Deterring Terrorists?

Today's New York Times has a fascinating article about how the US defense community is beginning to think about applying principles of deterrence to terrorist groups. Some excerpts:

The 2002 National Security Strategy, signed by the president one year after the Sept. 11 attacks, stated flatly that “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents.”

Four years later, however, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism concluded: “A new deterrence calculus combines the need to deter terrorists and supporters from contemplating a W.M.D. attack and, failing that, to dissuade them from actually conducting an attack.”

For obvious reasons, it is harder to deter terrorists than it was to deter a Soviet attack.

Terrorists hold no obvious targets for American retaliation as Soviet cities, factories, military bases and silos were under the cold-war deterrence doctrine. And it is far harder to pinpoint the location of a terrorist group’s leaders than it was to identify the Kremlin offices of the Politburo bosses, making it all but impossible to deter attacks by credibly threatening a retaliatory attack.

But over the six and a half years since the Sept. 11 attacks, many terrorist leaders, including Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, have successfully evaded capture, and American officials say they now recognize that threats to kill terrorist leaders may never be enough to keep America safe.

So American officials have spent the last several years trying to identify other types of “territory” that extremists hold dear, and they say they believe that one important aspect may be the terrorists’ reputation and credibility with Muslims.

Under this theory, if the seeds of doubt can be planted in the mind of Al Qaeda’s strategic leadership that an attack would be viewed as a shameful murder of innocents — or, even more effectively, that it would be an embarrassing failure — then the order may not be given, according to this new analysis.

Senior officials acknowledge that it is difficult to prove what role these new tactics and strategies have played in thwarting plots or deterring Al Qaeda from attacking. Senior officials say there have been several successes using the new approaches, but many involve highly classified technical programs, including the cyberoperations, that they declined to detail.

They did point to some older and now publicized examples that suggest that their efforts are moving in the right direction.

George J. Tenet, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote in his autobiography that the authorities were concerned that Qaeda operatives had made plans in 2003 to attack the New York City subway using cyanide devices.

Mr. Zawahri reportedly called off the plot because he feared that it “was not sufficiently inspiring to serve Al Qaeda’s ambitions,” and would be viewed as a pale, even humiliating, follow-up to the 9/11 attacks.

And in 2002, Iyman Faris, a naturalized American citizen from Kashmir, began casing the Brooklyn Bridge to plan an attack and communicated with Qaeda leaders in Pakistan via coded messages about using a blowtorch to sever the suspension cables.

But by early 2003, Mr. Faris sent a message to his confederates saying that “the weather is too hot.” American officials said that meant Mr. Faris feared that the plot was unlikely to succeed — apparently because of increased security.

“We made a very visible presence there and that may have contributed to it,” said Paul J. Browne, the New York City Police Department’s chief spokesman. “Deterrence is part and parcel of our entire effort.”

...

Even as security and intelligence forces seek to disrupt terrorist operations, counterterrorism specialists are examining ways to dissuade insurgents from even considering an attack with unconventional weapons. They are looking at aspects of the militants’ culture, families or religion, to undermine the rhetoric of terrorist leaders.

For example, the government is seeking ways to amplify the voices of respected religious leaders who warn that suicide bombers will not enjoy the heavenly delights promised by terrorist literature, and that their families will be dishonored by such attacks. Those efforts are aimed at undermining a terrorist’s will.

“I’ve got to figure out what does dissuade you,” said Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, the Joint Chiefs’ director of strategic plans and policy. “What is your center of gravity that we can go at? The goal you set won’t be achieved, or you will be discredited and lose face with the rest of the Muslim world or radical extremism that you signed up for.”

Efforts are also under way to persuade Muslims not to support terrorists. It is a delicate campaign that American officials are trying to promote and amplify — but without leaving telltale American fingerprints that could undermine the effort in the Muslim world. Senior Bush administration officials point to several promising developments.

Saudi Arabia’s top cleric, Grand Mufti Sheik Abdul Aziz al-Asheik, gave a speech last October warning Saudis not to join unauthorized jihadist activities, a statement directed mainly at those considering going to Iraq to fight the American-led forces.

And Abdul-Aziz el-Sherif, a top leader of the armed Egyptian movement Islamic Jihad and a longtime associate of Mr. Zawahri, the second-ranking Qaeda official, has just completed a book that renounces violent jihad on legal and religious grounds.

Such dissents are serving to widen rifts between Qaeda leaders and some former loyal backers, Western and Middle Eastern diplomats say.

“Many terrorists value the perception of popular or theological legitimacy for their actions,” said Stephen J. Hadley, Mr. Bush’s national security adviser. “By encouraging debate about the moral legitimacy of using weapons of mass destruction, we can try to affect the strategic calculus of the terrorists.”

It's about time. I have been saying for quite some time (just ask my students) that 9/11 represented a failure in American deterrence. The tepid responses to the numerous attacks against the US and American interests during the 1990s (the first WTC bombing, the dual embassy bombing in Africa, the bombing of the Khobar Towers, and the bombing of the USS Cole, all of which were met by police work and limited [and ineffective] cruise missile strikes) sent a clear message to the leadership of al Qaeda that the US did not consider international terrorism to be a primary concern and that the US would not respond seriously. If Osama bin Laden had believed that bringing down the twin towers and striking the Pentagon would result in the loss of Afghanistan as a haven, it's hard to imagine them not thinking twice about whether the cost would be worth the benefit.

Terrorists are rational actors; they use violence as a means to an end. And even if that rationality is hard for us to understand, they are nonetheless rational. The violence is not meaningless; it is not random. Targets are chosen for particular reasons and to advance particular goals. If the use of violence is ineffective, or even counterproductive, then its use makes no sense. It's about time that the US defense community has begun taking the deterrence of terrorists seriously.

UPDATE: Over at his blog, Dan Drezner notes that:

It's good stuff. But it's not "deterrence" in the Cold War sense of the word.

Successful deterrence of Al Qaeda would be taking place if the organization decided not to take action because they feared retaliation by the United States against assets that they held dear. Deterrence works if an actor refrains from attack because they calculate that the cost of the adversary's response would outweigh any benefit from the initial strike.

But that's not in the U.S. strategy. Instead, what U.S. officials appears to be doing is decreasing the likelihood of a successful attack -- by sowing confuson, interdicting logistical support, and reducing sympathy for the organization. The closest one could come to deterrence is if one defined Al Qaeda's reputation as a tangible asset that would face devastating consequences after a successful attack. Even here, however, the U.S. strategy is primarily to weaken Al Qaeda by increasing the odds of an unsuccessful attack.

The more appropriate word to use here is "containment." The United States is trying to sow divisions within the jihadi movement -- much like Kennan urged the United States to do among communists of different nationalities. The United States is applying counter-pressure in areas where Al Qaeda is trying to gain supporters and symathizers -- much like Kennan urged the application of "counter-force" in areas where the Soviets tried to advance their interests.

He's right. Mostly. Most of what the authors are describing isn't really deterrence, but containment or defense. But, deterrence does have elements that begin to blend into the other two concepts. Denial deterrence, for example, works by convincing the opponent that his attack will not succeed. From an article on the NATO website:

The deterrence by denial theory is not limited to missile defences, of course. The theory applies to any capability that can deny an enemy success in achieving his objectives. For example, passive defences such as decontamination equipment and suits and gas masks for protection against chemical and biological weapons might help to convince an enemy not to use such weapons. The National Security Strategy suggests that "consequence-management" capabilities for responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks may contribute to both dissuasion and deterrence by denial. It states: "Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends."

If al Qaeda can be persuaded that their attacks will be, as I said before, ineffective or counterproductive, they may be deterred from carrying them out. True, this begins to look more like defense, but the lines are blurry here.

What is Justice in Uganda?

The dispute between Uganda and the International Criminal Court over the status of the indictments of Joseph Kony and other leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army has reached a crucial point. Yoweri Musevni, the president of Uganda, has announced that Uganda will refuse to hand Kony and the others under indictment over to the ICC so that a peace deal, including an agreement for Kony and others to face local, Ugandan courts, can be struck. The ICC issued the indictments when Uganda, an ICC signatory, referred the case to the ICC in 2005 and Uganda is now obliged, as a result of its accession to the ICC, to arrest Kony and his lieutenants and remand them to ICC custody. Now, Uganda believes that that obligation is an obstacle to peace, as Kony has little incentive to end his rebellion and sign a peace deal if doing so will result in his arrest and trial in international court. Uganda has asserted the right to withdraw its request for ICC involvement, since Uganda requested the ICC's participation, but, according to the Guardian article linked above:

Richard Goldstone, the former chief prosecutor for the Bosnia and Rwanda international tribunals which laid the ground for the ICC, has said that if Museveni gets his way it would be "fatally damaging to the credibility" of the court.

"I just don't accept that Museveni has any right to use the international criminal court like this," he said last year. "If you have a system of international justice you've got to follow through on it. If in some cases that's going to make peace negotiations difficult that may be the price that has to be paid."

Last week, the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, refused to meet representatives of the LRA and said the indictments still stand.

The LRA is, unquestionably, deserving of punishment far beyond what a civil court can dish out. The LRA is infamous for abducting children and using drugs and terror to enslave them into their ranks, hacking off people's arms, legs, and even lips and eyelids, forcing children to rape and murder their parents, among other documented and reported atrocities. But should the desire to visit punishment and retribution on these monsters win out over the desire to resolve a long-running conflict that has killed, maimed, and dislocated thousands? Should the desire of the ICC and the international community outweigh the request of the Ugandan government to settle this conflict as it sees fit?

Over at Opinio Juris, Julian Ku and Kevin Jon Heller have been going back and forth on this issue. Julian sees the ICC as "an obstacle to peace," where Kevin argues that "it is difficult to argue that the ICC should simply step aside and leave the Ugandan government and the LRA to their own devices." According to Kevin:

There is obviously no guarantee that the two sides, once freed from ICC oversight, will negotiate a peace that is genuinely acceptable to ordinary Ugandans. Indeed, the evidence to date indicates otherwise. And, of course, the Court will suffer significant and potentially irreparable harm if it rewards the combined Uganda/LRA temper tantrum: as John Boonstra noted today (also at UN Dispatch), "[i]f the ICC is seen as capitulating to the demands of its host government — or worse, to those of an indicted war criminal — a dangerous precedent will be set for the court's work elsewhere."

What, then, is the right answer? It seems to me that the answer lies in the ICC's principle of complementarity. Given that ordinary Ugandans favor traditional justice for low-level perpetrators and criminal prosecution for high-level perpetrators, the Court should insist on two things: (1) that the Ugandan government and the LRA revert back to their original plan to try Kony and the other LRA leaders in Uganda's High Court; and (2) that the Ugandan government revamp its criminal justice system to satisfy the principle of complementarity. At that point — and only at that point — should the ICC step aside.

The principle of complementarity to which Kevin refers above is:

The International Criminal Court will complement national courts so that they retain jurisdiction to try genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

If a case is being considered by a country with jurisdiction over it, then the ICC cannot act unless the country is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute.

A country may be determined to be "unwilling" if it is clearly shielding someone from responsibility for ICC crimes. A country may be "unable" when its legal system has collapsed.

I think Kevin has set the bar a bit too high here, but his general point is a good one. Uganda has acceded to the Treaty of Rome, creating a clear jurisdiction for the ICC. The ICC should be more deferential to the needs of its members, particular in cases where indictments may be barring the road to settling a conflict (or convincing a leader to step down). And while it's right for the ICC to insist on some level of serious prosecution, the presumption should favor Uganda. A desire to lightly punish, or even perhaps pardon, Kony in order to end the conflict should not be seen as unwilling, so long as the settlement is real. If that's the price of ending the conflict, and if Uganda is willing to pay that price, the ICC should not stand in the way. If, however, Uganda was to pardon Kony and his underlings without a real end to the conflict, then the ICC would be right to maintain its insistence on carrying out the arrest warrants.

This is a difficult test case for the ICC and the expansion of international law more generally. As the example of Uganda shows, politics is often too complicated for generalized international law to deal with simply. And while law must not be ignored, it also must not be allowed to stand in the way of ending one of the more brutal rebellions on the planet.

Why Antigua Matters

Last August, the US lost an important decision before the WTO in which Antigua challenged American bans on on-line gambling. The WTO found that, in general, US bans on on-line gambling were illegal under WTO rules because the US allows significant amounts of domestic on-line gambling (e.g. on-line purchases of lottery tickets, Internet-based off-track betting). Antigua won the right to, if the US didn't comply with the WTO rule by either allowing on-line gambling or banning all on-line gambling, impose sanctions equivalent to $21 million (Antigua had asked for $3.4 billion) on the US through copyright violations. In response, the US withdrew from the part of the WTO dealing with on-line gambling, and is presently in negotiations with several countries over compensation for the US action. According to the previously referenced article:

Under WTO rules, a country may withdraw a service sector committed to WTO jurisdiction only with the authorization of other WTO signatory countries interested in the sector and only after compensating for future lost revenue a WTO signatory country might have earned were the commitment maintained. ... The U.S. is engaged in negotiations with the European Union, India, Costa Rica and Macao to determine how much it must pay them for withdrawing the gambling sector. These negotiations focus on what new service sectors the U.S. will submit to WTO jurisdiction in exchange for withdrawing gambling.

Yesterday, however, apparently dissatisfied with American offers of compensation, the European Union launched an investigation into American rules banning on-line gambling to determine whether those laws discriminated against EU-based companies. The investigation is seen as laying the groundwork for a potential suit in the WTO against the US.

US behavior in this case is absurd and barely explicable. The moral opprobrium argument holds no water, as gambling in the US is widespread and accepted. Is it really any different if someone buys lottery tickets, go to Vegas or Atlantic City, or gambles on-line? The only possible explanation is the US seeks to protect a small gambling industry, and is willing to undermine the global free trade regime to protect that industry. When it was Antigua challenging the US, the US was apparently willing to pay millions of dollars to avoid opening up (or banning altogether) gambling markets. But the entrance of the EU into this equation changes the parameters of the game quite drastically.

Since the dynamics of the US law haven't changed, it seems all but certain that the EU could win any suit filed in the WTO. It also seems certain that the EU would be granted far more than $21 million of damages. At which point the US would be faced with a real choice: Pay the EU billions of dollars in compensation (which would, in all likelihood be equated by some penalty against the EU for European protection) or lift the ban. The latter is, obviously, not preferred by the US domestic political arrangements. The former threatens to undermine the WTO. As I wrote when I initially blogged about this case:

It is very important that the US comply with the WTO's decision. The WTO is one of the cornerstones of the international order, and is vital for insuring the continued prosperity of this country, and nearly every other country in the world. Furthermore, the US has been trying to get smaller, developing countries to accept American intellectual property rights laws under the WTO. Why would they do so if the US refuses to play by the rules (of course, the American, European, Japanese, and Korean refusals to ease or cease agricultural subsidies are already driving this line of thought, but at least ag policy is not currently covered by the WTO)? Refusing to comply will fundamentally damage US credibility and interests to a degree that not even the invasion of Iraq was able to do. It is vital to the US that other countries commit themselves to the WTO and comply with its obligations; it is equally vital that the US do the same.

That was true when it was just Antigua. Now that the EU is involved, it's even more true.

Where Is the US in the South American Crisis?

Tensions continue to rise in the squabble between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In response to a Colombian raid into Ecuador that resulted in the death of a key rebel leader of FARC, Venezuela and Ecuador both expelled Colombian diplomats, curtailed trade between the countries, and mobilized troops and sent them to the Colombian border. In response, Colombia released revealed documents it claims to have seized in the Ecuadorian FARC camp implicating Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez as a major funding source for the Colombian rebels. Chavez has been blustering about the possibility of war, which, while unlikely, is highly destabilizing, particularly for a fragile country like Colombia. Trade between Venezuela and Colombia is normally robust, and, as Adam Isaacson, an analyst with the Center for International Policy, notes, the countries' militaries are not enthusiastic for war and the populations show little evidence of "war fever." However, revelations of Venezuelan funding for FARC along with Chavez's intimation that FARC will be allowed to operate freely in Venezuela make the possibility of another cross-border operation more likely which, at this stage, could be a catalyst for war, as Chavez has promised to retaliate against any Colombian incursion of Venezuelan territory.

Regional leaders, including the presidents of Mexico and Chile, have offered to mediate an end to the dispute, but so far, little progress at easing tensions has been made. The country that is most needed, in theory at least, to defuse the rising tension is the United States. With its political clout, military power, and economic might to provide inducements for cooperation, the US is invaluable in resolving these kinds of situations. In theory at least. In reality, US involvement would be, to put it mildly, counter-productive. The US, and President Bush, have spent so much time and energy needling Venezuela and Chavez about low-level policy disagreements like Venezuelan arms deal, not to mention the idiotic near-support for the attempted 2002 coup, the US has so poisoned the waters that it has no ability to influence the country when the situation is serious, as it is now. US attention has only emboldened and strengthened Chavez, allowing him to use US "imperialism" as a diversionary tactic to justify his domestic policies. It's hard to understand what the US believes it has gotten out of such antagonism, and now the policies are having a real impact on the ability of the US to maintain regional stability and order.

We can only hope that this situation will be resolved short of war. The countries of South America have enough problems without adding war to the mix. But we can also only hope that US policymakers will learn a valuable foreign policy lesson. Foreign policy capital is far too precious to squander on meaningless needling and ineffective interference. By engaging with and responding to Chavez's rhetoric and by developing a reputation as partisan and opposed to Chavez, the US has compromised its ability to act when its influence and power is most needed.

The Legal Status of Kosovo's Independence

My former professor at Georgetown University, Anthony Arend, has posted an excellent analysis of the legal status of Kosovo's recent declaration of independence. Here are some of the highlights:

I The Legal Framework

When discussing the question of secession, two basic legal principles are in tension: the right of states to maintain their territorial integrity and the right of peoples to self-determination. First, one of the cornerstones of the international legal order is the right of states to their territorial integrity, a right implied through out the United Nations Charter. Article 2 (4), for example, prohibits the threat or use of force against the "territorial integrity or political independence" of states. Second, another right-- explicitly recognized in the Charter-- is the right of self-determination of peoples. Under Article 1 (2) of the Charter, one of the purposes of the United Nations is "to develop friendly relations among nations [read, states] based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . ." (emphasis added).

...

When does a people have the right to pursue self-determination through secession?

This is the thorny question. The Charter doesn't address the question, so we have to look to subsequent practice. In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations. This non-binding resolution had the following to say about the right to self-determination:

Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the principle, in order:

(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States; and

(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned;

and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter.

Every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate action universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter.

The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.

Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.

Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.

Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country. (emphasis added)

In practice, this resolution (read together with others) meant that colonies had the right to pursue independence immediately. And this proposition seemed to be widely accepted by the international community. It also seems to mean that groups under direct foreign domination or subjugation-- like the people of Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion in 1990-- would have the right to pursue independence. But what about non-colonies or not subjected people-- like the component parts of Yugoslavia?

The Secession of Quebec took up this question. After declaring that the right to secede existed with respect to colonies and peoples there were under alien subjugation, the court noted:

A number of commentators have further asserted that the right to self-determination may ground a right to unilateral secession in a third circumstance. Although this third circumstance has been described in several ways, the underlying proposition is that, when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession. The Vienna Declaration requirement that governments represent "the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind" adds credence to the assertion that such a complete blockage may potentially give rise to a right of secession.

Clearly, such a circumstance parallels the other two recognized situations in that the ability of a people to exercise its right to self-determination internally is somehow being totally frustrated.

But, once again, the court did not have to determine if there is such a right to secession:

While it remains unclear whether this third proposition actually reflects an established international law standard, it is unnecessary for present purposes to make that determination. Even assuming that the third circumstance is sufficient to create a right to unilateral secession under international law, the current Quebec context cannot be said to approach such a threshold.

The court explained that the people of Quebec were able to fully participate in the political, economic, and cultural life of Canada and could not possibly be thought to have been denied their right to self-determination internally. So, even if the law allowed for secession in this third case, the people of Quebec could not exercise that right because they were in no way being blocked from internal self-determination-- the required condition for possible secession.

So what the court leaves us with is the conclusion that secession might be lawful in "category three" cases.

II Applying the Law to Kosovo

Are the persons living in Kosovo a "people"?

As noted earlier, there is no precise defintion of people under international law. Instead, it seems to mean a group that preceives itself to be a people based on certain common characteristics. This defintion would seem to cover the Kosovars. An overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian, Muslim group, they seem to me to perceive themselves to have a common bond.

But do they have the right to secede?

As seen above, the law is a bit murky. There is no straight-forward rule that would indicate that secession is permissible in cases like Kosovo. Preserving the territorial integrity of states remains an extremely important legal principle. But even if we accept that secession is permissible in certain "category three" cases, it would have to be demonstrated that the Kosovars were being denied the right to internal self-determination within the Serbian regime. Is this the case?

This is an interesting question. It seems clear that before NATO and the UN became active in Kosovo in 1999, the people there were facing the potential of ethnic cleansing and were being denied their rights to be full citizens of the Yugoslav state. Since that time, Kosovo has been under the protection of the international community, as determined pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and subsequent resolutions. Under this arrangement, Kosovo was to enjoy "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration." At the same time, Resolution 1244 reaffirmed "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region." What this suggests to me is that the way in which the UN envisoned Kosovo exercising its right of internal self-determination was as a substantially autonomous region that remained part of the state of Serbia. So can Kosovo now lawfully secede?


III Conclusions

1. In the absence of UN authority in Kosovo, a strong case for secession could be made.

If the UN had not become engaged in the Kosovo conflict, it would seem to me that a strong argument could be made that the people of Kosovo were being denied their right of internal self-determination and thus would have the right to secession. But note: even here the law is unclear as to whether a people in "category three" would ever have a right of secession.

2. Because the UN Security Council has been seized of the matter, a strong case against secession can be made.

Given that the UN Security Council has affirmed the territorial integrity of Serbia and continued to work for an autonomous, but not independent, Kosovo, a very strong argument can be made that in the absence of any further Security Council action, Kosovo secession would be illegal. Why? First, the Security Council has the authority to issue binding resolutions in this area. And even though Resolution 1244 does not explicitly prohibit secession or prohibit states from recognizing secession (like Security Council Resolutions 216 and 217 in the case of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965), it nonetheless seems to set forth the framework for self-determination that does not include independence. Second, it seems that all the parties in the case were attempting to create an autonomous arrangement-- not complete integration in to the Serbian political structure-- so the logic of the Quebec case's understanding of internal self-determination would not quite seem on point. In the Kosovo case, internal self-determination would be achieved through autonomy within Serbia, not full participation in the overall political, economic, and cultural life of the Serbian state, as was the case of Quebec.

Good stuff.

The Fallout from the US Satellite Interception

The United States has apparently successfully intercepted a failing satellite using a missile fired from an Aegis-class cruiser. However, it's not clear that the benefits of the strike will be worth the likely fallout. Coming on the heels of a Chinese test of a dedicated anti-satellite weapon, pressure seems to be mounting towards a space-based arms race as countries race to develop ASAT and AASAT capabilities at the same time as they seek to protect their own satellites. According to Clay Moltz, a professor of nuclear and space policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in California, "[the destruction of the satellite] solved a short-term problem, but it may cause us long-term headaches in terms of emerging test programs in other countries.”

This is a bad situation for the United States. The US is far more advanced in its satellite technology and capabilities than any other country. And while satellites are fairly expensive and sophisticated, it doesn't take nearly as much effort or sophistication to shoot them down. If American dominance in space is threatened, American dominance in many other fields is threatened as well. From my previous post on the January 2007 Chinese ASAT test:

First, from a national security perspective, a good deal of the American dominance in combat comes from its huge advantages in information -- reconnaissance, communications, imaging, GPS targeting and navigation, and so on -- which relies on satellites. An early strike on those space-based assets could blind the US military and level the playing field. True, the US has better weapons platforms and better trained soldiers, but without satellites, those advantages get mitigated.

Second, from a more global perspective, there is so much dual-use technology sharing between the military and the wider public that satellites, even military ones, are rarely purely military targets. GPS navigation, cell phones, weather imaging...all of these technologies rely on satellites that would be targeted in any preemptive military strike. Extending war into space could have dire consequences not just for the US military, but for the economies and civilian populations the world over.

The US needs to move quickly to derail the emerging space arms race. The US stands to lose far more than does any other actor, including China. There may have been pressing reasons to use a missile to destroy this particular falling satellite (although the only one that is credible is that the US feared that enough of the satellite would survive re-entry and impact as to pose a security threat if another country was able to retrieve it), this incident must not be allowed to set a precedent or spur spiral pressures for an arms race. The US has long opposed a global treaty banning ASAT weapons developments, largely for concerns over verification. Just last week, China and Russia proposed an international treaty banning ASATs. The US needs to work to figure out a mechanism by which it can confidently create a regime ensuring that space will remain peaceful and available for use by Americans and the world alike.

Another Sign of Progress in Iraq

Following on the heels of last month's passage of a de-Baathification bill, Iraq has taken another small step forward towards stability. Yesterday, the Iraqi parliament passed three vital measures: the 2008 budget, a law defining the scope of the powers of the Iraqi provinces, and an amnesty for thousands of jailed Iraqis, which also happens to be one of the benchmarks identified by the Bush Administration. The wrangling over these issues had been extremely acrimonious, and at times threatened to bring down the fragile and divided government.

While each of the measures is important in its own right, what is perhaps even more important is the way in which they were passed. Each law appealed to one of Iraq's primary ethnic groups. The budget was mainly supported by the Kurds who wanted to protect the 17% share of Iraqi national revenue that they had been receiving, the Shiites supported the definition of provincial powers to ensure that the central government will not be given too much power, and the Sunnis backed the amnesty, as the vast majority of the 26,000 prisoners in Iraqi jails are Sunnis. No side could get its preferred law passed against the opposition of the other two, and individually it appeared as if all the measures would fail. However, by working together and bundling the measures into one package deal, each party could receive its preferred measure in exchange for supporting the measures desired by the other party.

The importance of such a development can not be understated. The only chance Iraq has for stability and reconciliation is if the major political, religious, and ethnic groups believe that their futures can be protected and advanced through political participation and compromise. A cooperative deal such as this goes a long way to demonstrating that Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites can work together to achieve mutual interests, and that political power need not be a zero-sum game.

Again, as with the de-Baathification deal this is but a small success, and it no way indicates that Iraq has been "won". But again, the accumulation of small steps in the right direction can eventually produce the political climate necessary for success. It is certainly a positive sign that there are more and more examples of positive moves.

A Test For China

For the first time, the World Trade Organization has issued a major ruling against China. According to the AP report:

The WTO found that China was breaking trade rules by taxing imports of auto parts at the same rate as foreign-made finished cars, according to a copy of the ruling's conclusions obtained by The Associated Press.

In the sweeping decision, the three-member WTO panel found against China on nearly every point of contention with the U.S., the 27-nation EU and Canada.

The three trade powers argued that the tariff was discouraging automakers from using imported car parts for the vehicles they assemble in China. As a result, car parts companies had an incentive to shift production to China, costing Americans, Canadians and Europeans their jobs, they said.

...

China, which will still be able to appeal, claims the tariffs are intended to stop whole cars being imported in large chunks, allowing companies to avoid the higher tariff rates for finished cars. It argues that all measures are fully consistent with WTO rules and do not discriminate against foreign auto parts.

But the U.S. and the EU say that China promised not to treat parts as whole cars when it joined the WTO in 2001.

China's accession to the WTO was a vital component of the US strategy of engagement, in which economic relations with China are pursued as part of a two-pronged strategy. The first goal of economic development is to transform China's domestic economy into a middle-class, capitalist-style market which, it is argued, will in turn create domestic pressure for political reform. The second strategy of engagement is to make China increasingly dependent on the international community so that adherence to the status quo is more valuable than challenging it.

The WTO is an excellent forum for the latter strategy, as it requires countries to alter their domestic laws and economic rules to comply with international free trade requirements. As protection of domestic status is, more or less, the raison d'etre of national governments, agreeing to alter those arrangements for the sake of international free trade is a powerful signal of adherence to the status quo. How China reacts to the first negative ruling will be a meaningful statement of how China understands its own preferences vis-a-vis the status quo and the international system. If it agrees to comply with the ruling, which will certainly harm a sector of China's domestic economy that it desires to protect, it will be a strong sign that engagement is working.

The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

In a commentary in today's Chicago Tribune, Steve Chapman has a piece examining "The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism," in which he writes:

Why are we worried [about the possibility of nuclear terrorism]? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe," concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable."

The events required to make that happen include a multitude of herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing.

Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces."

Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if Al Qaeda could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it.

Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.

...If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

All of this is very likely true. Much of Chapman's piece is based on a talk Professor John Mueller of Ohio State University gave at the University of Chicago last month entitled "The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood" that argues "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." Mueller is also the author of the book Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them. Mueller's basic argument is that the threat of terrorism, especially when compared to other threats, risks, or priorities is exceedingly small and while basic precautions should be taken, much of the response in the War on Terror is overblown.

I agree with much of Mueller's argument, in theory. But, as I and Homer Simpson are fond of saying, in theory, communism works. Even if it is objectively demonstrable that the threat of terrorism, and nuclear terrorism in particular, is exceedingly small, that doesn't mean that the government can react in ways other than the ways it has.

Government, and democratic government in particular, is an inherently reactionary force that prefers not to address problems so long as they remain mere possibilities in the future. However, once an event happens, like 9/11, the government is on notice, so to speak, and cannot allow a similar event to happen again. Thus, overreaction occurs, as the government races to paper over obvious flaws and policy failures and and attempts to identify any similar potential problems in the future. And so we get the absurd prohibition on liquids aboard airplanes.

Now that 9/11 put terrorism on the radar screen in an emphatic manner, the government cannot be seen to be ignoring any future terrorist possibilities, no matter how small. Combine that with an over-arching paternalism that infects government at all levels, and it should come as no surprise that the government is likely to spend time and resources worrying about a threat that very well may have an infinitesimal chance of occurrence. Let's also not forget that those in favor of governmental action to deal with the threat of global warming advocate for the application of the precautionary principle, which argues that in the face of uncertainty about events with the potential to cause massive damage to humans or the environment, protective actions should be taken. A nuclear attack on an US city certainly meets that threshold level.

It very well be true that the threat of terrorism is small, and that the threat of nuclear terrorism even smaller. But that doesn't mean that we should expect the government to take proportionate steps to deal with the threats.

Next Stop, Garbage Island!

Apparently, garbage island, the destination of the barge on which Homer Simpson lands while escaping from a proselytizing Ned Flanders, is real. The Independent has a report about a "plastic soup" of garbage in the Pacific that is twice the size of the continental United States. According to the report:

The vast expanse of debris – in effect the world's largest rubbish dump – is held in place by swirling underwater currents. This drifting "soup" stretches from about 500 nautical miles off the Californian coast, across the northern Pacific, past Hawaii and almost as far as Japan.

...

The "soup" is actually two linked areas, either side of the islands of Hawaii, known as the Western and Eastern Pacific Garbage Patches. About one-fifth of the junk – which includes everything from footballs and kayaks to Lego blocks and carrier bags – is thrown off ships or oil platforms. The rest comes from land.

...

Curtis Ebbesmeyer, an oceanographer and leading authority on flotsam, has tracked the build-up of plastics in the seas for more than 15 years and compares the trash vortex to a living entity: "It moves around like a big animal without a leash." When that animal comes close to land, as it does at the Hawaiian archipelago, the results are dramatic. "The garbage patch barfs, and you get a beach covered with this confetti of plastic," he added.

The majority of the "soup" appears to be plastic. Recently, there has been increasing movement in cities, localities, and even countries to move away from the use of plastics, particularly in grocery bags. One can only anticipate that the existence of 100 million tons of floating garbage covering thousands of miles of ocean will increase international pressure to reduce the amount of plastics waste produced. I would fully expect that the UN, or some other international environmental entity, will take this issue up in the near future.

Global Incident Map

A new resource has come to my attention and I wanted to mention it here. It's the Global Incident Map, and it's a fantastic tool for anyone studying terrorism in any form. The map displays icons representing various "global incidents" of actual terrorist attacks, suspicious events, and other relevant goings-on.

For example, looking at the US right now (9:48 AM, Tuesday, February 5, 2008) shows 19 incidents, ranging from unidentified white powder in an envelope in Virginia to a suspicious package found in San Jose to bomb threats in South Dakota. Pulling the map over to Africa, we see icons representing an attack on the Israeli embassy in Mauritania, the bombing of the Saudi embassy in Chad, and pirates seizing a Russian ship off the coast of Somalia. Pakistan shows a report from arrested al Qaeda militants that 600 suicide bombers are planning a major attack in Karachi, while in the Philippines, government soldiers clashed with Islamic rebels.

A fantastic tool for keeping track of terrorism, insurgencies, political violence, and suspicious acts around the world. Check it out.

NATO In Trouble

A group of former senior NATO military officials have issued a report warning that the military alliance is in trouble and in need of a massive overhaul if it is to retain its usefulness and relevance. The authors of the report -- Gen. John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and a former NATO commander; Adm. Jacques Lanxade, former chief of the Defense Staff of France, Gen. Klaus Naumann, former chief of the Defense Staff of Germany; Field Marshal Peter Inge, former chief of the Defense Staff of Britain; and Gen. Henk van den Breemen, former chief of the Defense Staff of the Netherlands -- assert that NATO is paralyzed by several key problems, including "cumbersome decision-making rules, inequitable financing arrangements and an inability to sustain long-term missions."

This is not the first warning of the problems facing NATO. Last month, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates upset many key US allies and NATO members when he publicly stated that many of the military problems in Afghanistan were due to the inability of member forces to fight insurgency-style warfare. Eastern Afghanistan, which shares a border with Pakistan and is primarily patrolled by US forces has become more secure lately, while Taliban activity and violence levels have been rising in the southern regions, controlled by a force largely made up of British, Canadian and Dutch forces. More troops and better equipment have been sought to increase the military presence in Afghanistan, but NATO has had massive difficulties in meeting the demand.

In late 2006, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer had to literally beg NATO members to provide 2,500 troops to meet the 31,000 troop goal (eventually, the UK, Canada, Poland, and Romania provided 2,000 of the requested 2,500). NATO lacks the airlift capability to deploy its force (although the alliance did agree in 2006 to purchase 3 badly needed C-17s). Only 6 of the 26 member countries spend the recommended 2% of GDP on defense, and many of the states impose caveats and restrictions on the soldiers they do deploy. For example, Germany imposed a prohibition on German troops conducting "extended patrols," or the restrictions that many states place on their soldiers serving in the more volatile regions.

Earlier this week, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper threatened to pull the Canadian contingent out of Afghanistan if more NATO allies did not increase their presence. While Harper would like the Canadian forces to stay beyond their currently scheduled withdrawal date of February 2009, he "accepted the recommendations of an independent panel which last week urged Canada to end its mission in the southern city of Kandahar unless NATO provided an extra 1,000 troops as well as helicopters and aerial reconnaissance vehicles." According to the report, "Canada is exasperated at the refusal of many other NATO nations to commit more troops to Afghanistan, in particular to southern areas where the Taliban is strong."

All of this is exceedingly bad news. NATO is absolutely vital to US, European, and global security interests in many fronts. For the US, NATO provides multinational support and burden-sharing, both of which are particularly important in the face of international disapproval of the invasion of Iraq and the strain being placed on the US military as a result. For the Europeans, NATO is, almost literally, the only way in which they can remain military relevant in the age of total US military dominance. If NATO is incapable of carrying out military operations and its credibility erodes, all the more burden will fall on the US to provide security and policing for the world, a development that would only stress US capabilities and reputation even more. For the world, NATO provides a credible military response to problems with which the UN can not, will not, and should not deal.

Despite the predictions of many realists, NATO did not disintegrate with the end of the Cold War. Rather, it has become a vital tool for democratizing the East European states, and has allowed the US multilateral approval for military actions (Kosovo). NATO must not be allowed to collapse, or even lose its credibility as a result of failures in Afghanistan. The US must put massive pressure on France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, just to name a few, to increase their commitments to their own militaries and to NATO as well. NATO's defense spending requirement must become mandatory, states must agree to give up the right to place restrictions on the operations of their troops assigned to NATO command, and procurement and spending must be driven by military, not political need.

The US, Europe, and the world need NATO. Countries must not be allowed to free-ride on the US. No one is asking them to develop a massive military presence like that of the US; but it shouldn't be too much to ask powerful states like France and Germany to be able to deploy 5,000 well-equipped and well-trained troops to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban and to try to build democracy in a part of the world that is more important than ever.

The New York Times Hates the Darfuris

OK, so that's probably not true. But yesterday's editorial in the New York Times certainly isn't going to do anything to help end the suffering, deaths, and dislocation in Darfur either. In the editorial, the Times accurately points out that "The new United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur is not off to an encouraging start." The problem is that, unsurprisingly, the Sudanese government in Khartoum has done nearly everything possible to undermine the mission and prevent it from being able to do its job.

The 20,000 man joint UN-AU force was supposed to supplement from the badly under-equipped, under-sized (7,000) and poorly trained AU force that had been "patrolling" Darfur. So far, however, only one-tenth of the additional forces have been deployed (meaning that 9,000 of the 26,000 troops are in Darfur), largely because Khartoum has refused to allow non-African peace keepers. Much of the equipment necessary for the mission has not been provided, including helicopters which are essential for patrolling an land area the size of France. To date, none of the 24 helicopters so far requested has been deployed. One of the leaders of the genocidal janjaweed was named to be a special adviser to Sudanese President Omar El Bashir. And just 2 weeks ago, a UN convoy came under fire from Sudanese government forces, in an attack that Sudan denies was intentional, but UN officials claim should have been avoided as Sudanese forces were informed of the presence and route of the convoy.

It should be of no surprise that the UN mission in Darfur is failing. The UN is notoriously bad at these kinds of missions, which in reality should be called "peace making" rather than "peace keeping." In peace keeping, two sides which have been warring decide that they wish to end the conflict, but do not trust each other enough to warrant laying down their arms. A neutral third party is needed to interpose itself between the two sides and guarantee the peace will be observed. The UN, as a neutral and trusted third part is very good at these kinds of missions.

But that doesn't really describe the situation in Darfur, which looks more like peace making, in which an outside party uses military force (or the threat of military force) to impose a peace on a situation, particular when one weaker group is being threatened by a larger group. The NATO intervention in Kosovo is a classic example of peace making. Darfur looks much more like this kind of operation that it resembles peace keeping.

However, as good as the UN is at peace keeping, it is notoriously bad at peace making, largely because it lacks the political will to take sides and impose its will on the aggressor (which is exactly why it was NATO and not the UN that intervened in Kosovo, and why the UN was so disastrous in Bosnia [see Srebrenica]). The UN has neither the appetite nor the ability to bully Sudan, to deploy sufficient numbers of well-equipped troops, or to do what is really necessary to protect the people of Darfur.

So, why does the New York Times hate, or so I jest, the Darfuri? Because in the editorial in which the Times notes many of the problems I list above, the Times concludes that "There is no hope at all until a credible and credibly armed peacekeeping force is deployed" and that "What is needed is troops, equipment and a lot more diplomatic pressure on Sudan. The word of the United Nations is on the line, and so are the lives of Darfur’s people."

Has the Times learned nothing? Wasn't the word of the UN on the line when the Serb forces demanded access to slaughter the Muslims of Srebrenica? Wasn't the word of the UN on the line when UN forces on the ground in Rwanda stood back and watched 800,000 people hacked to death? Wasn't the word on the UN on the line when Albanians in Kosovo were driven from the homes and subjected to ethnic cleansing?

The UN will not be able to help the people of Darfur. It is simply not a mission for which the UN is well suited. And continuing to hope that the UN will come through is to condemn more Darfuris to explusion from their homes or death. If the Times really wanted to see the suffering in Darfur end, it would set aside calls for the UN, and instead ask President Bush and the leaders of NATO to take matters into their own hands as they did in Kosovo. That is the only chance that Darfur has.

MLK Day

"I Have a Dream"

Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his "I Have a Dream Speech" on August 28, 1963 from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C.

I am happy to join with you today in what will go down in history as the greatest demonstration for freedom in the history of our nation.

Five score years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand today, signed the Emancipation Proclamation. This momentous decree came as a great beacon light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice. It came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night of their captivity.

But one hundred years later, the Negro still is not free. One hundred years later, the life of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination. One hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity. One hundred years later, the Negro is still languished in the corners of American society and finds himself an exile in his own land. And so we've come here today to dramatize a shameful condition.

In a sense we've come to our nation's capital to cash a check. When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the "unalienable Rights" of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note, insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked "insufficient funds."

But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. And so, we've come to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of justice.

We have also come to this hallowed spot to remind America of the fierce urgency of Now. This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism. Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy. Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit path of racial justice. Now is the time to lift our nation from the quicksands of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood. Now is the time to make justice a reality for all of God's children.

It would be fatal for the nation to overlook the urgency of the moment. This sweltering summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning. And those who hope that the Negro needed to blow off steam and will now be content will have a rude awakening if the nation returns to business as usual. And there will be neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights. The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges.

But there is something that I must say to my people, who stand on the warm threshold which leads into the palace of justice: In the process of gaining our rightful place, we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again and again, we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force.

The marvelous new militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not lead us to a distrust of all white people, for many of our white brothers, as evidenced by their presence here today, have come to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny. And they have come to realize that their freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom.

We cannot walk alone.

And as we walk, we must make the pledge that we shall always march ahead.

We cannot turn back.

There are those who are asking the devotees of civil rights, "When will you be satisfied?" We can never be satisfied as long as the Negro is the victim of the unspeakable horrors of police brutality. We can never be satisfied as long as our bodies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging in the motels of the highways and the hotels of the cities. We cannot be satisfied as long as the negro's basic mobility is from a smaller ghetto to a larger one. We can never be satisfied as long as our children are stripped of their self-hood and robbed of their dignity by a sign stating: "For Whites Only." We cannot be satisfied as long as a Negro in Mississippi cannot vote and a Negro in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote. No, no, we are not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until "justice rolls down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream."

I am not unmindful that some of you have come here out of great trials and tribulations. Some of you have come fresh from narrow jail cells. And some of you have come from areas where your quest -- quest for freedom left you battered by the storms of persecution and staggered by the winds of police brutality. You have been the veterans of creative suffering. Continue to work with the faith that unearned suffering is redemptive. Go back to Mississippi, go back to Alabama, go back to South Carolina, go back to Georgia, go back to Louisiana, go back to the slums and ghettos of our northern cities, knowing that somehow this situation can and will be changed.

Let us not wallow in the valley of despair, I say to you today, my friends.

And so even though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream.

I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal."

I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.

I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a state sweltering with the heat of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice.

I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.

I have a dream today!

I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its governor having his lips dripping with the words of "interposition" and "nullification" -- one day right there in Alabama little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers.

I have a dream today!

I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, and every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight; "and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed and all flesh shall see it together."

This is our hope, and this is the faith that I go back to the South with.

With this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. With this faith, we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood. With this faith, we will be able to work together, to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day.

And this will be the day -- this will be the day when all of God's children will be able to sing with new meaning:

My country 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing.

Land where my fathers died, land of the Pilgrim's pride,

From every mountainside, let freedom ring!

And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true.

And so let freedom ring from the prodigious hilltops of New Hampshire.

Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of New York.

Let freedom ring from the heightening Alleghenies of
Pennsylvania.

Let freedom ring from the snow-capped Rockies of Colorado.

Let freedom ring from the curvaceous slopes of California.

But not only that:

Let freedom ring from Stone Mountain of Georgia.

Let freedom ring from Lookout Mountain of Tennessee.

Let freedom ring from every hill and molehill of Mississippi.

From every mountainside, let freedom ring.

And when this happens, when we allow freedom ring, when we let it ring from every village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual:

Free at last! Free at last!

Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!

The Costs of Free Trade

Steven Landsburg, an economist at the University of Rochester and author of the excellent The Armchair Economist, has a very interesting op-ed in the New York Times today. Landsburg argues that calls for retraining and support from workers who lose their job due to competition and globalization should be ignored, especially by the Republican presidential candidates who, particular before the Michigan primary, openly pandered to such calls. According to Landsburg:

All economists know that when American jobs are outsourced, Americans as a group are net winners. What we lose through lower wages is more than offset by what we gain through lower prices. In other words, the winners can more than afford to compensate the losers. Does that mean they ought to? Does it create a moral mandate for the taxpayer-subsidized retraining programs proposed by Mr. McCain and Mr. Romney?

Um, no. Even if you’ve just lost your job, there’s something fundamentally churlish about blaming the very phenomenon that’s elevated you above the subsistence level since the day you were born. If the world owes you compensation for enduring the downside of trade, what do you owe the world for enjoying the upside?

I doubt there’s a human being on earth who hasn’t benefited from the opportunity to trade freely with his neighbors. Imagine what your life would be like if you had to grow your own food, make your own clothes and rely on your grandmother’s home remedies for health care. Access to a trained physician might reduce the demand for grandma’s home remedies, but — especially at her age — she’s still got plenty of reason to be thankful for having a doctor.

Some people suggest, however, that it makes sense to isolate the moral effects of a single new trading opportunity or free trade agreement. Surely we have fellow citizens who are hurt by those agreements, at least in the limited sense that they’d be better off in a world where trade flourishes, except in this one instance. What do we owe those fellow citizens?

One way to think about that is to ask what your moral instincts tell you in analogous situations. Suppose, after years of buying shampoo at your local pharmacy, you discover you can order the same shampoo for less money on the Web. Do you have an obligation to compensate your pharmacist? If you move to a cheaper apartment, should you compensate your landlord? When you eat at McDonald’s, should you compensate the owners of the diner next door? Public policy should not be designed to advance moral instincts that we all reject every day of our lives.

Landsburg is exactly right. In theory. But, in theory, communism works. Landsburg has the economics down, but misses the larger political context of free trade debates. It is true that, as Landburg argues "Americans as a group are net winners. What we lose through lower wages is more than offset by what we gain through lower prices." But that winning can't happen if Americans as a political entity reject free trade and globalization due to the costs.

Free trade by nature is particularly vulnerable to collective action problems (in short, the steel worker who loses his job to foreign competition has more incentive to lobby for redress than the millions of people who save $2 on each car they purchase have to lobby for expanded free trade). As we saw in the 2006 midterm elections, the political opposition against free trade is growing stronger, even as the economic benefits from globalization continue to increase. A recent Pew Research Center poll showed that Americans had the lowest favorable attitudes towards globalization and trade of all 47 nations surveyed.

In terms of pure economic efficiency, and maybe even morally, it might not make sense to compensate the losers from globalization. But from a political perspective, it is imperative that we do so, if only to be able to maintain public and political support for expanding free trade. If some of the gains of free trade have to be spent to maintain the regime, so be it.

Progress (And Caution) In Iraq

Bill Kristol, in his role as the newest op-ed columnist for the New York Times, has a piece in today's Times blasting the Democrats for their failure to admit progress in Iraq or to retract their past predictions of failure for the surge. A sample:

When President Bush announced the surge of troops in support of a new counterinsurgency strategy a year ago, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and Democratic Congressional leaders predicted failure. Obama, for example, told Larry King that he didn’t believe additional U.S. troops would “make a significant dent in the sectarian violence that’s taking place there.” Then in April, the Senate majority leader, Harry Reid, asserted that “this war is lost, and this surge is not accomplishing anything.” In September, Clinton told Gen. David Petraeus that his claims of progress in Iraq required a “willing suspension of disbelief.”

The Democrats were wrong in their assessments of the surge. Attacks per week on American troops are now down about 60 percent from June. Civilian deaths are down approximately 75 percent from a year ago. December 2007 saw the second-lowest number of U.S. troops killed in action since March 2003. And according to Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of day-to-day military operations in Iraq, last month’s overall number of deaths, which includes Iraqi security forces and civilian casualties as well as U.S. and coalition losses, may well have been the lowest since the war began.

Do Obama and Clinton and Reid now acknowledge that they were wrong? Are they willing to say the surge worked?

No. It’s apparently impermissible for leading Democrats to acknowledge — let alone celebrate — progress in Iraq. When asked recently whether she stood behind her “willing suspension of disbelief” insult to General Petraeus, Clinton said, “That’s right.”

Kristol's confidence comes from two places: First, the Sunni "Awakening" that has gone a long way to reducing civilian and military casualties and marginalizing al Qaeda, and second, the de-Baathification law finally passed by the Iraqi Parliament. As I, and every other analyst, has been saying, the surge was only one part of the strategy in Iraq; the surge would only matter if it was accompanied by political change. The de-Baathification law was a long- and much-desired step in the right direction, needed to provide Sunnis with a sense that they can be part of the new government and that their futures would be best secured by participation rather than joining the insurgency. The de-Baathification policy implemented following the fall of Saddam Hussein threw countless Sunnis out of work and made them doubt their futures in the new democratic Iraq. According to Kristol:

And now Iraq’s Parliament has passed a de-Baathification law — one of the so-called benchmarks Congress established for political reconciliation. For much of 2007, Democrats were able to deprecate the military progress and political reconciliation taking place on the ground by harping on the failure of the Iraqi government to pass the benchmark legislation. They are being deprived of even that talking point.

And yet, the de-Baathification policy is only one step on the road to political reconciliation. And while it is a particularly important step, there are others that will need to be taken as well if the surge is to bear fruit. The exceedingly important oil revenue law, which is necessary to provide Sunnis with a stake in the future by ensuring them a share of oil revenues, is languishing in the parliament and doesn't look to be passed any time soon. Nor does a handful of constitutional amendments desired by Sunni political parties or laws setting rules for local elections. Furthermore, even the small step of the de-Baathification law has taken a very long time to pass. The Iraq Study Group set late 2006/early 2007 as the time frame for passing the de-Baathification law, as well as the oil revenue law, March 2007 for a referendum on the constitutional amendments, and provincial elections by June 2007. So far, the de-Baathification law is the only benchmark to be acheived, and nearly a year late at that.

Delays and fits and starts are to be expected in a project as comprehensive as the democratization of Iraq. But while the time to proclaim defeat may have passed, it is still too early to proclaim victory in Iraq. The surge is working, and the political reconciliation is moving in the right direction but the job is not yet done.

The real danger now is in complacency. Just because casualties are down does not mean that the surge should be undone. US troop levels must remain at a high level long enough for the political situation to catch up to the improved security. President Bush must continue to press the Iraqi government to continue on the path of political reconciliation. Only that, and not US military might, can ensure a stable, democratic Iraq. Pessimism is no longer warranted, but neither are over-optimistic assessments.

UPDATE: Kristol's own Weekly Standard reinforces the point I want to make about the need for caution. In this post on the Worldwide Standard blog, Brian Faughnan excoriates the editors of the New York Times for editorializing about the lack of progress towards political reconciliation on the same day as the paper reports the passage of the de-Baathification law. While the Times editorial could and should have mentioned the new law, its passage does not by itself represent sufficient progress.

UPDATE 2: The New York Times is reporting that the effect of the new de-Baathification law may not be as hoped:

...the legislation is at once confusing and controversial, a document riddled with loopholes and caveats to the point that some Sunni and Shiite officials say it could actually exclude more former Baathists than it lets back in, particularly in the crucial security ministries.

...

The most extreme interpretations of the measure’s effects actually came from Shiite officials. Some of them hailed it because it would ban members of even the lowest party levels from the most important ministries: justice, interior, defense, finance and foreign.

That would seem to preclude the government from keeping its promise to offer military and police jobs to the thousands of Sunni Arabs who have joined the Awakening groups.

...

Under that interpretation, the law would be directly at odds with the American campaign to draft Sunni Arabs into so-called Awakening militias with the aim of integrating them into the police and military forces.

...

But interpretations of the measure’s actual effects varied widely among Iraqi officials. In general, Shiite politicians hailed it as an olive branch to Sunni Arabs. But some Sunnis say it is at best an incremental improvement over the old system, and at worst even harsher.

“This law includes some good articles, and it’s better than the last de-Baathification law because it gives pensions to third-level Baathists,” said Khalaf Aulian, a Sunni politician who opposed the legislation. “But I don’t like the law as a whole, because it will remain as a sword on the neck of the people.

...

One particular improvement, he said, was that de-Baathification cases would now be subject to judicial review, whereas the old de-Baathification committee’s decisions were final. And the Council of Ministers would have the right to make exceptions to the law in order to serve the public interest. “Before, we dealt with Baath Party members as a group,” he said. “Now, being a Baath Party member is not a crime by itself. If someone has committed a crime in the old regime, that accusation should be made in court. And all of the members can get a pension.”

On other fronts, "Iraqi legislators said Sunday that they were making progress on two more key benchmarks urged by the Bush administration: the approval of an oil revenue sharing law and the settlement of competing claims to the contested northern city of Kirkuk."

Again, as I said originally, it's far too early to call the surge a success.

Crisis In Kenya

My friend who works for the microfinance company Unitus sent me a message today about how the political strife in Kenya is affecting development on the ground. I thought I'd print the message here, and see if any readers want to help:

Crisis in Kenya: Contribute to the Jamii Bora Emergency Fund

January 7th, 2008

Violence in Kenya following recent presidential elections—you can help!

> DONATE HERE

As has been widely reported, presidential elections in Kenya and the subsequent electoral returns December 30th have been followed by tremendous civil unrest and outright violence. Concern over potential electoral fraud following President Mwai Kabiki’s re-election has sparked a spate of violence that continues long after election day. News coverage of the election process and the post-election violence can be found at a variety of news sources; a few select articles are linked here:

• New York Times:
  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/03/world/africa/03kenya.html
• Reuters:
  http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL03725926
• Time:
  http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1699867,00.html
• International Herald Tribune:
  http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/03/africa/kenya.php

Impact on Jamii Bora Trust and Its Members
As many Unitus supporters know, Jamii Bora Trust is a microfinance institution in Nairobi, Kenya that Unitus has partnered with since 2004. We have recently learned that many of Jamii Bora’s members have been deeply impacted by this violence and are in desperate need of assistance. We have been in touch with Ingrid Munro, Managing Trustee of Jamii Bora Trust, in order to further extend Unitus’s support and understand more fully the conditions and circumstances facing the citizens of Nairobi, and more specifically, the fate of Jamii Bora’s members. Here, in Ingrid’s own words (dated January 1) is what we’ve heard:

Dear friends,

We have been able to be in touch with most of our branch staff in various parts of the country. The situation is very serious in many parts of the country. The target for most mob actions are the Kikuyu, the country’s largest tribe. But even families of other ethnic background are victims when the looting goes out of hand and nobody has time to check who is a Kikuyu and who is not.

Jamii Bora members are particularly badly hit, first because they are in the poorest areas that are most badly affected, second because in these areas they are often the most successful business people after many years of climbing with Jamii Bora, third because many are Kikuyus in the central urban areas, fourth because the police protection is not so strong in the poorest sections of the cities and town. The areas of the rich are much better protected and hardly attacked at all.

Terrible things are happening. People are killed and injured. Rape is on the rise. A church where many families with children had sought refuge was burnt down by an angry mob in Eldoret and many people including at least 34 children were killed. Poor people’s businesses are destroyed, burnt and/or looted. Homes and even churches are burnt down. The fruits of their hard work to climb out of poverty has been destroyed and burnt to the ground.

Tense calm has returned to a few places but most of the badly hit areas are still experiencing problems. Many families are running away in panic and have lost everything they have worked so hard for.

Some of the worst hit areas are the large slums in Nairobi especially Kibera, Mathare, Huruma- Korogocho, Kangemi and Kawangware. Other towns that have been exposed to serious destruction are Eldoret, Kisumu, Kericho and Mombasa. Many other parts of the country are experiencing serious problems in poorer sections of the towns. Several of our branches have also been looted and our computers and POS machines stolen. People can not run their businesses for risk of looting, thus even those who have not been looted or burnt down are affected. No buses are available since the owners fear that they may be stoned or vandalized. People are starving because they cannot access food, they are homeless and seek refuge at police stations and churches. Thus everyone is affected.

Jamii Bora estimates that almost 50% of the members are affected in at least one of the above mentioned ways. Our own disaster fund will not last long in this situation and we urgently need help.

Anything you can do to assist and contribute in a big or a small way will be highly appreciated.

Warm regards

Ingrid

How You Can Help
Please consider a donation to Unitus to support the Jamii Bora Emergency Fund. Members throughout the Nairobi slums—specifically Mathare and Kibera—have been affected, as well as members throughout greater Kenya where Jamii Bora has branches. Lives and futures have been devastated, and your generous support can help Unitus and Jamii Bora Trust lend a hand to those impacted by this violence. Funds donated to Unitus will go directly to Jamii Bora Trust to rebuild looted offices and to help members re-establish their businesses and homes.

Please make your contribution here.

Thank you!

- Your friends at Unitus & Jamii Bora Trust

www.unitus.com
www.jamiibora.org

I'll be donating...I hope that you will as well.

Here Comes The F-22

[Happy New Year and welcome back to Security Dilemmas! It's been a nice break, but I'm back and ready to blog.]

The Los Angeles Times is reporting that the US Air Force is considering permanently grounding dozens of F-15 fighters. The entire F-15 fleet, almost 700 fighters, was grounded back in November when one F-15 broke up during a simulated dogfight; 440 older model F-15s are still out of service and the Air Force plans on returning only 260 of those to action. The remaining 180 are believed to have a serious structural flaw in the beam that serves as the spine of the plane. Newer model F-15s are used in combat missions, currently in Iraq and Afghanistan, but older models, including those unlikely to return to the air, are used to patrol US territories.

The grounding of a large part of the F-15 fleet has a large impact on strategic readiness of the US Air Force, and comes in the midst of a on-going debate over the future of the USAF and the newest air platform, the F-22 Raptor, designed to replace the F-15 and the F-16. The F-22 is a extremely impressive plane. From the F-22 team website:

Stealth Capabilities –
First and Only 24/7/365 All-Weather Stealth Fighter

• Radar signature approximately the size of a bumblebee, thereby avoiding detection by the most sophisticated enemy air defense systems
• Signatures/emissions of sound, turbulence, and heat that can aid detection are reduced
• Requires no direct assistance from electronic support aircraft that may be more easily detected
• Includes planform alignment of the wing and tail edges, radar-absorbing sawtoothed surfaces, an engine face that is concealed by a serpentine inlet duct, "stealthy" coating cockpit design to minimize the usually substantial radar return of pilot’s helmet
• Through internal weapons placement, the F-22 eliminates multiple surface features that could be detected by enemy radar

See Without Being Seen

• The F-22 possesses a highly stealthy signature that greatly reduces the enemy’s ability to find, track and target — permits access to defended areas that cannot be accessed by nonstealth platforms
• First look/first kill in all environments: A combination of improved sensor capability, improved situational awareness and improved weapons provides first-kill opportunity against the threat
• The F-22 possesses a sophisticated sensor suite that allows the pilot to track, identify and shoot the threat before it detects the F-22. Significant effort is being placed on cockpit design and avionics fusion to improve the pilot's situational awareness. Advanced avionics technologies allow the F-22 sensors to gather, integrate and display essential information in the most useful format to the pilot
• Advances in low-observable technologies provide significantly improved survivability and lethality against air-to-air and surface-to-air threats. The F-22's combination of reduced observability and supercruise accentuate the advantage of surprise in a tactical environment

The air threat to the United States now and in the future is real.

• Current Russian fighters are already on par with America’s best fighter, the F-15. Europe's and Russia's newest class of fighters will surpass the F-15; they are set to roll off production lines by 2005
• At least three foreign aircraft threaten to surpass the F-15’s performance in the near future: the French Rafale, the Eurofighter 2000 and the Russian Su-35. Some foreign aircraft are already at parity with the F-15
• Nations are already denying America access to airspace around the globe by obtaining low-cost, but sophisticated, surface-to-air missile systems
• Highly capable surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems pose a formidable challenge to the F-15’s survivability. Advanced SAM systems, because of their relatively low cost, are a quick and easy way for countries to modernize their air defense systems
• Estimated twenty-one countries will possess the most advanced systems by 2005

Much of the debate surrounding the F-22 concerns this last point. The Air Force has long been claiming that it needs the F-22 to maintain the air superiority that is so critical for US combat forces in the field. The Defense Department and Congress, however, has been skeptical of claims that the F-15 and F-16 are not up to the task. To date, the USAF has requested 381 F-22s, but DoD has only authorized (subject to congressional approval) 183.

Assuming the Air Force is not being extra-cautious with the F-15s to encourage the purchase of more F-22s (such an assumption shouldn't be seen as an indictment of the Air Force, but rather a recognition of the way in which bureaucratic incentives affect decision making), the structural problems emerging in the F-22 does seem to recommend increasing the complement of F-22s. The F-15s are now, on average, 25 years old, and the F-16s are even older. The F-22 will keep the US Air Force unchallenged in the skies and will serve as a deterrent against potential rivals attempting to challenge US air superiority. Air dominance is such a vital component of US military strategy; it would be unacceptable to let the gap between the US and other states' air forces shrink. Not all military systems are worth the investment. But the F-22 is.