A Tough Situation For Iran

For several months now, it had been looking like Iran had the upper hand in international politics. There seemed to be little slowing of its burgeoning nuclear program, the West, and especially the European countries, lacked any bargaining power, and Iran is clearly benefiting from the chaos in Iraq. However, in the last few days, Iran's fortunes have taken a drastic turn for the worse. First, Iran's primary patron, Russia, has turned on it, and is now supporting the extension and toughening of international sanctions. Second, Iran seems to have made a huge miscalculation by seizing 15 British sailors in the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Iran claims the sailors had strayed into Iranian territorial waters; Britain and Iraq claimed the ship was in Iraqi waters performing a routine and legal search of a ship bound for Iraq. The timing of the seizure, occurring right before the vote in the UN Security Council on the sanctions seems to have been a bad attempt to threaten the UNSC into backing away from the use of sanctions. However, Iran seems to have acknowledged its mistake, and is currently interrogating the sailors in what is interpreted to be an effort to release them in a face-saving gesture by determining that the violation of Iranian waters was unintentional.

So, what's going on with Iran? Why the sudden reversal of fortune? The most important component here is the loss of Russian support. While it's not entirely clear why Russia would turn on Iran, I strongly believe that US plans to build an anti-ballistic missile system in Eastern Europe has demonstrated to Russia, and President Putin in particular, that Russia is no longer the power that was the USSR, and that the US will no longer acknowledge Russian interests without some kind of quid pro quo. That is, if Russia wants the US to back away from building the missile defense system, it can't just rattle its sabers. Rather, it must cooperate with the US and the West, producing some kind of material benefit that it can then use as political capital to get what it wants. Don't be surprised if, in the aftermath of the imposition of sanctions, Russia tries to re-open a conversation about the ABM system.

Such an outcome would be a big victory for the larger policy of engagement, in which the US backs away from pressuring countries to make political reforms in favor of economic liberalization. This is the same policy that the US has long applied to China. If the country becomes connected to the larger Western and international economy, it may not be willing to risk those connections to support rogue patrons like Iran, North Korea, or Sudan. Recently, we have seen China become more willing to pressure its patrons, and now Russian pressure on Iran seems to fit the bill as well. The US needs to keep the pressure on, convincing these states that their future economic success, as well as their political status in the international community, depends on them reining in their clients and playing by the rules of the system.

A Few Days Off

First, let me apologize for the sparse blogging lately. I'm buried under papers and exams that need grading.

Also, Security Dilemmas will be dark for a few days. I'm heading to Kobe, Japan tomorrow for a few days. I've been invited to serve as an outside evaluator of a new course on maritime security at Kobe University. I'll be back on Monday, so posting should resume by the middle of next week.

Now THAT'S Diplomacy

From Reuters:

Israel has recalled its ambassador in El Salvador after he was found drunk and naked with sex toys lying nearby in the yard of his official residence, Israeli media reports said on Monday.

A foreign ministry spokeswoman confirmed that the ambassador, Tsuriel Raphael, was recalled but offered no details. "The ministry sees his behavior as unbecoming of a diplomat," the spokeswoman said.

Israeli media reported that local police found Raphael in the yard of the official residence in San Salvador. The reports said he was drunk, naked, and bound and gagged with a rubber ball in his mouth and sex toys lying near him.

The foreign ministry spokeswoman said the incident took place two weeks ago.

"As soon as the episode was brought to attention of the foreign ministry it reacted and the ambassador was recalled to Israel. He is going to remain in Israel," she said.

Israel would seek another ambassador in El Salvador, an Israeli official said.

The Surge May Be Working

The early signs from Iraq are promising...the surge may in fact be working. Robert Kagan has a piece in Sunday's Washington Post arguing that the recent (and on-going) increase in US troops is succeeding. Kagan writes:

Leading journalists have been reporting for some time that the war was hopeless, a fiasco that could not be salvaged by more troops and a new counterinsurgency strategy. The conventional wisdom in December held that sending more troops was politically impossible after the antiwar tenor of the midterm elections. It was practically impossible because the extra troops didn't exist. Even if the troops did exist, they could not make a difference.

Four months later, the once insurmountable political opposition has been surmounted. The nonexistent troops are flowing into Iraq. And though it is still early and horrible acts of violence continue, there is substantial evidence that the new counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the infusion of new forces, is having a significant effect.

Before the arrival of Gen. David Petraeus, the Army's leading counterinsurgency strategist, U.S. forces tended to raid insurgent and terrorist strongholds and then pull back and hand over the areas to Iraqi forces, who failed to hold them. The Fadhils report, "One difference between this and earlier -- failed -- attempts to secure Baghdad is the willingness of the Iraqi and U.S. governments to commit enough resources for enough time to make it work." In the past, bursts of American activity were followed by withdrawal and a return of the insurgents. Now, the plan to secure Baghdad "is becoming stricter and gaining momentum by the day as more troops pour into the city, allowing for a better implementation of the 'clear and hold' strategy." Baghdadis "always want the 'hold' part to materialize, and feel safe when they go out and find the Army and police maintaining their posts -- the bad guys can't intimidate as long as the troops are staying."

A greater sense of confidence produces many benefits. The number of security tips about insurgents that Iraqi civilians provide has jumped sharply. Stores and marketplaces are reopening in Baghdad, increasing the sense of community. People dislocated by sectarian violence are returning to their homes. As a result, "many Baghdadis feel hopeful again about the future, and the fear of civil war is slowly being replaced by optimism that peace might one day return to this city," the Fadhils report. "This change in mood is something huge by itself."

Apparently some American journalists see the difference. NBC's Brian Williams recently reported a dramatic change in Ramadi since his previous visit. The city was safer; the airport more secure. The new American strategy of "getting out, decentralizing, going into the neighborhoods, grabbing a toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the locals -- that is having an obvious and palpable effect." U.S. soldiers forged agreements with local religious leaders and pushed al-Qaeda back -- a trend other observers have noted in some Sunni-dominated areas. The result, Williams said, is that "the war has changed."

It is no coincidence that as the mood and the reality have shifted, political currents have shifted as well. A national agreement on sharing oil revenue appears on its way to approval. The Interior Ministry has been purged of corrupt officials and of many suspected of torture and brutality. And cracks are appearing in the Shiite governing coalition -- a good sign, given that the rock-solid unity was both the product and cause of growing sectarian violence.

Kagan notes, as do many critics of the surge, that the disappearance of the Shiite militias from the scene may be only temporary, and that once the US troops leave, as they eventually will, the Mahdi Army will return. But that misses a crucial dynamic: the militias, whether Shiite or Sunni, are dependent on public support in a way that the al Qaeda-linked insurgency is not. The ethnic militias rely on their constituencies believing that violence is a better means to protect their interests than is the political process. If "regular" Iraqis" come to understand that peace, quiet, and the Iraqi government are better able to providing for the future than is violence, the militias will lose their support and purpose. The longer these groups are lying low, the longer that peace, security, and stability hold in Baghdad, the more Iraqis will develop faith in the government at the expense of the militias.

It's still too early to predict success, but things do seem to be trending in the right direction. As the rest of the surge forces (only three of five brigades have arrived in Iraq so far) continue to deploy and provide security, it just may be possible for the US to create the conditions for a working, stable society.

Congress Makes A Move

The US House of Representatives has apparently decided to challenge President Bush head-on about the length of the Iraq War. House Democrats today unveiled legislation designed to bring all US combat troops in Iraq home by the fall of 2008, at the latest. If the Iraqi government does not meet certain specified benchmarks of progress, troops would be withdrawn earlier. The bill would require President Bush to certify by July 1 and October 1 that the Iraq government is making satisfactory progress in providing security for the country, distributing oil revenues, and improving the method by which the constitution can be amended; if President Bush in unable to certify progress, all US combat troops would be withdrawn in six months. Assuming progress is made, troop would begin leaving Iraq in March 2008 and all combat soldiers would be back by September. The bill also requires the Pentagon to enforce its standards for training and equipping all troops being sent into Iraq, but allows Bush to issue waivers of the requirements (the intent is to force the president into publicly admitting that the troops are lacking equipment and training).

It is not entirely clear that the bill will pass the House. Nearly every Republican is likely to oppose it, and several Democrats have already spoken out against the bill. If it does pass, however, President Bush would face a difficult decision of whether to veto, as it will contain an extra $1.2 billion for the war in Afghanistan and $3.5 billion more for veterans' care and health care for active troops.

If the bill passes, the most likely outcome is that President Bush would not veto it, and instead simply ignore its dictates. The bill is of highly dubious constitutionality, as it smacks of the sort of micro-managing the US military that is off-limits to Congress. Congress' war powers do not extend to telling the president how many troops he may deploy to a combat zone. Congress could deny funding to the president for combat operations in Iraq, which would force the withdrawal of troops. But the president is the commander-in-chief of the US military, and only the commander-in-chief can make decisions about troop levels. The standards for training and equipment sound like they would fall under Congress' power to make rules for the regulation of the armed forces, but Congress has yielded such specific rule-making to the Department of Defense; any interference now without a statutory change would be unconstitutional.

This move by Congress will not succeed at bringing the boys home. If Congress really wants to end the war, it will have to step up, cut off the funding, and accept responsibility for the outcome. Anything else is merely spineless posturing.

Recasting The Darfur Debate

The US State Department has named the on-going genocide in Darfur the world's worst human rights abuse of 2006. The just-released 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices noted that "the Sudanese government and government-backed janjaweed militia bear responsibility for the genocide in Darfur" and that "all parties to the conflagration committed serious abuses, including widespread killing of civilians, rape as a tool of war, systematic torture, robbery and recruitment of child soldiers." The reappearance of the word "genocide" is particularly notable; it was first used in reference to Darfur in 2004 by then-SecState Powell, but has largely disappeared from official reports and speeches on the situation.

The US Special Envoy for Darfur, Andrew Natsios, is scheduled to meet with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir two days from now in an effort to convince al-Bashir to allow UN/AU peace keepers to increase their presence in the region. However, there are no signs of a imminent reversal by Sudan, which has to date steadfastly refused to allow a larger and better-equipped force into Darfur to protect the people there.

So, what the US do? While China has been willing to press Sudan a bit, it is unlikely that China (or Russia for that matter) would ever permit the Security Council to authorize an intervention without the acquiescence of the Sudanese government. Therefore any international action to protect the people of Darfur is likely to be, a la Kosovo and Iraq, conducted outside the bounds of the UN and international law. Given the experience of the US in interventions over the last 15 or so years -- Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan -- there is likely to be little stomach for an armed intervention. Even the success of Kosovo is more an exception that proves the rule, as Kosovo was a more traditional "war" involving state-against-state violence, while an intervention in Sudan is more likely to resemble Somalia or Rwanda.

Some people point to the recent breakthrough with North Korea as evidence that sanctions can work, particularly in the globalized world. But North Korea is more of unique case that I'm not sure can be applied to Sudan. North Korea has little to export the world, while Sudan has resources and oil. North Korea is politically and economically isolated, making it easier to close the flows, while Sudan is not.

If a military intervention is the only likely way to end the genocide and protect the long-suffering people of Darfur, how can the US overcome its reluctance to engage in these kinds of humanitarian operations? In a presentation I gave this past weekend to the local Darfur Action Group, I talked about how the discussion needs to be recast. Talking about the horrors and atrocities may help raise public awareness and sentiment, but it's not going to convince policy makers that action should be taken. The debate needs to be less about why Darfur is worthy of intervention, and more about why intervening in Darfur should be understood as part of US national interest.

Why should the US risk its soldiers and treasure to protect the people of Darfur? In Somalia, there was no clear answer to this question, and so when 18 US Rangers were killed, the country and the president lost their nerve and withdrew. If the US is to take action in Darfur, it must be made clear to the American public and decision makers that the action is the American interest and that US soldiers should die to protect the people of Darfur. I believe that case can be made. There are lots of ways that protecting innocent people being slaughtered by their government is in the US interest. There are lots of ways that stabilizing a volatile region is as well. President Bush in particular has shown himself to be open to this kind of argument; unfortunately, much of its force has been discredited by the debacle in Iraq.

But Darfur should not be forgotten. This country has a strong and vital interest in ensuring "Never Again."

Switzerland Invades Liechtenstein!

Seriously. Well, sort of seriously. The New York Times is reporting that a company of Swiss soldiers got lost on a training mission and crossed the border into Liechtenstein.

According to Swiss daily Blick, the 170 infantry soldiers wandered 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) across an unmarked border into the tiny principality early Thursday before realizing their mistake and turning back.

A spokesman for the Swiss army confirmed the story but said that there were unlikely to be any serious repercussions for the mistaken invasion.

''We've spoken to the authorities in Liechtenstein and it's not a problem,'' Daniel Reist told The Associated Press.

Officials in Liechtenstein also played down the incident.

Interior ministry spokesman Markus Amman said nobody in Liechtenstein had even noticed the soldiers, who were carrying assault rifles but no ammunition. ''It's not like they stormed over here with attack helicopters or something,'' he said.

Liechtenstein, which has about 34,000 inhabitants and is slightly smaller than Washington DC, doesn't have an army.

A Time To Not Be Unilateral

Reuters is reporting that friction is developing between the US and some of the other members of NATO about the potential deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Germany, in particular, along with several other European NATO members are concerned that the ABM system will destabilize relations with Russia, which has expressed serious concerns over the system, seeing it is an encroachment on the (former) Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, as well as a signal of divergent interests between the West and Russia. Germany is calling for discussions in the NATO-Russia Council, while the US has declared its intentions to press ahead with development and deployment, even without NATO approval or participation, if necessary. The basic plan is to deploy a radar system in the Czech Republic and a missile battery in Poland to protect Europe against missile launches from states like Iran or North Korea.

Germany and NATO are right to be concerned about the ABM system, but the object of their concern is misplaced. There's no real reason to worry about Russia; the former superpower is a shell of its former self and simply no longer matters in global politics. There's no reason to be antagonistic towards Russia, but Russia's concerns and needs should not be serious impediments to pursuing things deemed important for US/European/NATO security and interest.

There are two other reasons why the US should defer to NATO here. First is the need to assuage hurt feelings. Germany and France are still smarting from the rejection of NATO assistance in the early days of the invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion of Iraq. The US should be looking for any low-cost opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to NATO and multilateral structures, and this seems like such an opportunity, as building an ABM system should be low on the US's list of security priorities.

As I have blogged about before, I am no fan of ABM systems. I don't buy the arguments that they won't work...although I am suspicious of their efficacy. But the real question is: Is the benefit worth the cost? In a world in which our military is stretched thin, where our soldiers are having trouble getting equipment and training, the massive amounts of money being spent on ABM defense could be much better spent simply paying to enlarge the armed forces.

Given the concern expressed by our NATO allies, the Bush Administration should simply drop this issue. There's no reason to upset our friends, nor spend the money that could be better used elsewhere.

(A Little) Good News From Iraq

Two pieces of good news from Iraq in today's papers. First, from my local Tacoma News Tribune, a report that a local congressman, Norm Dicks (D-WA) has returned from a trip to Iraq more optimistic about the chances for success. According to the article, Dicks, a long-time critic of President Bush and the war in Iraq and who voted for the recent non-binding resolution criticising the surge, "'said the troop buildup led by Gen. David Petraeus, the new U.S. commander in Iraq, could work – if Iraqis believe in it and participate fully.'" "'I think this plan has possibilities, if the Iraqis will get their troops in the field and do the embedding with the U.S. forces, and if they do the political reconciliation' necessary for long-term stability."

But will the Iraqis get on board? That brings us to the second piece of good news. According to the New York Times, the Iraqi cabinet reached an agreement today on guidelines for the distribution of the country's oil revenues and foreign investment. According to the Times:

The draft law approved by the cabinet allows the central government to distribute oil revenues to the provinces or regions based on population, which could lessen the economic concerns of the rebellious Sunni Arabs, who fear being cut out of Iraq’s vast potential oil wealth by the dominant Shiites and Kurds. Most of Iraq’s crude oil reserves lie in the Shiite south and Kurdish north.

The law also grants regional oil companies or governments the power to sign contracts with foreign companies for exploration and development of fields, opening the door for investment by foreign companies in a country whose oil reserves rank among the world’s three largest.

Iraqi officials say dozens of major foreign companies, including ones based in the United States, Russia and China, have expressed strong interest in developing fields or have done some work with the Iraqi industry. The national oil law would allow regions to enter into production-sharing agreements with foreign companies, which some Iraqis say could lead to foreigners reaping too much of the country’s oil wealth.

Iraqi officials say all such contracts will be subjected to a fair bidding process, but American inspectors have reported that the upper echelons of the government, including the senior ranks of the Oil Ministry, are rife with corruption. There are also fears among non-Americans that American companies could be favored.

But oil industry analysts in the United States say it is unclear whether companies will rush to sign contracts because the law is vague about what legal protections investors would be given....

The oil law’s drafters reached agreement on the principle of revenue sharing fairly early in the process. Much more contentious was the issue of signing oil contracts. The Kurds, who have enjoyed de facto independence in the mountainous north since the end of the Persian Gulf war in 1991, argued strongly for regional governments or companies to have full power in signing contracts with foreign companies to develop oil fields. Sunni Arab leaders insisted on keeping this power in the hands of the Oil Ministry. The Shiites fell somewhere in the middle.

The draft law has a compromise: regions can enter into contracts, but a powerful new central body, the Federal Oil and Gas Council, would have the power to prevent the contracts from going forward if they do not meet certain prescribed standards, Mr. Salih said. A panel of oil experts from inside and outside Iraq would advise the federal council on the contracts.

The draft law also re-establishes the state-run Iraq National Oil Company, which was founded in 1964 to oversee oil production but was shut down by Mr. Hussein in 1987. The company would operate separately from the Oil Ministry and use a business model. In addition, any region that can produce at least 150,000 barrels of oil a day can create its own operating company.

This is a hugely important deal. One of the most critical sticking points between the three main players (Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites) has been the distribution of oil wealth. The uncertainty has been a catalyst for the ethnic violence/insurgency, as the Sunnis have feared being shut out of the country's oil wealth; if this deal can reassure Sunnis that they will benefit from a united and stable Iraq it may be possible for the government to get the violence under control. While there is a lot more work to be done (for an excellent analysis, see this post over at Westhawk), but this deal is, at the least, a little bit of good news.

UPDATE: Over at The Corner of National Review.com, Rich Lowry posts the following, which bolsters the slim hopes noted above:

My “Pentagon intel guy” writes in an e-mail:

Since my job at the Pentagon is to follow and report these kinds of things- there are several trends we are seeing lately:

1) Definite and measurable decrease in number of sectarian killings within Baghdad: From nearly 1,400 to 680 in the last two months.

2) We are killing and capturing increasing numbers of Sunni insurgents and Al Qaeda fighters. And when I say "we"- I mean Multi-National Forces Iraq as well as the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police Commando, and the newer "National Guard"/Territorial Forces in Anbar.

3) The recent bombings in ANBAR demonstrate red on red kinetic operations. Something which has been rare until the last few months. More and more Sunni tribes are pledging fealty to the Iraqi government and the Coalition and turning their back on the insurgents/AQI. This has caused them to be targeted.

We have seen the enemy bomb police recruitment drives, and now mosques of "apostate" Imams and Sheikhs who have sided with the Americans. This has happened twice in the last week. While the mainstream media considers this more proof of failure- it is actually a sign of the precarious position the terrorists are in. They need the Sunni population to protect them and shelter them. If they are now butchering them like everyone else- this could be a turning point in the relationship. This is crucial to watch. We need to protect the tribal leaders who have come over to us- and AQI knows that it is a death sentence for them if they can't stop it.

Congress Makes The Wrong Move

The Associated Press is reporting that the US Senate is moving to revoke the 2002 authorization for the invasion of Iraq. That resolution gave President Bush the power to use the American military "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq."According to the report:

Key lawmakers, backed by party leaders, are drafting legislation that would effectively revoke the broad authority granted to the president in the days Saddam Hussein was in power, and leave US troops with a limited mission as they prepare to withdraw.

Officials said Thursday the precise wording of the measure remains unsettled. One version would restrict American troops in Iraq to fighting al-Qaida, training Iraqi army and police forces, maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and otherwise proceeding with the withdrawal of combat forces.

Such a plan is more appealing to senators uncomfortable with the other option being explored by opponents of the war: the "slow bleed" plan being developed by Rep. John Murtha that is intended to limit the ability to deploy soldiers into Iraq by placing strict requirements on training and funding.

It probably doesn't matter which route Congress takes to try to end the Iraq war, as both paths are very likely unconstitutional. While it's not clear, Murtha's plan very likely violates the constitutional authority of the president as commander-in-chief as the plan seems to go beyond Congress' role of making rules of the government and regulation of the armed forces. The Senate's plan will likely be vetoed, but it wouldn't have to be. Congress has long ago ceded any responsibility for the control and deployment of the US armed forces. While the president did ask Congress for authorization, the administration also made it clear that it did not have to do, as all administrations have done since the passage of the War Powers Resolution. As I have argued in many posts, Congress' role in such matters is limited to funding the military and declaring war. If Congress really wants to end the US military involvement in Iraq, it will have to cut off funding for the troops.

Rumsfeld's Legacy

Yesterday, Republican senator and presidential candidate John McCain (AZ) blasted former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, stating that "Donald Rumsfeld will go down in history as one of the worst secretaries of defense in history." McCain's opinion is largely based on Rumsfeld's refusal to deploy sufficient troops into Iraq to stabilize the country and deal with the insurgencies, and, according to McCain, "we are paying a very heavy price for the mismanagement -- that's the kindest work I can give you -- of Donald Rumsfeld of this war."

I have blogged before about Rumsfeld, arguing that regardless of culpability (although there is strong evidence that he did ignore many arguments for increasing the US deployment in Iraq) , he, as SecDef, deserves the blame for the debacle that Iraq has become. On that charge, Rumsfeld is guilty as charged by McCain.

But does that taint his entire tenure as SecDef? In fact, Rumsfeld has been a very important and successful secretary, albeit often out of the public eye. Rumsfeld has done an admirable job of modernizing the US Army and preparing it for future warfare. Rumsfeld has been aggressive in cutting useless weapons projects (e.g. the Crusader), despite congressional and service branch opposition. The war in Afghanistan represents a major triumph, as Rumsfeld combined special operations forces with precision-guided munitions to win quickly. The US military will, as a direct result of Rumsfeld's leadership remain poised to maintain its full-spectrum dominance for many years to come.

Ironically, it is these very successes that are perhaps responsible for his failures in Iraq. While we do not know, it is most likely Rumsfeld's devotion to military transformation that led him to overlook the advice of so many generals and advisers pleading for more troops (although, to be fair, those same generals and advisers resist, complain, and whine when their precious weapons systems are cancelled or the military is transformed away from what they're used to).

So, how do we judge his tenure? It's probably too early, as we do not yet know how disastrous Iraq will turn out to be. But my gut says Rumsfeld did more good for this country than bad. Transforming the military was a critical task, and one that few SecDefs could have done. It's just that the bad is more visible. Fairly or not, that will likely define Rumsfeld's legacy.

The Return Of Al Qaeda

An article in the New York Times reports that al Qaeda is reorganizing and establishing new bases of operational control in Pakistan. According to the article:

Senior leaders of Al Qaeda operating from Pakistan have re-established significant control over their once-battered worldwide terror network and over the past year have set up a band of training camps in the tribal regions near the Afghan border, according to American intelligence and counterterrorism officials.

American officials said there was mounting evidence that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, had been steadily building an operations hub in the mountainous Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan. Until recently, the Bush administration had described Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Zawahri as detached from their followers and cut off from operational control of Al Qaeda....

Officials said the training camps had yet to reach the size and level of sophistication of the Qaeda camps established in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. But groups of 10 to 20 men are being trained at the camps, the officials said, and the Qaeda infrastructure in the region is gradually becoming more mature.

The main problem is Pakistan's unwillingness to challege al Qaeda in North Waziristan, an area in which Pakistan struck deals with local tribal elders to pull Pakistani forces out of the area in exchange for the halting of attacks across the border into Afghanistan. However, the withdrawal of government forces has allowed al Qaeda to grow in strength and influence and set up new centers of operation.

While the news of a resurgent and reorganized al Qaeda is most definitely bad, there is a sliver of a silver lining. One of the major successes of the invasion of Afghanistan was the destruction of the al Qaeda bureaucratic structure than enabled it to carry out extremely sophisticated attacks, such as the simultaneous bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, not to mention 9/11. With the loss of Afghanistan as a client state, al Qaeda decentralized, making it much more difficult to locate and strike at the leadership. However, that decentralization came at a price, and al Qaeda has not been able to carry out major attacks against significant targets. Bombings of buses, hotels, and discos, while deadly and serious do not advance al Qaeda's goals as do major operations like those carried out in the 1990s. But those kind of operations are not possible with a decentralized leadership and organizational structure.

If al Qaeda is regrouping and trying to rebuild a formal operational structure, it will certainly try to escalate its attacks and refocus its target set on more lucrative and high-profile targets. However, this move by al Qaeda is a risky one, and may signal the group's frustration with its inability to carry out major attacks since the loss of Afghanistan. Returning to the pre-9/11 structure of training camps and command bases makes al Qaeda a more visible target for counter terror efforts. More sophisticated attacks leave behind a more visible footprint of communications, money trails, training camps, and centralized leadership. The US will need to pressure Pakistan to move against these camps, or force President Pervez Musharraf to allow US special forces to do the dirty work for him.

The North Korea Deal And The Triumph (?) Of Realism

The US and North Korea have reached, for now at least, a deal concerning North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea has agreed to shut down its main nuclear reactor, disarm any existing nuclear weapons, and submit its remaining nuclear facilities to international inspections. In exchange, the US and the international community will provide around $400 million in food, fuel, and development aid, and the US will begin normalizing relations with North Korea, including discussions to remove North Korea from the list of states involved with sponsoring terrorism and lifting trade and financial sanctions. There are, of course, concerns over the verifiability of the deal, as the Times notes, "North Korea has sidestepped previous agreements, and is thought to have many mountainside tunnels where it can hide projects."

The deal, as it stands, is a pretty good one. There were few other palatable options, and using military force was nearly inconceivable. The deal, if it holds, gets the US and the international community pretty much everything desired. The US is bolstered by the presence of the Chinese, South Koreans, Japanese, and Russians, all of whom were involved in the negotiations. Specifically:

The deal places new requirements on both North Korea and the United States within the 60-day period. Besides closing and sealing Yongbyon , North Korea will "discuss" with the other nations a list of all its nuclear programs, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods. International inspectors are to verify the process.

The accord sets a 60-day deadline for North Korea to accomplish the first steps toward disarmament, and leaves until an undefined moment — and to another negotiation — the actual removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the fuel manufactured to produce them.

Under the agreement, the first part of the aid -- 50,000 tons of fuel oil, or an equivalent value of economic or humanitarian aid -- would be provided by South Korea, Russia, China and the United States; in the case of the United States , that would require congressional approval, which is likely to be difficult to get....

For disabling the reactor and declaring all nuclear programs, the North will eventually receive another 950,000 tons in aid. Further negotiations are to begin on March 19 in Beijing.

The ultimate goal is the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and the next round of talks is expected to begin to wade into the thicket of disputes over how to carry this out.

The steps outlined require the North to provide a complete list of its nuclear programs, including an inventory of its plutonium stockpile. It must also disable all nuclear facilities, including "graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing facilities."

Politically, however, there are two main problems with this deal. First, as former UN Ambassador John Bolton noted, the deal "sends exactly the wrong signal to would-be proliferators around the world: 'If we hold out long enough, wear down the State Department negotiators, eventually you get rewarded,' in this case with massive shipments of heavy fuel oil for doing only partially what needs to be done." As I've noted in a previous post, this is a perennial problem in international politics: states with interests in a particular outcome can be "blackmailed." The US and others want North Korea not to proliferate, so if North Korea can proliferate it can then bargain away its nuclear capability for rewards. Of course, this can work both ways -- perhaps Iran will look to this deal and see an opportunity to wheel and deal and get aid and assistance that it needs. On the other hand, maybe other problematic states will see proliferation as a useful and even necessary step towards international acceptance and payouts. Care must be taken so that the US and its allies not be painted as easy marks for nuclear blackmail. In this case, the length and history of the negotiations and the very nature of the bilateral relationship makes it easier for the US to claim that this is a unique deal and not a model for emulation (although if Iran eventually gets a similar deal, the claim becomes more difficult to sustain).

The other potential problem is more theoretical. The deal represents a clear triumph of a realist foreign policy that preferences raw national interest, defined narrowly, against more liberal considerations like human rights or values. Providing North Korea with food and fuel aid extends a lifeline to perhaps the worst regime the world has even known. There are no guarantees that the aid will improve the lives of North Korea's long-suffering people. As the Times report of the deal notes, the debate within the Bush Administration, and even before 2000, has been whether to deal with North Korea or to "squeeze" the country in hopes that it will collapse. That debate has been resolved now.

Should the US be making deals to prop up such a reprehensible regime? Many of those critical of the invasion of Iraq desired for a more realist foreign policy, noting that much of the case for invading Iraq came from neo-conservatives who saw the opportunity to topple a dictator, improve human rights, and introduce democracy into a part of the world that has known only authoritarian rule. Here's the result of that backlash: A deal that helps North Korea maintain its iron grip on its people and continue to starve them into submission and subservience.

Foreign policy must always be judged in the context of the situation: risk, alternatives, and potential outcomes must all be considered. Consistency is nearly impossible, as every situation, no matter how similar, is different from another, posing its own set of parameters and challenges. The US lacked any good options for dealing with North Korea. An invasion would likely wreak horrific damage on South Korea, and perhaps even Japan and China. Sanctions might have toppled the regime in the long run (although evidence of the efficacy of sanctions is very rare) but in the short run were merely further impoverishing the people of North Korea. Furthermore a nuclear North Korea threatened to undermine regional stability in a serious way, by encouraging both Japan and South Korea to consider proliferation themselves. In short, North Korea presents a sufficiently serious and imminent challenge to American and international security that it could only be dealt with under a "realist" framework.

I do not like the idea of the deal, but on balance it is probably the best outcome at the moment. However, in keeping with my earlier arguments about the need for multilateralism to be backed by force, if North Korea fails to keep to its obligations, the full weight and wrath of the international community must fall on North Korea. The US must make it clear to all involved parties, and especially Russia and China, that total isolation and complete economic sanctions must follow if North Korea obstructs the deal in any meaningful way and to be willing to threaten military action if necessary. The US was willing to go the multilateral route of a negotiated settlement, but the multilateral community must be willing to back the US if the settlement fails.

The Fatah-Hamas Deal

Fatah and Hamas have agreed to form a government that shares power between their rival factions in an attempt to end the fighting between the two groups that has recently engulfed Gaza. The new government will divide cabinet seats between Hamas and Fatah (currently, Hamas has all the seats by virtue of its electoral victory last year), and Hamas will keep the prime ministry, currently held by Ismail Haniyeh. Specifically, Hamas agreed to cede control of two important ministries, interior and foreign, the cabinet positions of which will be filled by independent politicians.

This agreement is nothing more than a bandage, temporarily stanching the bloodshed but doing nothing to resolve the long-term, fundamental problems in the Palestinian territories. First, as the Washington Post notes:

It remained unclear whether the new government will meet conditions laid down by Israel and international donors to fully restore funding to the Palestinian Authority that they cut off after Hamas's victory in January 2006 parliamentary elections.

The agreement does not explicitly recognize Israel's right to exist, a key international demand. Hamas officials said their movement would not do so.

So, the deal does little to end the political and finanical isolation imposed on the Palestinians as a result of Hamas' refusal to accept the negotiated framework that has been advancing. To wit, follwing the signing of the deal, the spokesman for Hamas, Ghazi Hamad said “I wonder why the issue of recognizing Israel is the key to everything? We are interested to end the siege but not at any cost.”

More importantly, the deal does nothing to resolve the most important problem which is the inability of any Palestinian government to maintain a monopoly of violence. Both Hamas and Fatah will hold on to their militias. Since the two parties still fundamentally differ on how to deal with Israel as well as on domestic issues, sooner or later the political comity of the meeting in Mecca will dissolve and each side will have the option to fall back on violence to try to get its way. Until this problem is solved and armed force is concentrated in the hands of the government, rather than the political parties, neither this deal nor any other will bring stability to the Palestinian territories or peace to the Palestinian people.

The Watada Case And The Legality Of The Iraq War

Sean Penn is currently in Tacoma as are hundreds of protesters, all here to offer their support for First Lieutenant Ehren Watada who goes on trial today for his refusal to deploy to Iraq with his unit. Watada is charged with missing a movement and conduct unbecoming an officer for his refusal and his public denunciations of President Bush and the war. While a number of enlisted men have refused deployment, Watada is the first officer to do so. Watada will claim that he has the right to refuse an unjust order and that the war is unjust because no weapons of mass destruction -- the primary justification for the invasion -- were ever found. This claim is exceedingly unlikely to hold up.

But it was not Watada's primary defense. His main reason for refusing deployment, which was thrown out of court by the military judge, was the the war is itself illegal. On what grounds could the war be considered illegal? For the war to be illegal, it must violate either national or international law.

The Iraq War is, plain and simple, legal under US law. Of this, there is no dispute. Congress authorized the war, but even if Congress had not done so there war would still have been legal. Congress has made no legislative effort to end the war or even to constrain the president's ability to prosecute it. Thus, the war is legal under US law (except as argued below).

What about international law? Watada's claim, now barred from being presented in court, was that the war violated US commitments under the UN Charter. The UN Charter is a treaty that was formally ratified by the US Senate; under the Supremacy Clause, ratified treaties are part of "the supreme law of the land"; thus, the UN Charter is, along with its restrictions on the use of force, supreme law of the United States and a war launched in violation of the UN Charter is illegal under both international and national law. Under the UN Charter, the use of force against a state is only permissible under two conditions: Authorization by the UN (which has only occurred twice: the Korean War and the first Gulf War), or in self-defense from an imminent attack (as in the case of Israel and the Six-Day War). Since there was no authorization from the UN, and since Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the US, the invasion is, according to this logic, illegal.

Unfortunately, this argument fails to hold water on several grounds. First, while many analysts are skeptical, the Bush Doctrine conflates the concepts of preventive war with preemptive war, making it possible to argue that the invasion of Iraq was in fact preemptive. Whether or not one agrees with this claim, there is no objective measure of what constitutes an imminent threat. Thus, the argument fails from being too vague.

Second, the legal status of the UN is questionable in and of itself. Law can only be meaningful and enforceable when and where it enforced fairly and consistently, and the UN is far from meeting this standard. States are free to routinely violate their commitments and obligations to the UN with impunity; genocide occurs with little response; and the UN is incapable of implementing its own rules and laws. Law cannot be selective; if the UN fails to uphold its laws on non-proliferation or genocide it cannot expect adhere to other laws, such as those governing the use of force.

Most importantly, however, is the argument that rests on the Supremacy Clause. In order for a ratified treaty to become "the supreme law of the land" it must either be self-executing or must be passed into law by both houses of Congress, and not just ratified by the Senate. A self-executing treaty is one that is clearly intended to replace or supersede existing legislation and thus would need no further implementation by Congress. According to the American Society of International Law:

Provisions in treaties and other international agreements are given effect as law in domestic courts of the United States only if they are "self-executing" or if they have been implemented by an act (such as an act of Congress) having the effect of federal law. Courts in this country have been reluctant to find such provisions self-executing, but on several occasions they have found them so--sometimes simply by giving direct effect to the provisions without expressly saying that they are self-executing. There are varying formulations as to what tends to make a treaty provision self-executing or non-self-executing, but within constitutional constraints (such as the requirement that appropriations of money originate in the House of Representatives) the primary consideration is the intent--or lack thereof--that the provision become effective as judicially-enforceable domestic law without implementing legislation. For the most part, the more specific the provision is and the more it reads like an act of Congress, the more likely it is to be treated as self-executing. A provision in an international agreement may be self-executing in U. S. law even though it would not be so in the law of the other party or parties to the agreement. Moreover, some provisions in an agreement might be self-executing while others in the same agreement are not.

In order for Watada's claim to hold up, the UN Charter must be seen as self-executing, as there has not been any legislation transferring the war powers of either the president or Congress to the UN. The relevant section of the UN Charter is Chapter VII, the most critical articles of which are:

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

That language certainly does not approach the level of specificity present in congressional legislation to make it self-executing. US courts have repeatedly held that the Charter is in fact not self-executing. Thus, absent legislation authorizing its provisions, the Charter cannot be held to supersede existing US constitutional law or legislation and therefore its rules concerning the use of force do not bind the US government.

Watada will go to jail, likely for four years. US military officers cannot decide for themselves when and where they will serve. I am disappointed that the court will not hear the real "meat" of Watada's argument, as it is both interesting and important. But that does not change the fact that Iraq War may have been ill-planned, but is not illegal.

UPDATE (2/24): The Army has refiled charges against Watada, who stands accused of missing deployment and four counts of conduct unbecoming of an officer for his public speeches. The Army has also added two new conduct-unbecoming charges that were dropped as a result of an agreement in the first trial. Watada's lawyer will file a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy protections.

A Little Civil War Now and Then Is A Good Thing

The cease-fire between Fatah and Hamas has collapsed in a paroxysm of violence. Over the last 24 hours, at least 21 Palestinians have been killed in gun battles, and 2 Palestinian universities have been set ablaze (one associated with each rival party). Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of Fatah, and Khaled Mashal, the exiled leader of Hamas' political wing, are scheduled to meet in Mecca at the invitation of Saudi King Abdullah in an effort to stop the fighting.

But stopping the fighting might not be the best idea. I've written many times before about the problems that occur when the ruling political power does not enjoy a monopoly of violence within its borders. Hezbollah drags Lebanon into a unwanted war with Israel that wreaks massive devastation on the civilian population; Sunni and Shiite militias in Iraq run around undermining the power and legitimacy of the central government. In Palestine, neither faction can advance its platform as the other has sufficient force to interfere.

Several years ago, Edward Luttwak wrote an article in Foreign Affairs entitled "Give War a Chance," in which he argued:

An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat.

The problem in Palestine is that each side has enough force, power, and support to believe that it should not have to submit to the will of the other. Cease-fires, truces, and negotiations only pause the conflict, allowing each side to regroup and rearm for the next outbreak of violence. It very well may be best for Hamas and Fatah to fight it out to the bitter end, enabling one side or the other to establish political control over the Palestinian territories. Permitting a civil war to rage may be of cold comfort to the Palestinian people who will suffer, but perhaps the short-term pain will produce a long-term political solution that has eluded them to date.

No Wonder The US Goes Unilateral

An article in today's New York Times details a growing spat between the US and the EU over the pace of imposing sanctions on Iran as punishment for Iran's continued violations of UN Security Council resolutions to abandon its nuclear program. Specifically, despite being in the forefront of the diplomatic push against Iran's nuclear program and strongly supporting the UNSC resolution calling for sanctions, the EU is now dragging its feet in actually imposing those sanctions. According to the Times:

At issue now is how the resolution is to be carried out, with Europeans resisting American appeals for quick action, citing technical and political problems related to the heavy European economic ties to Iran and its oil industry.

...

Administration officials say a new American drive to reduce exports to Iran and cut off its financial transactions is intended to further isolate Iran commercially amid the first signs that global pressure has hurt Iran’s oil production and its economy. There are also reports of rising political dissent in Iran.

...

“We are telling the Europeans that they need to go way beyond what they’ve done to maximize pressure on Iran,” said a senior administration official. “The European response on the economic side has been pretty weak.” The American demands and European responses were provided by 10 different officials, including both supporters and critics of the American approach.

One irony of the latest pressure, European and American officials say, is that on their own, many European banks have begun to cut back their transactions with Iran, partly because of a Treasury Department ban on using dollars in deals involving two leading Iranian banks.

American pressure on European governments, as opposed to banks, has been less successful, administration and European officials say.

The main targets are Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain, all with extensive business dealings with Iran, particularly in energy. Administration officials say, however, that Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, the current head of the European Union, has been responsive.

Europe has more commercial and economic ties with Iran than does the United States, which severed relations with Iran after the revolution and seizure of hostages in 1979.

The administration says that European governments provided $18 billion in government loan guarantees for Iran in 2005. The numbers have gone down in the last year, but not by much, American and European officials say.

American officials say that European governments may have facilitated illicit business and that European governments must do more to stop such transactions. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. has said the United States has shared with Europeans the names of at least 30 front companies involved in terrorism or weapons programs.

“They’ve told us they don’t have the tools,” said a senior American official. “Our answer is: get them.”

“We want to squeeze the Iranians,” said a European official. “But there are varying degrees of political will in Europe about turning the thumbscrews. It’s not straightforward for the European Union to do what the United States wants.”

[Interesting, isn't it, that this is a very similar problem to the one going on during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq; the Europeans, specifically the French and the Germans, were pushing for easing the sanctions on Iraq so they could ramp up their business dealings with Iraq, while the US was demanding stronger actions.]

The US under the Bush Administration has come under extremely heavy criticism for its failure to act multilaterally and for its disrespect of international institutions. Much of that criticism has been well deserved, as the US has squandered much of its post-9/11 goodwill, harmed its reputation as a cooperative actor, and damaged the institutions that it uses to govern the international system. However, multilateralism can be, if done poorly, just as dangerous as can be unilateralism.

Unilateral action can be more efficient, but it is also prone to less rational decision making processes. Multilateral action may get more opinions involved in the decision making process, and it may increase the sense of legitimacy surrounding an international action, but it can also be more prone to collective actions problems, such as free riding. Furthermore, when multilateral action in dealing with a crisis is not backed up with a sanction of force, it can easily devolve into appeasement.

It is plausible [please note I'm not arguing that this would have happened, only that it is plausible] that if France, Germany, and those in the UN opposed to the invasion of Iraq had been willing to enact a resolution threatening Iraq with war unless increased cooperation with previous resolution was immediately forthcoming, the US might have been willing to wait to see if inspections and sanctions would have worked, possibly avoiding the invasion all together. Instead, the UN steadfastly refused to give its own resolutions teeth, France and Germany continued lobbying for the erosion of the sanctions regime, and the US had good reason to doubt that the UN would do what was necessary to enforce its resolutions. One need look no farther than the moronic comments of Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency for another example of multilateralism that cannot be taken seriously.

If multilateralism is to be taken seriously in the security arena -- that is, if states and particularly the leader of the international system, i.e. the US, are to place responsibility for their own security in the hands of other states or even international institutions -- multilateralism must prove itself capable of fulfilling its mandate. And that will, occasionally, require the serious threat of force, and in even rarer circumstances, the use of that threatened force. The US will only see fit to restrain its unilateral freedom of action if the international community steps up to the plate when called upon. In this case, if the EU wishes to remain a meaningful partner in the non-proliferation efforts against Iran and wants to be taken seriously as a power broker on the world stage, it must be capable of enforcing the rules that it creates. It must develop the tools, in the case, to punish Iran for its proliferation according to the rules that the EU helped put into place. Then, and only then, can one even begin to discuss getting the US to behave in a more multilateral fashion. And if the EU or the UN will not do that, then the US will continue to ride roughshod over international opinion in an effort to provide for its own security.

Analyzing The WMD Intelligence Failure In Iraq

On Friday, I attended a talk by Professor Robert Jervis of Columbia University, sponsored by the International Studies Colloquium of the Political Science Department at the University of Washington. Jervis, recently ranked as one of the top 1o most influential international relations scholars by Foreign Policy, gave a talk entitled "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures on WMD: The Case of Iraq" in which he analyzed and assessed what caused the failure of the US, and international, intelligence communities to miss the absence of WMD in Iraq, and what can be done to improve intelligence efforts in the future. Professor Jervis has worked with the CIA on intelligence reform, and performed an external review of the Iraq-WMD failure, much of which is classified, so much of the talk was based on that review.

The general problems experienced by the CIA in Iraq, while perhaps more serious due to their nature, are not really different, according to Jervis, from the problems experienced by many other large organizations. Organizations have pathologies all their own that makes it difficult for them to learn from their mistakes and to adapt. The specific problems in Iraq were compounded by the difficulties in penetrating the country and in understanding the erratic and confusing behaviors of Saddam Hussein. Unfortunately, all these problems are present in other scenarios, such as North Korea or Iran.

The intelligence failure itself can be explained as one of three outcomes: Wrong assessments, not having the information that good intelligence should have had (also called collection failure), and developing unreasonable inferences from the available information (analysis failure). Having looked at all of the information and spoken with the analysts, Jervis concluded that a combination of collection and analysis failure were at work, causing analysts to make errors, but not ones caused by political pressure or willful ignorance/wishful thinking. This, however, leads to an interesting paradox of good news/bad news: The good news is that the analysts did a pretty good job of processing the available information, the bad news is that it is exceedingly difficult to avoid similar problems in the future.

The main problem of collection failure is a basic one: How much intelligence is needed to prove the absence of WMD? As former SecDef Donald Rumsfeld once noted, "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." And of course this can be true: intelligence grossly understated the state of Iraq's WMD programs before the first Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) as well as the nuclear program of Iran before confirming evidence could be gathered. There is no easy fix for this problem, and it is likely to be even worse in the future: the US had tons of intelligence on Iraq and will likely have much less in, say, confrontations with Iran or North Korea. One thing that can be improved, according to Jervis, is to create closer links between the collectors and the analysts. More reliance on alternative explanations could help as well.

The problem of analytic failure is just as serious and just as hard to fix. Alternative explanations of Saddam's behavior seemed to be missing from the analysis -- no one bothered to ask why Hussein would commit suicide. Furthermore, while analysts were making reasonable assessments based on the available information -- remember, every country, even those opposed to the invasion agreed that Iraq had large stocks of CBW and was moving towards a nuclear program -- they did tend to overstate their confidence in their assessments.

Unfortunately, Jervis notes that the overall failure would have been very difficult to prevent. Jervis' assessment was, as noted, that given the available information and intelligence, the inference of the presence of WMD was the best and more reasonable inference, even with the benefit of hindsight, although perhaps the confidence levels were overstated. Saddam's behavior was extremely puzzling for any alternative explanations, as he was clearly behaving, even while UN inspectors were crawling all over the country, as if he was trying to hide a WMD program. Why would Hussein behave this way and risk invasion and the destruction of his regime if he did in fact have nothing to hide? Furthermore, the plausibility of this inference was supported by previous examples: the inability of the intelligence community to correctly assess Iraq's WMD program before Desert Storm, the fact that Hussein had in fact used WMD in both the Iran-Iraq War and against the Kurds. UN inspectors were only able to examine 35% of the identified potential WMD sites, and Hussein's behavior of delays and misdirection seemed to support an argument that WMD information was being moved around to deceive the inspectors.

Jervis was able to identify several fundamental problems that can be addressed, although with great difficulty. First, the analysts in general did not do a good job of questioning their base assumptions. Also, the analysts displayed a lack of understanding of how to deal with negative evidence. For example, there was no systematic tallying or analysis of reports asserting the absence of WMDs. As any good scientist knows, a theory must be able to account for negative evidence. Unfortunately, these are some of the hardest problems to deal with and Jervis was unable to provide any concrete methods for solving them.

He did present a solid argument that political pressure was not responsible for the intelligence failure, claiming that no reasonable inference to the contrary could have been drawn from the available intelligence, and that while the confidence levels could have been lower, that likely would not have been sufficient to avoid conflict. Furthermore, if the Bush Administration was systematically pressuring the CIA to produce skewed analysis, that wouldn't explain why even the countries opposed to the war, such as France or Germany, could not produce any solid evidence or arguments to the contrary. Finally, Jervis noted that the CIA did challenge the Bush Administration on both the difficulties of occupation/reconstruction as well as the possibility of an Iraq-al Qaeda link. If political pressure was to blame for the intelligence failure, you would not likely have seen disagreement on those areas either.

So, what can be done? Unfortunately, the problems that produced the Iraqi WMD intelligence failure are some of the hardest to solve. There were no glaring, obvious, easy-to-solve causes or problems, meaning that there will be no easy solutions. Jervis presented three main reform proposals: Increased use of Red Teaming (Red Teaming means using a group of people to think solely about alternative explanations and to challenge the logic of the "main" group); more product evaluation (which is very hard to do for a variety of reasons), and greater connection of the intelligence community to outside experts for new, fresh opinions.

Ultimately, Jervis' talk was exceedingly important, if not frustrating. Frustrating because the problems in intelligence analysis are not likely to be solved. The international community is facing two major WMD problems in Iran and North Korea, and good intel is critically important in dealing with each. However, the US is likely to have even less reliable intel in either country than it did in Iraq. So, how to proceed? First, recognizing that there is a problem is the first step in solving the problem. Merely being cognizant of the reasons for failure in Iraq can help prevent a repeat failure. Analysts and policy makers alike must be more aware of how to deal with negative evidence, and must be more realistic when producing confidence levels. Iraq also reveals the limitations of relying on previous experience and outcomes; lessons drawn from history can guide present policy, but cannot be used as hard and fast rules. With Iran, for example, many similar problems exist. Iran had engaged in a long practice of deceit and denial about its nuclear program, causing international observers to grossly underestimate the extent of the program until recently. Analysts must be careful not to fall back too much on historical examples to determine plausibility of present scenarios. Each must be considered independently, and all assumptions must be challenged. This of course raises the serious possibility of historical ignorance and the creation of blinders.

The business of intelligence collection and analysis is necessarily a messy one, but one that is nonetheless vital to the security of this country and the larger international community. We will inevitable have to make decisions based on incomplete and unsatsifactory information. The lessons of the WMD failure in Iraq cannot be that the analysis was wrong and suspect. Jervis presents some useful ways to think about how to improve on the analytic assessments but we must be prepared for more failures along the lines of Iraq. Policy makers must make decisions for a collective good based on the best information they have, and they will often be wrong. It's important to remember that the intelligence failure is a separate issue from debacles that have been present in the occupation and reconstruction. Becoming too cautious as a result could have just as bad consequences, if not worse.

Israel In NATO?

David Schraub over at The Debate Link calls my attention to an interesting article in the Jerusalem Post claiming that the Israeli National Security Council is discussing how to get Israel accepted as a permanent member of NATO. According to the article:

In an effort to establish more effective deterrence in the face of Iran's race to obtain nuclear weapons, government ministries are, for the first time, working on drafting a position paper that will include guidelines and a strategy for turning Israel into a full-fledged member of NATO....

The paper is being drafted by an interministerial committee made up of representatives from the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry and headed by the National Security Council. The committee plans to complete the paper by the end of February and present it to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for approval.

The possibility has a few early supporters mentioned in the article, including former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, ex-senator and presidential candidate John Edwards, and General Lord Charles Guthre, former chief of the UK Defense Staff.

David's post on this question asks some interesting questions and notes some possible problems:

For one, as the article notes, most NATO countries do not want to be locked into a strategic alliance with a country embroiled in so many tense (to say the least) situations with its neighbors. For two, it would obviously strain relations between the NATO bloc and the Islamic world. Unfortunate, and possibly worth biting, but still a real concern. The third issue, however, which I think might be overlooked, is how Israel's contribution to NATO might be severely circumscribed by geopolitical realities. The article questions whether Israel will want to contribute troops to foreign peacekeeping operations. That, by which I mean Israeli willingness, I don't see as a major problem. The issue is that many of the locations for peacekeeping won't be willing to accept Israeli contributions. Putting Israeli troops in a peacekeeping force in Darfur, for example, would be a colossal PR disaster and would immediately be seized upon by the government (who, if you recall, already blames the Jews) and would make the job that much tougher. There are plenty of areas in which an Israeli contribution, though materially useful, would be diplomatically suicidal, and that I feel would create a serious strain on the alliance.

Excellent points all. The third, which David identifies as perhaps the most problematic, I don't find as troubling. After all, US soldiers rarely get involved in peacekeeping for largely the same reasons that Israeli forces wouldn't: they would make too tempting of a target and cause too much political strain. The Europeans do most of the heavy lifting when NATO gets involved with peacekeeping, and I don't see why, if Israel was to join, that would need to change. If/when Israel's entry into NATO might inflame the Arab/Islamic states, but Turkey's membership should do a little to assuage that. Also, would it really be have that much worse of an effect than US-Israeli ties already do?

The original article mentions that the odds of Israel joining NATO before a resolution of the Palestinian issue are low, but to me that seems to have things backward. Israeli accession to NATO would go a long way to easing a lot of the security concerns felt by Israel, especially those posed by Iran and the proliferation problems there. If Israel no longer has to worry about dealing with Iran, if Israel is protected by the American nuclear umbrella and NATO's collective defense, Israel would no longer need to worry about its northern borders. The more secure Israel feels, the more it may be willing to make progress on a Palestinian homeland. Membership in NATO would also send a clear message to those who refuse to recognize Israel (i.e. Hamas) that striving for Israel's destruction is a fool's errand.

Of course, all of this speculation is merely that for now. It's hard to imagine any serious movement towards admitting Israel into NATO. But I do see it as a move worth making.

War In Space?

The wars of the future will not be fought on a battlefield or at sea. They will be fought on space, or possibly on the top of a very tall mountain. In any case, most of the fighting will be done by small robots. And as you go forth today, remember always your duty is clear: To build and maintain those robots. Thank you.

-- Commandant, Rommelwood Military School ("The Secret War of Lisa Simpson," The Simpsons).

The war envisioned in the above quote is perhaps not quite so far off any more. On January 11, China successfully tested a ground-based weapon system designed to intercept and destroy space-based platforms, such as satellites. Using a kinetic-kill vehicle (a weapon that uses kinetic energy rather than explosives to destroy its target), China successfully knocked out an aging weather satellite using a ballistic missile. The test has been greeted with condemnation from the US, Great Britain, Japan, Australia, and Canada as an unnecessary creation of a space-based arms race, to which China has responded by professing its desire to "oppose the weaponization of space."

Why is a successful test of an ASAT (anti-satellite) weapon so troubling to so many countries? War is a pretty awful and comprehensive business anyway? Why would extending war into space be so vexing? Several reasons: First, from a national security perspective, a good deal of the American dominance in combat comes from its huge advantages in information -- reconnaissance, communications, imaging, GPS targeting and navigation, and so on -- which relies on satellites. An early strike on those space-based assets could blind the US military and level the playing field. True, the US has better weapons platforms and better trained soldiers, but without satellites, those advantages get mitigated.

Second, from a more global perspective, there is so much dual-use technology sharing between the military and the wider public that satellites, even military ones, are rarely purely military targets. GPS navigation, cell phones, weather imaging...all of these technologies rely on satellites that would be targeted in any preemptive military strike. Extending war into space could have dire consequences not just for the US military, but for the economies and civilian populations the world over.

The Bush Administration has, to date, not been willing to expend any resources for a ban on anti-satellite weapons, stating that "there is no arms race in space." Now there is. And it's serious. Despite Chinese professions to the contrary, "in the short-term, the Chinese will simply not be credible partners in efforts to keep space peaceful. Moreover, other countries could follow suit with their own anti-satellite programs, including the United States." Furthermore, the test sends another strong signal that China is moving to balance the might of the US.

The US needs to move quickly to deal with this development. While a war with China may be a long, long, LONG off, the US strategy of engagement cannot become complacent. If China is to be slowly brought in to the Western fold, it needs to be presented with stark choices: Its support for the genocidal Sudanese regime, for example, should be punished by the restriction of economic ties, as should any further development of ASAT weapons. Such actions may hurt in the short run, but if China really prefers economic engagement with the West to military confrontation, the pain won't last too long. However, if China desires to challenge US hegemony, better to know now than later.