not worth the damage to a country's public image. In this argument, a suspect being subjected to torture will say anything and everything to end the ordeal, and therefore evidence procured through torture is useless.

Interestingly, while the first argument may be the most powerful, many anti-torture advocates have moved to the second argument, primarily because the first leaves room for a utilitarian calculus. Yes, torture may be abhorrent to our liberal norms, but if, in extreme circumstances, such as the "ticking time bomb" scenario, the use of torture can prevent a large number of deaths or protect the larger fabric of society, its use may be justified. So, to avoid such leaving open such a possibility, many arguments against torture make the pragmatic argument: Torture doesn't work, and its use is damaging to the soft power of a liberal democratic state (as happened in the Abu Ghraib incident).

I have blogged many times (here, here, and here, for example) about torture and how I do not buy the logic of the pragmatic argument. Simply put: If torture doesn't work, then why is its use even a question? If it's so obvious to everyone that torture produces false confessions and made-up evidence, then why would those tasked with preventing terrorism and protecting their countries even want to use torture? Why would they waste their time pursuing false leads? It simply makes no logical sense. I have much more sympathy for the moral argument, although I also find logic in the argument for allowing the use of coercive interrogation tactics (and no, this is not just a euphemism...I'll explain more about this below) in certain circumstances.

So, I was quite excited for a lecture by Yohai Kitron, the former Chief of Interrogation of the Shabak (the Israeli FBI, more or less, also known as the Shin Bet) entitled The Failed Logic of Torture. At last, I thought, I'd get the real answer as to why torture is ineffective.

Mr. Kitron, however, did not make that argument. First, he differentiated between torture, which is the sadistic use of cruelty, and coercive interrogation, which is the controlled use of violence (or the threat of violence) to further an interrogation by undermining the mental safety and security of the suspect. Mr. Kitron claimed that while coercive interrogation is no more effective than non-coercive methods, it is most certainly faster. Thus, Israel now only uses coercive methods in "ticking bomb" scenarios, for example if a suspected terrorist in custody is believed to have information about a suicide bomber on his way to a target.

In such scenarios, the interrogator does not, under any circumstances, have the authority to use coercive methods on his own account. Rather, the interrogator must seek permission from the Legal Department of the Israeli Army, which is in turn subordinated to the Attorney General's office. Each interrogator bears personal responsibility for any force used; even if the circumstances dictate an ex post justification, such as the claim that there wasn't time to seek authorization, the interrogator will be reprimanded and punished, severely when the use of force cannot be justified (Kitron spoke of two Shin Bet officers sentenced to 8 years in prison for the unauthorized use of coercive interrogation).

Kitron emphasized the difference between an investigation and an interrogation. An investigation has a much longer time line, and is intended to produce information to further counter-terrorism and prevention efforts. An interrogation is when time-sensitive information is sought, such as to prevent an imminent terror attack. Coercive interrogation techniques can and should only be used in interrogations and only when the interrogation is necessary to prevent death. Coercive methods are not likely to be helpful in investigations, as suspects can provide much less specific information that may not be able to be verified and thus are more likely to say anything to end their ordeal.

Kitron was clear that coercive methods are immoral and damaging both to the society and the individual that uses them. Using them too often threatens to undermine democratic norms, damage the public image of the country, and do serious damage to the fabric of a democracy. However, just as the failure to protect individual rights undermines democracy, so does the failure to provide security. In a country that has suffered a sustained campaign of suicide bombings, rocket attacks, kidnappings, and other attacks against its citizens and soldiers, it's not hard to see why a method that might help prevent such attacks would be used, even if it is morally questionable.

However, the US is not Israel. There are few scenarios in which coercive methods would be needed by US security forces. There is no sustained campaign of suicide attacks within this country, no steady rain of rockets on our towns. Most of the time when terror suspects are in custody it is an investigation, not an interrogation. In these cases, as Kitron made clear, a good investigator can get the same, if not better, information using non-coercive, non-violent methods, and thus it's not worth the damage to American democratic norms, liberal ideals, and public image to use violence, coercive methods, or torture.

However, the option needs to be left open in case the scenario presents itself where a terrorist in custody does have knowledge of an imminent attack. This seems to be the result of the anti-torture amendment passed by Congress and signed by the president in December 2006. Torture is not allowed, although coercive interrogation techniques are still on the table. The president needs to realize the damage that even coercive interrogation can do to the US public image, and reserve its use for only the most drastic and critical of situations.

Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

Matthew from Caffeine Bunker asks whether the Israeli officials and academics with whom I met "regard Iran as seeking a nuclear weapons capability for power balancing and security self-assurance purposes or if they regarded them as more of an impending existential threat and regional expansionist/revolutionary power. What are they anticipating the regional behavior of a nuclear-capable Iran to be like?"

An excellent question, with a not-so-easy answer.

Almost all of the military types, most of whom are now retired and working for think tanks such as the Institute for Counter Terrorism, seemed to be exceedingly worried about Iran and the potential nuclear proliferation. They pointed to last year's war with Hezbollah as a sign that Iran is growing bolder, and argued that the inability of Israel to crush Hezbollah weakened Israeli deterrence vis-a-vis Hezbollah as well as Iran. The recent Qassam attacks by Hamas from Gaza, in this view, are seen as the fruits of that eroding deterrence. Many of them see an Iranian nuclear weapon as a direct and existential threat to Israel, not in the sense of an immediate attack, but in Iran being so emboldened behind its own nuclear deterrent that it would increase the pressure on Israel from Lebanon and Gaza (and soon in the West Bank, where Fatah's dominance is being steadily eroded by Islamists). And with the US bogged down in Iraq likely incapable of mustering political will for a strike as well as the current high price of oil, Iran's foreign policy will, according to these military types, become more aggressive. The Iranian reform movement lacks any real power, and the hard-liners are moving to expand their reach and spread Iranian influence to contain and respond to the growing Sunni/al Qaeda threat. Those who argued Iran represents a fundamental and potentially existential threat see Iran as the engine of global terror, even more than bin Laden or al Qaeda, and fear that the current political climate in the region strongly favors the regime in Tehran.

However, the more academic, non-military (well, all Israelis are military, but not all of them were career officers) types were much more reserved in their assessments of the threat from Iran. Many of them made the case that while Israel certainly didn't win in the second Lebanese War, Hezbollah, and by proxy Iran, came out with the shortest end of the stick as the looming threat of "unleashing Hezbollah" was exposed to be not too great. Remember, Hezbollah launched over 4,000 rockets into Israel and only killed 43 civilians (although much of northern Israel was evacuated). As one of our speakers said [I'm paraphrasing here], "Iran has green-lighted Hezbollah and has green-lighted Hamas, and the threat just isn't that serious."

According to this position, Iran's nuclear program is cause for concern, but not for panic. Israel does have its own nuclear deterrent, and combined with the failure of Hezbollah in the second Lebanese war and the presence of US troops on Iran's doorstep, Iran will find its options more constrained than it would like. Of course it would be better if Iran was weaker than it is, and if it is not able to develop a nuclear weapon, but in this line of thinking, the threat is a manageable one.

Personally, I agree with the second, more pragmatic line of reasoning. I have been arguing for some time that Hezbollah was the biggest loser in the last Lebanese war, as Iran has long held out the threat of "unleashing" Hezbollah as a potential deterrent, and now we know how impotent that threat is. The same with Hamas in Gaza: It's unthinkable, for the time being, that Hamas could launch a serious invasion of Israel, and short of that seems to be limited to Qassam attacks and minor infiltrations. These of course are problematic, but they are tolerable and pose only a limited threat to Israel. Iran is unlikely, even with a nuclear weapon, to launch a convention invasion.

One real different was whether one believes the apocalyptic rhetoric of Iranian President Ahmadinejad and some of the other more radical mullahs. Many of the military types seems to believe that Iran is irrational and undeterrable, and that a nuclear weapon in those hands would create a very serious possibility of use. I find this a difficult argument to sustain, as public rhetoric is one thing, but risking regime survival is another.

The only person who spoke at length about Iran was David Menashri of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. In his view, much of Iran's current strength stems from the weakness of its potential balancers, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. He sees the nuclear program as a potential threat, but not an immediate one, and recommended a containment-style strategy, designed to slow down the acquisition of NW as well as encourage internal dissent and the possibility of a domestic revolution against the religious regime. He was one of the more moderate voices, as most of the former career military officers suggested, often overtly, that US military action against Iran was absolutely necessary to maintain regional security.

It often felt like the military types were feeding us a line for us to come back and influence public policy here (if only we academics had that much power!!!!). It is telling that the split seemed to lie between the academics and ex-military. Iran most certainly poses a more serious threat to Israel than it does to the US. However, I for one do not see that threat as being an existential one, and I do not see US military force as desirable, necessary, or imminent.

Welcome Back!!

I'd like to welcome everyone back to Security Dilemmas. I've been gone for almost 2 weeks, which in the blogosphere is tantamount to a death sentence, so I hope that everyone's still around.

The trip to Israel was very interesting, and I'll be blogging about it in the days to come. First, I wanted to provide the schedule.

The Phenomenon of Modern Terrorism: Strategy, Operations, and Psychological Warfare, Yoni Fighel

Radical Islams Virtual Community: Propaganda, Recruitment and the Internet, Yoni Fighel

Southeast Asian Terrorism, Shaul Shay

Religious Sources of Islamist Terrorism, Shmuel Bar

The Radical Palestinian Islamist Movements and the P.A., Meir Litvak

Hezbollah and Lebanon, Eyal Zisser

Iran: Domestic Challenges and Regional Implications, David Menashri

Global and Middle Eastern NBC Terrorism, Ely Karmon

Police Special Operations Forces, Dubi Yung

Financing Terrorism, Eytan Azani

Defending India's Democracy from Islamist Terror, Indian Ambassador to Israel Arun Singh

Interrogation and the Failed Logic of Torture, Yohai Kitron

Meeting with the Special Forces of the Israeli Police

Meeting with Taufik Karaman, City Manager of Um El Fahem (an Arab village in Israel)

Visit to Maximum Security Prison and discussion with convicted terrorists

Visit to Beit El (Israeli settlement in the West Bank) and meeting with Yoel Zur (victim of terror attack and former commander of Israeli forces in the Yehuda district).

Visit to the Israeli bomb disposal unit.

Visit to the Israeli Nachson (prisoner escort and transfer) Unit

Meeting with Lt. Col. David Benjamin, Legal Advisor to the Israel Defense Forces

Visit to Ashdod Naval Base.

Visit to the Yahalom (explosive ordnance engineers) Unit.

All in all, it was a very interesting trip. In the next few days, I'll be blogging about some of the more interesting things I learned. But for now, I'll just mention a few of the overarching points:

First, Israel is obsessed with Iran right now. Almost all of the speakers mentioned that Iran is Israel's #1 threat, and that it's the responsibility of the US to deal with Iran, and especially to ensure that Iran is not able to obtain nuclear weapons. One or two of the people we met with did not agree with this assessment, but they were a distinct minority.

Two, Israel has responded to its own terror threat in a much more measured and reasonable manner than has the US. Security measures are serious and tight, but are focused much more on efficacy than public reassurance. No taking off of shoes, ridiculous limits on liquids carried on planes, or inane disbursements of counter-terror funds. Furthermore, Israel, while it's had it's problems, has much more reasonable laws concerning the detention of suspected terrorists; no indefinite detentions or suspension of habeas corpus.

Three, the near-civil war between Fatah and Hamas in Gaza, along with the continued rocketing of the Israeli town of Sderot by Hamas has all but killed the peace process. Meanwhile, the continued construction of the security fence threatens to create a fait accompli on the ground. Both of these things together will make it very difficult to solve the Palestinian problem in the near future.

I'll blog more about these lessons, and other things from the trip, in the next few days. If there's anything from the schedule that you'd like to know more about in particular, let me know and I'll be happy to focus on it.

Thanks!!!