Is It Civil War in Iraq?

There's an interesting story today from Reuters on whether the situation in Iraq can/should be called a civil war. Not surprisingly, the answer much depends on one's political persuasion:

U.S. and Iraqi government leaders are avoiding the term "civil war," although President George W. Bush, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and several generals have said Iraq was "close to," "nearing" or "in danger of" civil war.

Experts outside the administration have been less circumspect.

"Iraq's conflict is now worse than civil war," said an October report by the Center for American Progress, a Washington think tank close to the Democratic Party.

"The country suffers from at least four internal conflicts -- a Shiite-Sunni civil war in the center, intra-Shiite conflicts in the south, a Sunni insurgency in the west and ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds in the north."

...

In the latest of a series of reports on Iraq, Anthony Cordesman, a widely-respected expert at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies, said this month the level and sources of violence in Iraq clearly meet a dictionary definition of civil war.

Ken Pollack and Daniel Byman of the Brookings Institution think tank, reached a similar conclusion two months earlier.

"The debate is over. By any definition, Iraq is in a state of civil war," they said.

...

How to officially define "civil war" has been particularly difficult for the U.S. military. The U.S. Department of Defense's Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms has no entry for civil war and the term is also not mentioned in a new counter-insurgency manual for the Army and the Marines.

"It's really a political question," said an army officer who did not want to be named.

"And where this is debated publicly, it is mostly driven by politics. War critics make the point that we (the U.S.) aren't where we thought we'd be in Iraq, no matter how you describe what's happening."

Moving beyond politics into the world of serious political analysis (as Cordesman and Pollack and Byman most likely are) requires developing an objective standard for what constitutes a civil war. While I'm not an expert in intra-state conflict, it seems to me that a civil war occurs when the major political actors in a state cease participating in the legitimate political processes and instead turn to violence to pursue their interests. As I see it, this hasn't quite happened yet. The majority of the Sunnis -- both the public and the political elites -- are still trying to participate in the political reconstruction of their country. The Iraqi government exists, and Sunnis are still part of it. For now. This is not to say that the government is strong or that it will succeed or that the insurgency is doomed to fail. But the political process hasn't (yet) fallen apart. So, it's not a civil war yet.

As I've written about before, it's critical that the government not collapse, and that the US not allow old hatreds and rivalrys to scuttle the process. If the Shiites and Kurds can't govern in a way that keeps the Sunnis involved and secure, there are two options: Partion the country or take the governance away from Iraqis until the situation can be stabilized. Autonomy was given to the Iraqi government far too quickly, before processes seen as legitimate by all involved parties could be put in place. It's not civil war in Iraq yet, but it's close. Democracy be damned at this point...the US must do whatever it takes to hold the country together.

An Open Letter on Darfur

Courtesy of the Henry Jackson Society:

Alarmed by the continuing murder of the black people of Darfur by the Janjaweed militias - supported by the Sudanese regime in Khartoum - The Henry Jackson Society decided that more appropriate and concerted action by the world’s great democracies should be requested from leading governments. Accordingly, The Henry Jackson Society issued an open letter on the crisis in Darfur, signed by fifty-five politicians, opinion formers, academics and journalists, to both raise awareness of this pressing moral and strategic issue, and call on the international community to end ethnic cleansing in Darfur.

The open letter has been sent to the High Representative for European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, Dr. Javier Solana; Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Rt. Hon. Tony Blair MP; Chancellor of Germany, Dr. Angela Merkel; President of France, M. Jacques Chirac; President of the United States, Mr. George W. Bush; Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh; and President of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki. It was sent also to the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Rt. Hon. Margaret Beckett MP and the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt. Hon. Des Browne MP.

An open letter on the crisis in Darfur to the leaders of the European Union, the United States, India, South Africa, and other great democracies.

After the Holocaust, the world said ‘never again’ to genocide. Yet our will to prevent the murder and destruction of particular peoples was not sufficient to stop further genocides, even in the closing years of the last century. The genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia are a scar on the conscience of the world, and they led to insecurity and suffering on a scale which is beyond comprehension.

Today, in the early years of a new century the world stares in the hideous face of genocide once again. In Darfur, the black population faces annihilation at the hands of Arab Janjaweed and other militias, supported by the Sudanese regime in Khartoum. This is not a civil war or a religious conflict, but a calculated strategy of intimidation and ethnic cleansing. It is designed to kill, remove or enslave black people in Darfur. 200,000 have already been murdered, with a further two million driven from their homes.

We therefore urge our leaders – of the European Union and its member-states, the United States of America, India, South Africa, and other democratic nations the world over – to ensure that genocide does not destroy the people of Darfur. And although a genocide in Darfur is a serious moral issue, it is also a concern paramount to European security. Should the situation deteriorate further, it will spill over and damage an already unstable region, creating a breeding ground for extremism and terror. Moreover, we have a clear strategic interest to prevent attempts by the People’s Republic of China to support repressive regimes in Africa in return for energy concessions.

In light of such circumstances, we call on our governments to empower and fund the African Union, so that it has one last chance to deal with the crisis. Meanwhile, our leaders must apply as much pressure as may be required on the Sudanese regime in order to make it cooperate with the international community. Khartoum must allow international forces with a robust mandate into Darfur to reverse ethnic cleansing and re-establish the rule of law, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706. Should this cooperation not be forthcoming, we call on our governments to take all the necessary action – insofar as is possible in coordination with the United Nations – to ensure that the people of Darfur are protected, and that those driven from their livelihoods be allowed to return to their homes. This may require the speedy deployment of peace enforcers and the establishment of no-fly zones, in order to prevent the Sudanese regime from assisting the Janjaweed in their murder.

For many months, Darfur has stood on a precipice; today, it is very close to falling off into a dark age of chaos, carnage and genocidal murder. We must not let this happen.

Supported by (institutional affiliation listed only for means of identification),

Karim Abdian - Director, Ahwaz Human Rights Organisation

Mansour Silawi Ahwazi - Foreign Relations, Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz

Michael Allen - Editor, Democracy Digest

Nasser Bani Assad - President, British Ahwazi Friendship Society

Paul Beaver - Commentator and Parliamentary Advisor, United Kingdom

Prof. Vernon Bogdanor - Professor of Government, University of Oxford

Nicholas Boles - Director, Policy Exchange

Roberta Bonazzi - Director, European Foundation for Democracy

Max Boot - Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Daniel Brett - Director, British Ahwazi Friendship Society

Chris Bryant MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

David Clelland MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

Humphry Crum Ewing - Chairman, The Standish Group

Yahia Elbashir - Human Rights Secretary, Darfur Union

David Gauke MP - Member of Parliament (Conservative), United Kingdom

Michael Gove MP - Member of Parliament (Conservative), United Kingdom

Robert Halfon - Political Director, Conservative Friends of Israel

Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann - Founder and President, World Security Network

Gary Kent - Director, Labour Friends of Iraq (Personal Capacity)

Daniel Keohane - Centre for European Reform

Dr. William Kristol - Editor, The Weekly Standard

Bruce Jackson - President, Project on Transitional Democracies

Prof. Alan Johnson - Editor, Democratiya

Henry Knobil

Jackie Lawrence - Member of Parliament (Labour), 1997-2005, United Kingdom

The Hon. John Lehman - Secretary of the United States Navy, 1981-1987

Prof. Andrew Lever - University of Cambridge

Dr. Andrew Lilico - Managing Director, Europe Economics

Gideon Mailer - Africa Director, The Henry Jackson Society

Dr. Alan Mendoza - Executive Director, The Henry Jackson Society

Jan Mortier - Director, Civitatis International

Michael Mosbacher - Director, The Social Affairs Unit

Douglas Murray - Senior Fellow, The Social Affairs Unit

Fionnuala Jay O’Boyle MBE - Jay Associates Public and Government Affairs

Robert Philpot - Director, Progress

Dr. Efraim Podosik - Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Stephen Pollard - Columnist, The Times

Greg Pope MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

Ben Ramm - Editor, The Liberal

Ben Rogers - Deputy Chairman, Conservatives’ Human Rights Commission

James M. Rogers - Executive Secretary, The Henry Jackson Society

Prof. William Rubinstein - University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Prof. Roger Scruton - University of Arlington

Dr. Gary Schmitt - Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Dr. Brendan Simms - Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

Alex Singleton - Director-General, The Globalisation Institute

Dr. Ulrich Speck - Commentator and Journalist

Eva Strickmann - German Council on Foreign Relations

Gisela Stuart MP - Member of Parliament (Labour), United Kingdom

Peter Tatchell - Human Rights Campaigner

Rebecca Tinsley - Waging Peace

Lord Trimble - Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, 1998

Tomáš Weiss - Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM

Stuart Wheeler - Founder of IG Index

Prof. Alan Lee Williams - Director, Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom

MORE Honest Thinking About Torture

Score one for the ledger against using torture. Yesterday's Washington Post reports that:

"Several governments around the world have tried to rebut criticism of how they handle detainees by claiming they are only following the U.S. example in fighting terrorism, the U.N. special rapporteur on torture said Monday.

Manfred Nowak said that when he criticizes governments for their questionable treatment of detainees, they respond by telling him that if the United States does something, it must be all right. He would not name any countries except Jordan.

"The United States has been the pioneer . . . of human rights and is a country that has a high reputation in the world," Nowak said at a news conference. "Today, many other governments are kind of saying: 'But why are you criticizing us? We are not doing something different than what the United States is doing.' "

Now, I'm skeptical that countries would be less likely to torture their prisoners if the US doesn't. They may be using US behavior as a smoke screen to justify their own actions, but that doesn't mean that if the US stops said behavior and the smoke clears, that the other countries would stop as well.

Still, American reputation matters. Soft power is a critical tool of foreign policy, and US soft power stems from, to a large degree, American claims of moral rectitude and liberalism. And if one believes in democratic peace theory, it certainly becomes harder to move countries towards liberalism if the US is seen behaving badly.

This doesn't convince me that torture should be ruled out, but it certainly provides evidence towards that conclusion.

How NOT To Do Multilateralism

If serious multilateralism is to be a viable option to unilateral action in international security, then the organizations, institutions, and individuals involved in multilateralism must present themselves as credible and honest alternatives by which states can secure their security at lower costs than they could on their own. Yesterday, Mohammed ElBaradei, the executive director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, displayed why so many people are so skeptical of the ability of the UN and its related institutions to provide real international security. In the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear tests and in the midst of Iran ramping up its own enrichment programs, did ElBaradei warn these countries about their flagrant violations of international law, institutional commitments, and international norms? Of course not. To the contrary, ElBarabdei warned that sanctions could empower hardliners in both countries, stated that he does not believe Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, and argued that North Korea's nuclear test was a "cry for help."

This is so absurd as to almost be unbelievable. The UN Security Council which oversees the IAEA has condemned the actions of both states, passed sanctions against North Korea, warned Iran not to continue its path, and has clearly expressed the will of the international community that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be not be acceptable and will not be tolerated. If states are going to put their trust to any degree in international institutions to preserve international security, those institutions must step up to the plate in the face of threats. The more the UN refuses to enforce its own laws and punish states like Iran and North Korea that break their own legal commitments, the less any state will look to the UN as a guarantor of international peace.

Regardless of one's opinion of the invasion of Iraq, a large part of President Bush's reluctance to wait (not that waiting would have altered the outcome) on the UN inspections was a lack of faith that the UN would do anything meaningful to punish Iraq. Time and time again, from silence, if not almost cooperation, in the face of genocide, to a failure to even be able to condemn states that illegally develop WMD, the unwillingness of the UN and other international institutions to chastise and punish undermines the efficacy of those institutions. ElBaradei's comments are both dangerous and foolhardy, and undermine the very mission he purports to be advancing.

Honest Thinking About Torture

Alan Dershowitz has a provocative op-ed in yesterday's Los Angeles Times in which he advocates the creation of a torture warrant. Just like the police must, if they want the legal authority to enter and search a home or wiretap a suspected criminal's phone, provide sufficient evidence and obtain a warrant, so does Dershowitz believe that the federal government should have the option to, if a situation so demands, go before a federal judge and obtain permission to use "coercive interrogation" (i.e. torture) in the questioning of a suspected terrorist. Dershowitz is fond of the "ticking time bomb" example, in which a terrorist suspected of having knowledge of an impeding terrorist attack is in custody and the authorities want to use torture to force to suspect to divulge what he knows.

Dershowitz's article is less about the merits of the torture warrant idea and more about claiming an unusual and expected ally in his cause: President Bill Clinton. According to Dershowitz, in a recent interview on National Public Radio (September 20, 2006), Clinton was asked, as someone "who's been there," whether the president needs "the option of authorizing torture in an extreme case." Clinton's response:

Look, if the president needed an option, there's all sorts of things they can do. Let's take the best case, OK. You picked up someone you know is the No. 2 aide to Osama bin Laden. And you know they have an operation planned for the United States or some European capital in the next … three days. And you know this guy knows it. Right, that's the clearest example. And you think you can only get it out of this guy by shooting him full of some drugs or water-boarding him or otherwise working him over. If they really believed that that scenario is likely to occur, let them come forward with an alternate proposal.

"We have a system of laws here where nobody should be above the law, and you don't need blanket advance approval for blanket torture. They can draw a statute much more narrowly, which would permit the president to make a finding in a case like I just outlined, and then that finding could be submitted even if after the fact to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court."

Clinton was then asked whether he was saying there "would be more responsibility afterward for what was done." He replied: "Yeah, well, the president could take personal responsibility for it. But you do it on a case-by-case basis, and there'd be some review of it." Clinton quickly added that he doesn't know whether this ticking bomb scenario "is likely or not," but he did know that "we have erred in who was a real suspect or not."

If they really believe the time comes when the only way they can get a reliable piece of information is to beat it out of someone or put a drug in their body to talk it out of 'em, then they can present it to the Foreign Intelligence Court, or some other court, just under the same circumstances we do with wiretaps. Post facto….

But I think if you go around passing laws that legitimize a violation of the Geneva Convention and institutionalize what happened at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo, we're gonna be in real trouble."

Clinton's argument is that while the US certainly doesn't want to pass laws that normalize torture, or institute it as a regular policy option, as someone who has been the position of making very difficult decisions about how to best protect the country he seems to recognize that, in very rare cases, torture may be necessary.

The idea of a torture warrant is interesting for many reasons. One big reason to oppose it, however, is that there is little evidence that courts have the backbone to oppose federal requests for actions in the name of national security. Yes, FISA may keep warrants from being used in criminal proceedings or for political purposes, but there don't seem to be many instances of the government being turned down (this may be a problem of selection bias; that is, because the feds know they have to go before a judge and ask permission, they don't bother asking about the questionable cases). Would a judge deny the CIA or FBI the right to torture a terrorist after being told the suspect may have information that could save American lives? I'm normally suspicious of slippery slope arguments, but I'm even more suspicious of government power.

However, this is a discussion that needs to be taken seriously. My colleague, David Sousa, gave a talk for "Constitution Day" (American universities that receive federal money are required to do some kind of educational programming about Constitution Day) about civil liberties in the US after 9/11, in which he warned that if you think civil liberties are under siege now, just wait until after the next attack. That is a scary prospect. That's not to say that our country needs to take any and all steps to prevent another attack at all costs. But we also can't hide behind our squeamish and liberal natures. Developing some sort of legal and political barrier to prevent torture from becoming routine, but maintaining it as an option in an extreme scenario is something that needs to be discussed.

So It Was Nuclear

The US is now acknowledging that North Korea did indeed test a nuclear device last week. But given that the blast had a yield of under 1 kt, either the test was a failure or North Korea's nuclear program is far less advanced than has been assumed. It's most likely the former: developing a successful nuclear program is much more difficult than movies, TVs, and many analysts make it seem. This doesn't mean that North Korea isn't a threat...rather, it means that the time line is not as advanced as a successful test would have meant. If North Korea can't successfully detonate a device in ideal testing conditions, it certainly can't yet be considered a threat to deploy nuclear weapons. Furthermore, North Korea still doesn't have a demonstrable delivery capability.

All of this means that there is still time to try to encourage North Korea to back away from the precipice. Unfortunately but not surprisingly, it doesn' t look like the UN is going to be able to have much effect. The US must use all of its political and economic incentives (and sanctions) to force China and South Korea to isolate North Korea. Only if those states see that their aiding and abetting of the North Korean gulag state risks their domestic economic health as well as their relations with the larger international community will they take any serious actions against North Korea. The US, and only the US, can make this happen.

Update on the North Korean "Nuclear" Test

I posted a few days ago that I didn't believe that North Korea had successfully, or even unsuccessfully, tested a nuclear device. And while the jury is not quite yet in, it's getting closer to a verdict. Air samples taken from the area around the test site displayed no traces of radiation. Chinese officials confirmed this, stating that their own testing had discerned no radioactivity.

How NOT To Respond To North Korea

In the wake of North Korea's suspected test of a nuclear device, the US Congress has reacted predictably by throwing money at a solution. Duncan Hunter (R-CA 52nd) said "lawmakers negotiating the Pentagon's fiscal 2007 budget had added $100 million for Aegis ballistic missile defense SM-3 interceptors and Aegis system development."

Congress, and government more generally, is a fundamentally reactive body. That it, when something happens, Congress reacts to it which often causes an misestimation of the threat and an unnecessarly excessive response. Rather than thinking in an analytic manner about the nature of the threat posed, the costs and benefits of a particular solution, or anything else, Congress likes to throw money at a problem, both hoping that the chosen solution will work as well as trying to look like it's on top of the problem and taking actions to protect the country.

Thus, without considering why nuclear deterrence would fail to dissuade North Korea from launching a nuclear-armed ballistic missile at the US, without thinking about how much of a threat such an attack poses to the US, without thinking about how else $100 million might be spent on more useful, more immediate problems, Congress simply adds $100 million to the budget to deal with a technology fraught with technical problems and of dubious strategic necessity.

I wouldn't go so far to say Congress is a bigger threat to this country than Kim Jong-Il, but I wouldn't trust either of them with my ATM card.

I Don't Believe Kim Jong-Il

Let me go on record: I do not believe that North Korea tested a nuclear weapon or device on Sunday. I wish I had posted yesterday, but I'm buried writing a promotion evaluation of one of my colleagues and finishing a paper that's due this weekend. But ask my students: I said this before the White House has come out questioning what actually happened in North Korea.

There is very little evidence that the explosion detected in North Korea was the result of a nuclear reaction. The yield was under 1 kiloton, pathetically weak for a nuclear explosion. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of 12-15kt and 20-22 kt respectively. The first devices tested by India and Pakistan in the 1990s were 12 kt and 9 kt. So, if what detonated below North Korea was, in fact, nuclear, then it either didn't work or is so primitive and rudimentary as to be almost laughable.

But why should we believe North Korea in the first place? Since the announcement that the Hermit Kingdom there has been no confirmation of the existence of nuclear weapons. US intelligence agencies agree that North Korea should have enough fissile material to make several weapons, but having the material is a long way from being able to use them. North Korea has little to gain from a policy of "strategic ambiguity" a la Israel. North Korea wants to leverage its "arsenal" against the United States to extract economic concessions and no-attack guarantees, and it can't do that with a "bomb in the basement." However, if in fact the regime is too economically crippled to build a bomb (and given that it can't even provide electricity to its capital city for 24 hours, that's not hard to believe), then and only then would it make sense to intimate that a bomb exists. Given the lessons of both Gulf Wars (don't piss of the US unless you have a nuke), North Korea likely believes that only by making the US believe that Seoul is at risk of inceneration can the US be deterred.

Of course, I may be wrong. I don't think I am, but even if I am, I don't believe that North Korea is anywhere near weaponizing a nuclear device and is, as the most recent ballistic missile tests demonstrated, even farther away from being able to deliver such a weapon. However (and this is a big caveat), the threat posed by a "nuclear" North Korea is not so much about its capability to threaten the US, but more about the political pressure it puts on the regional security dynamic. So far, China seems to be on board with the West, Japan is reassuring everyone that it will not proliferate in response, and South Korea seems to be rethinking its idiotic "sunshine" policy. So far, so good. The US needs to work to create a regional coalition and, hopefully through the UN, work to impose serious punitive consequences on North Korea. Even if there is no weapon there, such moves are necessary to reaffirm the US dominance that is necessary for tamping down regional security dilemmas.

UPDATE: Apparently, we should know in a few days with some degree of confidence whether the explosion was in fact nuclear. Read this article to see why and how.

(What's So Funny 'Bout) Nuclear Testing?

As North Korea ramps up its preparation for an announced test of a nuclear weapon, the international community is up in arms. The US has urged North Korea to back away from its promise to test, stating that the US will not live with a nuclear-armed North Korea. As the US plans how to impose sanctions on an already-isolated Hermit Kingdom, the New York Times is urging President Bush to return to the negotiating table in a serious effort to determine North Korea's price for abandoning its nuclear program. On the other hand, the Washington Post encourages China and South Korea to take firm stand by punishing North Korea for its behavior to force it back into talks.

The stakes are, of course, high. First, North Korea is certainly one of the most erratic and abomindable regimes ever to exist. Possessing an overt arsenal of nuclear weapons with the capability of devastating major cities of its neighbors, North Korea could certainly become emboldened towards a more aggressive foreign policy. Second, proliferation by North Korea will create strong pressures on other countries in the region -- namely Japan and South Korea -- to develop a nuclear arsenal of their own. Such actions would create wide-ranging instability in Asia and must be avoided at (almost) any cost. Third, North Korea has demonstrated its affinity for criminal dealings to prop up its pathetic economy: The major sources of income for North Korea are believed to come from counterfeiting US currency and the drug trade. It is certainly not inconceivable that North Korea would sell enriched plutonium, if not an actual weapon, to a terrorist group.

So, what to do? The answer really lies in the assessment of North Korea's preferences vis-a-vis the status quo. States can be understood to view their interests in relation to the status quo. Most states perceive that their security and interests can best be protected and promoted by adhering to the existing rules and norms of the system. Some states believe that the status quo fundamentally threatens their security and interests, and thus they seek, at best, to promote their interests by means outside of the accepted norms and, at worst, to overthrow the status quo. The former types are known as "status quo" states, while the latter are "revisionist." Note that status quo and revisionist are not synonymous with "good" and "bad" or "friends" or "enemies." For example, two states may not "like" each other and may very well be locked in serious confrontation; however, if they pursue that competition within the existing rules of the system, they are status quo. The strategy selected to deal with a state greatly depends on its fundamental type.

If two states are in a crisis scenario, and the "complaining" state is status quo, its aims will be limited. That is, the nature of the system is seen as part of its security and interest; such a state can be dealt with through negotiations. However, if the complaining state is revisionist, negotiations will likely only increase the state's demands as it perceives weakness. This is the classic "Munich" analogy: appeasing aggressive, expansionist states now only makes them stronger in the long run. If North Korea is a revisionist state, negotiations, economic incentives, and other "carrots" will only postpone the inevitable confrontation by both emboldening and strengthening North Korea. If, however, North Korea is status quo, then negotiations may actually address its legitimate security concerns, while a muscular confrontation may, in fact, threaten the state and back it into a corner.

So, which type is North Korea? This is, perhaps, the most difficult question of them all. On the one hand, North Korea, while no angel, isn't the sort of international menace that, say, Iran is or pre-invasion Iraq was. There is no evidence of North Korean connections to international terrorist and there have been no cross-border invasions since 1950. On the other hand, North Korea demonstates no willingness to participate in the international institutions that go a long way to encouraging states to see their national interests as synonymous with the international order.

My sense is that North Korea is fundamentally a revisionist state, and that the only thing that has kept it hemmed in has been US power. A North Korea possessing nuclear weapons would be a difficult beast to keep caged, in addition to the wider implications and problems that would be caused for the other countries in the region. When North Korea's beyond-abysmal human rights record is thrown in to the mix, it's hard to understand how North Korea could perceive its national interest to be in line with that of the international community. The time has come for the UN, China, South Korea, Japan, and the US to take a firm, unyielding stand towards North Korea: Give up your nuclear arsenal or face serious consequences, including the shut-off of all monies and energy from China and South Korea, along with possible military action from the US. It is simply unacceptable for North Korea to be allowed to develop a nuclear arsenal.

The Myth of Humanitarian War?

Eric Posner, a law professor at (my alma mater) the University of Chicago, has an extremely provocative op-ed in this past Sunday's Washington Post entitled "The Humanitarian War Myth." In it, Posner argues that one of the most important lessons of the Iraq War should be the general discrediting of the logic of large-scale military-based humanitarian intervention. Posner writes:

...if the United Nations were to have its way, the Iraqi debacle would be just the first in a series of such wars -- the effect of a well-meaning but ill-considered effort to make humanitarian intervention obligatory as a matter of international law. Today Iraq, tomorrow Darfur.

The idea that war can have a humanitarian as well as a national security justification has a long pedigree and surface plausibility. Some of the worst atrocities of the 20th century occurred in weak states whose governments could not have resisted a foreign military invasion. The genocide in Rwanda, which killed more than 800,000 people in a few months, was eventually halted by a force of Tutsi rebels; surely a Western army could have stopped it sooner. If nations can intervene at little cost to themselves because the target nations are weak and by doing so they prevent massive human suffering, then surely they should do so. The logic seems compelling.

But logic is no substitute for experience, and experience shows that humanitarian war is an oxymoron. The first blow to the idea was the failed intervention in Somalia in 1993. U.S. forces sent to maintain the peace while aid was distributed to millions of starving civilians were withdrawn after just 18 U.S. soldiers died. Policymakers drew the lesson that the American public will not tolerate casualties in a humanitarian war that has no clear national security justification. This lesson guided President Bill Clinton's refusal to authorize military intervention during the Rwandan genocide and his decision to limit U.S. military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 to high-altitude bombing, which ensured that no American pilots were killed -- at the expense of civilians on whose heads errant bombs fell. The Kosovo intervention, although regarded as a success in some quarters, has cost billions of dollars, required a seven-year occupation and could turn out to be a slow-motion version of Iraq.

The Iraq war itself has dealt the second blow. The problem with humanitarian intervention is not only that the costs are usually too high, but it turns out that the benefits usually are low. There are just too many risks and imponderables when war is used to prevent atrocities rather than to defeat an enemy. Military weapons inevitably kill civilians, and smart tyrants foil smart bombs by using their own civilians as shields. Dictators understand that a war premised on humanitarianism fails if they can make the invader kill their citizens. Removing the dictator risks civil war, which is almost always worse than the original abuses. Replacing him with another dictator only puts off the atrocities until another day. Long-term occupation breeds hostility, then insurgency and violence. In comparison with this, the original ruler might not seem so bad after all.

...

Many people blame the humanitarian costs of the war in Iraq on the Bush administration's execution of it. This view is a psychological crutch that allows defenders of humanitarian intervention to keep the ideal alive for the next, presumably competent, administration of a President Hillary Clinton or John McCain. But complaints about this war are not noticeably different from complaints about earlier wars, where small mistakes (identifiable as such with the benefit of hindsight) resulted in enormous harm.

The Iraq war, consistent with experience, suggests that humanitarian wars will rarely yield humanitarian results. Why, then, is there a so-called "responsibility to protect" movement to make humanitarian intervention obligatory as a matter of international law? And why was this idea endorsed by the United Nations during its millennium summit?

The best humanitarians of our day recognize that we face a painful dilemma: to tolerate atrocities in foreign states or to risk committing worse atrocities in the course of ending them. From Rwanda, many people drew the lesson that failure to intervene is the worse option. The Iraq war may be the first step in unlearning this lesson. If not, an intervention in Darfur surely will be.

Posner's argument here is an interesting and important one, if not a new one. The general logic of modern political realism argues that international stability and order should be the primary concern of states and that ideological crusades will likely cause more problems than they solve. Edward Luttwak has written an article entitled "Give War a Chance," arguing that involvement in intrastate conflict can ultimately lead to increased violence over the long run. And, as Posner points out, the lessons of Somalia, Darfur, Bosnia, and perhaps even Kosovo (especially in light of, for example, this article about the increasing problems there) clearly indicate the dangers of becoming involved in military-based humanitarian interventions.

And yet, Posner's argument is too simplistic. As has been demonstrated fairly convincingly by Peter Feaver and Chris Gelpi, political scientists at Duke University [full disclosure: both Feaver and Gelpi were on my dissertation committee, and I TAed a course for Feaver as well], the problem that Posner identifies is less grounded in the US public as he intimates ("Policymakers drew the lesson that the American public will not tolerate casualties in a humanitarian war that has no clear national security justification. This lesson guided President Bill Clinton's refusal to authorize military intervention during the Rwandan genocide and his decision to limit U.S. military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 to high-altitude bombing...") and more in the political decisionmakers themselves. This argument can be seen in many places: Their book (here's the first chapter), or a Washington Post op-ed from November 7, 1999 (rr).

The reason that so many military interventions for humanitarian purposes devolve into disaster is an unwillingness of the political elites to convince their domestic audiences of the worthiness of the cause. In Somalia, Clinton was unwilling to spend any political capital to do so, just as he was in Rwanda and Kosovo. Bush, on the contrary, was willing to do so, even if he may not have chosen the "right" intervention: Few external analysts, even the most optimistic, believed that Iraq would be a simple and short affair, while Posner's other worst case, Kosovo, is hardly a drop in the bucket compared to Iraq nor would any potential operation in Darfur involve anything approaching the costs of Iraq.

Ideas are important, even in foreign policy, despite the desire of neo-realists to wish them away. Americans will not bear sacrifices for conflicts that they do not perceive to be in the country's interest. But leaders have a lot to say in how the American public perceives its interest. The mantra of humanitarianism and democracy has gone a long way to maintaining public support for a war in Iraq that seems to be going badly with few prospects for success. Posner is certainly right that any such interventions will be fraught with danger and risk. But that, in and of itself, does not mean that the danger and risk are not worth bearing.

Hillary Clinton Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks

In the wake of this past weekend's spat between former President Bill Clinton and Fox News guy Chris Wallace, Senator Hillary Clinton has waded into the fray in defense of her husband. In Senator Clinton's words:

I'm certain that if my husband and his national security team had been shown a classified report entitled 'Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States,' he would have taken it more seriously than history suggests it was taken by our current president and his national security team.

So, in Hillary's world, if only President Clinton had been handed a formal report, he would have taken action against al Qaeda and bin Laden. Alas, there was no such report given to Clinton. Were there other indications that, perhaps, al Qaeda was a threat to be taken more seriously? Today's Wall Street Journal provides a useful list of such indications:

Some 38 days after he was sworn in, al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center. He did not visit the twin towers that year, even though four days after the attack he was just across the Hudson River in New Jersey, talking about job training. He made no attempt to rally the public against terrorism. His only public speech on the bombing was a few paragraphs inserted into a radio address mostly devoted an economic stimulus package. Those stray paragraphs were limited to reassuring the public and thanking the rescuers, the kinds of things governors say after hurricanes. He did not even vow to bring the bombers to justice. Instead, he turned the first terrorist attack on American soil over to the FBI....

• In 1994, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (who would later plan the 9/11 attacks) launched "Operation Bojinka" to down 11 U.S. planes simultaneously over the Pacific. A sharp-eyed Filipina police officer foiled the plot. The sole American response: increased law-enforcement cooperation with the Philippines.

• In 1995, al Qaeda detonated a 220-pound car bomb outside the Office of Program Manager in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing five Americans and wounding 60 more. The FBI was sent in.

• In 1996, al Qaeda bombed the barracks of American pilots patrolling the "no-fly zones" over Iraq, killing 19. Again, the FBI responded.

• In 1997, al Qaeda consolidated its position in Afghanistan and bin Laden repeatedly declared war on the U.S. In February, bin Laden told an Arab TV network: "If someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting time on other matters." No response from the Clinton administration.

• In 1998, al Qaeda simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224, including 12 U.S. diplomats. Mr. Clinton ordered cruise-missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan in response. Here Mr. Clinton's critics are wrong: The president was right to retaliate when America was attacked, irrespective of the Monica Lewinsky case.

Still, "Operation Infinite Reach" was weakened by Clintonian compromise. The State Department feared that Pakistan might spot the American missiles in its air space and misinterpret it as an Indian attack. So Mr. Clinton told Gen. Joe Ralston, vice chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, to notify Pakistan's army minutes before the Tomahawks passed over Pakistan. Given Pakistan's links to jihadis at the time, it is not surprising that bin Laden was tipped off, fleeing some 45 minutes before the missiles arrived.

• In 1999, the Clinton administration disrupted al Qaeda's Millennium plots, a series of bombings stretching from Amman to Los Angeles. This shining success was mostly the work of Richard Clarke, a NSC senior director who forced agencies to work together. But the Millennium approach was shortlived. Over Mr. Clarke's objections, policy reverted to the status quo.

• In January 2000, al Qaeda tried and failed to attack the U.S.S. The Sullivans off Yemen. (Their boat sank before they could reach their target.) But in October 2000, an al Qaeda bomb ripped a hole in the hull of the U.S.S. Cole, killing 17 sailors and wounding another 39.

When Mr. Clarke presented a plan to launch a massive cruise missile strike on al Qaeda and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan, the Clinton cabinet voted against it. After the meeting, a State Department counterterrorism official, Michael Sheehan, sought out Mr. Clarke. Both told me that they were stunned. Mr. Sheehan asked Mr. Clarke: "What's it going to take to get them to hit al Qaeda in Afghanistan? Does al Qaeda have to attack the Pentagon?"

Furthermore, according to the Washington Post article cited above:

Some of Clinton's statements on Fox have drawn scrutiny. He said that after the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, "I had battle plans drawn to go into Afghanistan, overthrow the Taliban and launch a full-scale attack search for bin Laden. But we needed basing rights in Uzbekistan." The Sept. 11 commission, though, found no plans for an invasion of Afghanistan or for an operation to topple the Taliban, just more limited options such as plans for attacks with cruise missiles or Special Forces. And nothing in the panel's report indicated that a lack of basing rights in Uzbekistan prevented a military response.

Clinton also asserted that the Bush administration "didn't have a single meeting about bin Laden for the nine months after I left office." In fact, the Bush team held several meetings on terrorism through the interagency group known as the deputies committee and one on Sept. 4, 2001, through the principals committee composed of Cabinet officers. What Clinton may have been referring to was counterterrorism chief Richard A. Clarke's frustration that the principals disregarded his urgent calls to meet sooner because of a months-long policy review.

Now it's true that, despite Condoleezza Rice's claim to the contrary, Clarke did present the incoming Bush Administration with a plan to deal with al Qaeda. Nonetheless, despite these protestations to the contrary, Clinton's inattention to the rising threat of al Qaeda is clear.

I have long argued the 9/11 represented a failure of US deterrence. The unwillingness of the US to respond to a long string of terror attacks against American interests led al Qaeda to believe that it could strike the US with at best impunity and at worst a limited response. It's hard to imagine that if bin Laden and al Qaeda had anticipated the consequences of the American response to 9/11, in particular the destruction of their quasi-state in Afghanistan, the ripping of their financial networks and the relentless hunting of their leaders, they would have carried out the attack.

President Bush rightly and necessarily comes under scrutiny and criticism for his policies in dealing with international terrorism. President Clinton's policies deserve the same.

Bill Clinton Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks.

Over the weekend, former president Bill Clinton got into a unseemly and very unpresidential on-air tiff with Fox News Sunday host Chris Wallace. The subject: Clinton's handling of al Qaeda during his administration. In response to the question "Did you do enough to connect the dots and go after al Qaeda," Clinton argued that "We contracted with people to kill him. I got closer to killing him than anybody's gotten since." Clinton went on to claim that "I had responsibility for trying to protect this country. I tried and I failed to get bin Laden. I regret it, but I did try and I did everything I thought I responsibly could."

From everything I know about this, Clinton is here at best putting positive spin on the events in question and at worst commiting an outright lie to bolster his presidency. In his defense, Clinton referred to Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, written by Richard Clarke, the former White House head of counter-terror efforts under Clinton. However, as Byron York points out, Clarke's book pretty much supports the conventional wisdom: that the Clinton Administration passed on several chances to either apprehend or kill bin Laden during the 1990s. Quoting from York:

Judging by Clarke’s sympathetic account — as well as by the sympathetic accounts of other former Clinton aides like Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon — it’s not quite accurate to say that Clinton tried to kill bin Laden. Rather, he tried to convince — as opposed to, say, order — U.S. military and intelligence agencies to kill bin Laden. And when, on a number of occasions, those agencies refused to act, Clinton, the commander-in-chief, gave up. Clinton did not give up in the sense of an executive who gives an order and then moves on to other things, thinking the order is being carried out when in fact it is being ignored. Instead, Clinton knew at the time that his top military and intelligence officials were dragging their feet on going after bin Laden and al Qaeda. He gave up rather than use his authority to force them into action....

On page 223, Clarke describes a meeting, in late 2000, of the National Security Council “principals” — among them, the heads of the CIA, the FBI, the Attorney General, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretaries of State, Defense. It was just after al Qaeda’s attack on the USS Cole. But neither the FBI nor the CIA would say that al Qaeda was behind the bombing, and there was little support for a retaliatory strike. Clarke quotes Mike Sheehan, a State Department official, saying in frustration, “What’s it going to take, Dick? Who the shit do they think attacked the Cole, fuckin’ Martians? The Pentagon brass won’t let Delta go get bin Laden. Hell they won’t even let the Air Force carpet bomb the place. Does al Qaeda have to attack the Pentagon to get their attention?”...

So Clinton couldn’t get the job done. Why not? According to Clarke’s pro-Clinton view, the president was stymied by Republican opposition. “Weakened by continual political attack,” Clarke writes, “[Clinton] could not get the CIA, the Pentagon, and FBI to act sufficiently to deal with the threat.”...

But the bottom line is that Bill Clinton, the commander-in-chief, could not find the will to order the military into action against al Qaeda, and Bill Clinton, the head of the executive branch, could not find the will to order the CIA and FBI to act. No matter what the former president says on Fox, or anywhere else, that is his legacy in the war on terror.

York's argument supports the general argument of what is, in my view, the best book on the US's efforts to deal with al Qaeda in the 1990s, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 by Steve Coll. Coll identifies several opportunities when the US had chances to deal with al Qaeda and bin Laden, and chose not to. For example, on p. 323, Coll details the question of whether Sudan offered to arrest bin Laden and hand him over to the US. While it's unclear if the offer was made, Coll is clear that it wasn't clear if the US would take bin Laden if the opportunity to arrest him existed. The problem: lack of evidence. Coll cites Sandy Berger as saying "he knew of no intelligence at the time showing that bin Laden had committed any crimes against Americans." Throughout the book, Coll highlights instances where insufficient attention, hestiation and confusion, or simple unwillingness meant that opportunities to arrest or kill bin Laden were passed up.

Does this mean that Clinton is, as his self-defense indicates he believes himself to be accused, to blame to some degree for 9/11? Not exactly. I believe Clinton is correct when he says that he tried to deal with bin Laden and did everything he believed he could reasonably do. But what Clinton can be blamed for is not recognizing the situation for what it was to become and not changing the nature of the dialogue within and without the American government. As president, it was incumbent on Clinton to move the country away from thinking about bin Laden, al Qaeda, and terrorism as a law enforcement problem. The US was attacked 4 times under Clinton's watch (the first WTC bombing, the US embassies in Africa, the Marine barracks in Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole) and the American response consisted of a few arrests and the destruction of a pharmecuetical plant in Sudan and a few tents in Afghanistan. Clinton certainly did not willfully ignore the problem of Islamic terrorism, but he also did not recognize it for was it was, nor did he, in the words of York, order the military into action against al Qaeda or the CIA and FBI to act. Clinton's pathetic defensive response seems to indicate that he is well aware of this.

Mixed Messages in Palestine

In the wake of the announcement that Hamas and Fatah will form a unity government to lead the Palestinians comes a fair amount of confusion about whether the new government, and more specifically Hamas, will recognize Israel's right to exist and commit itself to pursuing a negotiated land-for-peace settlement rather than violence. Yesterday, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas from Fatah declared that the new unity government would recognize Israel. Abbas said that "I would like to reaffirm that any future Palestinian government will commit to all the agreements that the PLO and the Palestinian National Authority have committed to," agreements understood to include the mutual recognition documents signed in 1993 by Yasir Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin. Furthermore:

These letters contain mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, renunciation of violence, and commitment to negotiations as the path toward reaching a permanent solution that will lead to the establishment of the independent state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel. Any future government will commit to imposing security and order, to ending the phenomena of multiple militias, indiscipline and chaos and to the rule of law.

However, today Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas announced that he would neither recognize Israel nor head any government that did so. Haniyeh is seen as one of the more moderate leaders of Hamas, and his unwillingness to commit to Abbas' government harkens to problems as the Palestinians try to create the unity government. Fatah has been trying to figure out a way in which Hamas can participate and tacitly recognize Israel without being forced to publicly announce the change, for example by accepting the mutual recognition documents as part of the government but not in its party platforms. It is unlikely that Israel, and more importantly for the purposes of ending the isolation of the Palestinian government and re-opening the money taps, the US, would accept such vague language.

However, this would be a mistake. If Hamas is boxed in to a corner where its only choice to recognize Israel and thereby alienate its popular support, it may not be willing to do so. What is more important is that Hamas commit itself to pursuing peaceful negotiations and cracking down on renegade militias. As I noted in a previous post, Israel and the US need to develop clear guidelines for what kind of behavior will and will not be tolerated from a Palestinian government. If Hamas can demonstrate the ability and willingness to control its gunmen and a consolidation of power in the hands of the government and away from the militias (including itself), it should be accepted as the legitimate governor of Palestine and as a real negotiating partner, regardless of whether it can say the words of recognition.

A Global Gun Ban?

An article appeared in yesterday's New York Times Magazine about the growing international profile and role of the National Rifle Association, discussing the organization's involvement in beating back a challenge to gun-ownership in Brazil. The article is more about the internationalization of the NRA than supportive of any particular position on gun rights, but it got me thinking about the (inevitable) backlash against the NRA and the international pro-gun lobby. The UN just recently convened a conference on the international trade of small arms and there has been a strong push to ban the sale and trade of small and light arms, the availability and affordability of which are blamed for fueling and spreading conflict around the world. But would a global gun ban be a good idea?

Stemming the flood of small arms on the global market may indeed have the effect of reducing some conflict, such as those in Africa between rebel groups that could find it difficult to continue their struggle in the absence of cheap and readily available weapons. But, there are plenty of easily identifiable unintended consequences as well. While warring rebel groups may find their capacity to commit violence lowered, so would groups struggling to protect themselves against brutal governments be less capable of resisting. Governments have ways of acquiring weapons (making gun themselves, for example) that are not always available to non-state actors. Let us not forget the disastrous consequences of the "neutral" arms embargo placed on the warring parties of the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. Serbia, which was in possession of the vast majority of the former Yugoslavian Army, was in a much stronger position that Bosnia, which was unable to procure weapons to defend itself, thanks to the UN (which then compounded the problem by failing to live up to its offers of protection).

What about the victims of genocide? Wouldn't the poor Tutsis of Rwanda or those currently living in Darfur be better off if they could procure weapons and defend themselves? The international community isn't going to help them, and the governments trying to slaughter them are much better armed (or at least in the case of Rwanda, better organized). It's easy, living in a stable, modern world to forget the reasons why gun ownership can be vitally important as a tool of the weak to defend their rights against the powerful. So unless the UN and the rest of the international community is willing to defend those that cannot defend themselves against their brutal governments, there should be no global ban on small arms. Limiting the ability of governments to arms themselves may be a good thing; limiting the ability of peoples to do the same will likely have disastrous consequences.

Using Common Sense in Homeland Security

On Tuesday, Michael Chertoff, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, told a Senate committee hearing what any half-way intelligent analyst already knew: that the United States can not afford to protect every possible target from terrorism. Mr. Chertoff used the example of highway safety, noting that “I put my daughter in my car. If I wanted my daughter to be 100 percent safe, I’d put a five-mile-an-hour speed limit cap on the car. [But that is not an option] because that’s more safety than we can afford.”

This is true. Increased security always comes at a price. Sometimes that price is financial, sometimes it is paid in civil liberties, but there is always a price. The government needs to be more sensitive to those prices when determining how to best protect the country.

However, Chertoff didn't go quite far enough. His comments were directly primarily at government as the payer of the costs of security. But other agents pay as well. Banning liquids on planes, for example, not only imposed increased screening costs on TSA and DHS, but slowed down the speed of business and made people's flights uncomfortable. All are costs that must considered. In order to really determine whether the benefit of increasing security is worth the cost, Homeland Security must not only consider the financial burden to the nation, but also the price paid by other actors.

Progress in Palestine?

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has announced a deal with Hamas whereby the rival parties will cooperate in a unity government, and negotiations are underway to dissolve the existing Hamas-led government and replace it with a coalition cabinet. it is expected that Hamas will keep the prime ministry, with Fatah keeping the presidency with Abbas, and other cabinet positions being divided between the two. The deal is designed to end the international isolation of the Palestinian government imposed since the electoral victory by Hamas back in January that has cost the Palestinians hundreds of millions of dollars and made it impossible for the government to pay the salaries of its employees. According to the Washington Post:

Details of the agreement mark the first time Hamas has tacitly endorsed a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, if not explicitly the Jewish state's right to exist. Hamas and Fatah announced a tentative agreement several months ago, but it was never officially signed because of the tumult of an Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip following the June 25 capture of Israeli Cpl. Gilad Shalit by gunmen from Hamas's military wing.

This is certainly good news, but it is not yet reason to celebrate or re-open the money faucets. The appropriate metric of Palestinian willingness to participate in the negotiated peace process is not whether Hamas is able to share power, but whether the Palestinian government as a whole is willing and (more or less) able to crack down on extra-governmental militias. As Lebanon learned the hard way, a government cannot function if it does not enjoy a monopoly of violence within its own borders. For far too long, both Fatah and Hamas have been unwilling to subordinate their own militias and fighters to the central government. Each has been unwilling to disarm the fighters of rival groups. Thus, even when one party is negotating in good faith, it cannot control what the other groups are doing, giving small militia groups an effective veto over the negotiations.

If the Palestinian government is to be regarded as legitimate and resume receiving international aid, it must move towards unifying the various armed groups operating in the West Bank and Gaza. This is not to say that it must be capable to preventing any and all armed attacks against Israel. However, the government cannot continue to extend one hand in peace while pretending not to know the other hand is throwing a bomb. Israel and the US should immediately work with the new unity government to develop clear metrics and guidelines to determine how successful the Palestinians are at gaining control of their fractured society and political operators.

What I Do and Don't Know About Global Warming

While I may technically be a scientist (a political scientist, that is), I don't really know anything about real science. I took the two-year sequence of science for non-majors at the University of Chicago, and my wife has an MA in chemistry from Cal Tech, but that's about it.

So, when it comes to global warming, I don't have much to say. I can't make heads or tails of climate models, I don't understand the physics and chemistry behind the theories, and I certainly don't know enough to agree or disagree with the arguments bandied around.

What I do know, however, is to be skeptical when anyone, anywhere, tells me that there is no more dispute over an issue. So, when I hear people telling me that the dire predictions are no longer contested, or are settled science, I tend to resist joining the bandwagon.

For example, in a recent issue of Discover magazine to which I subscribe to bolster my meager scientific knowledge (although, unfortunately, I no longer have the issue so I don't know which one it is for linking purposes) I read an article from the editors about how there was no longer any debate about whether global warming was caused by humans, only how great the damage would be. In the very same issue was an interview with the chief hurricane scientist at NOAA, who was arguing that he does not believe that global warming is, in fact, man-made. Now I can't assess the arguments from either side; but I do know that the chief hurricance guy at NOAA is a real, respected scientist who disagrees with an opinion that Discover tells me is un-disagreeable-with. Similarly, a recent article in the Boston Globe discussed Richard Lindzen, the Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology at MIT:

Lindzen acknowledges that global warming is real, and he acknowledges that increased carbon emissions might be causing the warming -- but they also might not.

``We do not understand the natural internal variability of climate change" is one of Lindzen's many heresies, along with such zingers as ``the Arctic was as warm or warmer in 1940," ``the evidence so far suggests that the Greenland ice sheet is actually growing on average," and ``Alpine glaciers have been retreating since the early 19th century, and were advancing for several centuries before that. Since about 1970, many of the glaciers have stopped retreating and some are now advancing again. And, frankly, we don't know why."

When Lindzen published similar views in The Wall Street Journal this spring, environmentalist Laurie David, the wife of comedian Larry David, immediately branded him a ``shill." She resurrected a shopworn slur first directed against Lindzen by former Globe writer Ross Gelbspan, who called Lindzen a ``hood ornament" for the fossil fuels industry in a 1995 article in Harper's Magazine.

Finally, an article in last Saturday's Australian informs us that "Science tempers fears on climate change." The article, which has had early access to the forthcoming report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (a UN-based organization that has been in the forefront of the fight against global warming) reports that "the world's top climate scientists have cut their worst-case forecast for global warming over the next 100 years" and that "the new projections put paid to some of the more alarmist scenarios raised by previous modelling, which have suggested that sea levels could rise by almost 1m over the same period."

Let me be clear: I do not know what is going on with the environment. I don't know enough science to believe or disbelieve the claims for and against global warming being caused by humans. But neither do you. Nor do most people, including the scientists who tell us that the science is settled. And that's the point. So long as I hear that there is no more debate or discussion over the question, I will be skeptical of doomsayers. The only way to reach a reasonable and effective public policy solution is to allow as much debate and discussion as possible. So stop telling me that no one disagrees with global warming as a man-made phenomena and stop telling me that we have to act in accordance with the precautionary principle. I don't know what to think about global warming, and I certainly don't know what to do, but I'd like to learn.

A Looming Genocide in Sudan

Despite the signing of a peace deal in May 2006, the situation in Darfur seems to be heading towards disaster and genocide. Last week, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir refused to meet with the envoy dispatched from the United States, and then rejected a UN resolution to fold the existing, but ineffective, African Union peacekeeping force into a larger, more capable United Nations force. Today, the AU force threatened to pull out of Darfur when its mandate expires at the end of the month if the mission is not handed over to the UN. Meanwhile, Sudan has begun a major offensive -- a testament in and of itself to the ineffectiveness of the AU peacekeepers -- presumably in an effort to crush the Darfuri rebels before being forced to accept a UN force (or, more cynically, in advance of "graciously" allowing the UN in to Darfur to see how nicely the situation has been resolved). Civilian casualties, looting, and rapes are all on the rise. To date, deaths in Darfur are approximately 250,000, with 2.5 million peope displaced and at the mercy of the Sudanese government and the murderous janjaweed raiders if the peacekeepers are withdrawn.

The situation is coming to a head, and the world cannot wait for the UN to take action. Waiting to convince Sudan to accept the international peacekeepers will simply present Sudan with a window of opportunity to complete its operations. The UN needs to set aside its strong predilictions for state sovereignty, and formally request that other international actors, such as NATO, take actions into their own hands. However, as opposed to Kosovo, when UN authorization was not particular explicit and didn't come until after the NATO operation, this time the UN needs to act before thousands more Darfuris are slaughtered by their barbaric government. True, China and Russia would likely veto a Chapter VIII authorization of a regional actor intevening in Sudan's affairs, or even a less formal request to do so. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan must act in accordance with the spirit, rather the laws, of his institution, and issue a direct call from his office.

Would, if given the opportunity and green light from the UN, the west act? It's hard to say. On the one hand, the NATO powers, and the US in particular, has been much more vocal and active about Darfur than previous genocidal situations in Africa, like Rwanda. However, the lessons of Somalia still ring loudly in the ears of politicians and military leaders alike: in the absence of strong public support, humanitarian deployments are doomed to failure. Now is the time for President Bush to begin mustering support for a deployment to Sudan. Given that many European powers are providing troops for Lebanon, the US may have to send several thousand of its own. But, given the need to rebuild the US image (although intervening against the Muslim state of Sudan may not help the US with the Arab "street"), the clearly looming disaster, President Bush's interest in the problem, as well as the growing recognition that US inaction in Rwanda was a great black spot on US foreign policy, it doesn't seem impossible to imagine.

Malcolm Gladwell Should Know Better

Malcolm Gladwell, the author of best-sellers The Tipping Point and Blink, has an piece in the most recent New Yorker entitled No Mercy. The essay is an argument against "zero-tolerance" policies, and makes the point that Robert Oppenheimer, he of the Manhattan Project, was nearly kicked out of Cambridge University for trying to poison his tutor with a chemical-laced apple (note to my students: I don't eat apples). Gladwell notes that if Cambridge had had zero-tolerance policies, Oppenheimer might have been expelled rather than being placed on probation, and the entire course of human history may have been changed.

Maybe this argument is persuasive to you. It shouldn't be. It illustrates the need for theory and analysis behind policy debates, a theme which has been heavily discussed in some of my earlier posts.

Gladwell's problem here is making an argument based on an idiosyncratic, unique, personal example. OK, so it would have been horrible if Oppenheimer would have been expelled from Cambridge. But, surely it's possible to point to numerous examples of people given second chances who shouldn't have been. Criminals out on parole who steal or murder. People with one DUI conviction who get off with a slap on the wrist, drive and drive, and kill someone. And so on. Gladwell has chosen an extreme example...better to make his point. But it's still one example, which can be countered by other examples.

Arguments can only be sustained when supported by theory and analysis. Trying to make policy arguments based on anecdotes is doomed to fail, because the other side likely has just as many anecdotes that support their position. Malcolm Gladwell should know better.